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IN MEMORIAM: ERIK B. BLUEMEL, AND THE LIFE OF THE
LEGAL MIND
The place is here. The time is now.
- Erik B. Bluemel (1977-2009)
Erik Bluemel joined the faculty of the Sturm College of Law in the
fall of 2008. His appointment as a professor of law was a dream come
true for him, and he was comfortable enough to announce this trium-
phantly nearly every week. He was, as he repeatedly told me, "living the
dream, baby." Tragically, Erik passed away just days after his second
semester of teaching was complete. This issue of the Denver University
Law Review is dedicated to the memory of Erik-his selfless service to
others, his dry and witty humor, his wonderful compassion, and his in-
spiring intellect. Erik has left behind a large circle of friends at the Sturm
College of Law and elsewhere, and we do ourselves a service by reflect-
ing on his life.
I.
Although only thirty-one years old when he died, Erik lived a rich
and accomplished life. He studied and distinguished himself at Berkeley,
the University of Chile, New York University School of Law, and Geor-
getown University Law Center. He had backpacked throughout the
world, studying cultures and, I imagine, developing what I came to love
best about him, his joie de vivre. (Perhaps related, he was a masterful
pool player and skilled card player.) He also gave presentations on topics
of law and culture, even before he went to law school; indeed, Erik's
expertise in global climate change had made him an emerging intema-
tional commodity on the lecture circuit-he was scheduled to present in
Montana and Italy in the weeks following his untimely death. He had
already presented in Norway earlier in the year, and China before that.
Erik particularly relished his trips abroad, where he could explore discus-
sions with colleagues worldwide about the relationship between the
complexity of government structure and potential future solutions to the
problem of climate change.
Erik also had all the traits of a skilled and seasoned lawyer. I would
consult with Erik on criminal cases-a field he knew relatively little
about-because of his keen sense of adversarial strategy and awareness
of the realities of litigation. Perhaps most impressive of all, given his age
and other commitments and accomplishments, he was a prolific writer.
Erik wrote well, he wrote often (he published 15 papers in less than 10
years), and his writing was important.
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The loss of Erik leaves those of us who knew him feeling deprived
on a personal and emotional level. For the scholarly community, his loss
creates a void in the academic literature and activist movements relating
to environmental and indigenous rights issues. In one early effort at what
will be a long process of honoring Erik's memory and furthering his re-
search and social agenda, the Environmental Law Clinic at the Universi-
ty of Denver has created the Erik B. Bluemel International Environmen-
tal Law Scholarship. Each year, a graduate level law student will be se-
lected to work with an international environmental organization and
study such issues as the relationship between environmental degradation
and human rights.
II.
Erik brought youthful intellectual pride and spirit to the Sturm Col-
lege of Law. He was eager to contribute to the law school community in
ways that were both seen and unseen. He was a regular at the "Third
Thursday" social events held in the forum of the law school, and not just
because he liked free beer. Like me, Erik was in his first year of teach-
ing, and he was eager to mingle with his new colleagues and students.
Midway through his first semester at the law school, he had already
compiled a list of the entire active faculty, whether he had talked to them
personally, and what he had heard second-hand about them. To be sure,
Erik's list was a source of a good many laughs between the two of us as
we swapped stories about, for example, colleagues confusing us with
students, but for Erik the list also reflected his genuine desire to know the
DU community that he had joined. He was determined to become active-
ly involved in the daily life of the students, staff, and faculty, and I think
that it is fair to say that his enthusiasm served as a motivation for the rest
of us to redouble our sense of pride and commitment in the University of
Denver.
Indicative of the high esteem in which we as a faculty held Erik, in
just his second semester of teaching he was elected to the Faculty Execu-
tive Committee tasked with many important issues of faculty gover-
nance, including the development of a strategic plan for the law school.
My senior colleagues have mentioned to me that they saw qualities in
Erik that clearly foreshadowed a future as one of the law school's rising
leaders. As the Sturm College of Law works through an exciting transi-
tion period-hiring a permanent Dean, developing a long-term strategic
plan for the school, reducing class size, and increasing the number of
faculty-the DU community will do well to consider Erik's example. A
tireless scholar and selfless contributor to our academic community, Erik
also had exacting standards of excellence and took very personally the
importance of challenging others-students, colleagues, and future col-
leagues-with the hard questions necessary to bring out the best in them.
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III.
In addition to his remarkable record of extraordinary scholarship
and service accomplishments at such an early age, Erik was quite simply
a good human being. And to those he knew well (including this author),
he was a good friend. Erik's candor, compassion, and hilarity were
integral parts of my first year of teaching. There was not a moment of
junior faculty stress or disappointment that, between the two of us in our
common hallway, would not ultimately lead to eruptive and curing
laughter. Like many of us on the faculty, the sense of loss is deep; nearly
every law school debate leaves me wishing he were here to contribute, or
at least to laugh about it afterwards. But I like to think that Erik has
taught us all a little more about what it means to be an academic.
Simply put, Erik embodied the life of the mind; he was the con-
summate free and deep thinker. Early in Hannah Arendt's meditations on
The Life of The Mind, she poses the following: "Could the activity of
thinking as such, the habit of examining whatever happens to come to
pass or to attract attention, regardless of results and specific content,
could this activity be among the conditions that make men abstain from
evil-doing or even actually 'condition' them against it?" Erik had a pro-
found sense of integrity and empathy, and after each of our countless
debates about every piece of trivia known in law, sports, entertainment,
and vegetarianism (many of which ended with him winking, as silent
acknowledgement that he had, at least partially, persuaded me), I would
reflect on the beauty of his mind, or as I would often put it, his "huge
brain." I continue to wonder whether he was such a great thinker because
of his conscience and his desire to be good to all animals (human and
non-human) and the environment, or whether he was such a good person
because of his rich and curious intellect. I will never know for sure, but I
know that he was a person of courageous integrity and profound intellect.
He lived the life of the mind.
Justin Marceau*
* Assistant Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law.





Creating a list of fundamental human rights is a controversial
project, but there is one right that appears in many lists-a right to bodily
integrity, security, or control over one's own body.' The content of what
the right should be is hotly contested.2 For instance, does the right to
bodily integrity require that organ selling be forbidden? 3 Or, do funda-
mental rights require that organ selling be permitted? 4 What about sales
t B.A., Yale College; M.A., Harvard University; J.D., Yale Law School. Visiting Associate
Professor, University of California, Berkeley School of Law, Associate Professor of Law, Southwes-
tern Law School. I have received helpful comments from Anshul Amar, Ronald Aronovsky, Molly
Beutz, Devon Carbado, David Fagundes, Bryant Garth, John Greenman, Dante Harper, Sonia Ka-
tyal, Janine Kim, Sung-Hui Kim, Ethan Leib, Stephen Munzer, Camille Gear Rich, Angela Riley,
Michael Scott, Patrick Shin, Dean Spade, Michael Waterstone, and participants at the Law and
Society conference, the Southeastern Association of Law Schools conference, and the Lavender Law
conference. The paper also benefited from my participation as a fellow at the Cardozo Law School
Patenting People Conference. Mark Berkebile, Sylvia Chiu, Brian Craggs, Heather Croft, Michael
Manapol, and John Trani provided helpful research assistance. The editors of the Denver University
Law Review provided excellent editorial advice. Any errors are my own.
I. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (citing Rochin v. Califor-
nia, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (recognizing a right to "bodily integrity"); Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, 72, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10,
1948), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/043/88/IMGNR004388.
pdfOpenElement (stating in Article 3 that "[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and security of
person"); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES
APPROACH 78 (2000) (listing bodily integrity as one of ten "central human functional capabilities").
2. See, e.g., Stephen R. Munzer, An Uneasy Case Against Property Rights in Body Parts, in
PROPERTY RIGHTS 259, 261 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1994); Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy,
and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359, 360-63 (2000) (describing the American constitutional
right to bodily integrity and the fact that it has the character of a privacy interest-not a property
interest-in that it protects against state interference, but does not protect a right to alienate the
interest); see also Margo A. Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality and Biotechnology
in Patent Law, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 469, 511-12, 546 (2003) ("[T]he result may soon be,
among other things, patents on human fetuses that are genetically modified in ways one can only
imagine. Patent protection could convert such fetuses, to the extent they are denied constitutional
protection, into justifiable commodities, supplying life-saving tissue and organs to sick children and
adults.").
3. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION: ISSUES
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 99 (1986); HASTINGS CTR., ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES
PERTAINING TO SOLID ORGAN PROCUREMENT: A REPORT OF THE PROJECT ON ORGAN
TRANSPLANTATION 3-4 (1985); Munzer, supra note 2, at 266 (describing the Kantian human dignity
argument as applied to organ sales); see also Susan M. Shell, Kant's Concept of Human Dignity as a
Resource for Bioethics, in HUMAN DIGNITY AND BIOETHICS: ESSAYS COMMISSIONED BY THE
PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS 333, 344-45 (2008), available at http://www.bioethics.gov/
reports/human dignity/human dignity.and-bioethics.pdf.
4. Cf Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and Pay-
mentfor Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1835 (2007). Volokh based his argument not in a right to
"bodily integrity," but in a right to self-defense. Id. at 1815-16.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
of the use of one's body, such as prostitution? Do we violate fundamen-
tal rights by permitting the practice?5 Do we violate fundamental rights
by forbidding it?6 What about the sale of manual labor that is injurious to
the body?7 In other words, there is deep disagreement about whether the
right over one's body and its uses is a property-like right that must be
alienable in exchange for money, or is a dignity or privacy-like right that
must not be sold.
In this article, I argue that both sides are off the mark. The concept
of a monolithic, fundamental right to bodily "integrity" is both descrip-
tively and normatively wrong. There should be no legal "right to control
one's own body," saleable or not, with a scope that matches up perfectly
with the physical borders of the organic, physically continuous human
body. This is not to say that we should abandon many familiar rights
such as the right to not be tortured or raped. Rather, it is to say that there
should be no one-to-one mapping between the physical borders of the
organic, integrated human body and the legal borders of the rights de-
rived from it.
For instance, once we determine the relationship between our bo-
dies and fundamental rights, we might not derive any freedom to resist
vaccination (although certainly other rights, such as religious rights,
might protect this freedomS). On the other hand, we might be led to pro-
tect freedoms of dress and makeup, even though these activities do not
5. See Stephanie Farrior, The International Law on Trafficking in Women and Children for
Prostitution: Making it Live Up to its Potential, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 213, 218 n.24 (1997) (noting
the argument made by Coalition Against Trafficking in Women that prostitution "usurps and negates
prostitute women's right to human dignity, bodily integrity and physical and mental well-being");
Jane E. Larson, Prostitution, Labor, and Human Rights, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 673, 677 (2004)
(pointing out that the view-"any form of prostitution is a human rights violation"-is supported by
the 1949 UN Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and the Exploitation of the
Prostitution of Others where it states that "prostitution and ... traffic in persons for the purposes of
prostitution are incompatible with the dignity and worth of the human person").
6. See Int'l Comm. for Prostitutes' Rights, World Charter for Prostitute Rights, in A
VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WHORES 40, 40 (Gail Pheterson ed., 1989), available at
http://www.walnet.org/csis/groups/icpr.charter.htm; Norma Jean Almodovar, For Their Own
Good: The Results of the Prostitution Laws as Enforced by Cops, Politicians and Judges, 10
HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 119, 123 (1999) (arguing that the subsidiary effects of criminalizing pros-
titution is "violative of human rights and dignity"); Larson, supra note 5, at 681 (describing argu-
ments for legitimizing prostitution on the grounds that it "is a free choice made by an autonomous
individual" and that "[riespect for women's self-determination requires respect for female choices
about sex and survival"); see also DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX
DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 262 (1989).
7. See, e.g., RABBINICAL COUNCIL OF AM., POLICY STATEMENT ON HUMAN DIGNITY AND
LABOR (1987), http://www.rabbis.org/news/article.cfm?id=101063 (describing the fact that "workers
in chemical factories may be exposed to dangerous chemicals or radiation, the effects of which are
not recognized or diagnosed for many years" as compromising human dignity, to explain a position
supporting "legislation that will raise the standards of employment" in that and other industries).
8. E.g., Sherr v. Northport-East Northport Union Free Sch. Dist., 672 F. Supp. 81, 91
(E.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding that under the First Amendment, religious exemption to New York's
mandatory inoculation program for school children must be extended to all persons who sincerely
hold religious beliefs, and not just persons who are bona fide members of a recognized religious
organization).
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involve the manipulation of one's organic, physically continuous human
body.9 Similarly, the relationship of the body to fundamental rights might
lead us to regulate contracts entered into between patients and sellers of
prostheses, despite the fact that prostheses are not human. On the other
hand, we might not find a justification for either prohibiting or permitting
blood sales.' 0
In Part I, I argue that those who promote an inalienable or noncom-
modifiable right to bodily integrity-a right that cannot be exchanged for
money-fail to recognize the fact that possession is not the only impor-
tant right in a physical object. Even when the sale of possessory rights in
body parts is prohibited, the sale of use and exclusion rights in the body,
such as the sale of manual labor, are permitted, and these sales can cause
the same sort of physical harm and risk that sale of possessory rights can
cause. Indeed, I show that even market exchanges in the possession and
use of non-human objects can cause the same sort of physical harm and
risk that property rights in parts and uses of the human body can cause.
This is increasingly the case given dependence on medical and other
technological devices for sustaining life and health. In sum, those pro-
moting dignity-based rights in the organic, integrated, human body that
cannot be alienated for money are descriptively wrong about the body's
complex relationship to its surroundings.
In Part H, I argue that those who favor a property-like right to pos-
sess and use the human body and its parts free from limits neglect the
fact that property and contract rights can be regulated: ownership of an
object does not entail sole dominion over the object. Thus, even if "your
body is your property," that does not entail a fundamental right to free
markets in bodies, their parts, and their uses. In other words, those pro-
moting property-like rights in the organic, integrated, human body that
must be alienable for money, as a matter of fundamental rights, are de-
scriptively wrong about property.
In Part III, I argue that as a normative matter, we should not use
dignity or autonomy arguments to promote any monolithic right to bodily
integrity, whether alienable or not. However, my critique of a monolithic
concept of a right to bodily integrity, demarcated by the organic, human,
physically integrated body's borders, still leaves room to justify a more
nuanced version of rights in the body. Thus, I consider dignity and au-
tonomy as approaches to justifying more nuanced rights in the human
9. Cf Gowri Ramachandran, Freedom of Dress: State and Private Regulation of Clothing,
Hairstyle, Jewelry, Makeup, Tattoos, and Piercing, 66 MD. L. REV. 11, 60-69 (2006).
10. However, there may be other, purely policy-based, non-rights-based justifications for the
regulation of those transactions, such as public health. See, e.g., RICHARD TiTMUSS, THE GF"
RELATIONSHIP (1970), reprinted in THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL
POLICY, 57-315, at 314 (Ann Oakley & John Ashton eds., 1997) ("[C]ommercial markets are much
more likely to distribute contaminated blood; the risks for the patient of disease and death are sub-
stantially greater.").
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body, ones whose legal borders may not line up with the human body's
physical borders. I conclude that dignity as a basis for singling out the
body and prohibiting these sales is too arbitrary for a pluralistic society.
Autonomy as a basis for prohibiting the regulation of these sales ignores
the inevitable presence of economic and cultural coercion. Finally, I con-
sider and critique the capability approach to justifying nuanced rights in
the human body, since it arguably solves many of the problems identified
with dignity and autonomy.
Nevertheless, all this critique need not bring us to the conclusion
that human or fundamental rights have nothing to say about torture, pros-
titution, or forced labor. In Part lV, I propose that the body's relationship
to fundamental rights can be rooted in a proceduralist approach-such as
the use of fundamental fights to promote a dynamic, evolving culture-
just as speech rights are thought to promote political and cultural
processes. The reason is that the body is uniquely "personal and politi-
cal."" The body is especially personal because it grounds our subjective
experience, the experience that others cannot directly access. But the
body is also especially political because it is a primary site for exploring
different values, subcultures, and identities. This means that to avoid a
stagnant culture, we should use fundamental rights to avoid the consoli-
dation of control over individuals' bodies, whether in the hands of the
state or in the hands of economically powerful actors. Avoiding such
consolidated control is a key component of ensuring that the formation of
identities, subcultures, and cultural values is not directed by a powerful
few.
This way of justifying the relationship between the body and fun-
damental rights does not lead to either an inalienable "right to bodily
integrity" or to a particularly alienable "right to control one's own body."
Under this approach, the organic, integrated body no longer marks any
border between what we have human or fundamental rights in and what
we do not. To demonstrate, in Part VI provide some tentative examples
of how we would apply this view to questions such as state intrusion on
the body, rights to modify one's own body, prostitution, organ selling,
and the regulation of property and contract due to its effect on bodies,
such as patent law, employment and housing law, and welfare law. In-
stead of creating fundamental rights to protect "bodily integrity" in these
situations, we should create fundamental rights where necessary to avoid
monopolies over bodies.
11. "The personal is political" was coined by members of New York Radical Women, includ-
ing Carol Hanisch, in the late 1960s. JENNIFER BAUMGARDNER & AMY RICHARDS, MANIFESTA:
YOUNG WOMEN, FEMINISM, AND THE FUTURE 19 (2000).
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I. WHAT THE DIGNITY OR PRIVACY VERSION OF BODILY INTEGRITY IS
MISSING DESCRIPTIVELY: BODIES DEPEND ON ENVIRONMENTS
There may be simple utilitarian policy reasons to regulate or dere-
gulate particular instances of body commodification. For instance, some
argue that prohibiting blood selling improves the quality of the supply of
blood. 12 Others argue that permitting prostitution would increase eco-
nomic and social welfare. 13 But in this article, I focus on rights in bodily
use and possession that would trump these typical political concerns of
increased economic welfare, public health, or the expression of a socie-
ty's cultural values through law. 14 In other words, should constitutional
law, human rights law, or other forms of counter-majoritarian law have
any role in these debates? If so, what should those rights in bodily use
and possession look like?
There is a great deal of disagreement over this question, but one
significant class of views on the subject relies on the following concern:
the commodification of the human body's uses or components risks harm
to human dignity, or perhaps privacy or personhood, in a way analogous
to the way that slavery, the ultimate commodification of the human body,
does. 15
For this set of views, affording the formal legal status of property to
the body or its uses and parts is problematic because it threatens what is
often described as a fundamental right to human dignity.' 6 Alternately, it
is described as threatening a fundamental right to bodily integrity, 17 re-
spect for the sacredness or sanctity of human life, 18 religious moral man-
12. See, e.g., TITMUSS, supra note 10, at 206, 270, 314.
13. E.g., Almodovar, supra note 6, at 127 ("'Quality of life' is a subjective concept and the
least impressive argument for the continued harassment, arrest and incarceration of a group of
people who are trying to improve their quality of life by earning a living."); Martha C. Nussbaum,
"Whether from Reason or Prejudice": Taking Money for Bodily Services, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 693,
696 (1998) ('The legalization of prostitution, far from promoting the demise of love, is likely to
make things a little better for women who have too few options to begin with.").
14. Cf Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 115 (2007)
(arguing that "individuals naturally impute socially harmful consequences to behavior that defies
their moral norms," thus supporting law that "repress[es] morally deviant behavior" while "honestly
perceiv[ing] themselves to be motivated only by... harm prevention").
15. See MICHELE GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS: THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF BODY PARTS
194-96 (2006) (describing authors opposing commodification of body parts on the grounds that it is
like slavery); see also DAVID B. RESNIK, OWNING THE GENOME: A MORAL ANALYSIS OF DNA
PATENTING I-7 (2004) (describing controversy over DNA patenting that includes slippery slope
arguments ending in slavery).
16. E.g., sources cited supra note 3.
17. E.g., Rao, supra note 2, at 387-88 (describing the American constitutional right to bodily
integrity and the fact that it has the character of a privacy interest, not a property interest, in that it
protects against state interference but does not protect a right to alienate the interest).
18. E.g., Proclamation No. 8339, 74 Fed. Reg. 3955 (Jan. 15, 2009) (proclaiming the Presi-
dent's designation of January 18, 2009 as National Sanctity of Human Life Day); Daniel C. Dennett,
How to Protect Human Dignity from Science, in HUMAN DIGNITY AND BIOETHICS, supra note 3, at
39, 40 ("Human life, tradition says, is infinitely valuable, and even sacred .... "); William P. Clark,
Op-Ed, For Reagan, All Life Was Sacred, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2004, at A27, available at 2004
WLNR 5467725.
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dates,19 or "personhood .,,20 This is part of the justification provided for
prohibitions on organ selling 21 and prostitution. 22 It is not just moral con-
servatives who fit within this camp, however. There are disability rights
activists, those who are concerned with the rights of sexual minorities,
and egalitarians who oppose, on dignitarian-type grounds, leaving the
modification of bodies up to markets.
The argument might go as follows: A ban on slavery means that
humans are fundamentally ineligible for the legal status of property-
that which persons (including corporations) may both exercise control
over and alienate, either in whole or in part, and often in exchange for
money. 23 Therefore, to allow for property rights in parts or uses of hu-
mans would blur the line between humans and property. This would
threaten dignitary rights in our own bodies, respect for our own bodies,
and perhaps even respect for human dignity itself.2 4 Of course, there are
more nuanced objections to commodification of the body,25 but many of
them share a reliance on the concept that some set of commodification
practices threatens human dignity, a fundamental aspect of "personhood"
such as bodily integrity, or some similar universal concept such as a fun-
19. E.g., Vatican Bishop Points to Modem Social Sins, CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 11,
2008, http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/new.php?n=12031 (reporting the inclusion of "'bioethi-
cal' violations such as birth control" and "'morally dubious' experiments such as stem cell research"
in a list of seven modem social sins released by the Vatican via an interview with Bishop Girotti);
see also Nicola Gori, The New Forms of Social Sin, L'OSSERVATORE ROMANO, Mar. 9, 2008, avail-
able at http://blog.acton.org/uploads/penitentiary-interview.pdf (interview with Bishop Girotti).
20. E.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1852, 1885
(1987) [hereinafter Radin, Market-Inalienability]; see also MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED
COMMODITIES 55-56 (1996) [hereinafter RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES]; Margaret Jane Radin,
Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 1014-15 (1982) [hereinafter Radin, Property and
Personhood].
21. E.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 3, at 96; Munzer, supra note
2, at 266 (describing the Kantian human dignity argument as applied to organ sales).
22. E.g., Susan Estrich, What I Could't Teach Spitzer at Harvard Law, REAL CLEAR
POLITICS, Mar. 13, 2008, http://www.realclearpolitics.comarticles/2008/03/what-i-couldntteach_
eliotcspi.html:
I really believe it is none of my business, as a member of the public or the media, if a po-
litical or business leader has an affair. I don't sit in judgment of other people's marriages
or their private lives. But prostitution isn't just sex. Prostitution objectifies the women
who engage in it, dehumanizes sex and sexuality, and turns both into commodities with a
price tag.
See also Ann Lucas, The Currency of Sex: Prostitution, Law, and Commodification, in RETHINKING
COMMODIFICATION 248, 248 (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005) ("[Mlost objec-
tions to prostitution are commodification-based.").
23. STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 48-49 (1990) ("Property rights are body
rights that protect the choice to transfer."); Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 20, at 1854 n. 19
("Traditional property rights are alienable in all senses except cancellation; they may be forfeited,
relinquished, waived, condemned, and transferred by both gift and sale.").
24. See, e.g., DAVID B. RESNIK, OWNING THE GENOME: A MORAL ANALYSIS OF DNA
PATENTING 1-7 (2004) (describing the controversy over DNA patenting that includes "slippery
slope" arguments ending in slavery).
25. See, e.g., Rao, supra note 2, at 455-56 (arguing that a principle in accord with our intui-
tions on the subject would allow for property rights in body parts that have been detached from a
person, but would not allow for property rights in parts still internal to a person's body).
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damental human "capability" 26 for bodily integrity. The idea has roots in
Catholic thinking,2 7 and also appears in a Kantian argument that human
dignity requires persons not to make these sales.2 8 Bioethics committees
and advisory boards commonly use the fact that something involves body
commodification as a reason to be ethically concerned about it.
29
The public approach to this question-whether commodification of
the body is per se problematic-is somewhat schizophrenic, especially in
the United States. Selling of organs is forbidden by statute, 30 and blood
banks will not keep sold blood; yet some plasma centers use purchased
blood.31 The sale of manual labor is permitted, including physically inti-
mate manual labor such as massage therapy. Even payment to volunteers
who are willing to have their colons and vaginas invaded by medical
students learning how to perform various exams is permitted.32 However,
prostitution is forbidden in most of the United States.
Nevertheless, arguments against various practices of body commo-
dification, on the grounds that commodification of the body is proble-
matic to dignity or personhood, continue to have a great deal of purchase,
despite the existence of practices ranging from plasma selling to the
largely uncontroversial sale of physical labor.33 The view that there is
something threatening about assigning the legal status of property to
people or parts of people, at least some of the time-for instance, when
the part of the person is not detached 34 -continues to have a great deal of
26. NUSSBAUM, supra note I, at 78 (listing bodily integrity as one of ten "central human
functional capabilities"). It is important to note that although Nussbaum supports an intuitionist,
seemingly dignitarian approach to developing her list of capabilities, and although bodily integrity
maintains a place on her list, her specific views on how to apply those capabilities to law do not
necessarily lead to anti-body-commodification positions. For instance, Nussbaum has elsewhere
argued for the legalization of prostitution. See Nussbaum, supra note 13, at 723-24. On the other
hand, Radin has derived from Nussbaum's capabilities approach and concept of human flourishing a
stance against some forms of commodification. RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 20, at
64, 93-96.
27. See U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, SHARING CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING 5
(1998), available at http://www.archdiocese-chgo.org/departments/peace-and-justice/pdf/teaching-
doc/sharing.social-t.pdf ("[T]he Catholic Church proclaims that human life is sacred and that the
dignity of the human person is the foundation of a moral vision for society.... [This belief] is the
foundation of all the principles of our social teaching.").
28. See Munzer, supra note 2, at 259; Shell, supra note 3, at 344-45.
29. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 3, at 96; see also The
President's Council on Bioethics, http://www.bioethics.gov (last visited Nov. 2, 2009) (listing
"Property in the Body" as one of its main "Topics of Council Concern"). The Council was disbanded
on June II, 2009. Nicholas Wade, Obana Plans to Replace Bioethics Panel, N.Y. TIMES, June 18,
2009, at A24, available at 2009 WLNR 11613820.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2006).
31. Steven R. Salbu, AIDS and the Blood Supply: An Analysis of Law, Regulation, and Public
Policy, 74 WASH U. L.Q. 913, 942 n.163 (1996) (describing the move in the United States towards
an all donated blood supply, as encouraged by FDA regulations).
32. See Nussbaum, supra note 13, at 701, 706.
33. See id. at 693 ("ALL of us, with the exception of the independently wealthy and the
unemployed, take money for the use of our body."); Salbu, supra note 31, at 944-46.
34. See, e.g., Rao, supra note 2, at 455-56 (arguing that a rule forbidding property rights in
body parts when the parts are internal to a person, but permitting property rights in body parts when
detached from a person, would fit best with our intuitions).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
force. Even anxiety about prostitution, which involves the sale not of a
body part, but rather of a service employing the physical body, is often
expressed in the terms that it is a commodification of the body.35
However, it is not the specter of human parts or even humans hav-
ing the formal legal status of property that makes slavery and indentured
36servitude so horrifying, or markets in human body parts so worrisome.
In other words, we should not rest our concern with these practices on a
formalist idea that humans or human parts having the legal status of
property is itself an affront to some definition of what it means to be a
human, to some concept of inviolable dignity. This focus is descriptively
misplaced, as it relies on an overly simplistic conception of the relation-
ship between humans' bodies and their environments. Whatever human
dignity or personhood means, property rights already threaten it, even
where the line between property and persons is clear.
For instance, if we prohibited the sale of possession rights in bodies
and their parts, the sale of use rights would still pose risks to dignity in
the sense of health, physical well-being, and physical independence:
"The precedents for making use of one another's bodies are sufficiently
well established in manual labor. . . ."37 But manual labor often causes
changes to the body over time, such as repetitive stress injuries. Suppose
person A sells use of her hands until their function is so impaired that she
requires assistance to get dressed and lives with constant pain. Suppose
person B sells possession of her blood, or even a kidney, but remains
healthy and relatively pain-free. Although person A "merely" sold the
use of her body, and person B sold a possessory right to part of her body,
can we say that the laborer has somehow risked or harmed her bodily
dignity less?
On the other hand, it would be infeasible to go so far as to prohibit
sales of use rights in the body because this would prohibit all wage labor.
The use of person A's body was commodified not just when she was
injured, but even when she sold the "labor of animation." 38 And a profes-
sor commodifies the use of her body by agreeing to stand in front of a
35. E.g., sources cited supra note 22.
36. See GOODWIN, supra note 15, at 198:
Slavery's pernicious effect is not exclusively derived from a market evaluation in the
human body. Indeed, many slaves were given away as gifts.... The villainy of slavery is
best characterized by the creation of a chattel system wherein Black men, women, and
children were explicitly and exclusively exploited; stripped of their humanity, tortured,
bred, denied legal protection, forbidden educational instruction and religious expression.
37. Martyn Evans, The Utility of the Body, in OWNERSHIP OF THE HUMAN BODY:
PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON THE USE OF THE HUMAN BODY AND ITS PARTS IN
HEALTHCARE 207, 207 (Henk A.M.J. Ten Have & Jos V.M. Welie eds., 1998).
38. Sarah S. Jain, The Prosthetic Imagination: Enabling and Disabling the Prosthesis Trope,
24 SCI., TECH., & HUM. VALUES 31, 32 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Elaine
Scarry, The Merging of Bodies and Artifacts in the Social Contract, in CULTURE ON THE BRINK 85,
97 (Gretchen Bender & Timothy Druckery eds., 1994)).
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classroom for specified periods of time and talk about particular subjects,
using her mouth, lungs, and brain.39
One might imagine that we can separate the professor example from
the prostitute or someone engaging in manual labor based on whether the
work is typically thought of as selling the "use of one's body"-whether
the work is culturally viewed as bodily work. But even work not typical-
ly thought of in this way could raise concerns about bodily dignity. For
example, an employer who requires an employee to wear particular
clothes has not in fact required the employee to change his organic, phys-
ically continuous body. Most would not describe such an employee, pre-
suming he is not a model, as having sold the use of his body. However,
the clothes worn may have an effect on the employee's body so signifi-
cant that it cannot be cognitively overcome. Suppose the clothing re-
quired is high heels. Walking about in high heels is an entirely different
bodily experience than not, even if we leave aside the possibility of long
term injury to the body that can stem from wearing high heels. Or sup-
pose the clothing required is tight jeans, skirts with petticoats, or other
physically uncomfortable or cumbersome attire; is this somehow less
physically intrusive or cognitively overpowering to the worker than the
process of having one's blood withdrawn for sale, or an employer's re-
quirement that one's fingernails be trimmed? Umberto Eco has described
the experience of wearing tight jeans as so physically affecting that it
makes him write differently. 40 For many persons, the tight jeans require-
ment is far more intrusive than the fingernail-trimming requirement, and
for some, it would even be experienced as more intrusive than a require-
ment to obtain a vaccination.
It is not just sales of the use of one's body that can cause the same
sorts of physical harm or dignitary intrusions that sale of the parts of
one's body can. Even the exchange of use or possession rights in com-
pletely inorganic material which has no attributes of personhood can
result in the same type of threats to bodily integrity or self-control that
property rights in human parts are thought to raise. For instance, it is
completely unremarkable for property rights to exist in electronic gad-
gets. But we might be concerned if owners of patents on products such as
pacemakers and robotic arms were permitted to enforce "end user license
agreements" ("EULAs") 41 against patients. These EULAs could in effect
restrict what patients can do with products that have become merged
with their own bodies. And we should rightly, I argue, be similarly con-
39. Nussbaum, supra note 13, at 704 (constructing this example).
40. UMBERTO ECO, Lumbar Thought, in TRAVELS IN HYPERREALITY 191, 193-95 (William
Weaver trans., Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1986) (1983).
41. An End User License Agreement is a contract that dictates the terms under which an end-
user can use software or a device. Users often become a party to these contracts without reading
them due to their length and form. See Kevin W. Grierson, Annotation, Enforceability of "Click-
wrap" or "Shrinkwrap" Agreements Common in Computer Software, Hardware, and Internet
Transactions, 106 A.L.R. 5TH 309, § 2(a) (2003).
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cerned with the effects of property rights in wheelchairs, cochlear im-
plants, tools used in labor, and other such devices on the bodies of those
who need or desire to use them.
If that example is too sui generis, we can consider that exercise of
even the most mundane property right-the right to develop real estate-
can affect the bodily dignity of others. If that property right is unregu-
lated with respect to the installation of wheelchair ramps, then how prop-
erty holders choose to exercise the right will have far-reaching effects on
the mobility and lived bodily experience of persons who require wheel-
chairs to get around. Whether such persons' bodies are "disabled" or not
will depend on how those property rights are exercised. And yet, the
property holders will have had this effect on others' bodies without hav-
ing physically "touched," possessed, or used the bodies of the persons
using wheelchairs.42
In other words, we can construct many examples where someone
has exercised property-like rights over something other than possession
of a person or its parts, yet has entailed significant effects on another's
lived physical experience. Some of the examples involved the exercise of
possession and use rights over non-human objects, while other examples
involved the sale of use rights in a human or its parts. In some of these
examples, the effects on lived physical experiences are even more signif-
icant than the effects of selling possessory rights to a part of the body-
selling blood, for instance. The reason we can construct these examples
is that bodies, like any other objects, have a complex relationship with
their environment. 43 Just as failure to provide a neighbor with an ease-
ment can affect the neighbor's ability to use his property,44 failure to
install a wheelchair ramp can affect another's ability to use his body.
This is why refraining from physical intrusions on the human body
does not necessarily match up with maximal dignity for the person.
There are many ways for the dignity or integrity of bodies to be very
significantly affected by cultural norms, markets in items other than bo-
dies, and political rules. Once we recognize that our physical and social
42. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and "Disability," 86 VA. L. REV. 397,
429 (2000) (describing an acceptance of the social model of disability in the United States, in which
"disability is attributed primarily to a disabling environment instead of bodily defects or deficien-
cies" (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Harlan Hahn, Feminist Perspectives, Disability,
Sexuality and Law: New Issues and Agendas, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 97, 101 (1994));
Mairian Corker & Tom Shakespeare, Mapping the Terrain, in DISABILrrY/POSTMODERNITY:
EMBODYING DISABILITY THEORY 1, 2-3 (Mairian Corker & Tom Shakespeare eds., 2002) (describ-
ing the shift from medical model of disability to social model, in which activists raised awareness of
the fact that impairment alone does not cause disability, but rather social and economic conditions
overlaying impairment).
43. See sources cited supra note 42.
44. For instance, an easement by necessity can be required to ensure that another's parcel of
land has road access. E.g., Wilson v. Smith, 197 S.E.2d 23, 25 (N.C. Ct. App. 1973) ("A way of
necessity arises when one grants a parcel of land surrounded by his other land, or when the grantee
has no access to it except over the land retained by the grantor or land owned by a stranger.").
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experience of our bodies cannot be easily isolated from the environment,
we can see why simply drawing a physical line between persons and
property should not satisfy any concerns we might have with bodily dig-
nity, even if we could agree on what dignity means. We should not be
satisfied that we have protected persons physically by defining person-
hood so as to include, as most accounts do, bodily integrity.45 As a de-
scriptive matter, this approach is too simplistic.
While the fiction of a human body that could ever be made totally
free from "intrusion" or given complete "integrity ''46 continues to retain
purchase in debates about activities such as organ selling and prostitu-
tion,47 it is about to face a profound challenge: developments in biotech-
nology have already begun to result in very obvious physical mergers of
human and non-human parts and entities. For instance, in the case of a
pacemaker or a robotic arm, humans are merging with inorganic property
of the sort that is routinely and uncontroversially commodified.48 In the
case of merging plant genetic material with human genetic material, hu-
mans may merge with property that is organic, but which is nevertheless
still routinely commodified.49 In the case of merging human and animal
genetic material, transplanting an animal organ into a human, or growing
a human organ inside an animal, humans may merge with organic prop-
erty that is legally, but controversially, commodified.5 ° In some ways this
merger is nothing new.5' As I've argued above, very common forms of
property such as real estate can have significant effects on the lived phys-
ical experience of our own bodies. 52 However, developments in biotech-
nology are making this fact more visible. In the long run, as these mer-
45. E.g., JAMES HUGHES, CrrITZEN CYBORG: WHY DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES MUST RESPOND
TO THE REDESIGNED HUMAN OF THE FUTURE 73, 229-31 (2004) (arguing for "personhood-based
Icyborg citizenship' versus 'human racism,"' yet nevertheless asserting that personhood requires
self-ownership of bodies); NUSSBAUM supra note I, at 78 (including "bodily integrity" in her list of
capabilities).
46. See DONNA J. HARAWAY, A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-
Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century, in SIMIANS, CYBORGS, AND WOMEN: THE REINVENTION OF
NATURE 149, 150 (1991); Jain, supra note 38, at 43.
47. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 3, 21, 22.
48. E.g., Brian Mockenhaupt, Rebuilding: Bryan Anderson, ESQUIRE MAG., Mar. 2008, at
184, available at 2008 WLNR 25444912.
49. See generally Michael D. Rivard, Toward a General Theory of Constitutional Person-
hood: A Theory of Constitutional Personhood for Transgenic Humanoid Species, 39 UCLA L. REV.
1425, 1434-41 (1992) (describing processes for creating transgenic species).
50. See Elizabeth L. DeCoux, Pretenders to the Throne: A First Amendment Analysis of the
Property Status of Animals, 18 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 185, 220-21 (2007) (describing the suc-
cessful implantation of human embryonic stem cells into mouse embryos, and the resulting mouse-
human hybrids, which had a small amount of human brain cells fully integrated into their brains
otherwise made up of native mouse brain cells).
51. Some argue that humans are "embodied in an extended technological world," rather than
existing as "distinct beings in an antagonistic relationship with their surroundings." Robert Peppe-
rell, The Posthuman Manifesto, KRITIKOS, Feb. 2009, http://intertheory.org/pepperell.htm; cf
HARAWAY, supra note 46, at 150 (attempting to disrupt the naturalization of the human body and of
gender, but without seeking to be innocent or transcendent of the systems of power and coercion that
socially construct gender and the body).
52. See supra text accompanying note 42.
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gers between people and property become more common, sustaining
different formal legal statuses for people and other objects may appear
more and more arbitrary.
Prostheses such as robotic arms are likely to become common in
part because the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have produced hundreds of
amputees, spurring large increases in funding for prosthetic technology.
Amazing developments in the field are occurring.53 Researchers at the
University of Pittsburgh, for instance, have recently announced the suc-
cessful development of a robotic arm that a monkey can learn to control
sufficiently to pick up and eat food, using only a small device installed in
its brain.54
Transgenic species, or entities which include DNA from two differ-
ent species, have already been created.55 The species appear to exhibit
phenotypic characteristics of both species.56 Animal-human "hybrids" or
plant-human "hybrids" 57 might someday be useful for growing or devel-
oping replacement organs or tissue for humans, as one example of the
drive behind this research.58
This prominent merger of humans and property has raised a great
deal of anxiety over how we may avoid the state of legalized slavery or
other related threats to human dignity. For instance, recent scholarship on
"patenting people" has concerned itself with the mixture of human and
animal parts, especially genetic material.5 9 This scholarship expresses
fear that because human genetic material can currently be patented legal-
ly, and has been, eventually animal-human hybrids with many human
characteristics may be patented, and perhaps even turned into a slave
class.60 The specter now exists of a farm of highly intelligent pig-human
53. See Mockenhaupt, supra note 48, at 184 ("Funding for prosthetics projects has swelled
significantly over the past six years. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, or DARPA,
is bankrolling one of the most ambitious programs, the $85 million Revolutionizing Prosthetics
project to build a prosthetic arm that matches the human ann in functionality by next year .... The
fusion of man and machine is upon us, the extraordinary enabling the everyday.").
54. Benedict Carey, Monkey Thinks, Moving Artificial Arms as Own, N.Y. TIMES, May 29,
2008, at Al, available at 2008 WLNR 10097697.
55. See DeCoux, supra note 50, at 222.
56. Id.
57. Politicians have referred to animal-human hybrids, probably meaning both chimeras and
transgenic species, where chimeras contain cells from two different entities, and transgenic beings
contain DNA from two different entities. See Stephen Munzer, Human-Nonhuman Chimeras in
Embryonic Stem Cell Research, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123, 124 (2007) (providing these defini-
tions).
58. See Bagley, supra note 2, at 505-06.
59. Id. at 506-07.
60. See, e.g., id. at 502, 511-12. Indeed, in 2006, Cardozo Law School hosted an entire two-
day conference on the legal, moral, and policy implications of patenting human DNA, human-
animal hybrids, and other biotechnological innovations. Numerous law professors, government
patent lawyers, and others presented arguments at this conference, at which Bagley was the keynote
speaker. See Margo A. Bagley, Keynote Address at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law Patent-
ing People Conference (Nov. 12, 2006).
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hybrids being raised for removal of their kidneys and slaughter.6' Proper-
ty rights in human genetic material are thought to also threaten humans'
rights to do as they will with their own bodies-their own genetic ma-
terial. A patent-holder on genetic material might, for instance, prevent a
person with that material from reproducing.
62
Some of the literature has drawn on these fears to simply oppose the
technology that blurs the line between humans and property. The opposi-
tion ranges from proposing outright bans to moderate "think before we
act" proposals. 63 This opposition literature finds itself in alliance with
religious conservative activists who also oppose technologies that blur
the line between humans and non-humans. 64 These religious activists
argue that without a rigid definition of humans, encompassing everything
from embryos to persons in irreversible vegetative states, the degradation
of human dignity will eventually result.
65
In contrast, some argue that we must simply update our definition of
what a legal person is to potentially include entities that are not com-
pletely human.66 On this view, armed with a proper definition of legal
personhood, we could simply forbid property rights in anything that
counts as a person, whether completely human or not: property rights in
an embryo would be fine perhaps, but property rights in a pig with a high
functioning human brain would perhaps not be acceptable.
But despite the existence of these dramatically different responses,
both fail to come to terms with the hard truth that all of this technology
confronts us with: it is not enough to decide the difficult question of who
is a person and then simply forbid property rights in that person. It takes
much more than giving persons' bodies a special, formal legal status of
"non-property" to sufficiently protect the physical well-being and inde-
pendence of those bodies.
H. WHAT THE PROPERTY VERSION OF BODILY INTEGRITY IS MISSING
DESCRIPTIVELY: PROPERTY IS NOT SOLE DOMINION
An alternate approach to the question of what bodily integrity might
mean views control over one's body as a property-like right, essential to
freedom or autonomy. In this camp are persons who believe that there is
61. Cf Bagley, supra note 2, at 506 (describing a patented method for producing human
organs from pigs).
62. See HUGHES, supra note 45, at 231 (proposing regulation to prevent this from happening).
63. See Bagley, supra note 2, at 473.
64. E.g., id. at 510 (quoting with approval Professor Leon Kass, a religiously-inspired bioe-
thicist and former chair of President George W. Bush's Council on Bioethics).
65. See id. at 496-97.
66. As an example of this approach, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office initially rejected a
patent application for a HuMouse because it "embraces a human being," arguing that the Thirteenth
Amendment would prohibit such a patent. Gregory R. Hagen & Sibastien A. Gittens, Patenting
Part-Human Chimeras, Transgenics and Stem Cells for Transplantation in the United States, Cana-
da, and Europe, 14 RIcH. J.L. & TECH. 11, 34, 49 (2008).
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a fundamental right to control over one's own body or its parts.6 7 This
theory would not only protect the body from unwanted intrusion, but also
would protect one's right to modify one's body, choose to accept or re-
ject medical treatment, and the like. However, autonomy includes the
autonomy to contract one's autonomy away. Thus, the strong version of
this view would require that commodification of the body be permitted,
not simply when it is good economic or social policy, but because to do
otherwise would interfere with fundamental rights to ownership of one's
own body. 68 Strong libertarians would see prohibitions on the commodi-
fication of human bodies as unjust impositions on autonomy, and a cohe-
rent application of this view would therefore seem to permit organ sell-
ing, prostitution, the sale of genetically prized embryos, or employer
preferences for "upgraded" workers.
69
But to the extent this view derives the right to commodify one's
body from a property right in one's own body,70 it relies on a descriptive-
ly impoverished view of property as "sole dominion" over an object. The
person with ownership of the property, on this view, has the right to use
it, exclude others, possess it, and alienate it.71 Because persons own their
own bodies, the implication is that they must have the right to sell use
and possessory rights in their body and its parts.
67. Though they are not libertarians, major proponents of the transhumanist movement, which
supports the use of technology to make humans "better than well," have cited this argument from
autonomy in support of permitting such technologies. HUGHES, supra note 45, at 207, 229 (arguing
that "[o]nly beings with personhood are exempt from being property, since we each own ourselves
and can't be alienated from ownership of ourselves," and noting, with approval, "disparate move-
ments, like transgender rights, working to radicalize our control over our own bodies"); Nick Bo-
strom, In Defense of Posthuman Dignity, 19 BIOETHICS 202, 210 (2005) ("A liberal democracy
should normally permit incursions into morphological and reproductive freedoms only in cases
where somebody is abusing these freedoms to harm another person."); cf Volokh, supra note 4, at
1835 (arguing for a right to sell and buy organs rooted in the right to self defense). See also Bonnie
Steinbock, Sperm as Property, 6 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 57, 66 (1995) (arguing that "individual
autonomy should prevail, and sperm is correctly regarded as property that can be bequeathed by
will"); Mary Taylor Danforth, Current Topic in Law and Policy, Cells, Sales, and Royalties: The
Patient's Right to a Portion of the Profits, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 179, 191-95 (1988) ("Th[e]
property-based notion of control over one's name or likeness should be extended to one's body parts.
The common law recognizes the individual's exclusive right to use what is inherently personal, and
nothing is more personal than one's own genetic material."); Roy Hardiman, Comment, Toward the
Right of Commerciality: Recognizing Property Rights in the Commercial Value of Human Tissue, 34
UCLA L. REV. 207, 218 (1986) (arguing that "human tissue possesses characteristics that satisfy
many of the criteria for establishing rights in tangible property").
68. See sources cited supra note 67.
69. E.g., DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, SEX, DRUGS, DEATH, AND THE LAW 84-127 (1982) (arguing
that properly understood autonomy would lead to permission for prostitution); cf. RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 139 (3d ed. 1986) (suggesting that a market in babies could
benefit those who can bear children but do not want them and those who cannot bear children but
want them).
70. See sources cited supra note 67.
71. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *2; see also Robert P. Bums, Blackstone's
Theory of the "Absolute" Rights of Property, 54 U. CiN. L. REV. 67, 69 (1985) (arguing that the
reading of Blackstone as promoting "absolute" property rights is overbroad, and that he believed
property was "'independent of civil institutions' only in the most theoretical sense").
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But descriptively, ownership does not entail sole dominion over
property. 72 Instead, property is best thought of as a "bundle of sticks,"
where the sticks are rights and responsibilities that can be disaggregated
from the bundle.73 Thus, for instance, the law of nuisance may prevent
me from using my property in a manner that pollutes the air and disturbs
my neighbor.74 Or, my neighbor may have an easement by necessity
across my property, requiring me to permit her to cross my property so
that her parcel is not landlocked. 75 She may have this right even as I re-
tain possession of and title to the property. The removal of these "sticks"
from my "bundle" of property rights is not generally considered a viola-
tion of any fundamental right to my property.76 That is why even the
common law of property includes rights such as the easement by necessi-
ty or the nuisance action.77
What I do with my property affects other people, and thus, the fact
that the body may be analogized to property does not exempt it from this
general principle which permits property regulation for the sake of social
welfare and efficiency. While extremely low levels of regulation, or even
no regulation, might in fact be the best way to achieve social welfare,
this social welfare debate over regulation has nothing to do with funda-
mental rights. For instance, if my body is like any other form of property,
whether the state should decriminalize prostitution would depend on
whether (1) the practice is inherently unsafe, (2) women are better off
overall when the practice is prohibited or when it is permitted, and (3)
72. See Kristen A. Carpenter, Sonia K. Katyal & Angela R. Riley, In Defense of Property,
118 YALE L.J. 1022, 1026-29 (2009) (contrasting the classic ownership model of property with
more modem relational models of property, such as a proposed stewardship model, that would be
more descriptively and normatively appropriate to recognizing cultural property claims); David
Fagundes, Property Rhetoric and the Public Domain, 94 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manu-
script at 25, on file with author) (describing the popular myth of property as dominion over things,
and contrasting it to the more accurate conception of property as a "system that structures social
relationships with resources").
73. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 742 (1917):
In opposition to the ideas embodied in the passages just given, it is submitted that instead
of there being a single right with a single correlative duty resting on all the persons
against whom the right avails, there are many separate and distinct rights, actual and po-
tential, each one of which has a correlative duty resting upon some one person.
74. See, e.g., Aldred's Case, 9 Co. Rep. 57b, 58a (1610) (finding the building of a pig sty too
close to a neighbor's house to violate the neighbor's fights).
75. See, e.g., Wilson v. Smith, 197 S.E.2d 23, 25 (N.C. Ct. App. 1973) ("A way of necessity
arises when one grants a parcel of land surrounded by his other land, or when the grantee has no
access to it except over the land retained by the grantor or land owned by a stranger.").
76. For instance, regulation that limits the use of property is not considered a "taking" in the
United States even if discrete segments of the property rights are essentially removed, such as ability
to exploit airspace above land. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130
(1978). Nor, for instance, has labor regulation been considered to violate fundamental substantive
due process rights to property or contract in the United States since 1937. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,49 (1937) (upholding the National Labor Relations Act).
77. See Wilson, 197 S.E.2d at 26; Aldred's Case, 9 Co. Rep. at 58b.
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regulation would promote public health and safety better than criminali-
78zation.
One might respond to this descriptive point about the legitimacy of
property regulation by arguing that the body is a particularly special re-
pository of autonomy. On this view, the body is not like other forms of
property, and deserves to be protected by a kind of fundamental right to
sole dominion that other property does not entail. A strong proponent of
liberalism might go even further and argue that the state should not regu-
late traditional forms of property either: the state should not prohibit me
from being a prostitute or from chopping down my trees because both
are exercises of my autonomy. But as Part III will show, both of these
positions are normatively wrong.
III. WHY DIGNITY, AUTONOMY, AND CAPABILITY APPROACHES TO
RIGHTS IN THE BODY ARE NORMATIVELY WRONG
A. What's Normatively Wrong with Dignity
Many may feel that my descriptive critique of the dignitarian ap-
proach to bodily integrity is not enough reason to be against a dignitarian
right to bodily integrity. Maybe the fiction of a body with integrity that
cannot be intruded on is a good fiction-one that should be promoted as
much as possible. Perhaps we should be carving off the body from the
environment in which it exists. For example, some argue that it is a good
idea to resist technological advances that will blur the lines between bo-
dies and their environments even further, in order to ensure that people
continue to think of human bodies and life as sacred. Thus, perhaps we
should think of dignity as harmed more severely when the body has the
formal legal status of property than when it does not. Perhaps we really
should consider the person who sold her kidney to have suffered greater
dignitary harm than the person who sold the use of her hands to her em-
ployer until they were unusable. Or perhaps we really should consider a
prostitute to suffer greater dignitary harm than a person who, as a result
of poverty, puts his prosthetic arm up for sale on eBay.
In this section, I argue that attempts to resist technological advances
and maintain a rigid distinction between humans and property may lead
to less, not more, human and social flourishing. Technology that blurs
this line holds the potential to improve the lives of those who are sick,
injured, or disabled, or those who simply want to improve and modernize
their bodies.
I also critique the use of dignity as a justification for even more
nuanced rights in the body, ones that permit some forms of body com-
modification but not others. The reason is that dignity requires a univer-
78. See sources cited supra note 13.
[Vol. 87:1
2009] AGAINST THE RIGHT TO BODILY INTEGRITY 17
sal account of what is, essentially, a human, and what are the compo-
nents of human dignity. 79 Such universal accounts of what a dignified
life consists of are likely biased, and therefore carry with them the dan-
ger of becoming oppressive. This is not only a problem with using digni-
ty to promote a monolithic privacy like right to bodily integrity, it is also
a problem with using dignity to justify even more nuanced rights in the
body.
1. Pluralism
Many have an intuition that a right to control one's own body is
fundamental to human dignity, human flourishing, or liberty. 80 This con-
cept might support the right to protect the body from intrusion, but would
encompass no right to mutilate one's own body, to consent to euthanasia,
sell one's organs, or otherwise show "disrespect" for one's body. 8' The
notion that the body has special status is commonly held. For instance, a
Department of Health and Human Services task force, in issuing recom-
mendations on organ transplantation, once stated "society's moral values
militate against regarding the body as a commodity. 8 2 It went on to cite
a report from the Hastings Center that said:
The view that the body is intimately tied to our conceptions of per-
sonal identity, dignity, and self-worth is reflected in the unique status
accorded to the body within our legal tradition as something that
cannot and should not be bought or sold. Religious and secular atti-
79. One of the best accounts of this form, and from which we can learn a great deal, is Martha
Nussbaum's development and defense of a universal list of basic human capabilities. But her work
demonstrates that rigorous attempts to define universal dignitarian human capabilities or rights rely
on "intuition," which she acknowledges is subject to "distortion." Our intuitions about what is mini-
mally required for a life with dignity are subject to our own biases. For this reason, Nussbaum is
careful to describe the list as contingent and tentative, and also to allow for mechanisms of cultural
change that could help us revise the list, such as being able to imagine and reason. MARTHA C.
NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP 83, 174-75
(2006).
80. E.g., Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 807 (1997) (clarifying that the fight to refuse medical
treatment rests in the right "to bodily integrity and freedom from unwanted touching"); Washington
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)
(recognizing the right to bodily integrity); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278
(1990) (recognizing "a general liberty interest in refusing medical treatment"); NUSSBAUM, supra
note 1, at 78 (including it within her list of capabilities); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1
(1980) (consolidating battery, mayhem, and assault into a single crime); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS §§ 13, 18, 21 (1965) (defining battery and assault).
81. E.g., Vacco, 521 U.S. at 808 ("By permitting everyone to refuse unwanted medical treat-
ment while prohibiting anyone from assisting a suicide, New York law follows a longstanding and
rational distinction.").
82. Henry Hansmann, The Economics and Ethics of Markets for Human Organs, 14 J.
HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 57, 59 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 3, at 96).
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tudes ... make it plain just how widespread is the ethical stance
maintaining that the body ought to have special moral standing.
83
Many other countries also forbid organ sales.84 But this view loses
its appeal quickly when we consider that what one community may find
to express a lack of self-respect, another community may find an ulti-
mately fulfilling and meaningful use of the body. Changing the shape
of one's genitals might seem to some "disrespectful" of the body with
which one is born, but for some transgender persons, it is a self-affirming
expression of self and identity. Having sex in exchange for money may
be experienced as degrading for some prostitutes, but can be a fulfilling
career for other prostitutes. For instance, some prostitutes defy the pre-
sumption that emotional connections cannot be made through commodi-
fied sex, by forming friendships with clients, or having "favorite"
clients.86 Which, if any, is most degrading-getting paid to have an ad-
vertisement tattooed on one's arm, getting paid to have sex, or getting
paid to give a massage? The answer will surely be culturally contingent.
Covering one's breasts or hair could be alternately understood as ex-
pressing shame or expressing self-respect. 87 In a pluralist society, digni-
tary concerns seem an inadequate justification for forbidding people
from commodifying their bodies-they rely on conceptions of human
nature or what constitutes a good life that are not universally or even
widely shared, such as religious or "intuitionist" conceptions.
One of the most famous proponents of this dignitarian approach,
Leon Kass, the chair of the President's Council on Bioethics from 2002-
2005, encourages us to listen to the "wisdom of repugnance" in criti-
quing certain practices as harmful to human dignity.88 Kass has lamented
not only the immorality of reproductive technologies, but also the offen-
siveness of licking ice cream cones in public.
89
83. Kevin W. Wildes, Libertarianism and Ownership of the Human Body, in OWNERSHIP OF
THE HUMAN BODY, supra note 37, at 143, 152 (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
supra note 3, at 96).
84. E.g., Transplantation of Human Organs Act, No. 42 of 1994 (India); Human Tissue Gift
Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, ch. 211 § 10 (Can.). See generally WORLD HEALTH ORG., HUMAN ORGAN
TRANSPLANTATION: A REPORT ON DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE AUSPICES OF WHO, 1987-1991, at
15-26 (1991) (surveying and listing countries that ban organ sales and those that do not).
85. See Wildes, supra note 83, at 147 ("Much of the effort to regulate and constrain the use of
the human body is embedded in a moral language of 'sanctity', 'dignity', 'justice', 'integrity', and
'solidarity' that assumes particular moral commitments.").
86. Lucas, supra note 22, at 248, 252.
87. See FADWA EL GUINDI, VEIL: MODESTY, PRIVACY AND RESISTANCE 13 (1999) (discuss-
ing the evolution of differing views pertaining to veiling practices); cf. CAROLYN G. HEILBRUN, THE
EDUCATION OF A WOMAN: THE LIFE OF GLORIA STEINEM, at xviii (1995) (describing Steinem's
"feminis[m] in a miniskirt" as a walking "contradiction").
88. Leon R. Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance, THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 2, 1997, available
at http://www.catholiceducation.org/articles/medicalethics/meOO6.html.
89. LEON R. KASS, THE HUNGRY SOUL: EATING AND THE PERFECTING OF OUR NATURE 148-
149 (1994):
Worst of all from this point of view are those more uncivilized forms of eating, like lick-
ing an ice cream cone-a catlike activity that has been made acceptable in informal
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Some members of this camp would permit modifications to the
body that do not entail the sale of the body, its parts, or uses, such as the
free donation of an organ to a sibling in need, or the creation of an ani-
mal-human hybrid over which nobody holds intellectual property
rights. 90 Others would object even to some of these modifications that
could not fairly be called "commodification"91 because they involve no
economic exchange. But what characterizes this camp is the argument
that the root of the right to bodily integrity is a dignitary one. Because
people disagree over the contours of dignity, what exactly constitutes an
offense against dignity varies widely, and this is why the group contains
both moral conservatives and liberals.
This debate over whether a change to or use of one's body is self-
respecting appears even when the change is widely thought of as a medi-
cal "improvement." For instance, obtaining a cochlear implant that per-
mits the user to hear might seem a thoroughly unobjectionable alteration
of one's body to many. But to some members of the deaf community, it
can represent a rejection of one's self, as well as one's community-a
selling out, if you will, to dominant norms of communication and lan-
guage.92 Thus, in a pluralistic society, we cannot rest our rights in the
body on what actions demonstrate respect for the body and what actions
do not. To do so would rigidly fix the definitions of what are appropriate
uses and forms of the body.
Moreover, hewing to convention on the appropriate use and forms
of the body will not only lead to stagnation, it lacks compassion. For
instance, in his 2006 State of the Union speech, former President George
W. Bush opposed animal-human hybrids as one of many technologies
that the religious right fears will blur the line between humans and the
rest of the world.9 3 Even more recently, in March of 2008, the Vatican
published a list of seven modern sins that includes genetic manipulation,
morally debatable experiments, and violation of the fundamental rights
of human nature.94 But what if animal-human hybrids or stem cell re-
America but that still offends those who know why eating in public is offensive. I fear
that I may by this remark lose the sympathy of many readers, people who will condes-
cendingly regard as quaint or even priggish the ... view that eating in the street is for
dogs.... This doglike feeding, if one must engage in it, ought to be kept from public
view, where, even if we feel no shame, others are compelled to witness our shameful be-
havior.
90. For instance, United States law permits voluntary organ donation while forbidding organ
sales. 42 U.S.C.A. § 274e(a) (West 2009).
91. See id.; see also sources cited supra note 19.
92. E.g., SOUND AND FURY (PBS 2000) (documenting a deaf child's wish to obtain a cochlear
implant in defiance of her deaf parents' wishes).
93. George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union
(Jan. 31, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.c-span.org/executive/transcript.asp?cat=current
&code=bushadmin&year-2006).
94. See sources cited supra note 19.
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search can be used to alleviate a patient's severe pain?95 Other grounds
for opposing these technologies may exist, but a conventionalist's argu-
ment from "the wisdom of repugnance 96 is a particularly uncompelling
basis in a pluralistic society. Similarly uncompelling is an argument
rooted in the desire to preserve categorical distinctions between persons
and property, without a theory of why such a distinction is so worthwhile
as to overcome the claims of persons who are physically suffering and
their families. Both the kidney seller, who could use compensation to
improve her life, and the kidney purchaser, whose health is dramatically
improved through transplantation, must be answered to.
97
2. Dignity of the Body as a Social Justice Concept?
Some argue, in contrast, that compassion actually requires this for-
malist distinction between people, who are afforded special status, and
property.98 On this view, we must hold the line between persons and
property fast, as a way of protecting persons with disabilities and other
biologically disfavored persons, who might otherwise be deemed not
worthwhile. The concern is that such persons would have their lives,
security, and other needs "balanced" against other interests, rather than
respected as inalienable and non-negotiable rights.99 Life as a person
with disabilities, an abnormal person, or even an average person who
refuses to bring his or her body into conformance with current cultural
norms, would become a "choice" that would not be protected. 100
For instance, some argue that treating embryos as mere property
could cause the destruction of lesbian and gay persons or persons with
disabilities through genetic selection of "straight embryos" or "able-
bodied embryos."'' ° The "gay embryos" or "disabled embryos" could
simply be destroyed, as one's property can be destroyed. Or perhaps the
"straight, able-bodied embryos" would command a higher price in the
95. Stem cell research is widely discussed for its potential to lead to the development of
treatments for diseases, and animal-human hybrids might be used to develop organs for transplanta-
tion into humans. See Bagley, supra note 2, at 472, 520.
96. See Kass, supra note 88.
97. E.g., Volokh, supra note 4, at 1835 (arguing that forbidding organ sales violates the right
to self defense of those who need organs).
98. See Jean Bethke Elshtain, The Body and the Quest for Control, in Is HUMAN NATURE
OBSOLETE?: GENETICS, BIOENGINEERING, AND THE FUTURE OF THE HUMAN CONDITION 155, 161
(Harold W. Baillie & Timothy K. Casey eds., 2005).
99. See, e.g., id. at 155-61.
100. id. at 161 (arguing that parents who chose not to abort children with Down's Syndrome
and other disabilities would be viewed as having made a choice to do so that society need not sup-
port).
101. See e.g., Jennifer S. Geetter, Coding for Change: The Power of the Human Genome to
Transform the American Health Insurance System, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 1, 27 (2002) ("The very
phrase 'wrongful birth' suggests that the birth of the disabled child was wrong and should have been
prevented." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Taylor v. Kurapati, 600 N.w.2d 670, 688-
91 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999))).
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market than "gay embryos" or "disabled embryos," creating a significant
status harm for lesbian and gay persons and persons with disabilities.
0 2
In another example, some egalitarians argue that commodification
of the body could permit economic disparities to widen between those
who can afford financially valuable upgrades to their bodies and those
who cannot. 03 Perhaps an upgrade to the body would give a person more
abilities-such as strength or intelligence-that would be a great advan-
tage in the employment market. Those who could not afford such up-
grades would find it increasingly difficult to earn a good wage, once
forced to compete with those whose greater wealth, or whose parents'
greater wealth, afforded them the opportunity to buy into privately
owned body modifying technology.
Thus, some members of the dignitarian camp would forbid property
rights in embryos, in order to prevent perhaps their destruction and likely
their sale on the basis of their genetic content. Others might forbid em-
ployers from discriminating against those who fail to get certain up-
grades to their bodies.
The idea is that the special status of the natural human body must be
maintained to prevent some bodies from being worth less than other bo-
dies; otherwise our impulse is to require "natural" bodies to change, ra-
ther than changing the environment and society that is inhospitable to
them. In other words, our impulse to accommodate different bodies, es-
pecially those that are disabled, would be hindered. 104
However, intuitive ideas about what is natural and what is not do
not necessarily lead to protected bodies because aspects of our environ-
ment may feel intuitively natural. For instance, the existence of stairs in
many buildings and lack of wheelchair ramps may seem a natural, given
state of affairs. It took years of activism and scholarly writing by disa-
bility advocates to interrogate the medical model of disability and instead
promote the "social model" of disability, under which we can distinguish
between physical impairment and the social conditions, such as the use
of stairs rather than ramps, that turn an impairment into a disability. 0 5 As
102. Aside from ignoring that cultural pressure to perform a heterosexual identity is, and in
many cultures has been, enough to crush and subordinate lesbian, gay, and bisexual practice and
identity, this argument also fails to recognize that some persons would prefer to have gay children or
to be gay, and would choose those options. See generally Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, How to Bring
Your Kids up Gay, 29 SOC. TEXT 18 (1991).
103. See HUGHES, supra note 45, at 130-31 (describing the Center for Genetics and Society's
argument that cloning and the creation of inheritable genetic modifications will lead to such a situa-
tion).
104. E.g., Elshtain, supra note 98, at 163 ("[S]urroundings in which bodies are situated fades
as the body gets enshrined as a kind of messianic project.").
105. See Corker & Shakespeare, supra note 42, at 3 (describing the shift from the medical
model of disability to the social model, in which activists raised awareness of the fact that impair-
ment alone does not cause disability, but rather social and economic conditions overlaying impair-
ment).
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another example, a person with a severe allergy to unprocessed nuts, or
to locally native plants, could easily be subject to a belief that his or her
body is improperly adapted to the "natural" environment, if we simply
rely on intuitive ideas about what is natural. And lesbian, gay, and bisex-
ual people have long been accused of having "unnatural" sexual desires
because same sex sexual activity does not "naturally" lead to reproduc-
tion. Thus, what sexual minorities do with their bodies is often left un-
protected by the appeal to intuitions about nature.
And indeed, it is not clear that in all cases changing the environment
is necessarily more compassionate than changing bodies. It may some-
times be better to alleviate suffering by changing what we have previous-
ly thought to be "the central core of our humanity,"'10 6 rather than by
changing the environment. A formalist approach that reveres the organic
body or listens to the "wisdom of repugnance" does not adequately allow
for this, and can therefore seriously harm the rights of those with differ-
ent bodies, too.
For instance, transgender persons who choose to obtain body mod-
ifying surgery or engage in body disguising dress practices are changing
their bodies, rather than the environment, both of which are probably
contributors to gender identity disorder ("GD"). 10 7 It is unclear why the
insistence that we change the environment, rather than permitting trans-
gender persons to change their bodies and clothing, is a superior response
to GID. This is especially so when we realize that awareness of and re-
spect for the bodies of transgender persons may contribute to positive
changes in the cultural environment. Transgender persons who obtain
body-modifying surgery or dress in a manner that obscures parts of the
body do not necessarily accommodate or reinstantiate social construc-
tions of gender-these practices can destabilize those constructions.'
0 8
Questioning gender constructions and stereotypes can then lead to
changes in the environment and social order, rather than stubborn refus-
als to change the environment in which our bodies exist.
As an example of where this desire to glorify and dignify the natural
body can lead, we can look to Jean Elshtain. Elshtain at times appears to
be a defender of those who are different, such as persons with disabilities
and sexual minorities, but she also expresses concern with a society that
might no longer feel disgust towards a human body "riddled with pieces
of metal."' 9 Yet, that body riddled with metal may be a person with dis-
abilities who, like all of us, is using the available technology to live the
106. Elshtain, supra note 100, at 167.
107. 1 use the term GID because it is a well-recognized term, not to express any agreement
with the medical characterization of many transgender persons as having a "disorder." See Dean
Spade, Resisting Medicine, Re/modeling Gender, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 15, 19-21 (2003).
108. Judith Butler, Imitation and Gender Insubordination, in THE LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES
READER 307, 313-14, 318 (Henry Abelove et al. eds., 1993).
109. Elshtain, supra note 100, at 167.
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best life possible. Alternately, it might be a person who elects to have
numerous piercings as an important religious or identity related practice.
Revulsion towards such a body doesn't seem compassionate at all.
I believe the worth of different bodies, and the rights of persons
with different bodies, is better located in the public's interest in people
with different bodies as a means of facilitating cultural change, rather
than in a naturalist or intuitionist account of "what is a human." For in-
stance, we can value the bodies of persons with hearing impairments by
looking at the richness and beauty of sign language, rather than by valo-
rizing the "natural" state of the impairment and rejecting the wishes of
the deaf child who desires a cochlear implant. 10 This way of valuing
different bodies-based on their important place in cultural evolution-
might work better for persons with disabilities because it recognizes the
fact that people are constituted by and within technology. It is persons
with disabilities for whom this fact makes a great deal of material differ-
ence. In contrast, the naturalist approach might lead to less support for
welfare rights to technology that would assist persons with disabilities.
Why would a government-funded health care system pay for a cochlear
implant, or for a wheelchair, if deafness or inability to walk were revered
as "natural"?
The naturalist account is of course similarly dangerous for persons
with minority sexual identities. What is "naturally human" or "intuitive-
ly" beautiful or repulsive is always contested, and plenty of persons who
promote this formalist approach also promote the subordination of sexual
minorities and women."' If we reflect on how societies have historically
treated sexual minorities and persons with disabilities, the "wisdom of
repugnance" does not, in my view, seem to be the safest approach for
these groups.
Abandoning a naturalist or intuitive source of rights in favor of this
approach, geared at social and cultural change, need not mean that
people's bodies are only worth something when they have the capacity
for rational, political engagement. Instead, we can recognize that bodies
are sites of identity and cultural performance, and are therefore worth
something to others, even when they are mentally or otherwise disabled
in a way that makes traditional political participation impossible. People
can be loved, be part of society, and be part of our culture without being
110. In the documentary film Sound and Fury, a young child's deaf parents forbade her from
receiving a cochlear implant, after much debate with other members of the deaf community and both
hearing-impaired and non-hearing-impaired family members. They determined that the implant
would be a rejection of the rich and valuable deaf community they were a part of and that was often
discriminated against unjustly. SOUND AND FURY (PBS 2000). While views on the parents' decision
may vary, there is something tragic in the circumstances that led to the parents being unable to value
both the deaf community and their daughter's desire to experience what hearing is like.
Ill. E.g., Leon R. Kass, The End of Courtship (pt. 1), BOUNDLESS, Oct. 13, 2005,
http://www.boundless.org/2005/articles/a000I 154.cfm (arguing that women should be modest and
mothers).
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part of our politics. 112 Thus, we don't need an organic account of who is
naturally a human in order to value many different kinds of bodies. We
can recognize the importance of embodiment without revering the types
of embodiment we are used to, or responding with disgust to the types
that we are not.
B. What's Normatively Wrong with Autonomy
I have argued that the property-like approach to bodily integrity is
descriptively wrong about property-fundamental property rights are not
violated merely because they are heavily regulated. But as noted in Part
II, some might argue that normatively, we should protect either property
rights in the body or even all property rights against regulation, as a
component of autonomy. In this section, I argue against the use of auton-
omy as a basis for property-like fundamental rights in the body or any
other form of property that would trump typical political concerns such
as public health or even parentalism.
One might argue from an autonomy or personhood standpoint that
we should carve out a property-like right in our bodies, marked off by the
physical borders of the body. This right would be different from other
property rights in that it would be freer from restraints on alienation and
would truly serve as a trump of typical political concerns driving regula-
tion. The idea is that the body, more than property, is particularly funda-
mental to personhood or autonomy. "
3
But property, too, can be a crucial part of personhood and autono-
my, much more so than certain body parts. Margaret Radin, for instance,
has persuasively argued that certain forms of property are properly un-
derstood as personal in nature, such as wedding rings or houses.' 14 The
clothes I choose to wear may be a more important component of my per-
sonhood than my fingernails, as another example.
Regulation of property can even impact personhood via the body it-
self. This occurs whenever property is tied to the use and experience of
one's body. For instance, if the state forbids the sale of corsets, makeup,
and high heels, it infringes on the manner in which I make my body cul-
turally visible and the manner in which I physically experience my body.
The same is true when the state regulates sex toys and medical devices.
Food and drug regulation limits what we can ingest, and the Controlled
112. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES
MEMBERSHIP 96-106 (2006).
113. Cf Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 800 (1989) (arguing that
control of the body is "formative").
114. See Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 20, at 959-61.
[Vol. 87:1
AGAINST THE RIGHT TO BODILY INTEGRITY
Substances Act can determine whether someone's body exists in pain or
not.
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By arguing that the body is not a special repository of autonomy or
personhood, I do not deny that the body may have a special relationship
to autonomy, stemming from the cognitive force that being physically
controlled can have. It may be impossible in many circumstances to men-
tally "overcome" experiences like pain or physical restriction, and there-
fore control of another's body may amount to the destruction of that per-
son's autonomy'16 in a way that control of their property could not com-
pare. Torture has, for this reason, been described as "unmaking the
world" of the victim. 117 It is easy to see, with this in mind, why one con-
cerned with autonomy would argue that the government should not be
permitted to control the individual's body in a manner that is cognitively
overpowering, such as by forcing the individual to endure pain, requiring
the individual to experience pregnancy (or prohibiting the individual
from having such an experience), or prohibiting the individual's use of
psychoactive drugs.
But the claim that regulation of kidney sales, prostitution, manual
labor, and other forms of body commodification interferes particularly
egregiously with autonomy merely because these activities involve parts
or uses of the body would not be supported. An environmental regulation
that prevents me from chopping down trees on my land and selling them
is no less cognitively overpowering than a public health regulation that
prevents me from selling my kidney or engaging in prostitution. Even
though having a kidney removed or engaging in sex might have cogni-
tive effects that an individual desires and that cannot be duplicated in any
other way, a prohibition on engaging in these activities for money
doesn't prevent the individual from having those experiences at all: the
individual can still give the kidney away for free, or consent to sex for
free.
One might respond to this with the even stronger libertarian view
that all property rights should trump typical regulation, whether property
rights in the body or not. The problem with this view normatively is that
commodification itself, whether of the body or other material, is not en-
115. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 7 (2005) (noting, in the context of a case upholding the
Controlled Substance Act's prohibition on possession of marijuana as a valid exercise of Congress's
commerce clause authority, that plaintiff's "physician believes that forgoing cannabis treatments
would certainly cause [her] excruciating pain and could very well prove fatal").
116. Rubenfeld, supra note 113, at 788-89:
Yet power need not be directed at the undeveloped mind to have this effect; it may also
do so if directed at the fully-developed body.... Indeed, bodily control may be the more
effective medium to the extent that thought cannot, as it were, meet such control head on,
as it might when confronted by an idea that it is told to accept.... [I]ts effect can befor-
mative, shaping identity at a point where intellectual resistance cannot meet it.
117. See ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE WORLD
37-38 (1985).
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tirely unproblematic for autonomy, as choices can be coerced not only by
the state but also by private actors. If the state attempts to promote au-
tonomy by refraining from all regulation of what can and cannot be done
with the body altogether, those with private sources of power will be free
to interfere with the choices of others. When we live as members of a
society, our choices concerning our bodies will never be absolutely
"free," in the sense that they are uncoerced, uncontrolled, or undeter-
mined by others." 
8
For instance, when a person has a disability and obtains prosthetics
to assist with the disability, this is in part because the person's body has
been socially constructed as disabled. If we all used sign language to
communicate, fewer deaf persons would desire cochlear implants. In
another example, if we failed to classify persons on the basis of the shape
of their genitals, fewer transgender persons would desire genital surgery.
If actresses didn't receive massive sums of money for looking eternally
young, would so many of them "choose" to get injected with Botox?
Someone with a great deal of economic power can offer money to
an employee in exchange for the performance of a job, such as manual
labor, that eventually damages the employee's body. 19 Or, someone who
owns many buildings will, through her choices about whether to install
wheelchair ramps, influence the mobility of many persons with disabili-
ties. Markets that reward attractiveness can incentivize cosmetic sur-
gery. 120 Even the most typical forms of employment, such as waitressing
or bartending in a "uniform of makeup,"' 2 1 raise concerns about whether
selling control over one's body in this way is a choice made "freely."'
122
And does someone have sufficient autonomy if he desires a wheelchair
for basic mobility, but cannot afford one and is not provided one by his
society? 23 In other words, persons are unavoidably embodied in the con-
text of their environment, an environment largely made up of legal rela-
tionships of property and contract.
118. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 209-222
(Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977); see also Rubenfeld, supra note 113, at
770-81 (1976) (making this point with respect to sexuality and Citing Foucault's The History of
Sexuality).
119. See supra text accompanying notes 36-39.
120. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
121. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1084 (9th Cir. 2004), affd, 444 F.3d
1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
122. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
123. See Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/106, arts. IV, XX
U.N. Doc. AJRES/61/106 (Jan. 24, 2007) (stating obligations of parties to promote research into and
affordable access to aids for persons with disabilities, including mobility aids); cf Dean Spade,
Documenting Gender, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 731, 782-91 (2008) (documenting the double bind created
by, on the one hand, the exclusion of gender confirming medical care such as sex-reassignment
surgery or hormone therapy from Medicaid and other state funded health coverage, and, on the other
hand, state demands that transgender persons obtain such treatment in order to legitimize their status
and be appropriately gender classified).
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In critiquing the notion that inviolable private property-like rights
best promote autonomy, I am not advocating the eradication of private
property. That, too would threaten autonomy, since state coercion is no
less a form of coercion than economic coercion. Moreover, even without
economic and state coercion, social and cultural coercion remain. For
instance, one might obtain cosmetic surgery even in the absence of fi-
nancial incentives to do so because one desires an intimate relationship,
and cultural norms may prefer people with certain kinds of bodies. Or,
one may be pressured by family members to donate a kidney to a sibling.
Thus, there is no mechanism by which we can "maximize" autono-
my over the body. All we can do is make decisions about where to allo-
cate the coercive power that will inevitably influence individual choices
concerning the body.124 We might choose to allocate all that power in
totally unregulated private hands, through a strict libertarian "no state
action" doctrine. Or, we might choose to allocate that power in the hands
of those with cultural capital, while forbidding or limiting its exercise in
economic transactions. Thus, we might limit rights to contract away
one's control over one's body, while permitting families and other social
groups to coerce individuals into giving up that control. The problem
with the autonomy argument is that it doesn't help us choose from these
alternatives. We cannot compare all allocations for "levels of autonomy."
Some would even say that the notion of autonomy is itself essentially an
illusion for anyone who lives in a social context. 25 But even if we do not
take this strong a position in critiquing autonomy, it is still a poor basis
for a right in one's body that trumps typical regulation.
C. The Capability Approach-Combining Dignitary Approaches with
Liberal "Choice"
There are some essentially liberal justifications of human or funda-
mental rights that acknowledge the problem of private coercion. These
accounts therefore reject the libertarian approach in favor of one that
might require positive efforts to promote truer autonomy. In this section,
I consider and reject a strong example of such an account as an alternate
way of justifying human rights in the body.
Martha Nussbaum's capability approach, drawing on Amartya
Sen's capability approach to measuring welfare,126 uses an intuitive ap-
proach to reach a list of "capabilities" she argues are essential to human
dignity,12 7 and she includes bodily integrity in this list. 28 However, she
124. See FOUCAULT, supra note 118, at 194.
125. Id.; see also MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 159 (Robert Hurley trans.,
Pantheon Books 1978) (1976) ("The irony of this deployment is in having us believe that our 'libera-
tion' is in the balance.").
126. See generally AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT As FREEDOM 131-37 (1999).
127. NUSSBAUM, supra note 1, at 74-75.
128. Id. at 78.
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would not require one to maintain one's own bodily integrity, but would
only require, in a liberal way, that each person has the capability to do
so. 129 Moreover, she includes holding property on the list of capabili-
ties. 130 Thus, her approach to rights over one's body combines elements
of the traditional liberal autonomy idea with the intuitionist dignity
idea.
131
However, what distinguishes Nussbaum from a libertarian is that for
this capability to be provided to all, in the face of the problem of private
coercion and control described above, positive government action may
be necessary. As a result, the capability for bodily integrity will in many
cases need to come at the expense of some portion of the capability to
hold property or obtain employment. It wouldn't make sense to "trade
off' these two important and essential capabilities against each other,
under the approach, 32 but it is also true that not all the capabilities can
necessarily be maximized simultaneously. They are instead treated as
minimum thresholds-thresholds that incidentally do not appear to be
met for many of the world's citizens. Thus, one capability might be re-
duced in order to promote another, as long as one did not reduce the ca-
pability below the minimum threshold. This approach is intended to be
flexible, 133 which is part of why it is very coherent, as well as compas-
sionate and realistic in a way that neither the "wisdom of repugnance"
approach nor the libertarian approach is. However, the capabilities ap-
proach does not seem to help us answer the question of when freedom of
contract or property must be regulated in order to provide and promote
the capability for bodily integrity, and when it should not be. The pur-
pose simply doesn't seem to be to provide a principle for deciding that
question.
Moreover, the justification for regulating contract, property, and
other forms of individual choice stems, at bottom, from intuitions. Nuss-
baum's approach is self-consciously "intuitionist. ' 34 Thus, despite her
use of "capabilities," rather than fixed requirements for a life worth liv-
ing, this soft liberal approach still takes admittedly biased intuitions and
uses them universally 35 as a justification for regulating behavior. Nuss-
129. See id. at 87.
130. Id. at 80.
131. Id. at 91.
132. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 79, at 167.
133. Id. at 78-79:
I consider the list as open-ended and subject to ongoing revision and rethinking, in the
way that any society's account of its most fundamental entitlements is always subject to
supplementation (or deletion).
I also insist.., that the items ... be specified in a somewhat abstract and general way,
precisely in order to leave room for the activities of specifying and deliberating by citi-
zens and their legislatures and courts.
134. Id. at 174-75.
135. Id. at 78 ("The capabilities approach is fully universal .... The approach is in this way
similar to the international human rights approach .... "). It is important to note, though, that Nuss-
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baum is laudably cautious about all this, and indicates for this very rea-
son that the list of capabilities must be updated periodically, but the
strong risk of biased intuitions being used to justify oppressive regulation
still remains.
IV. WHAT THE BODY HAS TO DO WITH FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Does all this critique mean that human rights have nothing to do
with bodies? Do rights have nothing to do with controversial questions
such as whether to permit prostitution, whether the state may force vac-
cination, or whether organ selling should be permitted? In other words,
should all these questions only be resolved on the basis of typical politi-
cal and welfare concerns, with no rights "trumping" those concerns?
Having critiqued the autonomy, dignity, and capability approaches to
resolving these questions, in this Part I propose a different ground for
rights in bodies. However, this justification would not support a right to
"bodily integrity," alienable or not.
A. Proceduralist Theories of Rights
Autonomy, dignity, and even compelling combinations of such con-
cepts are not the only reasons in which we can ground fundamental
rights. Rights can also be vehicles for promoting social and cultural
change-ways of helping us update our intuitions. Free speech rights, for
instance, have been promoted on this basis. 136 While laws, social norms,
and cultural values will always determine what choices are available to
us, 137 we can use rights as vehicles for ensuring that those norms can
change, and that their evolution is not determined solely by orthodoxy.' 
38
Such a conception of rights would promote speech rights, for instance,
on the proceduralist theory that this contributes to a democratic culture,
or even to a search for truth, 139 rather than on an autonomy theory. This
might lead to obligations that the government subsidize the speech of
those with less capital, or limit freedom of contract so as to protect em-
ployee and tenant speech as against the property rights of employers and
landlords.
baum does not argue that the universal nature of the list "license[s] intervention with the affairs of a
state that does not recognize them." Id. at 80. She states that "military and economic sanctions are
justified only in certain very grave circumstances." Id.
136. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
26 (1948) (arguing that access to unconstrained information and ideas is necessary to an informed
populace and the functioning of democracy).
137. See Kahan, supra note 14, at 115 (arguing that even when consciously justified in secular,
pluralist terms, laws will often be driven by the expression of cultural values and repression of
deviant moral values).
138. Ramachandran, supra note 9, at 18.
139. D.A. LLOYD THOMAS, IN DEFENCE OF LIBERALISM 36 (1988) ('The case for a liberal set
of individual rights does not rest on the assumption that we already know what is intrinsically valua-
ble. Rather, it rests on a plausible claim about how it is possible to have better formed beliefs about
what is valuable.").
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Of course, law cannot eradicate social norms, and we probably
wouldn't want it to. However, it is important that those norms be capable
of changing. In order for culture to be capable of change, individuals and
subcultures must be better empowered to challenge and contribute to the
construction of culture: some level of cultural velocity must be
present. 40
The goal of maintaining cultural velocity shares similarities with
Jack Balkin's thesis that in addition to a democratic political system, we
need a democratic culture.14 Protecting the ability of individuals to form
affiliations, beliefs, and values-to engage in making culture-is impor-
tant, I argue, not because those abilities are crucial to autonomy, but ra-
ther because those abilities contribute to cultural exchange and evolu-
tion. 
142
B. Cultural Velocity and Identity
What I add to this conception is the view that identity is a precursor
to cultural and political meaning making. I define identity as the particu-
lar values, beliefs, and aspects of ourselves that we deem so important
we consider them self-defining. "Our aversions, desires, beliefs, and
choices all make up our identity, but our identity in turn then affects our
aversions, desires, beliefs, and choices."' 143 "Even when an aspect of
identity seems 'unchosen,' such as a biological sex or an ethnicity, we
still choose, albeit sometimes within very strong and other times within
very weak constraints, whether that 'immutable' trait will be part of our
identity."' 44 Although those choices will always occur within constraints,
law can carve out some space for the exercise of agency in the construc-
tion of identity. In this way, identity can be self-defining in the good
sense of a set of values and practices that one holds dear (but neverthe-
less could be different), rather than self-defining in the bad sense of a set
of stereotypes about a group that are resistant to change. Why would we
140. The idea of cultural velocity as a ground for deriving countermajoritarian rights shares
similarities with a consequentialist argument made by David Lloyd Thomas in In Defence of Libe-
ralism. See id. Thomas defends liberalism on utilitarian grounds, but on a unique form of utilitarian-
ism that he calls "experimental" utilitarianism. He rejects traditional utilitarianism because it would
require defining what is of utility-what is good, or of value, and he argues that we do not know the
answer to that question. However, he argues that we can defend those liberal rights, which would
contribute to discovering what is of value, by permitting experiments, in a sense, in what should be
valued. Id. at 36-37.
In a future piece, I will more thoroughly explore the concept of cultural velocity as a
justification for human rights more generally. For purposes of this article, however, it is sufficient to
note that such a concept could explain or justify rights in bodies, but not rights over the "integrity"
of bodies.
141. See Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2004).
142. See Ramachandran, supra note 9, at 31-33.
143. Id. at 32.
144. Id. For a similar conception of identity as "choice" rather than as "discovered" fact, see
AMARTYA SEN, THE ARGUMENTATIVE INDIAN: WRITINGS ON INDIAN HISTORY, CULTURE AND
IDENTITY 350-52 (2005).
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want to promote diversity and reformability of identity? Because identity
is determined in part by cultural norms, but it is also a ground from
which to rally for changing those norms.
145
We cannot ensure total "freedom of identity" or "freedom of per-
sonhood" for the same reasons we cannot maximize "autonomy." Such
freedom is to some extent an illusion, given that even our physical bodies
are constructed in part by their social context. Our choices are heavily
constrained. But in the face of those constraints, we often see resistance.
Sexual minorities, racial minorities, disability activists, and those ex-
cluded from aristocracy and nobility are just a few examples of persons
who have engaged in culture wars, perhaps not securing themselves "li-
beration, " 46 but certainly moving culture in radical ways. This is one of
the reasons often given for protecting speech rights-such rights facili-
tate that cultural and political change.
What is often neglected, though, is that resistance to current cultural
norms need not take the form of traditional political activism, speech,
and interest group formation. Certain identity practices, such as dress,
sexual practice, speech, mannerism, body modification, and the like, can
themselves be subversive, destabilizing acts that have cultural effects. 147
Judith Butler has described drag as such a practice, calling it "gender
insubordination." 48 These culturally disrupting, identity disrupting prac-
tices have been valorized by postmodernists and queer theorists, though
their work to do so has often seemed too "academic," not having any
practical import. 149 Part of what makes this celebration of subversion
seem pointless is that the prescription to disrupt identity or subvert cul-
tural norms has limited use for someone who will lose her job, be kicked
out of school, or sent to jail for doing so. 150 That is where legal rights
come into play. Law can carve out some space for individuals, subcul-
tures, families, and other groups to form different, challenging identities,
and even reform them, yet still have a job, shelter, and other needs met
that would permit participation with the broader culture. In this way,
rights can be used to ensure that some level of cultural velocity is main-
tained.
145. Ramachandran, supra note 9, at 93.
146. See FOUCAULT, supra note 118, at 289.
147. Cf Judith Butler, "Appearances Aside, " 88 CAL. L. REV. 55, 63 (2000).
148. See Ramachandran, supra note 9, at 22 (citing Butler, supra note 108, at 307).
149. As Seidman has explained in an illuminating history of queer theory's development, "[tjo
the extent ... that poststructuralist perspectives ... [has become] a politics of the disruptive gesture,
they lack coherence." STEVEN SEIDMAN, DIFFERENCE TROUBLES: QUEERING SOCIAL THEORY AND
SEXUAL POLITICS 136 (1997). As he has also noted, "Underlying this politics of subversion is a
vague notion that this will encourage new, affirmative forms of personal and social life, although
poststructuralists are reluctant to name their social vision." Id. at 134.
150. See Butler, supra note 147, at 6 3:
For this challenge to take place, it must be possible for a person whose appearance calls
the category of the person into question to enter into the field of appearance precisely as a
person.... [A] power that is 'had' to the extent that such a person is not first defeated by
the powers of discrimination.
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C. Applying Proceduralist Rights in Practice
Of course, many behaviors are a part of identity formation and re-
formation. Dressing a particular way is part of identity formation and
reformation, but so is smoking, reading certain magazines, speaking in
particular dialects, and so on. Law cannot protect the freedom to en-
gage in all such behaviors, especially if we want law to protect these
behaviors not just against the state, but to also positively regulate em-
ployers, landlords, and other private actors who would use their econom-
ic power to direct these behaviors. Thus, although the proceduralist prin-
ciple of promoting cultural velocity represents a non-intuitionist, conse-
quentialist ground for recognizing certain rights, a practical application
of this principle to create actual legal rights must depend on cultural con-
text.152 We will have to choose some identity formative behaviors to pro-tect legally.
In many societies, freedom of speech will be a sensible fight to
carve out as a means of promoting cultural velocity. I have argued that
freedom of dress in the United States is also a sensible right to carve out,
in part because of the unique way in which dress is experienced as both
social and deeply personal, experiences that are historically and cultural-
ly contingent.1 53 I argued that it even ought to be protected to some de-
gree against private regulation, such as in the workplace. How that pro-
tection could be functional in the context of American capitalism of
course also required attention to the cultural and political context. Thus,
a relatively weak "reasonable accommodation" framework was what I
proposed. 154 But in a society in which physical appearance is not a par-
ticularly common site of identity exploration and formation, a site that is
frequently experienced as uniquely personal or physical in nature, for
example, it might not make sense to recognize a freedom of dress. Or, in
particular professions, such as modeling and acting, it might also not
make sense to recognize a freedom of dress.
55
Once rights that promote cultural velocity are fleshed out in this
way, with an eye to the particular context, one might question how this
differs from many modem forms of liberalism, such as Martha Nuss-
151. See Ramachandran, supra note 9, at 25, 33.
152. Cf. Angela R. Riley, Good (Native) Governance, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1049, 1078 (2007).
Riley has argued that good governance need not look like liberal democracy in every cultural con-
text, but has still articulated some core components of good governance that are broadly applicable
to many sovereigns, such as the ability to dissent and the ability to exit. Id. at 1061-80. The cultural
velocity principle would likely result, in virtually every society it were applied to, in protection of
the formal ability to dissent and to exit. I believe, however, that these formal abilities would rarely
be quite enough to ensure a significant amount of cultural velocity-the amount required to ensure
that a culture can evolve and meet new challenges. Room to develop the kinds of different identities
and affiliations that lead to the desire to dissent and exit is required, in my view.
153. See Ramachandran, supra note 9, at 25.
154. Id. at 61.
155. In fact, I proposed a categorical statutory exception for these professions. Id. at 63.
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baum's intuitionist concept of capabilities. Her approach also varies
based on the particular context, and it includes capacities for mental and
social development that might produce very similar results to the cultural
velocity approach's concern with identity formation and reformation.
56
One might argue that by using culturally contingent facts, such as the
importance of appearance manipulation to identity formation in the Unit-
ed States, I have imported what amounts to an intuitionist approach
through the back door.
The important difference is the grounds from which I draw the need
to protect identity formation. I draw not from intuitionist or dignitarian
grounds, nor from an autonomy ground, but from the consequentialist
ground that cultural velocity is of procedural value in all cultures because
it helps secure the ability to adapt, whatever one's view of a good life is.
This means that claims about what will best promote cultural velocity are
empirically falsifiable. If I argue for a legal protection of dress in the
form of a right based on the culturally contingent fact that dress is an
important site of identity formation, and dress loses this cultural salience,
I would have to change my conclusion. 57 If it turns out that protecting
dress in the form of a right hinders, rather than promotes, cultural veloci-
ty, I would also have to change my conclusion. What rights we protect
through an application of the cultural velocity approach will therefore
change when cultural facts change, when scientific understandings
change, and when technological advancements change.
Intuition, on the other hand, is by definition slow to change. Intui-
tions might be formed through repeated observations of the world, 58 or
through a complex set of cultural meanings,' 59 or both. But however they
are formed, intuitions are by definition those beliefs that have become
"immediate," and involve "knowing or sensing without the use of ration-
al processes.',' 60 They are therefore resistant to challenges from empirical
evidence.'
6 1
156. NuSSBAUM, supra note 1, at 78-79 (including "senses, imagination, and thought" on the
list of capabilities, as well as "practical reason").
157. In fact, it is entirely within the realm of possibility that I will be forced to change my
conclusion about freedom of dress within my lifetime. Because working from home is becoming
more and more common, people are spending less time interacting with each other visually, and
more time online. If this trend develops dramatically, the importance of dress both as a means of
forming an identity, and as an impetus of cultural velocity, might diminish in the future.
158. See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477-78 (1998) (describing the use of mental heuristics as
an example of bounded rationality).
159. See Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1508 (2005) (describing
racial schemas, or meanings, as developing not merely in response to data perceived by one who
adopts the schema, but also growing out of complicated cultural meanings).
160. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 919 (4th ed. 2000).
161. See Jolls et al., supra note 158, at 1477-78; Kang, supra note 159, at 1508.
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D. Cultural Velocity and the Body
A cultural velocity approach seeks to protect diverse formations of
identity, but of course many behaviors are related to identity formation.
No society can protect all in the form of a legal right. We will have to
protect those areas of behavior which are most commonly culturally
meaningful, or which are unique in other ways that make them conve-
nient to carve off from other behaviors in the form of a right. Do reasons
such as this exist to carve off legal rights protecting control over one's
body?
1. The Body Is Political
The body is the site of our coming into being socially, and in the
United States, as well as in many societies, appears to be a particularly
common site of identity exploration, performance, and formation. I am
not arguing that the body is socially or culturally important in any "natu-
ral" or "essential" way. The argument here is decidedly not an argument
that treats the body as sacred, natural, and immutable. 62 Nor is it an ar-
gument that treats the body as distinct from and unaffected by the exter-
nal world and culture.
Indeed, I am positing that the body is not sacred, is deeply alterable,
and that "natural" and "unalterable" attributes of our bodies-such as the
color of our skin, the shape of our genitals, the color of our eyes, and the
texture of our hairs-may be no more important to many of us than "ar-
tificial" and "alterable" aspects of our bodies, such as our tattoos, pierc-
ings, jewelry, clothing, dyed hair, braided hair, hip implants, or canes.
t63
Rather than treating the body as a temple, I am recognizing its ines-
capable role-however historically, culturally, or politically contin-
gent-in our experience of self. I recognize that the body may hold no
more inherent, acontextual value than chattel. This is precisely why I
argue that we should not create a "right in the body" that rests on a for-
mal separation between persons and property, privileging outdated con-
structions of a biological or "natural" body.
On the other hand, the body's manipulation and alteration as an
identity formative practice has become widespread. The body and the
world around it have begun to bleed into each other: extreme body mod-
162. See Shell, supra note 3, at 333-34, 345-47 (discussing Kant's "concept of human dignity"
and bioethics in stem cell research).
163. In fact, the distinction between the natural or immutable and the artificial or choice-based
aspects of our bodies is a slippery one. Skin color, genital shape, eye color, and hair texture are all
alterable, with varying levels of effort. Body weight is alterable, but sometimes only with great effort
and social support. Tattoos are close to unremovable. Hip implants are removable, but only at great
medical cost to those who have them, and once implanted, they are internal to the owner. Are scars
from accidents "natural," or "artificial"? What about scars that are deliberately obtained as a form of
cosmetic body modification? Scars that result from surgery? Does it matter if the surgery was de-
fined as "elective" or "medically necessary"? Whose definition for those categories should we use?
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ification is on a more visible rise, clothes and other objects seem more
and more like parts of our bodies and extensions of ourselves, transsex-
ual persons' alterations of their gender are more and more visible, some
Asian Americans have opted for eyelid surgery, and Michael Jackson is
widely thought to have changed his skin color. And yet, all these trends
don't seem to represent a rejection of the body as having any importance
at all. These are not even trends toward the soul and mind taking prece-
dence over the body. If transsexual identity were about transcending the
importance of genital shapes, then why would so many transsexuals en-
dure the oppression they endure, spend the money they spend, and enter
into complicated relationships with the medical establishment to change
that which doesn't matter-the shape of one's genitals? Rather, these
manipulations, alterations, adornments, and extensions of our bodies
themselves carry a great deal of meaning to most of the people engaged
in them.
164
This need not be the case in some science fiction world of the fu-
ture, and it need not be universal. However, the fact that the meaning of
these body manipulations is contingent on a social and cultural context
makes them no less foundational a component of identity. It does, how-
ever, raise the question of whether the natural body actually makes sense
as a repository of special legal status. If we are accounting for the fre-
quency with which the body appears to play some especially important
role in identity formative practices, mapping the borders of a legal right
precisely onto the physical borders of the "natural," human body does
not make sense; for it is often "artificial" and "elective" manipulations
and adornments to the body that are identity performative.
There are many activities that are commonly experienced in terms
of their physicality, activities which are experienced as manipulations of
the body, but which do not involve alteration of the natural, biological,
integrated body. For instance, American feminists who argued for the
right of women to wear "sensible clothes," at the same time they argued
for the rights of women to vote and have jobs, did so not just because the
clothes that women were coerced to wear held a political meaning that
subordinated women, but also because the clothes were physically re-
strictive. Skirts and petticoats were experienced as a physical restraint on
women. 165 On the other hand, those who militate for freedom of speech
have rarely done so in terms of the right to control the air coming in and
out of their lungs and the movements they make with their mouths, de-
164. Ramachandran, supra note 9, at 39.
165. See KARLYNE ANSPACH, THE WHY OF FASHION 329-30 (1967) (describing the Bloomer-
ism movement to replace skirts with pants); CHARLOTTE PERKINS GILMAN, The Force Called Fa-
shion, in THE DRESS OF WOMEN: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE SYMBOLISM AND SOCIOLOGY
OF CLOTHING 107, 116-17, (Michael R. Hill & Mary Jo Deegan eds., 2002); CHARLOTTE PERKINS
GILMAN, Hope and Comfort, in THE DRESS OF WOMEN, supra, at 131, 133-41 (discussing the op-
pressive nature of fashion).
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spite the fact that these behaviors arguably involve the body more inti-
mately in a physical sense, by making use of its internal organs.
Similarly, contracting oneself out for arduous physical labor is often
experienced as contracting out one's physical self, while contracting one-
self out as a professor-while involving physical activity such as stand-
ing and talking-is rarely experienced in this manner.166 ff the reason we
should protect rights in our bodies stems from their especially important
role in identity formation, in contributing to cultural velocity, then we
should focus in particular on those uses of the body which, as a cultural
and social matter, are actually experienced as bodily practices of identity
formation or reformation.
2. The Body is Personal
As the previous section reminded us, the importance of the body as
a site of identity experimentation in many societies cannot be overstated.
Many persons consider the ways in which they fashion, adorn, and mani-
pulate or modify their bodies (or refuse to do all these things) to be ex-
tremely important to their identity and sense of self. The relationship of
these behaviors to physical experience is part of what makes them unique
among all sorts of identity performative behaviors.
This uniqueness may make many of these behaviors good candi-
dates for special legal protection. Because not all identity performative
behaviors can be singled out, it may make sense for us to at least include
those which have the unique aspect of being experienced by many as
both personal and political, straddling the line between our separation
from and connection to others. But is there any reason to single out the
human body per se, as opposed to some of its extensions, such as cloth-
ing and perhaps other chattel, from other arenas of identity exploration?
In this section, I consider whether the fact that we have embodied subjec-
tivities 67 provides such a reason.
Embodied subjectivity describes the notion that we are not cogni-
tively separate from our bodies, that we are not minds or souls simply
"inhabiting" or "inside" a physical body. We experience the world not as
consciousnesses separate from and encapsulated within a body, but rather
through our bodies.'
68
For instance, what if I purchased artificial eyes to improve my vi-
sion, but those artificial eyes contained a filter, blocking me from seeing
images that were deemed to undermine the interests of the company that
sold me the eyes? This physical change would alter my subjectivity it-
166. See Nussbaum, supra note 13, at 693-94 (pointing out that professorial labor, like prosti-
tution, involves contracting out the body).
167. See, e.g., MARGARET A. McLAREN, FEMtNISM, FOUCAULT, AND EMBODIED
SUBJECTIVITY 2-3, 14, 83-91 (2002).
168. See, e.g., id. at 83-84.
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self-my perception and experience of the world. The power to force or
even encourage most persons to implant such a filter would be a great
power indeed.
The concept of embodied subjectivity shares something with the
view that, "rather than speaking of rights in our bodies[,] it would be
more appropriate to say that for Hegel we have rights through our bodies
... an assault on one's body is not experienced as damage to one's prop-
erty but rather as direct injury to one's self as a person."'
' 69
Indeed, our brains and nervous systems, which in modern times we
often imagine to be our "consciousnesses," are part of our bodies, and
thoroughly embedded in our bodies. Nobody has yet succeeded in trans-
ferring the contents of a person's consciousness to a location outside the
person's body. There is currently no way to "upload" your brain to a
computer. Even if there were, it is unclear if the computer's inability to
taste, touch, smell, and see would proceed to alter the consciousness in
some significant way. 170 Another way to put this "is that all cognitive
experience involves the knower in a personal way, rooted in his biologi-
cal structure.' ' 71 "We have a subjective experience of our own thought
processes, but at best only an imagined representation of what goes on in
others' subjective experience."
172
The concept of embodied subjectivity implies that if I change my
body, I change the structure through which I perceive and experience-I
change my subjectivity. Were we to consider only this, we might pro-
mote a human right in the body that maps directly onto the physical, hu-
man body. Jed Rubenfeld, for instance, has argued that bodily control
should be part of the fundamental right to privacy because it may be a
particularly effective way for the state to influence subjects at the "for-
mative" level.
173
169. Uffe J. Jensen, Property, Rights, and the Body: The Danish Context-A Democratic
Ethics or Recourse to Abstract Right?, in OWNERSHIP OF THE HUMAN BODY, supra note 37, at 173,
180-81 (alteration in original) (quoting HARRY BROD, HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF POLITICS 69
(1992)).
170. This is not to say that the uploaded consciousness's difference from us would mean it
should be treated differently. That question goes to whether legal personhood should be granted to
so-called artificial intelligences. See Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhoodfor Artificial Intelli-
gences, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1231, 1231-32 (1992) (exploring this question). The point is simply that
current persons have embodied subjectivities, and we should therefore consider those embodied
subjectivities when we think about what rights to grant persons, and how best to fulfill them. It may
be that disembodied subjectivities wouldn't need the same rights that embodied subjectivities have.
This potentially unequal treatment should not trouble us, as this would simply be a case of treating
unlike persons differently, rather than treating like persons differently.
171. HUMBERTO R. MATURANA & FRANCISCO J. VARELA, THE TREE OF KNOWLEDGE: THE
BIOLOGICAL ROOTS OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 18 (rev. ed. 1998).
172. TERRENCE W. DEACON, THE SYMBOLIC SPECIES: THE CO-EVOLUTION OF LANGUAGE AND
THE BRAIN 424 (1997).
173. Rubenfeld, supra note 113, at 800-01.
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Imagine that we could have filters implanted into our eyes. What if
a filter were created that made it impossible for the recipient to see im-
ages deemed dangerous to the government, and the government forced us
all to have the filters implanted? In contrast, imagine that the state forces
us all to paint our houses in the colors of the incumbent political party.
We might propose that because we have embodied subjectivities, there is
a good reason to be even more frightened of the former state than the
latter. If the state can control how its citizens perceive the world, this
creates, we might say, a much greater danger of cultural stagnation than
if the state can control whether citizens demonstrate support for the gov-
ernment. At least in the latter case, the citizens could reappropriate the
incumbent party's colors for some subversive purpose, or could perhaps
shift their dissent to other arenas, like dress or speech.
In other words, the idea of embodied subjectivity might provide a
factual, scientifically verifiable reason to distinguish between the body
and "personhood property" like wedding rings or houses-a reason to
create "privacy" rights in the body. However, we should not forget that
the body is not only personal, due to its important role in our subjective
experience; it is also generally political, because it is often the site at
which we take on a social form. Thus, some uses of and changes to the
body will be more important to the formation and exploration of identity
than others, despite the fact that subjectivity is embodied. Moreover,
some changes to and uses of the body are commonly experienced in
terms of their physicality, such as appearance manipulation, and others
are not, such as speech. This is largely a product of social circumstance.
Finally, and most importantly, even the subjective, lived experience of
the body is inevitably determined in part by social circumstances and
coercion. The law cannot protect embodied subjectivity by carving off
the human body because even this does not make it fully secure from
state and private coercion.
Suppose, for instance, that a technological improvement were in-
vented that provided purchasers with additional sixth--or even tenth-
"senses." In fact, implants have already been created that would permit
the recipient to sense electromagnetic fields. 174 Implants of this sort are
property. They are clearly not part of the organic, human body. But the
power of the implant seller to retain certain property rights in the implant
may become a power to influence the subjectivity of the implant reci-
pient. Such a power is inevitable in a world in which the body and prop-
erty exist in relation to each other, in which they bleed into each other.
In other words, if there is a "body" that human rights or constitu-
tional law ought to be protecting, it is not the "human body," as defined
174. Quinn Norton, A Sixth Sense for a Wired World, WIRED.COM, June 7, 2006,
http://www.wired.com/gadgets/mods/news/2006/06f71087.
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to mean an organic, physically continuous being distinct and isolated
from the surrounding world, but rather the "posthuman body," defined as
constructed by and situated within a social and technological context.
175
Protecting this "posthuman body" can't be done by carving it off for spe-
cial legal status because it can't be carved off at all. Thus, it must be pro-
tected through a combination of negative rights against the state and pos-
itive regulation of property and contract. Under this view, we should no
longer recognize a fundamental right to "bodily integrity," and funda-
mental rights should abandon the concern with commodification of hu-
man bodies per se. However, we should choose rights to protect-both
as negative rights and through positive regulation-with a recognition
that various uses of and changes to the body are especially important to
the formation of diverse identities, and therefore, to the goal of cultural
evolution.
In sum, the body is indeed a unique arena of identity reformation
because of facts about embodied subjectivity-a subjectivity that is al-
ways influenced by the world around the body-and because of facts
about the body as an extremely common site of cultural, political, and
social identity performance.176 This provides a fair reason in many socie-
ties to give special legal attention to identity development and formation
that is related to the body. But it does not provide a sensible reason to
create a legal right that maps neatly onto the natural, human body. In the
next section, I outline what factors we would appropriately consider,
from the cultural velocity perspective, when deciding what kinds of
coercion over the body should be carved out for special legal attention.
3. Protecting Bodies from Control
Due to the embodied nature of subjectivity, control of a person's
body may in fact become control of that person's very subjectivity, di-
recting the identity, thoughts, and beliefs of the person being controlled.
But our fear of this result may not be substantiated in every instance in
which the body is commodified, even when this occurs in a context of
coercion. 177 For instance, when blood is removed from the body, sensory
experience and inputs do not appear to change dramatically in the long
term. When someone engages in sexual activity, future experiences may
be altered significantly, but the change might be a positive one, rather
than a negative one.1
8
175. See generally PEPPER ELL, The Posthuman Manifesto, supra note 51.
176. It may even be the fact that subjectivities are embodied that has partially led to the fre-
quency with which cultures treat the body as a primary site of identity expression, formation, and re-
formation.
177. See Stephen R. Munzer, Property as Social Relations, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND
POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 36, 46-52 (2001) (distinguishing between coercion, exploitation,
the use of power, and coercion as a neutral term and a negative term).
178. Of course, if the sexual activity results in pregnancy, these changes to the biological
structure are probably severe enough to dramatically change the subjective experience of the person,
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Sometimes a bodily intrusion or invasion carries with it a destruc-
tive social or cultural meaning that one is subordinate or one's identity
worthless. Rape has been described in this manner, for instance. Socially
and culturally, bodily invasion and control by another is often expe-
rienced as a loss of control over one's identity. On the other hand, those
who consent to sexual intercourse are not thought to generally experience
a loss of self-worth or identity in the way that some rape victims may.
We can ask ourselves in these varied situations, in what way does the
right to refuse or consent to bodily intrusion and invasion promote the
possibility of new and creative exercises of agency in the formation of
identity?
An interest of countermajoritarian constitutional or human rights
law in individuals' control over their own bodies is the interest in what
that control promotes-the capacity for social change as security against
stagnation. This explains why we might intrude on the libertarian auton-
omy to contract away control of the body where it better promotes that
public interest. Just as state control of bodies might get in the way of
bodies being used to explore and reform cultural identity, too much pri-
vate control of bodies might, too.
We may legitimately fear that an individual will become unable to
form their own opinions, thoughts, make their own decisions, and con-
sider a wide variety of cultural affiliations if another controls their body,
even if they consented to that control. Thus, there is something sensible
underlying the concern many have with transfers of rights in the body,
once we conceive of those rights as connected to cultural and political
expression and identity development, rather than merely zones of auton-
omy. Since subjectivity is embodied and bodies are so important cultu-
rally, those transfers may threaten our interest in dispersed, rather than
consolidated, control of the formation of subjects and identities. If the
formation of subjects is left to the control of the market, we may see so-
cieties as static as those in which the formation of subjects is rigidly con-
trolled by the state.
If we cared only about autonomy, we would leave persons to suffer
the consequences of their choices. That is what it means to have a choice.
And if we cared only about a static notion of respect for the natural body,
we would often refuse to permit persons to modify their own bodies. But
if we also care about freedom of thought, affiliation, and cultural produc-
tion because it is good for society, then we might want to prohibit some-
one from entering into contracts that will inhibit those freedoms, in order
to prevent those with greater capital from obtaining a monopoly on these
crucial contributors to social, political, and cultural change. The goal of a
even aside from changes in the way the person is treated socially. Thus, we might want to do our
best to ensure pregnancy is a state entered into with some forethought.
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society not overly constrained by orthodoxy may require that we forbid
persons from entering into too many self-constraints, but would still re-
quire respect for most of the choices persons make.
However, getting rid of all social coercion over our bodies is im-
possible. The relevance of our bodies is largely within a social context.
When a property owner places stairs at the front of a building, she makes
the bodies of those persons who cannot climb stairs relevant to their ex-
perience of the world in a way it would not be had she made the entrance
level with the sidewalk. When an employer requires his cocktail wai-
tresses to wear three-inch heels at work, he has not required them, at
least in the short term, to modify their natural bodies, 79 but he has
changed the way it feels when his employees walk, stand, or even sit.
Even "the use of tools and artifacts," such as at work, "requires a degree
of incorporation into the body; . . . the 'labor of animation."' 180 And
these uses of the body have lasting effects. For instance, despite the fact
that Henry Ford believed that repetitive labor would not "injure[] a man
in any way," such injuries do result. (Ford admitted having been told "by
parlour experts that repetitive labour is soul-as well as body-
destroying, but that has not been the result of our investigations," he ar-
gued.) 181
Not only is all this private coercion inevitable, human flourishing is
possible within the context of all this coercion, and is even facilitated by
the existence of private repositories of power. For instance, although
capitalism is a system that places a great deal of coercive power in pri-
vate hands, capitalism can provide the freedom to deviate from social
and cultural norms that contributes to the creation of new subcultures.
These subcultures can then challenge the very norms from which they
deviate. For instance, capitalism opened up a venue for the flourishing of
queer culture,' 82 and gay men and lesbians have found a refuge in com-
mercial venues such as bars and certain sectors of the entertainment in-
dustry.
Similarly, although it would seem that the choice to have sex in ex-
change for money is always, in some sense, coerced by the need or desire
for that money, this commodified sexual activity is not necessarily less
fulfilling or more corrupted than sexual activity arising out of "love" or
other impulses. For instance, in the work of some pro-sex feminists,
prostitutes have reported emotional connections and even having "favo-
179. Although in the long term he may have caused them lasting injury.
180. Jain, supra note 38, at 32 (quoting Elaine Scarry, The Merging of Bodies and Artifacts in
the Social Contract, in CULTURE ON THE BRINK 85, 97 (Gretchen Bender & Timothy Druckery eds.,
1994)).
181. Id. at 34 (quoting HENRY FORD WITH SAMUEL CROWTHER, MY LIFE AND WORK 105
(Doubleday, Page & Co. 1923) (1922)).
182. See John D'Emilio, Capitalism and Gay Identity, in THE LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES
READER, supra note 108, at 467,473-75.
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rite" clients. 83 These positive stories of prostitution can in turn challenge
our conceptions of what sexual activity should be and what role it should
play in our lives.
Finally, proponents of cultural property rights for indigenous and
other groups, in response to arguments that these rights would "commo-
dify" important elements of a culture, have demonstrated how this com-
modification need not be destructive to a subordinated subculture, and
can be used for progressive ends.'
84
In other words, we should acknowledge that human flourishing can
occur in the context of economic transactions, and can even be facilitated
by it.'85 In the context of the First Amendment, the United States Su-
preme Court has already recognized this, holding that forbidding profit
from speech is an unconstitutional restriction of speech.186 Thus, a feder-
al law that prevented civil servants from being paid for speeches and
writings has been struck down as overly restrictive of speech.1 87 Similar-
ly, one of New York's "Son of Sam" laws was struck down as overly
restrictive of speech. The law required convicted criminals profiting from
their crimes through books and movie deals to donate the profits to a
victim compensation fund. 88 These holdings acknowledge that banning
the commodification of a practice, or banning profits from the practice,
does not in the context of a generally capitalist economic system "pro-
tect" the practice in any sense. Rather, it discourages the practice.
On the other hand, the sometimes deleterious effects of capital on
these explorations of and articulations of identity cannot be ignored ei-
ther. The most visible forms of gay culture have displayed a tendency to
idolize the white and the wealthy.' 89 And positive stories of prostitutes
documented by pro-sex feminists aside, there are plenty of stories of
prostitution experienced as exploitative, denigrating, misogynist, and
183. Lucas, supra note 22, at 252.
184. See Carpenter et al., supra note 72, at 1026-30; Madhavi Sunder, Property in Person-
hood, in RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION, supra note 22, at 164, 171 ("[Tlhere may, in fact, be
some room for property in personhood claims if they are grounded on more modem understandings
of both culture and property.").
185. See Carol M. Rose, Afterword: Whither Commodification?, in RETHINKING
COMMODIFICATION, supra note 22, at 402, 404 ("Markets seem inappropriate for some things, but
then again, maybe markets are pretty useful for exactly the same things."). Rose also discusses the
"market's possibilities for novelty, liberty, and self-fashioning-not to speak of money." Id. at 421.
186. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
761-62 (1976) (concluding that speech which proposes a commercial transaction is protected by the
First Amendment).
187. United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 467 (1995) (holding the
government to a high burden to justify its "wholesale deterrent to a broad category of expression by
a massive number of potential speakers").
188. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
117 (1991) (subjecting Son of Sam law to First Amendment scrutiny because it operated as a "disin-
centive[] to speak").
189. Ramachandran, supra note 9, at 55-56 (using Will and Grace and Queer Eye for the
Straight Guy as examples).
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racist. We should acknowledge that systems of capital can facilitate hu-
man flourishing but also have an enormous effect on the end results of
that flourishing. Leaving that influence unchecked risks the consolidation
of power over cultural and social production in the hands of a few. Thus,
we may want to soften the effects of capital on practices that promote
cultural velocity through regulation of property and contract, rather than
through total bans on practices such as commodifying the body.
So what question should we answer when we embark on that
project? When should we regulate property and contract in the interest of
the special role the body may play in cultural velocity? I propose the
following standard: we should ask ourselves, to what degree does the
property transfer being contemplated, or the assertion of rights by the
property owner, raise the concern that an individual will lose the ability
to explore, form, and reform his identity as a social being?
a. Pain
If the control an individual seeks to submit himself to involves pain
or extended physical discomfort, the fear may be substantiated. For most
persons, subjection to pain and discomfort is cognitively difficult to
overcome. Of course, some persons are particularly lucky or resistant;
they do not mentally collapse even after years of torture or slavery. But
others lose all capacity to interact as social beings. Torture has been de-
scribed as "unmaking the world" of the victim for this reason. 190 Even
those in slavery who are not physically abused can often lose their sense
of agency in manufacturing a social identity. The embodied nature of our
subjectivities is why the infliction of physical pain through torture can
have this effect. In other words, even in the absence of any cultural
meaning that torture is disrespectful to the victim, acts like torture may,
via control of the body and infliction of pain, too greatly inhibit the indi-
vidual's development of an identity. 191
b. Duration
In addition to the degree of pain a particular intrusion on the body
entails, the duration of the consequences of subjection to the physical
control of another may be relevant to the capacity to form and reform
one's own identity. For instance, there is a substantiated risk that some-
one who sells an entire limb will undergo a change in his or her expe-
rience of the world so significant (and permanent) that it may be difficult
to cognitively overcome the feeling that one's identity has been al-
tered.192 Selling oneself into indentured servitude of permanent duration
190. SCARRY, supra note 117, at 37-38.
191. See Rubenfeld, supra note 113, at 776-81.
192. See Miho iwakuma, The Body as Embodiment: An Investigation of the Body by Merleau-
Ponty, in DISABILITY/POSTMODERNITY, supra note 42, at 76, 81 (describing the phenomenon of
phantom limbs in amputees).
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would likely do something similar. But the fear that one will lose the
capacity to develop one's identity by selling blood or hair is far less
substantiated because neither of these losses is very permanent.
c. Cultural Meaning
Finally, if the control an individual seeks to give up is over the way
the body is culturally read and presented, this can implicate law's interest
in dispersing control over formation of identities. Thus, when employees
contract away to employers their rights to dress as they please, the inter-
est in dispersed control over bodies is implicated. This need not mean
that as the right is balanced against other interests, the right always pre-
vails. However, it does mean that positive regulation of such employ-
ment contracts might be one way of promoting cultural velocity through
individual rights to "bodily" exploration of identity.
In the next Part, I explore a few tentative examples of how we
might apply this standard in the United States. These examples will serve
to flesh out how the approach might be applied in a particular cultural
context. Even when we take into account current social realities about the
importance of the body, the legal rights we would then recognize will
look different than traditional rights to bodily integrity we have seen
before. The examples will necessarily not be comprehensive, and of
course, application of the principle will sometimes involve a host of oth-
er considerations, especially when positive property and contract regula-
tion is considered. The purpose of the examples, however, is to help elu-
cidate the difference between rights in the human body and rights that
acknowledge the body's importance, but stop treating it as an end in it-
self.
V. EXAMPLES OF THE BODY'S RELATIONSHIP TO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Applying a human or constitutional right that appropriately protects
the public interest in cultural velocity, as it relates to the practical impor-
tance of the body in cultural velocity, will necessarily require both nega-
tive rights against the state and positive property and contract regulation.
Only a combination of both negative rights and positive regulation can
help to ensure that the legal and social coercion that bodies are subject to
does not lead to consolidated control over culture in the hands of a po-
werful few.
Some of these example applications will result in very familiar neg-
ative rights against the state, ones that both dignitarians and libertarians
promote, such as the right to refuse medical treatment or other state at-
tempts to mandate changes to the body. Other familiar rights against the
state would include the right to change one's own body, such as the right
to obtain tattoos and piercings, to cross-dress, or to purchase medical
treatment.
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Other applications will consist of protecting rights that increase cul-
tural velocity against private regulation, resulting in property regulation
that many dignitarians would agree with, but that strong libertarians
would reject. For instance, we might limit the ability to sell one's own
body part when that sale would result in long term physical pain and thus
cognitively interfere with the ability to develop and reform one's identi-
ty.
There will also be applications of cultural velocity to protect rights
against private coercion that would be totally unfamiliar to either the
dignitarian or libertarian approaches. For instance, my approach might
lead us to regulate exchanges in ordinary chattel, such as certain implants
and prosthetics. Still other forms of regulation might consist in exten-
sions of employment and housing law, protecting people with different
bodies from discrimination in these realms.
I also describe in this Part some examples of property and contract
regulation, such as total bans on prostitution and organ selling, that do
not in fact further properly conceived "rights in the body." This is despite
the fact that such regulation is frequently justified on the grounds that it
protects against commodification of the body.
A. Rights Against State Intrusion-from Torture to Forced Vaccination
Applying the cultural velocity principle to questions of state intru-
sion into the body would likely result in the recognition of a relatively
familiar negative right against state intrusion into the body. This is be-
cause embodied subjectivity creates the danger that many forms of state
intrusion on bodies are too cognitively difficult to overcome. If the state
can intrude on one's body, and can thereby direct our subjective expe-
riences, this may lead to state suppression of different ways of living,
different experiences, and different identities, all of which generally con-
tribute to cultural evolution when left unpunished by criminal law.
Thus, rights to resist severe state imposed pain' 93 or very invasive or
permanent medical treatment,194 such as forced sterilization,' 95 would
likely be included within an application of the cultural velocity approach,
just as they would likely be included in the "bodily integrity" rights pro-
tected under many dignitarian and autonomy approaches.
193. Cf Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1530 (2008) (noting that what many forbidden punish-
ments under the Eighth Amendment "had in common was the deliberate infliction of pain for the
sake of pain-'superadd[ing]' pain to the death sentence through torture and the like" (alteration in
original)).
194. E.g., Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 807 (1997) (clarifying that the right to refuse medical
treatment rests in the right "to bodily integrity and freedom from unwanted touching").
195. E.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 534 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring) (describing the
now discredited but "once-pervasive" forced sterilization of persons with disabilities).
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On the other hand, mandatory vaccination does not entail a great
degree of pain, the pain felt does not last very long, and the cultural
meaning of being marked as a person with or without a vaccination is not
very significant to most persons' identity. Thus, no fundamental right to
refuse vaccination should stem from the special relationship of the body
to rights. This does not mean that rights to refuse vaccination could not
stem from other sources, such as religious freedoms. 196 But the argument
that rights to bodily integrity or control over one's body should entail
rights to refuse vaccination are too fetishistic about the body, subscribing
to the fiction that our bodies could ever be "free" from all intrusion that
implicates dignity or autonomy.
B. Rights to Change One's Body-From Abortion to Cross Dressing
Applying the principle to the question of rights to proactively modi-
fy and treat one's body would also likely result in relatively familiar neg-
ative rights against state criminalization of those modifications and
treatments, such as abortion, 197 or treatments that are necessary to avoid
pain.198 A right to purchase many forms of medical treatment, or even
"upgrades" to "healthy" or "normal" bodies, would also likely fall within
the scope of rights we would want to protect in order to promote cultural
velocity.
In this way, any "bodily" right protected under cultural velocity
would be quite different from the American constitutional right to bodily
integrity, which distinguishes between rights to resist intrusion into the
body and rights to modify one's own body. The United States Supreme
Court has recognized a fundamental right to refuse life sustaining medi-
cal treatment, but has not recognized a fundamental right to contract for
assistance in committing suicide through the use of medication. 99 But
the cultural velocity principle would not make this distinction because
the right is not grounded merely in the "integrity" of the body, nor even
merely in avoiding physical pain.
196. E.g., In re Sherr v. Northport-East Northport Union Free Sch. Dist., 672 F. Supp. 81, 91
(E.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding that under First Amendment, religious exemption to New York's mandato-
ry inoculation program for school children must be extended to all persons who sincerely hold reli-
gious beliefs, and not just persons who are bona fide members of a recognized religious organiza-
tion).
197. SeeRoev. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
198. Some Supreme Court justices have indicated that they would find constitutional fault with
laws that prohibit the administration of pain medication necessary to alleviate great suffering, even
in instances where the administration of the medicine is virtually certain to cause death. Washington
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 736-37 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The parties and amici
agree that in these States a patient who is suffering from a terminal illness and who is experiencing
great pain has no legal barriers to obtaining medication, from qualified physicians, to alleviate that
suffering, even to the point of causing unconsciousness and hastening death.").
199. Compare Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990), with Vacco, 521
U.S. at 807.
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The principle also recognizes the importance of the body as a means
of exploring and forming a cultural identity, and would therefore likely
protect choices to engage in numerous kinds of body modifications, such
as abortions, surgical and hormonal sex change procedures, cosmetic
surgery, tattooing, piercing, and perhaps the ingestion of "mind altering"
drugs. Again, rights are rarely absolute in any constitutional system, so
professional and safety regulation of many of these practices would like-
ly pass muster, as they do in the American constitutional system.2°
The right to cross dress, and indeed, to dress as one pleases in pub-
lic generally, would likely also be appropriately protected, even though
dress and the use of jewelry do not involve the alteration of one's "natu-
ral" body. I have argued for such a freedom of dress in a prior work, but
it is not on solid footing in American constitutional law.2°' Of course, as
with all rights, sometimes the right will need to be balanced against other
rights and other interests. Thus, threatening exercises of dress, such as
indecent exposure committed with intent to harass and threaten, or the
wearing of dangerous weapons as part of an "outfit," could be regulated,
but the point remains that some kind of countermajoritarian right to ma-
nipulate one's appearance would make sense under the cultural velocity
principle's application to the special importance of our bodies.
C. Rights to Use One's Body-from Sexual Liberty to Verbal Harassment
A right to sexual liberty202 might also be grounded in this cultural
velocity principle. Sexual activity is a use of the body that is largely de-
scribed as having important components of physicality, just as the free-
dom to manipulate one's appearance through dress was historically de-
scribed as a bodily freedom.20 3 Moreover, sexual activity is one impor-
tant means in many cultures of forming cultural affiliations and identity.
But would recognition of the body's importance to cultural velocity
principle mean that we would protect every single use of the body?
Could I claim that because my verbal harassment of another person in-
volves use of my mouth that it is protected under the right? Could I claim
that because thinking involves my brain, which is part of my body, an
inquiry into my intent to commit a crime is an intrusion into my rights
over my body?
200. For instance, the right to obtain an abortion may be limited by health and safety regula-
tions throughout pregnancy. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874-78 (1992).
201. Ramachandran, supra note 9, at 16-17 (describing Supreme Court's denial of certiorari on
the issue in the face of a circuit split).
202. Cf Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (finding criminalization of same sex
sodomy between consenting adults in private to violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
203. See James Allon Garland, Breaking the Enigma Code: Why the Law has Failed to Recog-
nize Sex as Expressive Conduct Under the First Amendment, and Why Sex Between Men Proves that
it Should, 12 L. & SEXUALITY 159, 180-87 (2003) (using the example of relationships between gay
men to demonstrate the expressive nature of sex).
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Recognition of the body's importance to cultural velocity, as a prac-
tical reason to select certain bodily-identity performative behaviors for
legal protection, would not provide a reason for selecting speech or
thought for legal protection. Those reasons would have to be articulated
separately. This is because the cultural velocity conception has aban-
doned any idea that rights should map onto the physical borders of the
human body. Thus, not every use or modification of the human body will
necessarily implicate the body in a manner relevant to cultural velocity.
Those uses that, as a cultural matter, tend to be experienced and unders-
tood as implicating subjectivity and cultural performance will be the uses
that sit at the core of the fight. This is why dress would be a more plausi-
ble candidate for protection than verbal speech, despite the fact that ver-
bal speech involves a great deal of movement of one's mouth-part of
the human body-while dress may not involve the movement of any part
of the human body. Dress merely involves the placement of chattel upon
the human body.
D. Patent Law
Beyond these mostly familiar negative rights against the state, ap-
plying the cultural velocity principle would also likely result in some
rather unfamiliar forms of property regulation. For instance, it is possible
that we might want to restrict end user license agreements ("EULAs") in
certain forms of chattel because they would threaten individual innova-
tion and ability to form and reform identity. We wouldn't ignore the im-
plications of sellers retaining property rights in highly personal chattel
just because it's chattel, rather than part of the organic body.
As one example, we might want to restrict the enforcement of EU-
LAs against users of prostheses and other medical technology that inti-
mately affects mobility, perception, or communication. This would in-
clude items like cochlear implants, robotic arms, visual aids, wheel-
chairs, and the like. While the idea that patent holders on these technolo-
gies would enforce EULAs against patients may seem far-fetched, the
possibility that they would do so in a future in which many of these de-
vices are "elective" is much stronger. If Apple is willing to enforce such
agreements against purchasers of iPhones,2°4 would it not consider en-
forcing them against purchasers of computer or phone implants? Memo-
ry card implants?
We might even want to simply restrict the enforcement of EULAs
against users of any technology deeply tied to identity formation, wheth-
er or not it has anything to do with physicality or the body. It may be that
204. Katie Hafner, Altered iPhones Freeze up, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2007 at CI, available at
2007 WLNR 19068410 ("Jennifer Bowcock, an Apple spokeswoman, said that when people went to
update their software with their computer through iTunes, a warning appeared on the computer
screen, making it clear that any unauthorized modifications to the iPhone software violated the
agreement that people entered into when they bought the phone.").
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the importance of the body will start to drop away, over time, and will no
longer be a pragmatic, culturally appropriate way of singling out some
identity formative practices from others for legal protection. The number
of persons who find their phones, Facebook accounts, and other items to
be more foundational to identity than even a prosthesis or their clothing
may be growing. The cultural velocity approach is well-suited to deal
with these sorts of changing conditions because it is an empirically falsi-
fiable, consequentialist approach.
E. Employment and Housing Law
Another relatively unfamiliar area in which we might want to pro-
mote cultural velocity as it relates to bodily identity performance is in the
regulation of employment and housing contracts. The U.S. economic
system provides very minimal welfare rights, and indeed, provides no
welfare entitlements to those who are considered able to work but do
not.20 5 Thus, the process of entering into employment and housing con-
tracts for most adults in the U.S. is essential. With respect to the
workplace, statutes like the Civil Rights Act of 1964206 have made the
American workplace more integrated and diverse along culturally salient
categories such as race than many other private institutions such as
churches or social clubs.20 7 The workplace is already a venue where
Americans can learn about those with different identities, where we can
be challenged. 0 8
We have already made statutory moves toward accommodating dif-
ferences in bodies in both the employment and housing contexts, and we
do not limit ourselves only to those differences in bodies which are fully
biologically determined. For instance, we forbid discrimination on the
basis of race, sex, and skin color 2° 9 in these contexts, even though both
race and sex can be thought of as socially constructed in part. We also
require reasonable accommodation, at least in principle, of persons with
disabilities at work and in school.2 1°
205. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 permitted
states to stop paying benefits to those otherwise eligible for welfare assistance if the recipient did not
engage in qualified work. Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 407, 110 Stat. 2105, 2129-34 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 607 (2006)).
206. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e- Ito -17 (2006).
207. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89
GEO. L.J. I, 17 (2000) ("[E]ven the partial demographic integration that does exist in the workplace
yields far more social integration-actual interracial interaction and friendship-than any other
domain of American society.").
208. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Free Speech and Due Process in the Workplace, 71 IND. L.J. 101,
112 (1995) ("The workplace functions not only as a self-governing institution and as a regulated
institution; it also functions as a crucial intermediate institution that stands between the individual
and the state.").
209. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 3601-3619 (2006).
210. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006).
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However, we may want to expand this to accommodating not just
biological or "accidental" difference, but also other differences in bodies.
We may protect the ability of employees in their use of chattel closely
related to the body, such as clothing, jewelry, or hairstyling. 21 1 We might
also protect transgender employees, who change the gender presentation
of their bodies through both surgical and somewhat more superficial
changes. We could also protect transgender persons and persons who
dress unusually from being excluded from housing. When it comes to
this kind of private regulation of rights, a workable way of protecting
rights in this private context will of course require a great deal of finesse.
One appropriate way to balance the many interests at stake would be to
require reasonable accommodation of employee differences in dress in
most workplaces and provide statutory exceptions for certain jobs such
as modeling or acting.
212
Protections from sexual orientation discrimination could be con-
ceived of as a means of promoting the right as well, as sexual conduct is
certainly in the United States a means of exploring and forming identity
through the use of the body.
Finally, we could consider expanding the kinds of bodies we rea-
sonably accommodate in workplaces and schools beyond those currently
protected by the Americans with Disabilities Act. Perhaps a body need
not be "disabled" to the point of impairment in a "major life function"
for us to recognize that it represents a different identity we may want
others to interact with and learn from.2 13
Under this framework, persons who choose not to or cannot afford
to "upgrade" their bodies through the use of drugs (such as steroids) and
other biotechnology could be protected against unjust workplace or edu-
cational exclusion through reasonable accommodation of their compara-
tive disadvantages and differences. However, the protections would not
necessarily be great-"reasonable accommodation" is, after all, a rela-
tively weak mandate. As a result, those who did not alter their bodies and
therefore became less adept at truly core job functions would likely be
left unprotected. I choose the weak requirement of reasonable accommo-
dation purposefully as an example of what protecting rights to have a
different body in a private sphere such as the workplace might look like.
211. 1 have proposed just this in a prior article, Freedom of Dress. See Ramachandran, supra
note 9, at 37-43.
212. Id. at 61-64.
213. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") such
that the protected class of disabled persons it protects is quite narrowly defined. E.g., Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 488-89 (1999) (finding that severely myopic job applicants
were not disabled within meaning of the Act because they could use corrective lenses, and therefore
received no protection from discrimination by the defendant employer on the basis of the myopia).
The ADA was recently amended, however, to clarify that the coverage should be broad. ADA
Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4, 122 Stat. 3553, 3555-56 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102 (West 2009)).
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This relatively weak protection takes seriously the fact that some
degree of coercion over bodies is inevitable. There will likely be eco-
nomic incentives to take enhancing medication or alter one's body in
other ways in the future, just as there are economic incentives to obtain
cosmetic surgery that makes one more attractive now, and economic
incentives to wear contact lenses or even obtain LASIK surgery. Because
this coercion is inevitable, the aim of property and contract regulation to
protect rights in the body can never be to provide absolute, substantive
equality or absolute "freedom" for different bodies. The aim can only be
to soften the effects of capital and other sources of private power on the
variety of bodies and identities that become part of our culture-to pre-
vent the consolidation of power over culture through power over bodies.
F. Welfare Law
With this in mind, we may be faced with body modifications in the
future that are so economically valuable we simply cannot accommodate
those who do not obtain them. Such accommodation may not be as easy
as accommodation of visual or hearing impairments in many professions.
For instance, we might be faced with the development of technology that
dramatically expands memory or other components of intellectual ca-
pacity.
Thus, we might find it simpler at times to just redistribute wealth
more dramatically, as a means of ensuring that those without capital re-
tain a degree of material security no matter what they do or do not do to
their bodies. This is certainly not strong protection, since all it would
likely guarantee is that having an unusual body will not lead to starvation
or homelessness. But we might argue that more generous welfare bene-
fits are required for precisely this reason.
It is also worth pointing out that currently, we do not even have pro-
tection against starvation and homelessness for persons with unusual
bodies, persons who are challenging our social norms. Transgender per-
sons, for instance, are so marginalized under American law that they
often become homeless and their very existence essentially crimina-
214lized. No welfare system ensures basic material security for transgend-
er persons, as even sex segregated homeless shelters are often unable to
provide security.21 5
As another reform of welfare law, we might also provide welfare
entitlements to obtain some economically valuable body modifications,
214. Spade, supra note 123, at 751-52.
215. Id. at 752-53 (describing how a host of laws, including gender documentation require-
ments even for driver's licenses, create a lack of access to employment and housing, and unsafe
conditions at homeless shelters for many transgender persons).
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to ensure that those with fewer financial resources and their progeny are
not locked out of future opportunity and cultural participation.2 16
In fact, some prominent members of the "transhumanist" movement
have predicted that once extremely valuable technology modifying the
body is available, the masses will simply "demand" a dramatic wealth
redistribution.2t 7 This is meant to respond to egalitarian concerns that
body modifying or improving technology could widen the gap between
poor and rich too far.218
While I find this prediction to be overly optimistic, the core point is
a fair one-perhaps generous welfare law is a more direct instrument
with which to deal with the inequality that social and cultural coercion
over bodies inevitably causes. This makes sense once we have recog-
nized that private property rights already threaten persons' control over
their bodies. If that is the case, welfare law, rather than rights to "bodily
integrity" or "personhood," may sometimes be the most effective way of
protecting the ability to have a different or unusual body.
G. Body Commodification-From Prostitution to Organ Selling
Are there some sales of the body's parts or uses that must be prohi-
bited, or that cannot be prohibited? There are some sales of the body or
its parts that we might legitimately be concerned with from the perspec-
tive of protecting the public interest in cultural velocity. This is because
we might legitimately be concerned that those with economic power and
other forms of private influence could obtain too much control over cul-
ture by obtaining too much control over bodies. On the other hand, not
every commodification of the "natural" body need be categorically for-
bidden, because not every commodification of the natural body impli-
216. The United Nations Convention on The Rights of Persons with Disabilities represents an
important move towards welfare rights to certain aids. Section (g) of Article 4 states an obligation of
parties to "undertake or promote research and development of, and to promote the availability and
use of new technologies, including information and communications technologies, mobility aids,
devices and assistive technologies, suitable for persons with disabilities, giving priority to technolo-
gies at an affordable cost." G.A. Res. 61/106, art. IV, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/106 (Jan. 24, 2007).
Article 20 states that parties "shall take effective measures to ensure personal mobility with the
greatest possible independence for persons with disabilities." Id. at art. XX. This includes
"[flacilitating access by persons with disabilities to quality mobility aids, devices, assistive technol-
ogies and forms of live assistance and intermediaries, including by making them available at afford-
able cost." Id.
217. HUGHES, supra note 45, at 214-15.
218. Id.:
It is unlikely that a future majority of service-providing 'commoners' with more free
time, communications and democracy than today would tolerate being lorded over by a
dynasty of non-working hereditary capitalists. They would vote to change the system.
The trend in the social democracies has been to equalize income by raising the standards
of the poorest as high as the economy can bear. In the age of robots, that minimum will
be very high.
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting HANS MORAVEC, ROBOT: MERE MACHINE TO
TRANSCENDENT MIND 132 (2000)).
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cates this concern. But are there any sales of body parts or uses that must
be permitted, from the perspective of protecting cultural velocity?
1. Prostitution
The best example of body commodification that arguably must be
permitted under a proper understanding of the relationship of the body to
rights is prostitution. Prostitution does not inherently involve pain, nor
does it inherently involve indentured servitude or a use of the body that
is extremely long in duration. Moreover, the long term physical effects of
sexual activity, when engaged in with protections such as condoms, may
be less significant than the long term physical effects of other forms of
labor we permit, such as repetitive factory work.
Of course, the cultural and social meaning of engaging in sexual ac-
tivity with another can be very significant, but forbidding all profits from
activities that involve identity exploration, or from culturally meaningful
acts, is unlikely to "protect" these activities in an otherwise essentially
capitalist context. It is more likely to simply disincentivize them. This is
why the United States Supreme Court has recognized that forbidding
profits altogether from certain kinds of speech is usually an overbroad
restriction on that speech.21 9 It is also why, when I argued for a freedom
of dress, I did not argue that modeling and acting should be outlawed.22°
Thus, it is arguable that not only should we abandon the claim that pros-
titution violates fundamental rights to bodily integrity, but we should
also recognize a fundamental right to engage in prostitution, given the
importance of sexual activity to identity formation and culture.
One might ask, does sex really need to be incentivized, the way cer-
tain forms of speech need to be incentivized? Do we really need financial
incentives for sexual identity formation and exploration? The kind of sex
that is culturally "normal" probably needs little additional financial in-
centive for persons to experiment with it. But some kinds of unusual or
culturally challenging sexual experiences will probably happen more
often in the United States if prostitution is legalized. For instance, per-
sons with certain disabilities and disfigurements may be more likely to
have sexual experiences if prostitution is legalized. 221 Alternately, some
of these culturally challenging practices might be made more culturally
visible, and actually have some effect on cultural norms regarding sex-
219. United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 468-70 (1995).
220. Indeed, I proposed categorically exempting these jobs from reasonable accommodation of
dress requirements. Ramachandran, supra note 9, at 63-64.
221. See Lucas, supra note 22, at 253 ("[l1n our nonideal world some individuals may be
limited to a choice between commodified sex and involuntary celibacy."). See generally Elizabeth F.
Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State's Role in the Accidents of Sex and Love, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 1307, 1385 (2009) (including information on state subsidies in some countries for the purchase
of prostitution services by persons with disabilities).
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uality, if prostitution is legal and more persons can "admit" to having
sexual experiences with persons that are culturally disfavored sexually.
222
Of course, sexual activity can be experienced as a bodily intrusion
that affects one's very identity, even one's capacity to develop a different
identity in the future.2 3 Thus, many forms of regulation of prostitution
may be wholly appropriate, and because any right to prostitution would
not be grounded in "autonomy," such regulation would not necessarily
infringe upon the right. Some examples of appropriate regulation could
be laws that seek strong assurance of consent, laws requiring safe prac-
tices to prevent disease and pregnancy, laws ensuring the ability of par-
ties to change their minds, and perhaps periodic surveillance or inspec-
tion to prevent violence. Even taxing the proceeds of prostitution and
using the funds for mandatory counseling or other activities designed to
ensure that the identity of the prostitute is not destroyed might be appro-
priate.
But in the face of arguments from sex workers that the work need
not be destructive to identity formation and reformation, and in the face
of the fact that we permit adults to take these risks with their physical
bodies in the context of unpaid sex, prostitution appears to be a commo-
dification of the body that we ought to legalize under a practical applica-
tion of the cultural velocity principle, even one that accounts for the im-
portance of sexual practice as a use of the body to identity formation.
Arguably, some legal form of prostitution is even required as a matter of
fundamental rights.
2. Organ Selling
Organ selling, in contrast, is a form of body commodification that
involves lasting physical effects on the body. Thus, societies may be
rightly concerned that those who sell organs might be selling away an
aspect of their very subjectivity, in a manner that could affect their abili-
ty to explore many possible identities and cultural affiliations. But this is
likely not the case for every organ or organ sale.
Selling one's eyes, a hand, or another such body part intimately in-
volved in sensory perception or mobility may have lasting effects on
one's identity that the seller regrets. On the other hand, selling a kidney
seems less problematic with respect to this public interest in cultural evo-
lution and change. Certainly the loss of a kidney entails future medical
risk and even perhaps some experiences of pain that last well into the
future. Thus, there are reasons to regulate such sales heavily to ensure
222. Cf Lucas, supra note 22, at 261 ("Another benefit of commodification would be that...
prostitutes could openly discuss their work, describe its pros and cons .... Customers could frankly
discuss their experiences, both in the crass, economic way that commodification critics fear but also
in honest terms about... what needs they seek to fill.").
223. See id. at 257-58.
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fully informed consent. But a categorical prohibition on kidney sales
does not appear to further the legitimate public interest in protecting in-
dividuals from contracting away their ability to form diverse identities.
On the other hand, there doesn't appear to be any reason to categor-
ically protect a right to sell organs under this approach, either. Organ
donation is not a particularly culturally salient practice, nor does it seem
to involve physical experiences that are part of identity exploration, the
way sexual acts arguably do. Moreover, most people donating organs are
anesthetized during the process-it is not a bodily experience in which
the donor is generally attempting to change or control his or her subjec-
tivity, even temporarily. Thus, it is neither particularly "personal" in the
sense of importance to subjective experience, nor particularly "political"
in the sense of identity performative.
There may be traditional utilitarian concerns that would lead to bans
on organ selling and other commodifications of the body, such as selling
blood. The economic stability of a community and public health con-
cerns are two potential reasons. And there may be traditional utilitarian
concerns that would lead to permitting organ selling or other commodifi-
cations such as selling blood-we might want to increase the supply of
organs, for instance. But these concerns need not be couched in terms of
a fundamental right to bodily integrity, human dignity, or autonomy.
H. Animal-Human and Plant-Human Chimeras
What about the patenting of animal-human or plant-human chime-
ras, or transgenic entities,224 that has raised so much new concern over
assigning the legal status of property to persons or their parts?
225
If an animal-human or plant-human chimera is capable of cultural
interaction and affiliation, or of identity group formation and reforma-
tion, then it would seem that the cultural velocity principle would require
us to forbid patent owners from controlling these entities in these activi-
ties.
It is important to note here that because of the way I have grounded
the rights we protect under law, I am not requiring these entities to have
"human intelligence" or to be capable of full political participation in
order to be possessed of rights. Thus, my theory also protects almost all
persons with disabilities, including those with mental disabilities. Even if
a person with a severe mental disability never develops to the stage of
traditional political participation, he is capable of identity performance
and cultural affiliation, as well as of social attachments that are instruc-
224. See Munzer, supra note 57, at 124 (providing definitions of these terms).
225. See, e.g., Bagley, supra note 2, at 546; see also supra notes 50, 60, 62-64, 66 and accom-
panying text.
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226tive and useful to society. But some minimal level of "intelligence" or
cognitive processing is probably required for a being to attain the kinds
of identities or bodily identity performances that could contribute to our
cultural evolution.
Although a proper conception of how the body relates to rights may
ultimately prevent a patent-holder from exercising control over the be-
ings she creates, the principle I have articulated would not necessarily
prevent a patent holder from preventing another person or company from
producing identical beings for the duration of the patent. This portion of
the patent right does not seem to lastingly affect our interest in cultural
evolution or cultural velocity. Thus, a patent holder in an animal-human
chimera or transgenic creature might see his or her patent rights dimi-
nished, but not destroyed, under a proper conception of the body's rela-
tionship to fundamental rights.
It may seem strange for a company to hold a patent in the method of
producing an entity that has intelligence, interacts with others, and is a
member of society. But this state of affairs is not without analogy in laws
with which we are familiar. Not long ago, children were treated like the
property of their fathers.227 But parents do not exercise absolute domi-
nion over their children. For instance, parents cannot abuse or neglect
their children in the United States. And even in the past, fathers had du-
ties of care to their children. 228 Moreover, once children reach adulthood,
parents exercise no dominion or control over their children at all. And
yet, this recognition that parents should not have total control over their
children need not stop us from using property rights to govern control
over embryos that parents have contributed to genetically. Allowing a
parent to sell an embryo or donate rights in the embryo to another parent
is not the same as allowing a parent to exercise dominion over a child. 29
CONCLUSION
The problem of property and freedom of contract threatening fun-
damental rights is not new. However, the physical merger of humans and
non-humans is about to become prominent. Thus, we can no longer sub-
scribe to the fiction that by drawing a sharp line between humans and the
226. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 79, at 99, 129 (describing her "conception of the person as a
social animal, whose dignity does not derive from an idealized rationality," and also "the advantage
of understanding humanity and its diversity that comes from associating with mentally disabled
people on terms of mutual respect and reciprocity").
227. See MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: THE
HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES 1-13 (1994) (describing the fathers' custody
over children as similar to the master/servant relationship, which involved duties of care, as well as
the ability to contract out and profit from a servant's labor).
228. Id. at 12-13.
229. See Dan L. Burk, Patenting Transgenic Human Embryos: A Nonuse Cost Perspective, 30
Hous. L. REV. 1597, 1648 (1993) ("[T]he holder of a patent for a transgenic human being could
presumably prevent others from making, using, or selling such a transgenic human being, but this
does not mean that the patent holder could impress the patented person into servitude or bondage.").
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rest of the world, and prohibiting the commodification of the human, we
have sufficiently protected the need for diverse exercises of human agen-
cy against property rights. Property rights and freedom of contract have
always threatened to stifle us via our bodies, such as by constructing us
as "disabled" rather than "abled," or by determining whether we will
need to perform physical labor to survive.
We must accept that the line between humans and property is being
blurred, and that already human self-control can be affected by the distri-
bution of property rights. To deal with threats to physical self-control we
cannot rely on the formal sanctity of the human body as separate from
property. At the same time, we cannot rely solely on unregulated, auton-
omy-based, property-like rights in the body. For the same reasons that all
forms of property are regulated, and do not entail sole dominion, proper-
ty-like rights in one's body should also sometimes be regulated.
We instead need a conception of rights that would simultaneously
protect the diverse set of bodily choices that form individuals' identities
and cultural affiliations, while using the regulation of property and con-
tract to protect against a few actors obtaining monopolies over the sub-
jectivities and identities of others. But because we are at least in part
products of technology, our rights to control our own subjectivities or to
form diverse identities cannot be protected by any kind of neat "right to
bodily integrity" or autonomy over the natural, human body.

RETHINKING "INSURANCE," ESPECIALLY AFTER AIG
BOBBY L. DEXTERt
INTRODUCTION
In order to qualify as an "insurance company" for federal income
tax purposes, both life insurance companies and their property and casu-
alty counterparts must clear the hurdle of Section 816(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code ("the Code").' That section clarifies that insurance com-
pany status follows only if more than half of the entity's business is the
issuance of insurance or annuity contracts.2 Although neither the Code
nor the Treasury Regulations define "insurance," 3 longstanding common
law doctrine dictates that an arrangement will constitute insurance only if
it incorporates requisite risk shifting and risk distribution.4 A life insur-
ance policyholder, for example, typically shifts the financial risk of his
untimely demise to an insurance company by paying premiums.5 In turn,
the life insurance company broadly distributes that risk by collecting
premiums from a large population of policyholders 6 so that any claims
presented will not present a financial challenge to the company relative
to the aggregate premiums received and set aside for claim payments.7 In
t Associate Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law. B.A., Yale University,
1989; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1992. 1 would like to thank Chapman University School of Law for
providing research support for this article and my faculty colleagues for offering comments and
suggestions during the presentation of this work. Thanks are also in order for comments from par-
ticipants attending the Southern California Junior Law Faculty Workshop held at Pepperdine School
of Law, the 2009 Annual Meeting of the Law & Society Association, and the 2009 Junior Tax
Scholars Workshop held at Brooklyn Law School.
1. See I.R.C. § 816(a) (2006). With respect to property and casualty companies subject to tax
under § 831, section 831(c) indicates that "insurance company" under § 831 has the same meaning
as that set forth in § 816(a). I.R.C. § 83 1(c) (2006).
2. See § 816(a). A company may also qualify by reinsuring risks underwritten by other
insurance companies. See id.
3. See Rev. Rul. 2005-40,2005-2 C.B. 4, 2005 WL 1415557.
4. See Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531, 539 (1941) ("Historically and commonly insur-
ance involves risk-shifting and risk-distributing.").
5. See Clougherty Packing Co. v. Comm'r, 811 F.2d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1987) ("Shifting
risk entails the transfer of the impact of a potential loss from the insured to the insurer. If the insured
has shifted its risk to the insurer, then a loss by or a claim against the insured does not affect it be-
cause the loss is offset by the proceeds of an insurance payment."); Spring Canyon Coal Co. v.
Comm'r, 43 F.2d 78, 80 (10th Cir. 1930) (noting that the taxpayer would have shifted the risk had it
paid the premium).
6. See Clougherty Packing Co., 811 F.2d at 1300 ("Insuring many independent risks in
return for numerous premiums serves to distribute risk.").
7. See id. As an interesting historical aside, several of the initial founders of the North Caro-
lina Mutual Life Insurance Company (which currently has insurance in force exceeding $12 billion
and is the oldest and largest historically African-American-owned life insurance company in the
United States, see N.C. Mut. Life Ins. Co., http://www.ncmutuallife.com/newsite/pages/about.html
(last visited Sept. 7, 2009)) had to pool their own funds after a quick meeting in the rear of a barber
shop in order to pay the $40 death benefit claim of a widow. See 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AFRICAN
AMERICAN BUsINESS 519 (Jessie Carney Smith ed., 2006).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
adopting that approach, the company takes advantage of the so-called
"law of large numbers." Using reliable probability data, it can generally
coordinate premium receipts with predicted losses. With a population of
policyholders in a life insurance pool sufficiently large and varied, pre-
dicted mortality rates will roughly correlate with the population's actual
mortality rates, 9 and the company can generally pay benefits as they
come due over the long term without going broke in the short term.'
0
For many companies, satisfying the qualitative and quantitative "in-
surance" standards presents no problem. Accordingly, the company does
not question its status as an insurance company. Logically, those policy-
holders entitled to deduct premiums paid to insurance companies as ordi-
nary and necessary business expenses also have no reason to question the
tax deductibility of the payments made." Historically, however, there are
prominent victims of the risk shifting/distributing standard, entities
known in the business world as "captive" insurance companies. 12 Gener-
ally speaking, a captive insurance company (which is routinely organized
and operated as a wholly-owned subsidiary of a parent entity) is often
created to provide coverage to a business that cannot secure the insur-
ance it needs from the marketplace, or can only secure such insurance at
a prohibitive cost' 3 (for example, a company operating nuclear reactors
in an urban area and needing insurance against the risk of a meltdown).
Legitimate business needs notwithstanding, the Internal Revenue Service
("IRS" or "Service") has long been hostile to the notion that a wholly-
owned subsidiary can insure its parent company' 4 and, accordingly, that
the payment of a premium from a parent to its captive insurer subsidiary
qualifies as a deductible ordinary and necessary business expense. At-
tempts to resolve this issue have, not surprisingly, resulted in substantial
judicial activity, a series of IRS pronouncements, and a healthy body of
professional and scholarly commentary.' 5 For some time, the Service
8. See Clougherty Packing Co., 811 F.2d at 1300.
9. See id. (linking the law of large numbers, a statistical phenomenon, and the concept of risk
distribution).
10. See id. ("Distributing risk allows the insurer to reduce the possibility that a single costly
claim will exceed the amount taken in as a premium and set aside for the payment of such a claim..
• By assuming numerous relatively small, independent risks that occur randomly over time, the
insurer smoothes out losses to match more closely its receipt of premiums.").
11. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a) (as amended in 1993) ("Among the items included in busi-
ness expenses are ... insurance premiums against fire, storm, theft, accident, or other similar losses
in the case of a business .... ").
12. For a basic definition of "captive insurance company," see Gordon A. Schaller & Scott A
Harshman, Use of Captive Insurance Companies in Estate Planning, 33 AM. C. TR. & EST. COUNS.
J. 252, 252 (2008). Application of the traditional "insurance" test to captive insurance companies is
discussed in Part II of this Article.
13. See id.
14. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977-2 C.B. 53, 1977 WL 43573, obsoleted by Rev. Rul.
2001-31, 2001-1 C.B. 1348, 2001 WL 606232. As discussed in greater detail in Part 11, the prior
ruling concluded, inter alia, that a parent had not entered into an insurance relationship with its
wholly-owned insurance subsidiary.
15. See, e.g., Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. Comm'r, 62 F.3d 835, 840-43 (6th Cir. 1995); Ocean
Drilling & Exploration Co. v. United States, 988 F.2d 1135, 1153-54 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Amerco, Inc.
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reasoned that a premium payment from one related entity to another in its
affiliated or consolidated group for insurance simply did not shift any
risk because, in the end, the financial burden of loss coverage did not
leave "the economic family."' 16 Without risk shifting, no insurance ar-
rangement existed, and a tax deduction for a premium payment from the
entity to its fellow group member was deemed inappropriate. 7 Even in
the wake of judicial attack 18 and scholarly criticism, 19 the Service persis-
tently appeals to traditional risk shifting and risk distributing standards
with regard to the tax deductibility of insurance premium payments.20
Whether stating its opposition to a given arrangement under the ru-
bric of risk shifting/distributing or "economic family," the Service seeks,
at root, to prevent the taking of a deduction for what it sees as merely a
contribution to a contingency reserve. Its opposition is not unwavering
v. Comm'r, 979 F.2d 162, 164, 168 (9th Cir. 1992); Harper Group v. Comm'r, 979 F.2d 1341, 1342
(9th Cir. 1992); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Comm'r, 972 F.2d 858, 860-62 (7th Cir. 1992); Humana,
Inc. v. Comm'r, 881 F.2d 247, 251-52 (6th Cir. 1989); Clougherty Packing Co. v. Comm'r, 811
F.2d 1297, 1305-07 (9th Cir. 1987); Beech Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 797 F.2d 920, 922-23
(10th Cir. 1986); Carnation Co. v. Comm'r, 640 F.2d 1010, 1013 (9th Cir. 1981); Hosp. Corp. of
Am. & Subsidiaries v. Comm'r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 1020, 1997 WL 663283, at *30, *35 (1997);
Kidde Indus., Inc. v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 42, 56-58 (1997), appeal dismissed per stipulation,
194 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Comm'r, 89 T.C.
1010, 1025-29 (1987); Rev. Rul. 2008-08, 2008-1 C.B. 340, 2008 WL 131946; Rev. Rul. 2005-40,
2005-2 C.B. 4, 2005 WL 1415557; Rev. Rul. 2001-31, 2001-1 C.B. 1348, 2001 WL 606232; Rev.
Rul. 78-338, 1978-2 C.B. 107, 1978 WL 41909; Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977-2 C.B. 53, 1977 WL 43573,
obsoleted by Rev. Rul. 2001-31, 2001-1 C.B. 1348, 2001 WL 606232; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-24-
028 (June 14, 1996), 1996 WL 326435; James A. Christopherson, The Captive Medical Malpractice
Insurance Company Alternative, 5 ANNALS HEALTH L. 121, 125-32 (1996); Karen Gantt, Federal
Tax Treatment of Medical Malpractice Insurance Alternatives for Nonprofits, 52 DRAKE L. REV.
495, 514-21 (2004); Ray A. Knight & Lee G. Knight, Disregarding the Separate Corporate Entity
of Captive Insurance Companies: A Violation of the Moline Properties Doctrine, 14 J. CORP. L. 399,
405-09 (1989); Robert W. Minto, Jr., Captives and RRG'S in the Reinsurance Environment, 889
PLI/CoMM 837, 843-44 (2006); Schaller & Harshman, supra note 12, at 254-58; F. Roy Sedore,
Insurance Premium Deductibility, 779 PLI/TAX 1061, 1067-69 (2007); Stuart R. Singer, When the
Internal Revenue Service Abuses the System: Captive Insurance Companies and the Delusion of the
Economic Family, 10 VA. TAX REV. 113, 160-63 (1990); Scott A. Taylor, Taxing Captive Insur-
ance: A New Solution for an Old Problem, 42 TAx LAW. 859 passim (1989); Donald Arthur Win-
slow, Tax Avoidance and the Definition of Insurance: The Continuing Examination of Captive
Insurance Companies, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 79, 110-14 (1990); Armando Gomez, Note, A
Practical Approach to the Captive Insurance Problem: Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Commissioner, 46
TAX LAW. 619, 620-23 (1993).
16. See Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977-2 C.B. 53, 1977 WL 43573, obsoleted by Rev. Rul. 2001-31,
2001-1 C.B. 1348, 2001 WL 606232.
17. See id.
18. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Comm'r, 972 F.2d 858, 861 (7th Cir.) (indicating that
in Le Gierse the Supreme Court "was not writing a definition for all seasons and had no reason to").
The court went on to say that "it is impossible to see how risk shifting can be a sine qua non of
'insurance."' Id. at 862.
19. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 15, at 119 (describing the risk shifting/distributing standard
as dicta from dated U.S. Supreme Court authority and the Service's economic family theory as an
invention); Knight & Knight, supra note 15, at 417 (arguing that the "economic family" theory-
advanced by the Service in concluding that risk shifting and distributing were absent in some trans-
actions-cannot be reconciled with the Moline Properties doctrine); Note, The New York Stock
Exchange Gratuity Fund: Insurance That Isn't Insurance, 59 YALE L.J. 780, 782 (1950) (describing
the risk shifting/distributing test as "cryptic").
20. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2008-08, 2008-1 C.B. 340, 2008 WL 131946; Rev. Rul. 2005-40,
2005-2 C.B. 4, 2005 WL 1415557.
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because various Code provisions explicitly sanction the taking of deduc-
tions for additions to reserves for some companies. For example, life
insurance companies facing ultimate liability for a given death benefit
22and nuclear energy companies facing decommissioning obligations
may properly deduct premium payments made into their own reserves.
Yet, despite the fact that establishing substantial financial reserves is a
wise move for any responsible company, the ability to do so at the ex-
pense of the United States Treasury is not a matter of easily obtained
Congressional grace. Should it be?
This Article asks and attempts to answer questions of doctrine and
policy. Should the "reserving function" be limited, as a matter of sound
tax policy, to a discrete subset of taxpayers operating in industries of
relative certainty (e.g., death, decommissioning, and the like), or should
Congress allow deductions for limited contributions to contingency re-
serves more broadly? If one deems a general contingency reserve regime
fiscally untenable, then can one rationally consider allowing gradual,
limited, and regulated reserving for companies "too big to fail?" Or, does
that approach ask way too much for financial exigencies that merely
might occur? Also, as a purely doctrinal matter, should the Service alto-
gether abandon its traditional, yet utterly shakable, risk shift-
ing/distributing approach, or reserve that approach for companies that
could be served well enough by the established insurance markets but
merely wish to use a captive insurance company to reduce overall operat-
ing expenses (i.e., leave this to experts, and don't try it at your office)?
Given the posture of various courts and commentators, one can cer-
tainly argue the case for tweaking the "insurance" test to accommodate
individual entities (or affiliated groups) with risks that are both statisti-
cally "certain-to-occur-at-some-point" and sufficiently numerous, ho-
mogenous, and independent 23 to take advantage of the law of large num-
bers without the involvement of an entity outside the affiliated group (for
example, a single corporate entity or group with a massive fleet of serv-
ice vehicles needing some form of insurance coverage).
In light of recent economic challenges, 24 now may be a good time to
reconsider the permissible ambit and optimal scope of the reserving func-
tion in the tax arena. We live in a time when one hungry corporate Goli-
ath grumbles impatiently behind its household name big brother, each
21. I.R.C. § 805(a)(2) (2006).
22. See I.R.C. § 468(a)(1)(A) (2006).
23. See generally Gulf Oil Corp. v. Comm'r, 89 T.C. 1010, 1025 n.9 (1987) ("As a theoretical
matter, risk distribution or pooling requires: (i) Mass - * * * , (ii) Homogeneity - * * *, and (iii)
Independence - * * *. If these requirements are met to some minimum extent, the principles of
average and large numbers operate .... ").
24. See Adam Zagorin & Michael Weisskopf, Inside the Breakdown at the SEC, TIME, Mar.
9, 2009, at 34, available at 2009 WLNR 3721270 (describing current economic conditions as "the
worst financial crisis since the Great Depression").
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queuing for its slice of federal bailout. 25 Neither is alone. Americans are
also grumbling. They rightfully ask why they should be on the hook for
resuscitating companies that should have never been allowed to wade so
26far into the deep. With justified skepticism, they question the wisdom
of bailing out companies with their hard-eamed tax dollars27 while cor-
porate executives, without the restraining leash of rapt oversight,28 re-
cline on private jets and make their way to the next boondoggle hoping
that the redecoration of their offices will have been completed by the
time they get back.29 Given the potential negative economic ramifica-
tions for the broader U.S. economy, maybe certain companies were in-
deed "too big to fail"3°  but certainly they were not too big to strategi-
cally reserve some portion of their profits instead of routinely showering
millions31 on a select few for contract-based or "performance-based
' 32
compensation. Would it not be better for American taxpayers to collec-
tively suffer corporate deductions for the gradual creation of a limited
25. See, e.g., Bill Saporito, Is This Detroit's Last Winter?, TIME, Dec. 15, 2008, at 34, avail-
able at 2008 WLNR 23306940 (indicating that American International Group, Inc. ("AIG") and
Citigroup had received multi-billion dollar bailouts and that Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler
were hoping to receive federal bailouts). Some companies have returned several times for additional
assistance. See Francesco Guerrera, AIG Considers Break-up in Bid to Stay Afloat, FIN. TIMES, Feb.
25, 2009, at I (reporting that AIG might be broken up as part of a radical restructuring of the com-
pany and noting that, at the time, the government had bailed out AIG three times in five months).
26. See, e.g., Saporito, supra note 25, at 34 (highlighting situational irony by pointing out that
"AIG torpedoes the entire economy and gets a $150 billion handout; Citigroup takes risks no sane
manufacturing company would even contemplate and is rewarded with a $20 billion federal bail-
out").
27. Current proposals direct trillions of dollars at recovery efforts. See John Fritze, Trillions
Aimed at Recovery, USA TODAY, Feb. 11, 2009, at IA, available at 2009 WLNR 2668766 ("The
White House unveiled a sweeping proposal ... to spend as much as $2 trillion in public and private
funds to prop up the nation's financial system as the Senate narrowly approved an $838 billion
stimulus intended to jump-start the failing economy.").
28. See, e.g., Alan Beattie & Edward Luce, Obama Gets Tough on Pay for Executives, FIN.
TIMES, Feb. 5, 2009, at I (noting U.S. President Barack Obama's disgust at various Wall Street
excesses and reporting that Wall Street executives received $20 billion in bonuses in 2008 despite
massive market losses); see also Sarah O'Connor, Top Senators Rap Fed Over AIG Rescue, FIN.
TIMES, Mar. 6, 2009, at 3 (noting the warnings of the U.S. Senate's banking committee with respect
to future financial support of AIG given the "failure to reveal how the $163bn injected into the
insurance company has been spent").
29. See Mark DeCambre & Paul Tharp, Goofy Getaway-AIG Ripped for Senseless Spending,
N.Y. POST, Oct. 10, 2008, at 34, available at 2008 WLNR 19335564; see also Terry Keenan, The
Reign of Thain Was Mainly Just a Pain, N.Y. POST, Jan. 25, 2009, at 32, available at 2009 WLNR
1631465.
30. Many consider AIG the quintessential company that is "too big to fail." See, e.g., Bill
Saporito, How AIG Became Too Big to Fail, TIME, Mar. 30, 2009, at 24, available at 2009 WLNR
5204402.
31. See, e.g., Mimi Hall et al., Critics Blast AIG as Flap Escalates over Bonuses, USA
TODAY, Mar. 17, 2009, at IA, available at 2009 WLNR 5033330 (reporting growing public disgust
with corporate America and indicating that bonuses paid to certain AIG executives were negotiated
in early 2008). Apparently, compensation restraint is now a reality with respect to certain federal
funds recipients. See Beattie & Luce, supra note 28, at I (reporting that going forward, executives at
companies receiving a certain level of federal assistance would receive no more than $500,000 per
year as compensation).
32. Although I.R.C. § 162(m)(1) generally disallows a deduction in the publicly-held com-
pany context for "applicable employee remuneration" above $1,000,000, certain performance based
compensation is excluded from the definition of "applicable employee remuneration" under
§ 162(m)(4)(C). I.R.C. § 162(m) (2006) (limiting deductions for compensation in some contexts).
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contingency reserve with which the companies could head off full-scale
financial havoc at the pass (or at least make a hefty contribution to their
own bailout), rather than being forced to ante up a lump sum on short
order, bear the brunt of the various agency costs inherent in the corporate
form33 (enhanced and exacerbated by gargantuan bailout infusions), and
shoulder all of the attendant repayment risks at the same time?
Turning first to the doctrinal inquiry, Part I of this Article glances
back to the common law origin of the risk shifting/distributing standard
and reaches back a bit further, to highlight early authority in which the
Service frowns harshly on taxpayer deductions for self-reserving activity.
To flesh out evolving doctrinal contours and set the stage for a cri-
tique, Part II shifts the focus to the captive insurance company context
where much-if not most--of the litigation regarding risk shift-
ing/distributing has taken place. In addition to addressing the rise and fall
of the economic family argument empire, Part II also explains which
captive insurance arrangements work and highlights the Service's most
recent pronouncements that effectively delineate its current litigation
position.
Part III briefly summarizes prior criticism of the risk shift-
ing/distributing standards, both of which have been gradually weakened
by courts and commentators, before going on to explore the question of
whether recent IRS pronouncements reflect a new and aggressive eleva-
tion of form over substance in the captive insurance arena. Part III also
notes that current business realities, coupled with the nefarious practices
that many insurance companies habitually employ, compel some ques-
tioning of the utility of the risk shifting/distributing standards. Arguably,
these standards best apply in more idealistic settings.
Part IV presents and assesses a two-pronged proposal for reform:
the allowance of both contextual self-insuring (which seeks to modify the
prevailing standard), and utilitarian contingency reserving (which would
permit regulated contingency reserving using existing nuclear decom-
33. One commentator notes the following:
Agency costs are defined as the sum of the monitoring and bonding costs, plus any resid-
ual loss, incurred to prevent shirking by agents. In turn, shirking is defined to include any
action by a member of a production team that diverges from the interests of the team as a
whole. As such, shirking includes not only culpable cheating, but also negligence, over-
sight, incapacity, and even honest mistakes.
... [A]gency costs are the inevitable consequence of vesting discretion in someone other
than the residual claimant.
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 35-37 (2002). Directors and offi-
cers of companies are often protected from liability for mismanagement of the business and affairs
of a given company. Indeed, those individuals often enjoy several layers of protection, given that
they tend to be covered by both primary policies and several "excess" policies (i.e., those that will
generally pay after primary policy limits have been reached). See Eric S. Connuck, Excess D&O
Insurance: The Exhaustion by Payment Condition, Bus. L. TODAY, Sept.-Oct. 2008, at 45.
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missioning reserve fund rules and procedures as a basic model). Part V
sets forth concluding thoughts.
1. TRADITIONAL DEFINITIONS: "INSURANCE COMPANY" AND
"INSURANCE"
Insurance companies, whether life and health companies or property
and casualty companies, commonly have substantial amounts of both
underwriting income (e.g., premium payments, fees, and assessments)
34
and investment income (e.g., interest, dividends, and rents).35 At the
same time, these companies, because they perform an important societal
function, enjoy favorable treatment under the federal income tax laws.
Among other things, they have the ability to take current deductions for
increases in certain internal reserves. 36 Reasoning that an entity devoted
primarily to the generation of investment income should not enjoy un-
duly favorable tax treatment, Congress requires that an entity seeking to
qualify as an "insurance company" for federal income tax purposes sat-
isfy both qualitative and quantitative standards. Speaking in general
terms, the company must be in the business of issuing insurance or annu-
ity contracts,37 and that business activity must constitute more than half
of all the company's total business.
38
Although the "more than half' quantitative standard has long ap-
plied to life insurance company determinations, non-life companies (such
as property and casualty) could, at least until recently, qualify as insur-
ance companies by establishing that the issuing of insurance contracts
was their "primary and predominant" business activity. 39 By way of the
Pension Funding Equity Act of 2004,40 Congress eliminated the quantita-
tive standard duality and now requires that all insurance companies sat-
isfy the "more than half' standard.41 Unfortunately, Congress did not use
that legislation as a vehicle to clarify the precise meaning of "insurance."
34. See KENNETH BLACK, JR. & HAROLD D. SKIPPER, JR., LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE 971
(13th ed. 2000).
35. See I.R.C. § 832(b)(2) (2006) (listing specific items of investment income).
36. Life insurance companies are entitled to a deduction for increasing their life insurance
reserves. See I.R.C. §§ 805(a)(2), 807(b), (c)(1) (2006). Other insurance companies are allowed
adjustments in calculating underwriting income for increases in unearned premiums and unpaid loss
reserves. See § 832(b)(3), (b)(4)(B), (b)(5)(A)(ii).
37. The company may also qualify as an insurance company by reinsuring risks which are
underwritten by insurance companies. I.R.C. § 816(a)(2) (2006). For a basic application of the quali-
tative standard, see Allied Fid. Corp. v. Comm'r, 572 F.2d 1190, 1194 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding that a
wholly-owned subsidiary was not an insurance company because the character of its primary busi-
ness, the writing of bail bonds, was not the writing of contracts of insurance).
38. § 816(a)(2).
39. Treas. Reg. § 1.801-3(a)(1) (as amended in 1972). Thus, it was simply easier for a prop-
erty and casualty company to qualify as an insurance company. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-432, pt. 2, at
1402-04 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 697, 1047 (indicating Congress's intent to create a
standard more strict and precise for life insurance company characterization).
40. Pension Funding Equity Act of 2004, Pub L. No. 108-218, § 206, 118 Stat. 596, 611
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 83 1(c) (2006)).
41. See I.R.C. §§ 816(a)(2), 831(c).
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Thus, as a traditional starting point, we are left with the risk shift-
ing/distributing standards set forth in 1941, in the landmark case of
Helvering v. Le Gierse.42
Less than a month before her death, 80-year-old Edyth Le Gierse
purchased both a single-premium life insurance contract and an annuity
from the Connecticut General Life Insurance Company ("Connecticut
General").43 Together, the contracts obligated Connecticut General to
pay her $589.80/year for the remainder of her life and a $25,000 death
benefit to her daughter, the designated beneficiary. 44 Edyth executed the
contracts and paid $27,125 in a lump sum to Connecticut General. 45 Ul-
timately, it was hoped that these arrangements would allow the exclusion
of the $25,000 death benefit from Edyth's gross estate for federal estate
tax purposes.46 Concluding that the death benefits should not have been
excluded from Edyth's gross estate, the Commissioner asserted a defi-
ciency, but was forced to pursue the case to the U.S. Supreme Court be-
fore achieving the desired result.47
Writing for the majority, Justice Murphy noted that the parties com-
plied in all respects with standard contractual formalities,4 8 but went on
to emphasize that "the [purported insurance] amounts must be received
as the result of a transaction which involved an actual 'insurance risk' at
the time the transaction was executed. Historically and commonly insur-
ance involves risk-shifting and risk-distributing., 49 Viewing the transac-
tion holistically, the Court concluded that the life insurance contract
would not have been issued without the annuity contract and that
"[c]onsidered together, the contracts wholly fail to spell out any element
of insurance risk., 50 The Court emphasized that all contract consideration
was prepaid,5 1 and any risk that the amounts paid by Edyth Le Gierse
would not generate earnings sufficient to cover the annuity payments due
her was an investment risk, not an insurance risk.52 Accordingly, the
Court held that the $25,000 should have been included in the decedent's
gross estate.53
Although there is only so much to be learned about the fundamental
nature of insurance from Le Gierse-namely, that insurance is not the
42. 312 U.S. 531 (1941).
43. Id. at 536.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See id. at 537-38.
47. See id. at 537.
48. See id.
49. Id. at 539.
50. Id. at 541.
51. Id. at 542.
52. Id.; see also Comm'r v. Treganowan, 183 F.2d 288, 290 (2d Cir. 1950) ("[T]here is no
risk unless there is uncertainty or, to use a better term, fortuitousness.").
53. See Le Gierse, 312 U.S. at 542.
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equivalent of a mere investment risk5 4 -the opinion serves as landmark
decision because it articulates the risk-shifting and risk-distributing stan-
dards.55 Even though the Le Gierse opinion was criticized as cryptic soon
after issuance of the opinion56 and weakened, to some extent, by subse-
quent judicial developments 57 and scholarly commentary, 58 the two-part
test has managed to survive for decades. 59 Whether this sturdy, concep-
tual immunity is a good thing, whether its application remains justifiable,
and whether the standard has weathered steady criticism in worse condi-
tion than its proponents are willing to acknowledge, all remain open
questions to be addressed in the following Parts of this Article.
There remains a need to separate true "insurance" companies enti-
tled to favorable tax treatment from non-insurance companies that fail to
qualify for favorable treatment. Thus, some gate-keeping standard must
be in place. That standard must, however, be rational, and ideally should
be fully consistent with sound tax policy. Further, compliance standards
should be readily ascertainable, given that a company that unwittingly
fails the standard may find itself in an unexpected or unworkable tax
environment, and those paying purported premiums may suddenly find
that deduction of the amount was improper.
Whether deservedly or not, captive insurance companies and their
premium-paying organizers have historically been the predominant vic-
54. See id. For a more recent statement of this principle, see Rev. Rul. 89-96, 1989-2 C.B.
114, 1989 WL 550753 (emphasizing that the mere assumption of an investment risk cannot create an
insurance contract for federal income tax purposes).
55. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2008-08, 2008-1 C.B. 340, 2008 WL 131946 (citing Le Gierse and
noting that it is United States Supreme Court precedent).
56. See Note, supra note 19, at 782. The Note also argues that in Estate of Strauss, the Tax
Court erred in concluding that risk-shifting had not occurred and that the death benefit plan at issue
did not constitute "insurance." See id at 784-86. The Tax Court was later reversed by the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. Treganowan, 183 F.2d at 293.
57. See Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. Comm'r, 62 F.3d 835, 838-39 (6th Cir. 1995); Ocean Drill-
ing & Exploration Co. v. United States, 988 F.2d 1135, 1144-46 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Amerco, Inc. v.
Comm'r, 979 F.2d 162, 164-65 (9th Cir. 1992); Harper Group v. Comm'r, 979 F.2d 1341, 1342 (9th
Cir. 1992); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Comm'r, 972 F.2d 858, 861-62 (7th Cir. 1992); Humana, Inc.
v. Comm'r, 881 F.2d 247, 255 (6th Cir. 1989); Beech Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 797 F.2d 920,
922 (10th Cir. 1986); Carnation Co. v. Comm'r, 640 F.2d 1010, 1013 (9th Cir. 1981); Kidde Indus.,
Inc. v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 42, 56-57 (1997), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 194 F.3d 1330
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Comm'r, 89 T.C. 1010, 1025-27
(1987); Rev. Rul. 2008-08, 2008-1 C.B. 340, 2008 WL 131946; Rev. Rul. 2005-40, 2005-2 C.B. 4,
2005 WL 1415557; Rev. Rul. 2001-31, 2001-1 C.B. 1348, 2001 WL 606232; Rev. Rul. 78-338,
1978-2 C.B. 107, 1978 WL 41909; Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977-2 C.B. 53, 1977 WL 43573, obsoleted by
Rev. Rul. 2001-31, 2001-1 C.B. 1348, 2001 WL 606232; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-24-028 (June 14,
1996), 1996 WL 326435.
58. See Christopherson, supra note 15, at 127-28; Gantt, supra note 15, at 517-20; Gomez,
supra note 15, at 624-28; Knight & Knight, supra note 15, at 409; Minto, supra note 15, at 841-47;
Schaller & Harshman, supra note 12, at 254-55; Singer, supra note 15, at 123, 133-34; Taylor,
supra note 15 passim; Winslow, supra note 15, at 94-99.
59. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2008-08, 2008-1 C.B. 340, 2008 WL 131946 (emphasizing that risk-
shifting and risk-distribution must be present in order for an arrangement to constitute insurance for
federal income tax purposes).
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tims of the two-part "insurance" test. 60 To some extent, their bad luck
was fortuitous because it resulted in a degree of healthy doctrinal modifi-
cation 61 and, at the same time, provided an accessible setting for thor-
ough doctrinal assessment.
Part II of this Article provides an in-depth examination of the rigor-
ous attempt to apply the risk shifting/distributing standard in the captive
insurance company context, the industry's creative responses, the con-
ceptual concessions made by the Service, and the structural limits im-
posed on taxpayers. Part II closes by presenting the doctrinal status quo
and discussing two recent IRS pronouncements that clarify the Service's
current litigating position and serve as analytical segues to the critique
presented in Part III and proposals presented in Part IV.
II. DOCTRINAL EVOLUTION AND THE STATUS Quo: CAPTIVE INSURANCE
COMPANIES
A. Captive Insurance Companies-General Description and the Lurking
Problem
Although it is easy to think of captive insurance companies existing
only as wholly-owned domestic subsidiaries providing coverage to their
parent or brother-sister entities (a "pure" captive), in reality captive in-
surance companies take many forms.62 In addition to those organized in
the United States, pure captives are commonly organized offshore in
foreign jurisdictions.63 Often this is because foreign jurisdictions have
less demanding standards with respect to insurance company formation
60. See, e.g., Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. Comm'r, 62 F.3d 835, 840 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that
"insurance" cannot exist between a "sham" captive and insureds in its corporate family); Carnation
Co. v. Comm'r, 640 F.2d 1010, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that no "insurance" exists if a
company's risks are purportedly insured with an unrelated entity which reinsures those risks with the
insured's wholly-owned insurance subsidiary); Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977-2 C.B. 53, 1977 WL 43573
(setting forth the "economic family" theory as justification for denying deductions with respect to
amounts paid to captive insurance companies-i.e., those within the same corporate family-
because such amounts did not constitute "insurance" premiums), obsoleted by Rev. Rul. 2001-31,
200 1-1 C.B. 1348, 2001 WL 606232.
61. See, e.g., Amerco, Inc. v. Comm'r, 979 F.2d 162, 166, 168 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that a
parent, and a brother sister entity, can have a true insurance transaction with the parent's captive
insurance company when the captive has substantial outside insurance business); Harper Group v.
Comm'r, 979 F.2d 1341, 1342 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that a captive insurance company with 29/-
33% of its business coming from unrelated insureds could have true "insurance" relationships with
members of its corporate family); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Comm'r, 972 F.2d 858, 860, 864 (7th
Cir. 1992) (holding that Sears purchased "insurance" from its wholly-owned subsidiary, Allstate,
and noting that 99.75% of Allstate's business came from other sources); Humana, Inc. v. Comm'r,
881 F.2d 247, 257 (6th Cir. 1989) (emphasizing the Moline Properties mandate and holding that
there was risk-shifting and risk-distributing when a captive insured the risks of brother-sister enti-
ties); Rev. Rul. 2001-31, 2001-1 C.B. 1348, 2001 WL 606232 (noting that the Service "will no
longer raise the 'economic family theory,"' set forth in Rev. Rul. 77-316, "in addressing whether
captive insurance transactions constitute valid insurance" and indicating that "the Service will ad-
dress such transactions on a case-by-case basis").
62. See, e.g., Minto, supra note 15, at 841-42.
63. See Schaller & Harshman, supra note 12, at 252.
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and lower levels of ongoing oversight. 64 Several businesses may come
together to form a "group captive" (which insures the various liability
risks of its owners/members), 65 and it is not uncommon for a given busi-
ness (whose clients routinely need to secure some form of insurance) to
form a "sponsored captive" 66 for the benefit of its clients. In that setting,
the sponsored captive creates segregated financial cells to isolate and
thereby protect individual client risks from the risks of others.
67
Whatever the form, companies generally resort to a captive insur-
ance arrangement to secure coverage that is either unavailable or difficult
to obtain at a reasonable price (for example, insurance for medical mal-
practice, 68 latent construction defects, or potential earthquake damage 69).
Alternatively, companies may also resort to a captive for financial or
strategic reasons,7 ° such as to lower the cost of insurance or invest the
insurance company's reserves. 71 These legitimate, rational business pur-
poses have never managed, on their own, to establish the existence of an
"insurance arrangement, 72 under the Le Gierse standards.
Indeed, captive insurance company arrangements remain consis-
tently vulnerable to attack because a company purportedly paying a pre-
mium to the captive bears an uncomfortable resemblance to a company
contributing to a contingency reserve, and the Service has long been hos-
tile to the notion that a taxpayer deserves a deduction for that.73 For ex-
ample, in Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Commissioner,7 4 the taxpayer oper-
ated a coal mine and was obligated by state law to obtain workmen's
compensation insurance either by securing it from a private carrier, par-
ticipating in the state insurance fund, or by demonstrating an independent
ability to pay claims. 75 Opting to take the latter route, the taxpayer estab-
64. See id. at 253-54; see also Christopherson, supra note 15, at 132-33 (pointing out that
offshore formation of captives is common because offshore domiciles have lower capitalization
requirements, more lax reporting requirements, and a less stringent regulatory environment).
65. See Minto, supra note 15, at 842.
66. See id.
67. Id.
68. See Gantt, supra note 15, at 498-500 (noting that medical malpractice insurance needs
have prompted many responses, including the formation of captive insurance companies).
69. See Schaller & Harshman, supra note 12, at 252.
70. See Christopherson, supra note 15, at 122 (stating that, among other reasons, health care
providers may form a captive to control premium and capital investment and obtain coverage
broader than that which is commercially available). Christopherson also notes that by forming a
captive, a company should be able to minimize administrative costs, eliminate third-party profit
margins, reduce loss exposures, and improve claim management. See id. at 123.
71. See Schaller & Harshman, supra note 12, at 252.
72. See Beech Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 797 F.2d 920, 923 (10th Cir. 1986) (emphasiz-
ing that the legitimacy of the business purpose behind forming the captive does not establish risk-
shifting and risk-distributing and does not foreclose a finding of the absence of either).
73. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Comm'r, 89 T.C. 1010, 1024 (1987) ("Although technically transfer
of risk may occur when a captive is involved that is a separate, viable entity, financially capable of
meeting its obligations, we simply declined to recognize it as such when the arrangement was merely
in substance the equivalent of a reserve for losses or self-insurance.").
74. 43 F.2d 78 (10th Cir. 1930).
75. Id. at 78.
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lished a "Welfare or Compensation Insurance Fund ' 76 and ultimately
sought to deduct amounts contributed to the fund as ordinary and neces-
sary business expenses.77 The Service objected, claiming the amounts
were not "expenses" but rather "reserves" set aside for contingent
losses.78 Siding with the Commissioner, the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit held that:
The whole object of self-insurance is to avoid the expense of in-
surance premiums. If the petitioner had elected to insure its risks in
the state fund or a private company, it would have expended the pre-
mium and shifted the risk; instead, it retained the risk and kept the
premium. Having elected not to expend the premium, it cannot
charge a corresponding sum as an "expense." ... [T]he petitioner is
not entitled to deduct as an expense a sum of money which it might
have expended for insurance premiums, but did not.
79
The dilemma faced by taxpayers in situations like those in Spring
Canyon Coal Company did not resolve itself over time. Aggressively
seeking (or legally obligated) to acquire some form of designated insur-
ance, and determined to do so in a manner they deemed financially feasi-
ble, companies were rather creative in their efforts to get both the cover-
age and the benefit of something akin to a premium payment deduction.
80
The Service did not sit idly by. To the extent that companies steered clear
of naked contingency fund reserving and moved towards the use of sepa-
rately-incorporated but wholly-owned "insurance" entities, the Service
countered by creating or appealing to broad-sweeping doctrines to disal-
low deductions for what it considered contingency reserve contribu-
tions.8 1 For decades, the "economic family" theory was the Service's
weapon of choice.
82
B. The Rise and Fall of the "Economic Family" Argument Empire
The Service formally set forth its "economic family" theory in
Revenue Ruling 77-3 1683 by presenting and assessing three hypothetical
situations. In each situation, a new, wholly-owned foreign insurance sub-
sidiary provides fire and other casualty insurance to members of its cor-
porate family.
76. Id. at 79.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 80.
80. See, e.g., Carnation Co. v. Comm'r, 640 F.2d 1010, 1013 (9th Cir. 1981) (using a fronting
company obligated to reinsure with a wholly-owned captive insurance subsidiary and using a con-
tingent capitalization agreement to persuade the fronting company).
81. See Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977-2 C.B. 53, 1977 WL 43573 (announcing the "economic
family" theory), obsoleted by Rev. Rul. 2001-31,2001-1 C.B. 1348, 2001 WL 606232.
82. See, e.g., id.; Sedore, supra note 15, at 1105. Commentators note that the Service has
challenged the current deductibility of premiums paid to captive insurance companies by appealing
to various theories. See, e.g., Sedore, supra note 15, at 1105-06.
83. See Rev. Rul. 77-316.
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REv. RUL. 77-316, SITUATION 1
In Situation 1, X and its wholly-owned domestic subsidiaries, A and
B, paid amounts to S1, a wholly-owned foreign "insurance" subsidiary of
X, for various forms of property and casualty insurance. The rates paid
by X, A, and B were commercially appropriate, and Si provided insur-
ance only to X, A, and B.
I/ I
REV. RUL. 77-316, SITUATION 2
In Situation 2, the scenario is similar, however Y and its wholly-
owned subsidiaries, A and B, paid amounts to M, an unrelated insurance
company (a "fronting company" 84) which, by agreement, reinsured 95%
of this risk with S2, Y's wholly-owned foreign insurance subsidiary.
84. See Minto, supra note 15, at 847.
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REv. RUL. 77-316, SITUATIoN 3
In Situation 3, the facts are similar to Situation 1, but Z and its
wholly-owned, domestic subsidiaries, A and B, paid amounts to S3, and
by prior agreement, S3 reinsured 90% of this risk with W, an unrelated
insurance company.
In assessing the deductibility of amounts paid from the parent com-
pany and subsidiaries to the relevant entity, Revenue Ruling 77-316
starts by emphasizing both the risk shifting/distributing standards set
forth in Le Gierse and the historical judicial hostility directed towards
taxpayer attempts to take deductions for contributions to self-insurance
reserves. 85 The Service concluded that the amounts paid over to Si, S2,
and S3 do not involve risk shifting or risk distributing because the parent
company, insured subsidiaries, and captive all "represent[ed] one eco-
nomic family." 86 Accordingly, the Service reasoned that those suffering
the loss ultimately bear the financial burden of the loss. 87 The Service did
clarify that an arrangement constituted insurance to the extent risks were
retained by third-party insurers or passed on to reinsurers (for example,
the 5% retained by the fronting company in Situation 2 and the 90%
passed on in Situation 3).8 Further, amounts paid by the purported in-
sured subsidiaries (as premiums) and amounts paid by the captive (as
loss coverage) to those subsidiaries were generally recast as dividends
from one entity to the common parent followed by a contribution of a
given amount to the intended recipient as a capital contribution; "pre-
mium" payments from the parent to the captive were recast as capital
contributions to the captive, and loss coverage payments from the captive
to the parent were deemed to be dividends to the parent. 89 Given that its
conclusions were facially at odds with Moline Properties, Inc. v. Com-







missioner,90 which dictates that an entity organized for legitimate busi-
ness activity is treated as a separate taxable entity, the Service attempted
to reconcile the differences. The Service emphasized that it respected the
separate corporate existence of the various entities (giving due regard to
their business activity), but opted to "examine[] the economic reality"
presented by each hypothetical situation.
91
For several years, the Service's economic family argument managed
to secure a degree of traction, especially in the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit. In Carnation Co. v. Commissioner, the taxpayer cre-
ated a wholly-owned Bermuda subsidiary to insure its risks, as well as
the risks of several of its subsidiaries. 92 By prior arrangement, Carnation
paid premiums directly to American Home Assurance Company, which
proceeded to reinsure 90% of Carnation's business with Carnation's cap-
tive insurance subsidiary. It was clear, however, that American Home
would not have entered into an agreement with the captive unless Carna-
tion agreed to further capitalize the captive if needed. 93 Denying the
deductibility of 90% of the premium paid to American Home, the court
refused to countenance the fronting company strategy adopted by Carna-
tion.94 It also affirmatively rejected any Moline Properties arguments,95
and thereby substantially aligned itself with the Service's position in
Situation 2 in Rev. Rul. 77-316.
A few years later, the Ninth Circuit drove the point home in
Cloughtery Packing Co. v. Commissioner.96 Cloughtery Packing held
that, even in the absence of a contingent capitalization agreement, a par-
ent corporation's payment of premiums to an unrelated insurer who, by
pre-arrangement, reinsures that risk with a captive insurance company of
the parent is not payment of an "insurance" premium because the parent
"retains an economic stake in whether a covered loss occurs. 97 All
along, it should have been known that the outright defiance of the Moline
Properties mandate via the economic family theory could not last.
90. 319 U.S. 436, 438-39 (1943). ("The doctrine of corporate entity fills a useful purpose in
business life. Whether the purpose be to gain an advantage under the law of the state of incorpora-
tion or to avoid or comply with the demands of creditors or to serve the creator's personal or undis-
closed convenience, so long as that purpose is the equivalent of business activity or is followed by
the carrying on of business by the corporation, the corporation remains a separate taxable entity.").
91. Rev. Rul. 77-316.
92. Carnation Co. v. Comm'r, 640 F.2d 1010, 1012 (9th Cir. 1981).
93. See id.
94. See id. at 1013.
95. Id. ("We reject Carnation's contention that [language quoted from Revenue Ruling 77-
316] conflicts with the recognition of the separate status of corporations.").
96. 811 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1987).
97. Id. at 1299, 1307 (indicating that there was no indemnification, capitalization, or other
guarantee in place with respect to the parent company and the wholly-owned captive insurance
company).
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Although the captives in Carnation and Clougherty Packing insured
no one outside their affiliated group, 98 a number of wholly-owned or
controlled insurance companies (which are technically captive insurance
companies relative to their parent entities) have a substantial amount of
outside business.99 To conclude that such "captives" can have valid in-
surance relationships with non-affiliated entities, while being unable to
have such relationships with affiliated entities, would defy logic and ef-
fectively gut Moline Properties. The Tax Court embraced this reality in
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Commissioner. 00 Even though the court concluded that
the percentage of insurance business from unrelated parties was insuffi-
cient, 1° it noted that the existence of sufficient outside business would
clear the self-insurance taint of an arrangement between various affili-
ated entities and their captive insurance company.1
02
Several years later, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit adopted this view. In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Commissioner, the
court held that Sears was purchasing true "insurance" from its wholly-
owned subsidiary, Allstate, 10 3 because 99.75% of Allstate's business
came from other sources. 0 4 Other Courts of Appeals, as well as the Serv-
ice, have since clarified that lower percentages of outside business will
suffice,10 5 but the more significant development lies in the fact that the
decisions collectively establish the relative irrelevance of risk shifting in
the face of substantial risk distribution. Even in the absence of a risk-
shifting imperative, however, the Service could still require the existence
of substantial outside business before acquiescing to the existence of a
valid insurance relationship' 6-or so it thought.
Even before Sears, Roebuck and Co. and its progeny challenged the
core legitimacy of a risk shifting inquiry, at least one court had begun to
98. Clougherty Packing Co., 811 F.2d at 1299; Carnation Co., 640 F.2d at 1012.
99. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Comm'r, 972 F.2d 858, 860 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting
that Allstate, a subsidiary of Sears, had substantial outside business).
100. 89 T.C. 1010, 1027-28 (1987) (concluding that the fact that the reinsuring captive insur-
ance company had 2% net premium income from unrelated parties did not result in the characteriza-
tion of "premiums" paid indirectly by the parent corporation and its affiliates as "insurance" premi-
ums).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1026-27.
103. 972 F.2d 858, 864 (7th Cir. 1992).
104. Id. at 860.
105. See, e.g., Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co. v. United States, 988 F.2d 1135, 1152 (Fed.
Cir. 1993) (holding that true "insurance" existed between a captive insurance company and the
insureds in its corporate family when the captive had 44/o-66% of its business coming from unre-
lated entities); Amerco, Inc. v. Comm'r, 979 F.2d 162, 168 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding sufficient unre-
lated business at 520/,74% of total business); Harper Group v. Comm'r, 979 F.2d 1341, 1342 (9th
Cir. 1992) (citing unrelated business was 29-/o-33% percent of total business).
106. See e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Comm'r, 89 T.C. 1010, 1027-28 (1987) (concluding that 2% of
net premiums from outside sources was sufficient to create an insurance relationship between a
captive and its affiliated); see also Christopherson, supra note 15, at 128 (pointing out that courts
will look to the level ofa subsidiary's outside business in determining whether an insurance relation-
ship exists between the parent and the subsidiary).
[Vol. 87:1
RETHINKING "INSURANCE"
whittle away at the outside business requirement. In Humana, Inc. v.
Commissioner, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held, over
the contrary opinion of the Tax Court, that risk shifting and risk distribut-
ing were present when a captive insurance company insured the risks of
its brother-sister entities.10 7 However, it did not extend to the parent-
captive relationship. 0 8 The Tax Court, in considering the parent-captive
relationship, concluded that the payment of a covered loss by the captive
to the parent would ultimately show up on the parent's balance sheet as a
reduction in the value of the captive's stock, 10 9 a result it found offensive
in light of its belief that true risk shifting must occur and that "[t]rue in-
surance relieves the firm's balance sheet of any potential impact of the
financial consequences of the insured peril."'
' 10
Although the Tax Court's logic could not apply with respect to
payments for the losses of brother-sister entities of the captive, the court
chose not to invite or sanction the favorable manipulation of corporate
structure."' Emphasizing the Moline Properties mandate 1 2 and firmly
rejecting the Service's economic family argument, 13 the Sixth Circuit
opted to go a different route, respecting the balance sheet analysis with
regard to the parent, but finding a valid insurance relationship between
the brother-sister entities and the captive. Other courts soon followed
suit.'14
In addition to weathering judicial assault, the economic family the-
ory found itself the target of scholarly criticism. One commentator
charged the Service with abusing its discretion by inventing and advocat-
ing an "eccentric theory of law" to "provide a quick fix for a perceived
abuse,"115 rather than doing the legwork to mount an effective attack on
more established grounds. 1 6 Although the commentator acknowledged
107. 881 F.2d 247, 257 (6th Cir. 1989) (emphasizing the Moline Properties mandate and
holding that there was risk-shifting and risk-distributing when a captive insured the risks of brother-
sister entities).
108. Id.
109. Humana, Inc. v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 197, 211-12 & n. 13 (1987).
110. Id. at 211.
Ill. Id. at 213-14.
112. Humana, Inc., 881 F.2d at 252.
113. Id. at 257.
114. See, e.g., Hosp. Corp. of Am. & Subsidiaries v. Comm'r, 74 T.C.M (CCH) 1020, 1997
WL 663283, at *18, *26-27 (1997) (concluding that, between a captive insurance subsidiary and its
brother-sister entities, there was bona fide "insurance"); Kidde Indus., Inc. v. United States, 40 Fed.
Cl. 42, 67 (1997) (holding that a parent company could deduct amounts paid-to cover its sepa-
rately-incorporated subsidiaries-to unrelated insurer ceding amounts to parent's captive insurance
subsidiary but denying such treatment with respect to payments made on behalf of the parent's
divisions), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 194 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (unpublished table
decision).
115. Singer, supra note 15, at 115.
116. See id. at 127 (arguing that the Service might have been able to attack the transactions by
using § 482). Singer also notes that the Service may have had little confidence in existing precedent
to support a transaction recharacterization approach. See id. at 123.
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that taxpayers might form captives in attempts to abuse the tax system, 117
he went on to endorse an alternative that would have the Service focus
on the captive (i.e., the income side) and require that it satisfy certain
requirements in order to qualify for special treatment.118
Other commentators, like some courts, highlighted the simple in-
ability to reconcile the economic family theory with the mandate of
Moline Properties.1 19 Even while noting that companies forming captive
insurance companies may be motivated, to some extent, by tax consid-
erations, they reasoned that such motivations have never sufficed to dis-
allow premium deductions at the parent level, especially in light of the
120legitimate business reasons for forming captives and the doctrine that a
subsidiary be treated as a separate and distinct entity when the parent
effectively establishes the subsidiary's business purpose.121
In response to the occasional irrelevance of a risk-shifting in-
quiry,122 ready judicial acceptance of brother-sister-captive insurance
relationships, 123 scholarly criticism,124 and overt judicial rejection of the
economic family argument, 125 the Service issued Revenue Ruling 2001-
31.126 In doing so, the Service promised that it would "no longer raise the
'economic family theory' set forth in Revenue Ruling 77-316 ... in ad-
dressing whether captive insurance transactions constitute valid insur-
ance."' 127 The Service did emphasize that, in general, it would continue to
analyze individual arrangements on a case-by-case basis and specifically
challenge some arrangements, such as alleged sham transactions 128 and
117. Id. at 117.
118. Id. at 162-64. Singer would generally require proper record keeping and management,
adequate and properly invested reserves, proper risk pooling, arms-length pricing, and maintenance
of a sufficient level of unrelated policyholder business. Id. at 163. Singer also set forth simple disal-
lowance of a deduction for premiums paid to a related party, but he questioned the wisdom of that
approach, given the ordinariness of transferring risk to a legitimate insurance company. Id. at 162.
119. Knight& Knight, supra note 15, at 417.
120. Id. at 404.
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Comm'r, 972 F.2d 858, 861 (7th Cir. 1992).
123. See, e.g., Humana, Inc. v. Comm'r, 881 F.2d 247,255 (6th Cir. 1989).
124. See, e.g., Christopherson, supra note 15, at 128 (noting that the "economic family ap-
proach has been widely rejected"); Gomez, supra note 15, at 627-28 (arguing for the eradication of
the economic family theory and the institution of a two-part inquiry into the legitimacy of the insur-
ance company and the particulars of given transactions).
125. See Humana, Inc., 881 F.2d at 257.
126. Rev. Rul. 2001-31,2001-1 C.B. 1348, 2001 WL 606232.
127. Id. (internal citation omitted).
128. The Service specifically referenced Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. Commissioner, which held
that "insurance" cannot exist between a "sham" captive and insureds in its corporate family. Id.
(citing Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. Comm'r, 62 F.3d 835 (6th Cir. 1995)). According to the court, a
captive will be a "sham" captive if it is either (1) undercapitalized, (2) a party to a reinsurance ar-
rangement in which the captive's parent indemnifies the primary insurer for amounts owed by the
captive to the primary insurer, or (3) both. Malone & Hyde, Inc., 62 F.3d at 842-43.
[Vol. 87:1
RETHINKING "INSURANCE"
purported insurance transactions between parent entities and their cap-
tives.
129
C. The Status Quo
Even though the Service officially abandoned its economic family
argument in Revenue Ruling 2001-31, it tenaciously adheres to and ap-
plies the risk shifting/distributing standard in assessing purported insur-
ance arrangements. This may well be, in some contexts, a means of
appealing to the economic family theory under a safer rubric. Indeed,
recent IRS pronouncements demonstrate that the Service has already
taken the entire game to the next level. Rather than merely assessing the
existence of an insurance relationship when the transaction involves af-
filiated entities, the Service is now willing to scrutinize transactions be-
tween purported insureds and entities wholly unaffiliated with the insured
or its group (even when there is no reinsurance with a controlled subsidi-
ary of the insureds). Arguably, this move represents the opening salvo of
a new wave of intent: the elevation of form over substance in the captive
arena.
In Revenue Ruling 2005-40,131 the Service presented and assessed
four situations to clarify its current litigating position. Each situation is
presented schematically with the Service's assessment appearing imme-
diately thereafter. All situations involve a domestic entity, X, which op-
erates a courier transport business, owns a substantial fleet of automotive
vehicles, needs to insure those vehicles against various operational risks,
and pays an arm's length premium to Y for the coverage. Note that in
each instance, X owns vehicles "representing a significant volume of
independent, homogenous risks"' 32 (that is, enough to distribute risk in-
dependently), and that Y is adequately capitalized and operates in accord




REv. RUL. 2005-40, SITUATION 1
129. See, e.g., Clougherty Packing Co. v. Comm'r, 811 F.2d 1297, 1307 (9th Cir. 1987) (hold-
ing that a parent-subsidiary transaction was not insurance).
130. Rev. Rul. 2008-08, 2008-1 C.B. 340, 2008 WL 131946; Rev. Rul. 2005-40, 2005-2 C.B.
4, 2005 WL 1415557.
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In Situation 1, the X-Y contract constitutes 100% of Y's business.
The Service acknowledges that X shifted risk from itself to Y, but, after
noting that Y does not insure any non-X risks, concludes that Y has not
distributed X risks amongst other policyholders. Accordingly, the Serv-








REv. RUL. 2005-40, SITUATION 2
The facts in Situation 2 indicate that the X-Y contract constitutes
90% of Y's business and that the remaining 10% comes from Y's con-
tract with Z. Here too, the Service concludes that the relationship be-
tween X and Y is not an insurance relationship. Although Y's relation-
ship with Z adds some degree of risk distribution, the Service concludes
that the 10% of risk from Z is insufficient to alter the character of the X-










Purported Individual Insurance Arrangements
(LLCs disregarded for federal tax purposes)
REv. RUL. 2005- 40, SITUATION 3
In Situation 3, Y does not contract with X. Instead, Y contracts with
twelve LLCs, each of which has X as its single member. X conducts its
business through the LLCs, and each LLC has elected to be disregarded
for federal income tax purposes (that is, each LLC has elected not to be
treated as separate and distinct from X). The facts also indicate that each
contract between Y and a disregarded LLC constitutes 51/o-15% of Y's
total business and that Y insures no other entities. Because Y is treated as
contracting only with X, the Service concludes that the individual ar-










(LLCs regarded as separate and distinct associations for
federal tax purposes)
REv. RUL. 2005 - 40, SITUATION 4
Situation 4 is the same as Situation 3, except that the LLCs elect to
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Service concludes that the individual LLCs shift risk to Y and that the
risk is distributed amongst the twelve LLCs. Accordingly, the relation-
ships are deemed to constitute "insurance" relationships.'
37
The Service's most recent pronouncement in the captive insurance
arena is Revenue Ruling 2008-08,3' which involves a sponsored captive
in the form of a "protected cell company."1 39 A protected cell company is
similar, in many ways, to a group captive, an arrangement in which vari-
ous companies come together and form a captive for the purpose of in-
suring their own risks. 140 The Service has ruled that premium payments
to a group captive owned by thirty-one companies were "insurance"
premiums,141 noting that "because the taxpayer and the other insureds-
shareholders are not economically related, the economic risk of loss can
be shifted and distributed among the shareholders who comprise the in-
sured group."'' 42 A protected cell company differs from a group captive in
that separate cells/accounts are created for each equity holder making a
capital contribution, and each cell receives premiums and insures the
risks of the designated equity holder. 143 Revenue Ruling 2008-08 clari-
fies that insurance may or may not exist with respect to a given protected
cell company relationship.
137. Id.
138. Rev. Rul. 2008-08, 2008-1 C.B. 340,2008 WL 131946.
139. Id.
140. See Minto, supra note 15, at 842.
141. Rev. Rul. 78-338, 1978-2 C.B. 107, 1978 WL 41909 (concluding that premium payments
made to a group captive owned by 31 companies were ordinary and necessary business expenses-
i.e., "insurance" premiums).
142. Id.
143. Gantt, supra note 15, at 520 ("With the protected cell, investor funds are not subject to
losses affecting other parts of an insurance company. Monies from investors would be deposited into







In this protected cell company arrangement, X only pays premiums
to Cell X, and Cell X only insures the risks (and pays the losses) of X.
144
Similarly, Cell Y only receives payments from 03, t, and w and only in-
sures the risks (and pays the losses) of those entities. 145 The Service con-
cluded that the arrangement between Cell X and X does not constitute an
insurance arrangement because the relationship is akin to one in which a
subsidiary insures only its parent. 146 Accordingly, risk shifting and risk
distributing are not present; thus, no insurance relationship exists.147 Not-
ing that the relationship between Cell Y and the wholly-owned subsidiar-
ies of Y were akin to a brother-sister insurance relationship, the Service
concluded that the arrangements constituted insurance given the presence
of adequate risk shifting and risk distributing. 1
48
III. CRITIQUE
Although the Service officially asserted that it would no longer em-
ploy the "economic family" argument in assessing captive insurance
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company arrangements, 4 9 recent IRS pronouncements demonstrate it did
not tell the whole truth. The prevailing common law environment will
not allow an economic family argument to succeed in a captive-brother-
sister setting. 50 But, depending on the level of non-parent business at the
subsidiary level, the Service can still get away with it in some parent-
captive contexts (or those deemed akin to that context) so long as the
position is cloaked in the garb of risk shifting and risk distributing.,'
Assuming arguendo that the risk shifting and risk distributing standards
were ever truly useful, they now arguably fall short as effective determi-
nants, especially in today's complex business environment.
A. The Shell of Risk Shifting
Sears, Roebuck & Co. and its progeny have firmly established that
an insurance relationship exists between a parent company and its
wholly-owned subsidiary when the subsidiary has a sufficient level of
outside business.152 Thus, although the Service routinely cites Le Gierse
on the way to its risk shifting and risk distributing analyses,'5 3 various
courts (whether explicitly or implicitly) fail to regard risk shifting, in the
traditionally-understood sense, as a sine qua non of insurance. 54 To the
extent a sufficient level of risk distribution is the key to eliminating the
risk shifting requirement, established companies with substantial outside
business enjoy an undue benefit relative to new and growing companies.
Although a given company may, after further development, reap the
same benefits, there remains the troubling problem of uni-directionality.
Under Sears, Roebuck & Co., an insurance relationship is deemed to
exist between a parent company and its wholly-owned captive insurance
subsidiary because the captive has a sufficient level of outside business
to distribute its risks adequately (in other words, because the captive has
enough homogenous, independent risks to satisfy the law of large num-
bers). 155 This reality does not change when the parent company adds its
risks to the mix, but, per the confirmation of Revenue Ruling 2008-08,
the street only runs one way. 56 If it is the parent (or a parent-like entity)
with enough homogenous, independent risks to satisfy the law of large
numbers, the Service will not respect the parent-captive arrangement as
149. Rev. Rul. 2001-31,2001-1 C.B. 1348, 2001 WL 606232.
150. See, e.g., Humana, Inc. v. Comm'r, 881 F.2d 247, 248-52 (6th Cir. 1989).
151. See, e.g,, Hosp. Corp. of Am. & Subsidiaries v. Comm'r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 1020, 1997
WL 663283, at *24-*26 (1997); Kidde Indus., Inc. v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 42, 51-57 (1997),
appeal dismissed per stipulation, 194 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision).
152. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 61.
153. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2008-08, 2008-1 C.B. 340, 2008 WL 131946.
154. See, e.g., Humana, Inc., 881 F.2d at 252-56.
155. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Comm'r, 972 F.2d 858, 860 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that Allstate
collects more than $5 billion in premiums annually and that "[s]ome 99.75% of Allstate's premiums
[come] from customers other than Sears").
156. Rev. Rul. 2008-08 (citing Rev. Rul. 2005-40, 2005-2 C.B. 4, 2005 WL 1415557; Rev.
Rul. 2002-89, 2002-2 C.B. 984, 2002 WL 31749579) (indicating that the relationship between X and
Cell X would not qualify as insurance).
[Vol. 87:1
RETHINKING "INSURANCE"
"insurance" in the absence of outside business at the captive level, be-
cause risk shifting and risk distribution are deemed absent.'57 That is, the
Service would refuse to find "insurance" despite the presence of effective
risk distribution and arguable irrelevance of the risk shifting standard. A
far more egregious problem arises when the Service elects to ignore risk-
distributing realities in a similar context: when a non-affiliated insurer is
involved and risk shifting cannot be denied.
B. The Husk of Risk Distribution: Doctrinal Issues
Under Revenue Ruling 2005-40, Situation 1, the Service will not re-
spect an arrangement as insurance where a single entity with risk distrib-
uting capacity happens to be the only insured with respect to an unre-
lated entity. 158 Arguably, this approach represents an aggressive eleva-
tion of form over substance. X's homogenous, independent risk units are
lumped together under a single corporate roof1 59 such that, for risk distri-
bution purposes, X is deemed to be nothing more than a single insured
corporate entity. 160 And while the Service appears to acknowledge the
existence of risk shifting,' 6' its final conclusion on Situation 1 reveals
something altogether suspect. Rather than recognizing the business real-
ity (that Y is insuring a large volume of homogenous, independent risks
such as individual vehicles), the Service deems Y's business activity to
be the attempt to insure one entity, X, even though Y, by contract, would
likely have been on the hook with respect to an individual vehicle loss,
and not solely on the loss of the entire fleet. The Service's posture in this
regard is perplexing in light of the Tax Court's conclusion in Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Commissioner that "a single insured can have sufficient unre-
lated risks to achieve adequate risk distribution,"' 162 and the IRS's pro-
nouncement indicating that "a single taxpayer may transfer an amount of
homogenous and statistically independent risks which would be suffi-
cient to satisfy the risk distribution requirement."'
163
The question then becomes whether it is appropriate to pierce the
veil of the nominal insured for risk distribution assessment purposes.164
Surprisingly, as discussed below, the Service willingly confirmed in at
least one instance that individual independent risk exposures are meas-
157. Compare Rev. Rul. 2008-08 (finding that no insurance relationship existed in a given
transaction because it was akin to a parent-subsidiary relationship), with Sears, Roebuck & Co., 972
F.2d at 860 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that insurance existed when a subsidiary with substantial outside
business insured its parent).




162. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Comm'r, 89 T.C. (CCH) 1010, 1026 (1997).
163. I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. (Oct. 19, 1998), 1998 WL 34066011.
164. Logic and experience dictate that when an insurance company issues a group life insur-
ance policy, there is no confusing insured individuals with the common corporate employer.
2009]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
ured by looking within the corporate entity, 65 not by viewing the corpo-rate entity as a single insured unit.
In Private Letter Ruling 9624028, the Service addressed the de-
ductibility of amounts paid by thirty-six Funds to an assessable mutual
insurance company owned solely by the thirty-six Funds and formed to
insure them against various loss events with respect to the investments
made by each Fund. 166 After highlighting the fact that none of the Funds
owned a controlling interest in the mutual, 167 the Service noted the fol-
lowing:
[1]n terms of risk distribution, we note that Mutual has accepted a
large number of independent risks and is taking advantage of the
"law of large numbers." (The (independent) risk exposures here are
possible defaults of any one of the 28x issues of "securities" of Fund
1 (or the possible default of any of the issues of any other of the 35
funds).)
168
Thus, the Service privately says that it will look beyond the corporate
shell at individual risk units to ascertain whether risk has been ade-
quately distributed, but pronounces something altogether different in
Situation 1 of Revenue Ruling 2005-40. The analytical consistency does
not improve with Situations 2-4 of that pronouncement.
In Situation 2, the Service concludes that the presence of an addi-
tional business source does not automatically alter the character of the X-
Y relationship. 69 However, to the extent that this ruling and others des-
ignate or look to a specific percentage of outside business as key to the
"insurance" analysis, they reveal nothing more than arbitrary line-
drawing. The Service's conclusions regarding Situations 3 and 4, viewed
together, would appear to allow, rather inexplicably,1 70 a taxpayer to cre-
ate or destroy "insurance" merely by making an election. 17 1 Yet, random
elevations of form over substance have been prohibited in this arena
since Edyth Le Gierse struck her deal with Connecticut General. Or at
least that's been the long-running story.
C. The Husk of Risk Distribution: The Modern "Insurance" Reality
Wholly aside from doctrinal problems, practical realities do not jibe
well with the Service's prevailing risk distribution standard. The canvas
of background assumptions is too pristine. Although it may be comfort-
165. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-24-028 (June 14, 1996), 1996 WL 326435.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. (emphasis added).
169. Rev. Rul. 2005-40, 2005-2 C.B. 4,2005 WL 1415557.
170. See Sedore, supra note 15, at 1104 (describing the Service's rationale in assessing Situa-
tions 3 and 4 as "somewhat inexplicable" because in some instances, the Service respects the sepa-




ing to assume that insurance companies willingly offer life, health, and
other forms of insurance to broad segments of the population and quietly
allow the law of large numbers to operate, the truth is far nastier.
Modem insurance is a business more so than ever, and rather than
suffer the vagaries of the law of large numbers, underwriters do their best
to outsmart or outmaneuver it. Companies impose tough underwriting
standards and thereby manage to issue unwarranted denials of coverage.
And even when coverage is offered and premiums are paid over time in
good faith, companies habitually attempt to deny coverage by appealing
to, among other things, contractual exclusions for "pre-existing condi-
tions" and "experimental" treatments. 172
The case of Patrick Tumulty is typical. After paying health insur-
ance premiums to Assurant Health for six years (under a series of six-
month policies), 173 the company ultimately refused coverage for Tu-
multy's kidney disease. 174 Because the company treated him as a new
insured under each contract, 75 his ailment was deemed a pre-existing
condition when it was finally diagnosed176-prior medical tests under
"prior" policies proved it. 177
If certain commentators are to be believed, the problem of unwar-
ranted coverage denial is rampant. In his searing documentary on the
American health care system, 178 Michael Moore captured the prevailing
sentiment. One claims adjuster noted, "' [People aren't] slipping through
the cracks,' . . . '[The insurance companies] made the crack and are
sweeping you toward it.'' 179 Thus, at least with respect to some forms of
insurance, the theoretical operation of risk distribution stands in stark
contrast to practical realities.
Further, at the same time that companies are attempting to minimize
or eliminate the negative impact of the law of large numbers in one
sphere, they are also flouting, misinterpreting, or simply ignoring the
fundamental rules of traditional risk distribution elsewhere. As the fol-
lowing discussion demonstrates, the AIG saga adds an exclamation point
to that assertion and helps reveal the truly limited utility of the risk dis-
tribution standard, as currently applied as an "insurance" determinant.
172. See Karen Tumulty, The Health Care Crisis flits Home, TIME, Mar. 16, 2009, at 26,
available at 2009 WLNR 4231105 (discussing the misfortune of Patrick Tumulty whose kidney
disease was deemed to be a non-covered, pre-existing condition by Assurant Health, which issued






178. SICKO (Weinstein Company 2007).
179. Richard Corliss, Sicko Is Socko, TIME.COM, May 19, 2007,
http://www.time.com/time/arts/article/0,8599,1623337,00.html.
2009]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
As noted earlier, risk distribution relies on the operation of the law
of large numbers. With a sufficiently large pool of individuals, for exam-
ple, actual mortality and predicted mortality will roughly correspond due
to the accuracy of historical mortality and morbidity data. Thus, the law
of large numbers operates well in some insurance environments (such as
life insurance). If, however, a company seeks to insure against the occur-
rence of an event when there is no reliable data with respect to prior
events, accurate probabilities cannot be ascertained, and the law of large
numbers (no matter how large the pool of insureds) cannot be relied on
to match predicted and actual experience going forward. 180 As explained
below, AIG's treacherous dalliance with credit default swaps and special
purpose vehicles bears this out.
D. Special Purpose Vehicles, Credit Default Swaps, and Sub-Prime
Mortgages
Several years ago, there was a sharp and noticeable uptick in the
making of subprime loans. 181 Certain existing and aspiring homeowners
were easy targets.'8 2 Once originated, the individual mortgage obliga-
tions were transferred through the hands of various industry participants,
and ultimately pooled together in a trust or other entity-such as a spe-
cial purpose vehicle or "SPV" 83 -such that interested parties could in-
vest in the pool by purchasing debt securities of the SPV from the trus-
tor/seller. 84 In general, these securities were issued in tiers or tranches
which were rated by various credit rating agencies, like Standard &
Poor's, according to the likelihood that the holder would be paid (e.g.,
from "AAA" to "BBB" and below). 8 5 Before parting with higher ratings
for senior investment grade securities, however, rating agencies would
commonly require the SPV to obtain some form of credit enhancement,
such as a guarantee, to ensure that payment shortfalls with respect to
those securities would be covered. 86 For these senior tiers of debt, many
SPVs looked to insurance companies to provide the requisite payment
guarantee. 1
87
180. See Taylor, supra note 15, at 878-82.
181. Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder
in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 571 (2002).
182. See id. at 572.
183. Id. at 538-39.
184. Id. at 539.
185. Id. at 540-41; Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street
Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2047 (2007).
186. Engel & McCoy, supra note 185, at 2047.




Holder ofPV' H1oldroS "A" Holder of SPV's








Vehicle "l / C o m p a n y
.. ....  .  , Enhance e,
Against Obtain AAA
J Payment IRating for Senior
Shortfall on Obligations
FIGURE 1: SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES
At the same time, at the other end of the equation, financial institu-
tions holding sub-prime, mortgage-backed debt obligations or some re-
packaged derivative thereof-such as a "collateralized debt obligation,"
or "CDO" 188-- would contract with counterparties to insure against de-
fault.189 AIG Financial Products Corporation ("AIGFP"), a subsidiary of
AIG, was one such counterparty. 190 AIGFP issued this form of "debt
insurance" 19 1 -referred to as a "credit default swap," or "CDS"-even
though it was organized as a bank and not an insurance company.,
92
Though the CDS business generated hundreds of millions of dollars of
insurance premium income when times were good, 193 the lurking obliga-
tions ultimately put AIG on the hook for various obligations under the
CDOs.
188. Gretchen Morgenson, Behind Biggest Insurer's Crisis, A Blind Eye to a Web of Risk, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 28, 2008, at A 1, available at 2008 WLNR 18427841.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See Saporito, supra note 30, at 24 ("[A] CDS is, in its simplest form, an insurance policy.
... AIG wrote multiple insurance policies covering the same underlying package of increasingly
toxic assets.").
192. Id; Henny Sender, AIG Still Facing Huge Credit Losses, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2009, at I
("AIG was particularly active in providing guarantees for... collateralised debt obligations, bonds
backed by debts such as subprime mortgages.").
193. Morgenson, supra note 188, at Al (indicating that the CDS business was generating as
much as $250 million in premium income).
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FIGURE 2: CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS
With CDO stability ultimately depending on payment streams from
holders of sub-prime mortgages and on rising home values, it did not
take long for the disaster that was waiting in the wings to step in when
the housing bubble burst.
From a pure insurance theory perspective, the problem is clear.
Even with a large number of SPVs and an even larger pool of independ-
ent debt obligations insured against default, the law of large numbers can
operate successfully only if the insurance issuer has reliable probability
data with respect to the event insured against (i.e., default with respect to
the obligation held). 194 Large numbers matter because such numbers gen-
erally make actuarial predictions meaningful. 195 Regarding pool size in
this context, one commentator notes the following:
[Although credit derivatives may transfer insurance risk, an investor
who assumes this risk does not usually assume the risks of a suffi-
ciently large number of underlying obligors so as to pool and dilute
(or diversify) the risks in any statistically meaningful sense. As a re-
suit, these investors do not satisfy the pooling condition for insurance
and the contract should not constitute insurance for the credit protec-
tor or, under conventional wisdom, for the credit protected counter-
party.'
96
The news gets worse from a probability data perspective. It might
have been the case that historical mortgage default information was read-
ily available and could have provided predictive value with respect to
non-sub-prime mortgages. The same certainly cannot be said with re-
spect to obligations backed by pooled sub-prime mortgages. Securitiza-
tion of sub-prime mortgages is relatively new, and a priori probabilities
do not exist with respect to the likelihood that this particular type of
CDO will default. Acquiring a reliable default probability would have
required an extensive assessment of the prior performance of similarly-
backed CDOs, but at the time the "insurance" was issued, that informa-
tion did not exist. According to at least one commentator, industry par-
ticipants were, nonetheless, blindly undaunted:
194. See Taylor, supra note 15, at 877-83.
195. See Singer, supra note 15, at 116.
196. David S. Miller, Distinguishing Risk: The Disparate Tax Treatment of Insurance and
Financial Contracts in a Converging Marketplace, 55 TAX LAW. 481, 542 (2002).
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Financiers, as well as the investors who bought their wares and the
ratings agencies that evaluated them, agreed that by applying the
proper equations it was possible to, say, bundle a bunch of subprime
mortgages, chop them up and sell the pieces as fairly safe securities,
even as they were leveraged to the hilt. Why? The mathematical
models-backward-looking and based on just a few years' data from
an asset bubble-said so. 197
As it turns out, short-term experience proved negative for AIGFP,
and, for the sake of the larger financial sector: AIG, the parent company
ultimately liable, had to be rescued. To the extent that the prevailing
"risk distribution" assessment is based on the mere existence of a large
number of risk units in the insured pool, without any real effort to ascer-
tain whether reliable risk-occurrence probabilities exist for that pool, the
standard lacks real teeth and thus creates the appearance of insurance
where none truly exists. 198 Indeed, investment activity can masquerade as
"insurance." Ben Bemanke, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, hit the nail
on the head when he referred to AIGFP as "a hedge fund basically that
was attached to a large and stable insurance company. ' 199
And that is not the worst of it from a federal tax perspective.
Wholly aside from facts specific to AIGFP and AIG, if a given com-
pany's investment activities can mask as "insurance" (a likelihood en-
hanced by the proximity of legitimate insurance and the expectation of
some investment activity), then a company may undeservedly qualify as
an insurance company by appearing-to the naked eye-to satisfy the
"more than half' standard. And even if a company satisfies the "more
than half' standard, notwithstanding the masquerading of investment
activity as insurance (because of the extent of its pure insurance busi-
ness), the company nonetheless may understate its income by overstating
its unearned premiums and/or unpaid loss reserves.
Although the Service tenaciously adheres to standards and concepts
articulated in the 1940s to ascertain whether a given arrangement rises to
the level of "insurance, 2 ° ° modem courts have not hesitated to question
197. Barbara Kiviat, Reassessing Risk, TIME, Nov. 17, 2008, at I, available at 2008 WLNR
21138582.
198. In discussing the concept of insurance for purposes of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, one
commentator makes a similar point. See Steven J. Williams, Note, Distinguishing "Insurance "from
Investment Products under the McCarran-Ferguson Act: Crafting a Rule of Decision, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 1996 (1998) (noting that the securitization process itself may appear to shift risk from one
lender to another who pools and thereby distributes risk but does not, itself, constitute "insurance").
Highlighting the weakening of the line between banking and insurance, the author notes that "finan-
cial services innovation and expanding national bank powers have blurred the line between bank-
authorized investment products and insurance." Id. at 1996. The author further points out that "a
judicial definition of 'insurance' which only looks for some element of risk, without determining
whether that risk is of the kind commonly associated 'insurance,' will inevitably reach beyond any
common understanding of the term." Id. at 2019.
199. Sender, supra note 192, at 1.
200. See Rev. Rul. 2008-08, 2008-1 C.B. 340, 2008 WL 131946 (citing Helvering v. Le Gierse,
312 U.S. 531 (1941)).
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the relevance of a risk-shifting inquiry. 2° ' In doing so, they rob that prong
of the analysis of its evaluative force more generally. Further, even
though there are those who embrace risk distribution as the true essence
of insurance,2 °2 scholars compellingly argue that the law of large num-
bers has predictive value only when attached to reliable probability
203data, a point which is occasionally lost on, ignored, or suppressed by
modem-day insurers. Additionally, the law of large numbers does not
appear to be a sine qua non of a risk distribution finding by the Service.
It also bears noting that, in some contexts, adequate risk distribution is
the only hurdle to clear. One commentator summarizes the problem well:
One of the consequences of reliance on Le Gierse is that instead of
developing analyses of pooling, homogeneity, independence and vol-
ume, advocates of both the economic family and recharacterization
approaches are left with the bare words "risk distribution," which
mean nothing without further explanation and contextualization. This
problem was exacerbated in subsequent years when even the advo-
cates of the recharacterization approach appeared to reduce the issue
of defining an insurance operation to a computation of the amount of
unrelated risks covered by the captive.
20
4
Wholly aside from problems with the theoretical underpinnings of
risk shifting and the limited utility of current risk distribution assess-
ments, one can argue that both the two-test hurdle and the longstanding
hostility towards deductions for self-reserving activity have resulted in
an unhealthy concentration of risk (both predictable and dangerously
unpredictable) in large, long-established entities that still qualify as "in-
surance companies," even though a hefty chunk of their business consti-
tutes pure investment activity.
Shifting risk to an insurance company and having that risk distrib-
uted at the insurance company level may make good business sense for
certain companies in certain industries. However, in viewing the universe
of insurable risks more broadly, there is certainly room to consider ap-
proaches that promise better checks on risk concentration and thus, a
more effective balancing of traditional risk shifting/distributing and ra-
tional risk retention.
IV. PROPOSALS
Scholars have proposed various solutions to the captive insurance
company problem, such as focusing on the treatment of the captive and
requiring the captive to satisfy certain requirements in order for it to
201. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Comm'r, 972 F.2d 858, 863-64 (7th Cir. 1992).
202. See Note, supra note 19, at 784 (emphasizing that "[t]he process of risk distribution ... is
the very essence of insurance").
203. Taylor, supra note 15, at 878-83.
204. Singer, supra note 15, at 140.
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qualify for special treatment-for example, proper risk-pooling, arms-
length pricing, and maintenance of a sufficient level of unrelated policy-
holder business.2 °5 Fortunately, and perhaps due to a degree of judicial
arm-twisting, some of those solutions are reflected in existing law. One
approach, for example, respects the captive arrangement if there exists
sufficient outside business at the captive level.2 6 Others see the solution
as a simple matter of weighing the business purpose of establishing the
207captive against any apparent tax avoidance purposes. Neither approach
is wholly satisfactory. The former fails to fully embrace the notion that
one company may have a sufficient volume of homogenous risk and
should have self-insuring options available without the participation of
an external, unrelated third-party insurer. The latter approach is encour-
aging but could benefit from the imposition of specific standards to en-
sure that self-insuring is truly feasible, and not merely a matter of suffi-
ciently weighty business purpose.
Thus, along those lines, the following discussion proposes contex-
tual self-insuring. To address the problem of concentrated risk and to
advance a simple utilitarian goal, this Article proposes the allowance of
current deductions for the creation of limited contingency reserves for a
specific subset of taxpayers.
A. Contextual Self-Insuring
The contextual self-insuring model seeks, at root, to allow compa-
nies with certain risks to self-insure through a related entity and deduct
the relevant "premiums," even if the arrangement would not satisfy the
Service's traditional risk shifting/distributing standard (such as a parent-
subsidiary arrangement). A company would qualify for contextual self-
insuring only if it could satisfy each of the following requirements:
(1) The arrangement involves an insurance risk and not merely an
investment risk;
(2) Either the company finds a captive arrangement financially ap-
pealing or the desired insurance is commercially unavailable,
available only at an exorbitant cost, or available at a cost sub-
stantially higher than the amount the company would have to
pay if self-insuring;
205. See, e.g., id. at 162-164.
206. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co., 972 F.2d at 863-64.
207. Winslow, supra note 15, at 135 (arguing that captive insurance arrangements should be
analyzed by weighing legitimate business purposes against tax avoidance purposes, rather than
attempting to ascertain whether insurance is "theoretically present"). Winslow has the same view
with respect to retrospectively rated insurance contracts. See Donald Arthur Winslow, A Note on
Retrospectively Rated Insurance and Federal Income Taxation, 79 KY. L.J. 195, 221-23 (1990)
(suggesting that a business purpose test might be a more useful means of ascertaining whether insur-
ance exists in a retrospectively rated contract). He notes that a retrospective insurance arrangement
allows an insurance company to share the cash flow advantages typical of self-insurance or captive
insurance company arrangements. See id. at 197.
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(3) The taxpayer has a sufficient number of homogenous, inde-
pendent risk units;
(4) There exists sufficient, reliable historical information regarding
the risk pool such that the law of large numbers can operate ef-
fectively; and
(5) The insuring entity will be adequately capitalized and operated
in accordance with the law of the captive's jurisdiction.
Companies unable to satisfy the foregoing would have the option of
forming a group captive or going the traditional route and seeking cover-
age from an insurance company in an arrangement currently sanctioned
by existing law. The proposal effectively allows individual companies
that are able to distribute their own risks internally to avoid the high cost
of obtaining that insurance from a third party, an alternative that is par-
ticularly appealing if the company is required to obtain the coverage.
Further, this approach allows those same companies to access reinsur-
ance markets directly, to the extent they feel reinsuring is appropriate,
and avoids many potential problems that might be encountered when
dealing with a third-party insurance company (such as resistance to claim
payment and unnecessary delay).
Contextual self-insuring is, of course, vulnerable to the argument
that allowing some companies to take deductions for self-insuring allows
distortion and substantial understatement of income, a result that is unfair
to other companies lacking the business profile or sheer size which
would allow them to take advantage of this elaborate form of contin-
gency reserving. There is also the potential charge that the eligibility
standards are weighed down by ambiguities, such as: What qualifies as
"exorbitant cost," when does a higher cost become "substantially
higher," and what qualifies as "reliable historical information?"
Fortunately, current and historical market data can point those in a
position to apply the standards in the right direction. Prevailing market
rates can easily sort out "exorbitant" costs, and neutral decision-makers
can readily assess the extent and quality of probability data to ascertain
whether it is reliable and useful in the relevant context. That being said, a
limited amount of ambiguity should not be fatal; applicable standards
should allow some degree of flexibility and room for healthy evolution
while, at the same time, retaining their immunity from easy manipula-
tion. To the extent that there are legitimate fears regarding income distor-
tion, there are a host of options with respect to reducing or minimizing
the apparent harm. For example, allowing deduction of only a percentage
of the premium, phasing in a full or partial deduction over a given time
period, and disallowing a premium deduction altogether once the insur-
ing company attains a certain financial profile.
While it remains true that only some companies will qualify for
contextual self-insuring, society cannot deny the differential treatment of
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various corporate taxpayers under current law, and should weigh the
harm inadvertently suffered by individual companies against the overall
health of the business sector and dangers of concentrated risk. Small
companies, no matter how limited their product or service line, have in-
surable risks. Thus, to the extent these companies choose to grow and
expand, they too may ultimately attain that critical mass of independent
risk units which would allow them to take advantage of contextual self-
insuring.
B. Utilitarian Contingency Reserving
The notion of utilitarian contingency reserving proposed here con-
sciously departs from any consideration of risk shifting, risk distributing,
or traditional notions of insurance. Rather, the core idea is that compa-
nies of a certain size-or those operating in certain industries-should,
as a matter of sound tax policy, and in accord with pursuit of the com-
mon good, be allowed to establish and take deductions for contributions
to a limited contingency reserve.
What industries and company sizes qualify? The question is tough
to answer but obviously depends on the extent lawmakers wish to make
available deductions for reserving. Whether broadly or narrowly tailored,
if a utilitarian justification is to have force, a qualifying company must
either be large enough such that a failure of the company or a sudden
financial challenge to it would negatively affect a substantial segment of
the U.S. economy (i.e., "too big to fail"), or be engaged in an industry in
which the ready availability of capital in an emergency (or even over the
long haul for crucial non-emergency activities) would maximize the
health, safety, and welfare of the citizenry, such as clean-up immediately
after an environmental disaster.
In any event, federally-endorsed reserving outside the insurance
arena is not a revolutionary notion. Since 1984, taxpayers operating nu-
clear power plants have been able to take deductions for contributions to
a Nuclear Decommissioning Reserve Fund ("NDRF" or "Fund"),2 °8 and
the tax rules and procedures governing NDRFs serve as an excellent
model for utilitarian reserving more generally.
Section §468A of the Code allows electing taxpayers to deduct
amounts contributed to a Fund during the taxable year,20 9 but limits the
annual contribution to a designated "Ruling Amount., 210 Determined by
208. I.R.S. Chief Counsel Adv. 2007-03-007 (Jan. 19, 2007), 2007 WL 121781 (concluding
that nuclear decommissioning cost is not an insurance risk and noting that "[t]he obligation to de-
commission has attached[,] therefore no hazard or fortuity as to the occurrence of decommissioning
exists.... Thus, no insurance risk is involved.").
209. I.R.C. § 468A(a) (2006).
210. Id. § 468A(b).
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an established schedule, 211 the Ruling Amount for each taxable year ba-
sically allows the taxpayer to contribute to the fund the total cost of de-
commissioning (but not more) over the estimated useful life of the power
212plant at a level-funding rate. On the flip side, the electing taxpayer
faces a gross income inclusion when amounts are distributed from the
213 214Fund213 or, barring regulatory exception, certain other events occur.
Assuming the amounts were distributed from the Fund and used to cover
actual decommissioning costs, 2 15 the gross income inclusion is offset by
a deduction for decommissioning expenses when economic performance
occurs.
2 16
Although Congress designed the rules set forth in §468A for nuclear
power plants facing definite decommissioning obligations, one could
readily argue that a similar system would be useful for risks that are
more contingent but financially radioactive, environmentally offensive,
or threatening in their own right. If, for example, Congress allows com-
panies to call on their contingency reserves (with an offsetting deduction
for designated expenditures) as the economy begins to slip into a reces-
sion (or a given company encounters exigent financial circumstances),
they may be able to delay or avoid layoffs, or take other steps to smooth
out the volatility of the short- and long-term business cycles. And, to the
extent that more large companies are able to bear their own risks, or at
least fine tune the balance of risks shifted and those retained, American
taxpayers will benefit as their shoulders are relieved of potential bailout
burdens.
If the recent past is any indicator, federal bailout infusions, granted
in exchange for an equity stake, exacerbate corporate agency costs. So,
rather than those costs being borne by the historic shareholder group
alone, those costs spread to the larger U.S. taxpaying population. It re-
mains true that as with contextual self-insuring, utilitarian reserving can
be attacked as allowing distortion and substantial understatement of in-
come. However, the core premise of utilitarian thought is that the larger
societal benefits outweigh individual harms.
211. Id. § 468A(d)(1). Although the Secretary is obligated to review the schedule of ruling
amounts during the useful life of the power plant (revising them if necessary), the Secretary may do
so more frequently if the taxpayer requests. Id. § 468A(d)(3).
212. Id. § 468A(d)(2)(A).
213. An exception applies with respect to amounts distributed from the Fund to cover certain
costs connected with Fund operations. Id. § 468A(c)(1)(A), (e)(4)(B).
214. These events include deemed distributions under § 468A(e)(6), terminations of the Fund
under § 468A(e)(7), and a disposition of any interest in the nuclear power plant. Id. § 468A(c)(I)(B).
215. The Fund can be used to cover decommissioning costs, to cover operational expenses, and
to the extent of amounts not needed for the foregoing, to make investments. Id. § 468A(e)(4). For
provisions governing the taxation of the Fund, see id. § 468A(e)(2).




In light of general judicial rejection and scholarly criticism, the
Service officially abandoned its economic family theory in the captive
insurance company arena in 2001. As promised, however, the Service
continues to analyze certain captive insurance transactions to ascertain
whether they incorporate risk shifting and risk distributing, despite the
fact that courts have questioned the legitimacy of a risk shifting inquiry
and thereby weakened its determinative force. Commentators do not
criticize the risk distribution requirement as inherently useless, but they
do accurately note that the standard can be used to demarcate true "insur-
ance" only in those contexts in which reliable probability data exists with
respect to the designated risk pool.
To the extent the Service or any other entity focuses only on the
mere existence of a large number of apparently independent, homoge-
nous risk units in the designated pool (with very little or no regard for
predictive data with respect to that pool), latent investment activity may
successfully cloak itself in the garb of "insurance." AIG's so-called "debt
insurance" on credit default swaps has brought home that truth and,
given the concentration of risk within behemoth AIG, that truth arrived
with resounding and devastating force.
Contextual self-insurance represents a healthy and viable means of
de-concentrating insurable risk generally, and for companies deemed
"too big to fail"--or those operating in certain industries-limited con-
tingency reserving is far more palatable than multi-billion-dollar bailouts
and the attendant enhancement of corporate agency costs. Indeed, both
contextual self-insuring and limited contingency reserving promise to




HE SPEAKS NOT, YET HE SAYS EVERYTHING; WHAT OF
THAT?: TEXT, CONTEXT, AND PRETEXT IN STATE V.
JEFFREY DAHMER
GREGORY J. O'MEARA, S.J.t
[Dahmer] drill[ed] holes in his living victims' heads, pour[ed] in
chemicals to "zombify" them, ha[d] sex with the corpses' viscera,
and ke[pt] some body parts in his refrigerator, occasionally eating
them.
1
Of course, in some respects, Abraham does speak. He says a lot. But
even if he says everything, he need only keep silent on one single
thing for it to be concluded that he hasn't spoken.
2
She speaks, yet she says nothing; what of that?
3
INTRODUCTION
In State of Wisconsin v. Dahmer,4 the defense attempted to lead the
jury through a series of inferences that would have them conclude the
defendant was insane at the time he committed each of the fifteen mur-
ders charged by the State of Wisconsin. They portrayed a client who
cooperated fully with the authorities and who was too disturbed to be
responsible for his actions. To make this approach work, they needed
narrative distance between Dahmer and the jury so he would not be inter-
rogated about his prior inconsistent statements and meticulous planning
of the killings. This distance was created by Dahmer's silence in the
courtroom. The jury heard his words only through others' voices.
Though silence had worked as Dahmer's strategy outside the courtroom,
the weight of the evidence undermined that approach at trial. His actions
t Assistant Professor, Marquette University Law School. B.A., Notre Dame; J.D., Wiscon-
sin; L.L.M., New York University. When I was an Assistant District Attorney for Milwaukee Coun-
ty, I was part of the prosecution team in State v. Dahmer. Lead counsel for the prosecution was then
Milwaukee County District Attorney E. Michael McCann, assisted by both Assistant District Attor-
ney Carol L. White and me. The defense was headed by Mr. Gerald Boyle, assisted by Ms. Wendy
Patrikus and Ms. Ellen Ryan. The current District Attorney of Milwaukee County, John Chisolm,
graciously gave me access to the office's file in the Dahmer case. I am grateful to him and his assis-
tant, Ms. Sheila Stanelle, for their generosity in the preparation of this article. I am grateful also to
Professors Edward M. Gaffney, Bruce Berner, Scott Moss, Philip Chmielewski, S.J., Daniel Blinka,
and Paul Secunda for their help on earlier drafts of this paper. Thanks also to Mr. Bryan Bayer and
Mr. Michael Moeschberger for their research assistance.
I. Stephen M. Glynn, If Dahmer's Not Crazy, Who Is?, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 9, 1992, at 13.
2. JACQUES DERRIDA, THE GIFT OF DEATH AND LITERATURE IN SECRET 60 (David Wills
trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2d ed. 2008) (1999).
3. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 2.
4. No. 1991CF912542 (Milwaukee County Cir. Ct. filed July 25, 1991).
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spoke louder than his wordlessness, and the jury spoke in finding him
responsible for what he did.
The job of a trial attorney is to tell a story and create a reality in the
courtroom using the tools at hand: exhibits, testimony of witnesses, the
rules of evidence, and the substantive law at issue in the case.5 In crafting
this narrative, attorneys take a complex set of events and filter them into
various causal chains which are necessarily selective and stripped-down
representations of what occurred on some prior date or series of dates.
6
Sensitive attorneys understand that success before a jury requires appre-
hension not only of content, the "what" of the narrative, but also of style,
the "how" of the narrative.7 This emphasis on style is critical because the
incompleteness of information given to the jury requires it to fill gaps in
reasoning.8 Often attorneys selectively choose which facts are presented
to a jury because there is too much material. 9 Such selectivity may also
imply causal inferences in the jury.10 This Article maintains that, in the
case of State of Wisconsin v. Jeffrey Dahmer, how the case was presented
was just as important as the content of that evidence. The text of the evi-
dence needed a context; without it, the jury would not be persuaded.
In January 1992, television cameras and newspaper reporters
flocked to Milwaukee, Wisconsin as the case pitting the State of Wiscon-
5. See, e.g., ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 110-11
(2000); JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND
RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY 265 (1984) [hereinafter WHITE,
CONSTITUTIONS AND RECONSTITUTIONS]; JAMES BOYD WHITE, Rhetoric and Law: The Arts of
Cultural and Communal Life, in HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE
LAW 28, 34-35 (1985) [hereinafter WHITE, HERACLES' Bow].
6. See PAUL RICOEUR, MEMORY, HISTORY, FORGET'ING 85 (Kathleen Blarney & David
Pellauer trans., 2004) ("It is, more precisely, the selective function of the narrative that opens to
manipulation the opportunity and the means of a clever strategy, consisting from the outset in a
strategy of forgetting as much as in a strategy of remembering.").
7. See, e.g., AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 5, at 167, 175 (discussing how rhetorical
style can imply a range of meanings without saying any of them explicitly).
8. See SEYMOUR CHATMAN, STORY AND DISCOURSE: NARRATIVE STRUCTURE IN FICTION
AND FILM 28-29 (Cornell Paperbacks 1980) (1978):
Whether the narrative is experienced through a performance or through a text, the mem-
bers of the audience must respond with an interpretation: they cannot avoid participating
in the transaction. They must fill in gaps with essential or likely events, traits and objects
which for various reasons have gone unmentioned. If in one sentence we are told that
John got dressed and in the next that he rushed to an airport ticket counter, we surmise
that in the interval occurred a number of artistically inessential yet logically necessary
events: grabbing his suitcase, walking from the bedroom to the living room and out the
front door, then to his car or to the bus or to a taxi, opening the door of the car, getting in,
and so on. The audience's capacity to supply plausible details is virtually limitless, as is a
geometer's to conceive of an infinity of fractional spaces between two points.
9. Indeed, trial courts demand that attorneys pare down facts to avoid repetition or waste of
time. See, e.g., Brown v. Wainwright, 785 F.2d 1457, 1466 (11th Cir. 1986) ("In the normal eviden-
tiary sense cumulative evidence is excluded because it is repetitious."); accord Int'l Minerals &
Res., S.A. v. Pappas, 96 F.3d 586, 596 (2d Cir. 1996).
10. See CHATMAN, supra note 8, at 28-29.
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sin against serial killer Jeffrey Lionel Dahmer unfolded." The defendant
pled not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect to fifteen counts of
first-degree intentional homicide.' 2 Although he admitted killing the fif-
teen victims, he maintained he should not be held responsible for those
deaths on the ground that he suffered from a mental disease, and, because
of this disease, he was unable to conform his actions to the requirements
of the law. 13 Essentially, Dahmer claimed he was a victim of his psycho-
logical disturbance and was no more to be blamed for his actions than
were the young men whom he killed.
From one perspective, the trial should have been simple. Because of
the guilty plea, there was no need for the panoply of witnesses and phys-
ical evidence that normally attends a homicide prosecution; no need for
coroner reports to determine cause of death; no need for specific details
of each of the fifteen murders because the defendant conceded causing
them. Because the affirmative defense carries the civil burden, the defen-
dant did not need to prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt 4 nor win
the assent of a unanimous jury. 5 Rather, the jury had only to weigh the
testimony of detectives, acquaintances of the defendant, and expert wit-
nesses to determine the answers to two questions: at the time of each
murder (1) "did the defendant have a mental disease or defect?" and, if
that question were answered in the affirmative, (2) "[a]s a result of that
mental disease or defect, did the defendant lack substantial capacity ei-
ther to appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct or to conform that
conduct to the requirements of the law?"'16 Sentencing was not expected
to be a major issue in this case-the defendant was going to be locked up
for the rest of his life. 17 The sole question for sentencing was which sort
of institution would house him: a prison or a hospital.' 8
11. Duane Dudek, Dahmer's Insanity Defense Brings Court TV Coverage, MILWAUKEE
SENTINEL, Jan. 15, 1992, at 2 (describing how Court TV offered "gavel-to-gavel coverage" of the
trial).
12. Dahmer Changes Plea to Guilty but Insane, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1992, at A19, available
at 1992 WLNR 3335725.
13. Id.
14. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.15(3) (West 2009) ("Mental disease or defect excluding responsi-
bility is an affirmative defense which the defendant must establish to a reasonable certainty by the
greater weight of the credible evidence."). The provisions of the Wisconsin Statutes dealing with the
defense of mental disease or defect have not substantively changed since the Dahmer case was tried.
See, e.g., Act of May 27, 1994, 1993 Wis. Act 486, 1993 S.B. 826 (amendment to remove sexist
language).
15. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.165(2) (West 2009) ("No verdict on the plea of not guilty by
reason of mental disease or defect may be valid or received unless agreed to by at least five-sixths of
the jurors.").
16. WIS. JI-CRIMINAL § 605, at 1 (2003). The jury's deliberation on this matter is directed by
two questions on the verdict form. Id. at § 605B, at 1. The jury is directed "to answer the second
question only if [they] answer the first question 'yes."' Id. at § 605, at 1.
17. Pursuant to § 971.165, the jury was instructed that Jeffrey Dahmer would not go free if
they found him not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. Rather, he would be committed to
the custody of the state and likely be confined to a state mental hospital "unless the court determines
that the defendant would not pose a danger to himself or herself or to others if released under condi-
tions ordered by the court." § 971.165(2). If the jury rejected the defense of not guilty by reason of
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However, a close examination of the evidence presented in this case
subverts any assertion of simplicity. In every insanity case, the legal and
mental health professions understand mental disease differently; those
difficulties were present here as well. Further, Dahmer's volubility and
his penchant for documenting his actions with photographs and memen-
tos required his attorneys to walk a fine line in crafting a picture of him
that was at once familiar enough to garner jury sympathy and odd
enough to assure a finding that he suffered from a mental disease. While
proclaiming a strategy of complete and open disclosure, the defense care-
fully avoided facts that might have derailed the story it attempted to con-
struct for the jury.19
This strategy of concealment is made manifest with a simple obser-
vation: Dahmer's guilty plea constituted the bulk of the words he said in
open court before sentencing. 20 Although Dahmer's statements to detec-
tives and mental health professionals provided almost all the facts as-
sumed as true in the case, he was never sworn in as a witness, he never
spoke at trial, and all of his words were mediated by others who reported
them.2' Rather than permitting the jury to observe the flesh-and-blood
defendant from the witness stand, the defense orchestrated his previous
statements to fabricate the most appealing figure possible, never under-
mining this discursive image with the defendant's live testimony. The
strategy not only focused the jury but also controlled the defendant,
whose earlier statements revealed inconsistencies and admissions detri-
mental to his defense.
After a brief description of the facts, and the substance of the testi-
mony, this Article will trace the development of the insanity defense as it
applies to the Dahmer case. I will then present challenges that confront
any defendant who attempts to raise this argument in a criminal trial,
coupled with challenges peculiar to defending Jeffrey Dahmer himself,
mental disease or defect, then the defendant would likely be sentenced to prison; specifically, in
Wisconsin, he would be sentenced to life imprisonment. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.50(3) (West
2009). Realistically, the issue at trial was not whether Jeffrey Dahmer would be locked up for life,
but where this incarceration would take place.
18. See § 939.50(3); WIS. JI-CRIMINAL § 605, at 3.
19. This strategy of avoidance may also be attributed to the prosecution in this case. Although
Mr. Dahmer confessed to a number of assaults in which he had sexual contact with people who were
unconscious because he drugged them, the prosecution chose to focus solely on the murders in the
complaint and information filed with the court. On the one hand, a number of murder charges surely
outweigh incidental sexual crimes. On the other hand, it may be that the prosecution did not want to
dilute the case's clean plot line by risking the jury's focus on the defendant's sexual desires and
fantasies rather than on the tragic deaths of fifteen young men.
20. Obviously the defendant has a guaranteed fight not to testify on his own behalf. Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442 (1966). Further, the prosecution cannot comment on the defendant's
exercise of that fight at trial. See e.g., Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617-18 (1976). I do not chal-
lenge that right. Still, from the viewpoint of trial tactics and narrative theory, one cannot pretend that
the defendant's choice not to take the stand is inconsequential. Part of what this Article does is show
how far-reaching the decision to shift the defendant's words into other mouths at trial can be.
21. See Rick Romell & David Doege, Boyle Says He Agonized over Dahmer Testifying,
MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Feb 14, 1992, at I.
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given his actions before and after arrest. Next, I will turn to narrative
theory to explain how the defense presented its case, demonstrating that
its case-in-chief restricted the flow of information to the jury and painted
a picture of the defendant at odds with his own statements. I will then
sketch out how the prosecution countered this image.
I. THE VERDICT, AND THE FACTS UPON WHICH IT WAS BASED
The trial itself lasted fewer than thirteen days from opening state-
ments to final summation. The jury's deliberation was complete in less
than twenty-four hours. On February 15, 1992, Judge Laurence Gram, Jr.
received a special verdict in which the jury found that, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, Jeffrey Dahmer did not suffer from a mental dis-
ease or defect when he committed the fifteen murders to which he had
pled guilty. 22 The jury's finding was paradoxical because most of the
psychiatrists and psychologists who examined Dahmer thought that he
may have suffered from some sort of mental disease.23 The verdict was
met with cognitive dissonance both within the legal community and the
public at large. 24 On the one hand, people appreciated that Jeffrey Dah-
mer was not "given a pass," and that he was held accountable for his
disturbing actions which included murder, dismemberment, and canni-
balism resulting in the deaths of at least seventeen young men in Ohio
and Wisconsin between 1978 and 1991.25 On the other hand, we feel
uneasy with a finding that someone who kills seventeen people, collects
the skulls and genitalia of some, eats parts of others, and drills holes in
22. Jim Stingl, Dahmer Sane: Families of Victims to Describe Their Pain at Sentencing
Monday, MILWAUKEE J., Feb. 16, 1992, at 1. Because ten of the twelve jurors found that the defen-
dant did not suffer from a mental disease, the jury did not consider the second question concerning
the defendant's ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. ld.: see also Wis. J1-
CRIMINAL § 605, at I.
23. As a matter of law, the jury instructions make clear:
The term "mental disease or defect" identifies a legal standard that may not exactly
match the medical terms used by mental health professionals. You are not bound by med-
ical labels, definitions, or conclusions as to what is or is not a mental disease or defect to
which the witnesses may have referred.
WlS. JI-CRIMINAL § 605, at 2. Still, even Dr. Park Elliott Dietz, one mental health witness who did
not find that Jeffrey Dahmer suffered from a mental disease, wrote that a diagnosis of "a mixed
personality disorder with antisocial, schizoid, and schizotypal features would be defensible." See
Park Elliott Dietz, Report on Mental Status of Jeffrey L. Dahmer 6 (Jan. 10, 1992) (unpublished
court file, on file with author).
24. My experience indicates that most people think Jeffrey Dahmer was successful in raising
the defense of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. One may observe that the prosecution
won where it counts-in court; but perhaps the defense did better than most thought in painting a
picture of a troubled man, beset by a maelstrom of circumstances, rather than the somewhat cold and
calculating killer that the prosecution argued was better supported by the evidence at trial. Despite
winning the verdict, the prosecution's case seems not to have captured the popular imagination.
25. See Don J. DeBenedictis, Sane Serial Killer: Experts Say Insanity Plea Alive and Well,
Thanks Partly to Dahmer Jury, A.B.A. J., April 1992, at 22. Theresa Smith, whose brother, Edward
W. Smith was killed by Dahmer during the summer of 1990, noted that the verdict "brought back the
faith I lost in the justice system." Dirk Johnson, Milwaukee Jury Says Dahmer Was Sane, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 16, 1992, at 24, available at 1992 WLNR 3304512 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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their skulls to "zombify" them is sane.26 As one commentator asked, "If
Dahmer's not crazy, who is?
27
Beginning with the death of Steven Tuomi in late 1987 and continu-
ing until his arrest in July 1991, Jeffrey Dahmer refined his modus ope-
randi for murdering men susceptible to his entreaties.28 Dahmer would
charm and seduce attractive young men, inviting them to come home
with him and promising to pay them to pose for erotic photographs or to
watch videos.2 9 The victims were mostly in their twenties, and none of
them drove a car.3° After taking a cab or bus to a spot that was a few
blocks from his residence, 3' Dahmer would walk to his dwelling with the
victims, invite them in, and eventually offer them a drink laced with Hal-
cion, a sleep aid for which Dahmer had a prescription. 32 Once the victims
were unconscious, Dahmer would have sex with them, and then he
would strangle them before they awoke.33 Dahmer would often fondle
their dead bodies and masturbate, and eventually he would move their
bodies either to a drain spout or into a bathtub where he would cut them
26. Glynn, supra note 1, at 13.
27. Id.
28. Initially, Dahmer claimed all of his victims were gay or bisexual. Dennis Murphy, State-
ment of Jeffrey Dahmer, Case No. 2472 § 5, at 15 (July 23, 1991) (unpublished police report, on file
with author). ("He stated the reason that he killed these homosexuals and he stated they all were
homosexuals, was because he wanted to be with them."). Later, he admitted that a number of his
victims were not gay but came home with him to be videotaped upon his promising them payment.
Frederick A. Fosdal, Interview Notes for Jeffrey Dahmer Examination 23-25 (Nov. 13, 1991) (un-
published report, on file with author).
29. Dennis Murphy & Patrick Kennedy, Statement of Jeffrey Dahmer, Case No. 2472 § 5, at
88 (July 31, 1991) (unpublished police report, on file with author):
As far as the sexual preference and/or race, religion, or education of the individuals that
the suspect preferred, the suspect stated it was not a matter of race, religion, or education,
it was just a matter of opportunity. He stated he offered each one of the individuals mon-
ey to be photographed, to view videos, or to have sex, and after he persuaded them to
come into his apartment, he would give them a sleeping potion, namely Halcion, and
once they went to sleep, he would strangle them either manually or with a strap, photo-
graph most of them after death, sometimes have sex with them after death, and then sub-
sequently dismember them and on approximately eleven of the victims, kept the skulls
and approximately four torsos, the hands, a couple hearts, and other inner organs.
30. Frederick A. Fosdal, Interview Notes for Jeffrey Dahmer Examination 59 (Jan. 10, 1992)
(unpublished report, on file with author).
31. Murphy & Kennedy, supra note 29, at 8 1:
He stated the reason why he would have the taxi drop him off several blocks from his
apartment was in order to keep the taxi driver from knowing exactly where he lived at
and to see if anyone had been following him, as he did not want anyone to detect his ac-
tivities.
32. Dennis Murphy, Statement of Jeffrey Dahmer, Case No. 2472 § 5, at 149-50 (Aug. 22,
1991) (unpublished police report, on file with author):
We then asked if he was experiencing any withdrawals, not only from alcohol but from
not using halcion. He related that he has not experienced any withdrawals from alcohol
nor from the use of halcion, because he does not take the pills regularly. He related that
he would take one pill about every six months and that was only when he could not sleep.
He related that the main reason he had halcion was to use [it] on the people he brought to
his apartment or the ones he met in the bathhouses. He related that he first started to ex-
periment by using three pills on the people and then used as many as seven on some of
them. He related that he would bluff the doctors into prescribing the pills for him because
he would tell them that he could not sleep but never used them.
33. Murphy & Kennedy, supra note 29, at 88.
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up to dispose of them, occasionally saving trophies such as their skulls or
preserved genitalia.34 On four occasions he engaged in cannibalism but
later stated he found this unfulfilling. 35 He would either burn or throw
out their clothing and destroy any identification they had on them.
36
When Dahmer was arrested, there were remains of eleven of his victims
in his apartment.
37
In addition to these facts recounted by the defendant to police detec-
tives, additional claims emerged from Dahmer's discussions with clini-
cians. Dahmer reported he attempted to exhume a freshly dead corpse for
sexual purposes,38 he drank blood from a test tube while working as a
phlebotomist,39 and he drilled small holes into the skulls of five of his
victims while they were drugged and injected a mixture of muriatic acid
and water, or boiling water alone, in an attempt to make them sexual
slaves.40 He also claimed that he planned to build a "'temple' that fea-
34. Frederick A. Fosdal, Interview Notes for Jeffrey Dahmer Examination 37 (Dec. 20, 1991);
Patrick Kennedy, Statement of Jeffrey Dahmer, Case No. 2472 § 5, at 123 (July 23, 1991) (unpub-
lished police report, on file with author).
35. Murphy, supra note 32, at 151-52:
Jeff Dahmer went on to relate that he had originally told us that he had only eaten a bicep
of one of his victims. He related that there were other times in which he had eaten part of
the victim. The first time was the person he identified as Cash D (Raymond Smith-
Victim #5). He related that he eat [sic] this victim's heart. He related that it tasted kind of
spongy. He indicated that the next victim was the person he met by the bookstore, (Vic-
tim #7-Ernest Miller). He related that this was a person he really liked. He indicated
that he had filleted his heart and had kept it in the freezer and also kept his bicep. He in-
dicated that he had eaten the thigh muscle of this subject, but it was so tough he could
hardly chew it. He then purchased a meat tenderizer and used it on the bicep. He stated
that it tasted like beef or a filet mignon. The next person he was going to eat, and in fact
tried, was victim # 15-Oliver Lacy. He stated that on this victim he ate his bicep. This
also tasted like Filet mignon. He stated that he would tenderize it first. He stated that he
did keep this individual's heart and bicep. We asked him if he had eaten the body parts,
just plain. He stated that he would use salt, pepper, and A-1 Steak sauce on them. He
stated that the reason he ate these parts was because he was curious but then it was be-
cause he wanted to make them a part of him. He stated that this way he could keep these
people with him. He stated that he ate only the people that he really liked and wanted
them to be a part of him or with him all the time.
See also Dietz, supra note 23, at 4 ("He had no enduring interest in cannibalism, but rather tried it
out of curiosity and made use of the occasion to masturbate to fantasies of a victim he had con-
sumed. Although he did so on as many as 10 occasions, this did not develop into an enduring or
intense sexual interest.").
36. R.W. Munsey, Statement of Jeffrey Dahmer, Case No. 2472 § 12, at 195 (July 26, 1991)
(unpublished police report, on file with author) ("Jeffrey L. Dahmer stated he took the victim's
clothing to a location used to bum trash by his father where there he burned the clothing and identi-
fication.") (describing Dahmer's destruction of evidence following the Hicks homicide in Bath,
Ohio).
37. See Jeffrey Jentzen et al., Destructive Hostility: The Jeffrey Dahmer Case: A Psychiatric
and Forensic Study of a Serial Killer, 15 AM. J. FORENSIC MED. PATHOLOGY 283, 292 (1994).
38. Dietz, supra note 23, at 3.
39. Id. at 4.
40. Fosdal, supra note 28, at 26-27:
"I was trying to think of a way to not have to kill them."... Said he would drill a small
hole through the top of the skull and into the brain-on about four or five victims-used
a baster ... [and] injected diluted muriatic acid into the skull .... Said drilling the hole in
the skull was "an experiment-it never worked out." Tried this technique on his last 4-5
victims-put acid into the hole on four of the victims and boiling water in one of the vic-
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tured his victims' remains in hopes of 'receiving special powers andenergies.'41
II. THE UNDERLYING ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
The above facts surely signal someone who is seriously disturbed.
Indeed, if one asked someone on the street whether a person who did
. ,42these things were crazy, the answer would be a resounding "yes. This
recognition gains significance in light of two seemingly contradictory
positions held by the law. On the one hand, the criminal law prides itself
on being a system that concerns itself with justice rather than ven-
geance.43 Judgments are not determined by categories used by persons in
ordinary discourse; the law calls for analytical distinctions developed
throughout the course of its history.44 On the other hand, juries determine
if a defendant raises the insanity defense successfully, and the courts'
instructions advise the panel that it may disregard expert witnesses' opi-
nions and draw its own conclusion as to the mental state of the defen-
dant.45 These instructions invite jury members to give weight to their
own reasoning and conclusions, even when those conclusions deviate
from the conclusions of those recognized as experts in the field of mental
health.46 Because it grants jurors the authority to disregard expert opi-
nions, the court must control precisely what information it permits the
jury to consider. The insanity defense rests upon the Aristotelian assump-
tion about all human beings that underlies the criminal justice system;
specifically, the law presumes that human beings are rational and make
free and unconstrained choices in this world.4 7 Aristotle maintained that
tims. Said the five individuals did not get into a "zombie" state.... The purpose was that
they would be alive, the bodies would be preserved, but their personality would be "zom-
bie-so I wouldn't have to go out looking for partners."
41. David Doege, Dahmer Planned Shrine of Bones, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Feb. 5, 1992, at
1.
42. See GEORGES CANGUILHEM, THE NORMAL AND THE PATHOLOGICAL 117 (Carolyn R.
Fawcett trans., Zone Books 1989) (1966) ("When we call another man insane, we do so intuitively
,as men, not as specialists.' The madman is 'out of his mind' not so much in relation to other men as
to life: he is not so much deviant as different.").
43. See PAUL RICOEUR, CRITIQUE AND CONVICTION 117 (Lawrence D. Kritzman ed., Kath-
leen Blamey trans., Columbia Univ. Press 1998) (1995) ("[J]ustice encounters its contrary first in the
thirst for vengeance, which is a powerful passion: justice consists in not seeking vengeance. Between
the crime and the punishment, to return to well-known categories, lies justice and, consequently, the
introduction of a third party.").
44. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 99 (1986) (discussing precedent and legislation in
the conception of state power).
45. WIS. JI-CRIMINAL § 605, at 2 (2003) ("You are not bound by medical labels, definitions,
or conclusions as to what is or is not a mental disease .... ). In an explanatory footnote to this
instruction, the Jury Instructions Committee explains:
The intent of this sentence is to emphasize that the jury is not bound by what is consi-
dered "mental disease or defect" for medical purposes. The jury is bound by the legal de-
finition of mental disease as explained in this instruction. In a proper case, the judge may
wish to emphasize this distinction.
Id. at 7 n.7.
46. See id. at 2, 7 n.7.
47. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 65 (Martin Ostwald trans., Bobbs-Merrill Educ.
Publ'g 1962):
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the origin of our actions is internal, within ourselves, and thus voluntary:
"[I]f we cannot trace back our actions to starting points other than those
within ourselves, then all actions in which the initiative lies in ourselves
are in our power and are voluntary actions."48 Professor George Fletcher
shows how this notion of the rational human being acting voluntarily is
often formulated in terms of "free will."49 Criminal law presumes free
will operates in all situations unless we recognize extenuating circums-
tances giving rise to an excuse or justification. 0
Despite the admonition that the law is addressed solely to rational
actors choosing freely among alternative courses of action, the law has
not always recognized an actor's rationality. 5' Rather, the law's early
focus was solely on consequences of the physical act itself. In early Eng-
lish law, if there were a quarrel and a dead body resulted, then the killer,
regardless of reasons for doing so, was liable to punishment. 52 As com-
mon law was influenced by canon (church) law following the Norman
Conquest, matters began to change; canonists assigned weight not only
to the act itself but also to the intention that lay behind it.53 By determin-
ing a penitent's intention, the confessor could assign an appropriate pen-
For where it is in our power to act, it is also in our power not to act, and where we can
say "no," we can also say "yes." Therefore, if we have the power to act where it is noble
to act, we also have the power not to act where not to act is base .... But if we have the
power to act nobly or basely, and likewise the power not to act, and if such action or inac-
tion constitutes our being good and evil, we must conclude that it depends on us whether
we are decent or worthless individuals.
See also GEORGE P. FLETCHER, THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW: AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE,
AND INTERNATIONAL 9-10 (2007) (discussing the history of Aristotle's view of involuntary actions
by reason of mistake, duress, or insanity).
48. ARISTOTLE, supra note 47, at 65.
49. FLETCHER, supra note 47, at 10 ("This problem of attributing agency has traditionally
been addressed under the label of 'free will.' In the Christian West, the discussion of free will took
the place of Aristotle's focus on the issue of voluntary action.").
50. See id.
51. See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ AND
THE LAW ON TRIAL 30 (1988):
From roughly the 13th to the 16th century, the plea of self-defense, called se defendendo,
came into consideration whenever a fight broke out and one party retreated as far as he
could before resorting to defensive force. His back had to be literally against the wall.
If he then killed the aggressor, se defendendo had the effect of saving the defendant
from execution, but it left intact the other stigmatizing effects of the criminal law. The
defendant forfeited his goods as expiation for having taken human life. The murder wea-
pon was also forfeited to the Crown as a deodand, a tainted object. Killing se defendendo
was called excusable homicide, for though the wrong of homicide had occurred, the cir-
cumstances generated a personal excuse that saved the manslayer from execution.
52. See id.
53. JOHN MAHONEY, THE MAKING OF MORAL THEOLOGY: A STUDY OF THE ROMAN
CATHOLIC TRADITION 180 (1987). At least Aquinas considered both the act and the intention in
determining the moral goodness of an action. His perspective was a corrective on the work of Peter
Abelard which focused solely on the intention with which an act was done. Mahoney notes:
[I]n his ethics Abelard was equally individualistic, to the extent of concentrating the mo-
rality of good or bad action not in what was being done, but in the intention with which it
was done .... Moral goodness or badness does not reside in any action considered in it-
self but derives only from the intention which produces the action.
Id. at 176.
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ance in the confessional.54 Professor Fletcher maintains that the criminal
law was influenced by these pastoral attempts at grading the intention
behind an act.55 For example, distinctions in self-defense can be traced
back to distinctions made by canonists 56:
The modem approach to the distinction between self-defense and
punishment finds its best exposition in the work of Thomas Aquinas,
who emphasizes the intention with which the defender harms the ag-
gressor. If the intention is not to harm but merely to fend off the at-
tack, then the action can properly be described as an act of self-
defense; but if the intention is to make the aggressor suffer for his
misdeed, then the act appears to be closer to punishment.... The ba-
sic principle is that a private individual may not intentionally kill
another human being when the explicit object (rather than the side ef-
fect) of the action is to cause death.
57
Because the criminal law lacks ministers to interrogate the offender
with the breadth and depth granted to the confessor,58 it modified the
canonist's approach to intent or motive. Rather than focusing on a psy-
chological reality underlying a given act, criminal law constructs an ele-
ment called the actor's "intent." The best definition of intent in criminal
law arises in the work of the nineteenth-century jurist James Fitzjames
Stephen: "The only possible way of discovering a man's intention is by
looking at what he actually did .... what must have appeared to him at
the time the natural consequence of his conduct."59 The understanding of
a defendant's intent is not an inquiry into the actual motives that stirred
the defendant to action or deep desires of the heart; rather, it is an act of
reconstruction based on the defendant's external actions. 60 The law looks
at what an actor did and reasons backwards, presuming that the rational
actor intended the ensuing consequences.
61
By considering the actor's intent, the law went beyond its earlier
consideration of external acts and focused on the actor's point of view.
This concentration on the subject's motivation gave rise to two broad
categories of defenses: justifications and excuses. 62 These defenses in
54. See id. at 179-80.
55. FLETCHER, supra note 47, at 14. ("[W]hat one intends specifies moral actions, not what
one does not intend, since the latter result is accidental.... And so such acts of self-defense by them
to preserve one's life, do not have the character of being unlawful" (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting St. Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologica)).
56. See id.
57. id. (footnote omitted).
58. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 58-73 (Robert Hurley trans., Pan-
theon Books 1978) (1976).




62. Of course other defenses are possible, for example, those rooted in a failure to fulfill the
elements of the crime or claims that the crime, as written, violates constitutional protections. Be-
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turn imply the presence of an event conveyed to the jury by means of
narrative. 63 They provide a context, a world that is subject to limitations,
in which the defendant lives and in which he makes rational choices.
64
111. JUSTIFICATIONS AND EXCUSES IN CRIMINAL DEFENSE
Justifications take the following form: "When viewed in its entirety,
the defendant's act was neither wrong nor bad; indeed, the act was vir-
tuous. ' 65 An act such as the use of defensive force to repel an aggressor's
unlawful attack is an example of a justified action. We say that the actor
is justified because we find self-defense or defense of others understand-
able, rational, and worthy of commendation.66
Excuse in criminal law is different. The law excuses criminal de-
fendants from penal consequences for wrongful acts arising either
through no fault of their own or in situations where the law perceives that
the defendant was subject to a "maelstrom of circumstance." 67 Excuse is
rooted in the sense that "what the actor did was wrong, but she had a
good reason for doing it."
68
Excuses in criminal law stem from reasons either external or inter-
nal to the actor. Duress is one example of an external force resulting in
an excuse.69 Assume defendant D shoots an innocent victim V, causing
bodily injury to her. Normally this action should result in a charge of
cause this paper considers issues of defect in a defendant's intent, I am focusing on justification and
excuse because these defenses are addressed particularly to the mens rea element.
63. See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4-5 (1983):
No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it
and give it meaning. For every constitution there is an epic, for each decalogue a scrip-
ture. Once understood in the context of the narratives that give it meaning, law becomes
not merely a system of rules to be observed, but a world in which we live.
(footnote omitted).
64. Id.
65. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 759 (1978):
Claims of justification concede that the definition of the offense is satisfied, but challenge
whether the act is wrongful; claims of excuse concede that the act is wrongful, but seek to
avoid the attribution of the act to the actor. A justification speaks to the rightness of the
act; an excuse, to whether the actor is accountable for a concededly wrongful act.
66. To label a defense as a justification rather than an excuse is already to accept a set of
values subject to the vagaries of history. As alluded to above, the common law did not view as self-
evident that killing another in self-defense freed the actor from punishment. See ARISTOTLE, supra
note 47, at 65. The underlying command "Thou shalt not kill" would have been seen as outweighing
an assumption that self-preservation is an unmitigated good. Only when moral weight is given to
preservation of life as a good in itself can the act of defensive force be seen as justified. It may be
that the intuitive "rightness" that characterizes a particular defense as a justification rather than an
excuse is as much a product of social mores as anything else.
67. FLETCHER, supra note 65, at 808:
Excuses are motivated by compassion for persons caught in a maelstrom of circumstance.
The underlying sentiment is that if any one of us were forced to act at gunpoint or to steal
in order to survive, we would do the same. If we recognize our essential equality with the
accused and identify with his situation, then we cannot help but feel compassion and
excuse his all-too-human transgression.
68. See id. at 802-03.
69. See, e.g., id. at 829-33.
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battery. However, when D pulls the trigger and shoots V solely because
actor A has a revolver cocked and pointed at D's temple, threatening to
kill him if he fails to fire the gun, the law may excuse D's action. A's
training a gun on D impeded D's ability to choose, and therefore, shoot-
ing the gun at V was not the product of D's will. To put the matter diffe-
rently, D does not evince a criminal character by acting as he does, and
his act may therefore be excused.
Excuses also arise from internal forces understood as burdening an
actor's freedom of choice just as much as a gun held to his temple. Con-
sider the excuse rationale underlying the mistaken use of defensive force.
Imagine defendant E reasonably believes that her life is threatened by
actor F. Assume further that E believes her failure to take immediate
action to thwart this deadly attack will result in her death. Assume finally
that E's belief is mistaken; she is not under attack at all. E's act of vi-
olence directed at F injures an innocent person. In this situation, the law
may excuse E's action because, had the circumstances been as E reason-
ably believed them to be at the time of her act, E's actions would have
been justified.
Excuse defenses uphold the anthropology of the rational actor be-
cause actors who are excused when under duress or mistaken about sur-
rounding facts still act rationally. 70 They choose among alternatives after
weighing options they perceive, even if their assumptions are later dis-
proved. The plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect
likewise upholds the anthropology of the rational actor in criminal law
because it excuses defendants who are unable to act rationally in a given
situation through no fault of their own. 7 1 That said, the insanity defense
remains filled with difficulties and seeming contradictions.
72
IV. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL EXCUSE OF INSANITY
A. Vicious Wills and Reason
The first English lawyer to consider the mental element of the crime
and propose relief for the insane was Henri de Bracton in his thirteenth
century treatise On the Law and Customs of England.73 He maintained
70. Id. at 802-03.
71. Id. at 835:
The definition, administration and ramifications of the insanity defense express the deep-
est concerns of the Anglo-American legal culture.... In posing the question whether a
particular person is responsible for a criminal act, we are forced to resolve our doubts
about whether anyone is ever responsible for criminal conduct. And if some are responsi-
ble and some are not, how do we distinguish between them?
72. See id.
73. De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae was completed around 1256; it is credited as "the
first systematic treatise on English." Anthony Michael Platt & Bernard L. Diamond, The Origins and
Development of the "Wild Beast" Concept of Mental Illness and Its Relation to Theories of Criminal
Responsibility, I J. HIST. BEHAV. Sci. 355, 356 (1965); see also JOEL PETER EIGEN, WITNESSING
tNSANITY: MADNESS AND MAD-DOCTORS IN THE ENGLISH COURT 35 (1995):
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that one needs a "will to harm" before a crime can be committed.74
Drawing on canon law, Bracton noted that, just as the law does not hold
infants or brute beasts responsible for the consequences of their behavior,
there are some adults who should likewise be excused because their
ability to reason is impaired, and they are thus comparable to children or
"brutes."
75
The focus on the will noted by Bracton was underscored later by
Blackstone: "So that to constitute a crime against human laws, there must
be, first, a vicious will; and, secondly, an unlawful act consequent upon
such vicious will."' 76 Although he agreed with Bracton on the necessity of
the will in making legal determinations, Blackstone reframed the issue in
terms of cognitive impairment.77 Whereas Bracton excuses the insane
whom lack "corrupt intent," "will to harm," and "malice," Blackstone
addressed the actor's inability to reason because, presumably, reason
informs the will:
[I]f there be any doubt, whether the party be compos or not, this shall
be tried by a jury. And if he be so found, a total idiocy, or absolute
insanity, excuses from the guilt, and of course from the punishment,
of any criminal action committed under such deprivation of the
senses; but, if a lunatic hath lucid intervals of understanding, he shall
answer for what he does in those intervals, as if he had no deficien-
78
cy.
According to Blackstone, a defendant may be relieved of responsi-
bility not only when he manifests a wholly deficient reason but also at
sporadic points when his reason seems impaired. 79 Further, during times
when his reason seems unaffected, a defendant should be held responsi-
ble for what he does.
80
B. Reason and the M'Naghten Standard
This recognition that partial impairment may support a defense of
insanity occurs in the case of Daniel M'Naghten. 8 1 Here the test for in-
sanity shifts from the defendant's volitional impairment to his cognitive
Bracton... was the first English lawyer (he was also chancellor of Exeter Cathedral and
chief justiciary of the highest court in the realm) to incorporate the mental element into
legal writing: "For a crime is not committed unless the will to harm be present ... In
misdeeds we look to the will and not the outcome." In essence, the law conceived of
people as capable of free choice, a free exercise of the will.
(alteration in original).
74. EIGEN, supra note 73, at 35.
75. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
76. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *21.




81. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). M'Naghten was a politically celebrated case.
See EIGEN, supra note 73, at 153.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
processes. M'Naghten shot Edward Drummond who eventually died
from the wound.82 M'Naghten was charged with murder and pleaded not
guilty by reason of insanity.83 The case presented difficulties because
M'Naghten fit into neither of the two categories described by Black-
stone. He was neither a "lunatic" nor someone who seemed insane with
occasional lucid intervals. 84 Rather, M'Naghten appeared otherwise sane
and lucid except when dwelling upon a particular delusion that he was
the victim of political persecution. 85 The physician Edward Thomas Mu-
nro testified in the trial court that this condition should be sufficient to
relieve the defendant of responsibility:
[A] person may have a morbid delusion, and yet still know that thiev-
ing is a crime, or that murder is a crime, but his antecedent delusions
lead to one particular offense or another ... [I] think that delusion of
this nature [political persecution] carries a man quite away-I mean
that his mind was so absorbed in the contemplation of the fancied
persecution, that he did not distinguish between right and wrong.86
In its recitation of the facts, the high court agreed as it observed:
[I]t was of the nature of the disease with which the prisoner was af-
fected, to go on gradually until it had reached a climax, when it burst
forth with irresistible intensity: that a man might go on for years
quietly, though at the same time under its influence, but would all at
once break out into the most extravagant and violent paroxysms.
87
M'Naghten's case perplexed the Queen's Bench because his custo-
mary appearance of sanity raised the possibility of the defendant's ly-
ing.88 The original jury returned a verdict of not guilty by reason of in-
82. M'Naghten, 8 Eng. Rep. at 718. Drummond was the prime minister's secretary; most
people think M'Naghten mistook Drummond for Prime Minister Peel, a fact which cuts both for and
against his sanity. Id. See ROGER SMITH, TRIAL BY MEDICINE: INSANITY AND RESPONSIBILITY IN
VICTORIAN TRIALS 124-25 (1981) (discussing the development of the M'Naghten rules in light of
competing professional claims by medicine and law).
83. M'Naghten, 8 Eng. Rep. at 718.
84. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 76, at *25.
85. See EIGEN, supra note 73, at 153-54 (citing Old Bailey Sessions Papers, Case 874, 5th
Sess. 756-59 (1842-43).
86. id. at 153 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Old Bailey
Sessions Papers, Case 874, 5th Sess. 756-59 (1842-43)).
87. M'Naghten, 8 Eng. Rep. at 718.
88. In recognizing this possibility, the court touched upon a widely-held belief that still infects
the public perception of the criminal justice system. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER CRONIN, FORENSIC
PSYCHOLOGY 93 (2006):
When asked, most students will estimate that the insanity plea is used anywhere from 25
to 50 percent of the time in criminal cases. Additionally, the public also feels that it is
generally successful as a way to avoid incarceration. One study found that the public
thought that the insanity plea was used as a ploy in nearly 50 percent of all criminal cases
and that it was successful 20 percent of the time. Actually, the plea of not guilty by rea-
son of insanity is used in less than 1 percent to 3% of all criminal cases .... It also has a
much lower success rate than most people believe. Several studies have found that the
plea is successful... approximately 25 percent of the time.... Approximately 70 percent
of the insanity acquittals are the result of a plea bargain or similar arrangements rather
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sanity.89 This decision was appealed to the House of Lords, which, after
debating the matter, referred the case for declaratory judgment to the
High Court.90
The published decision consists of two opinions.9' In the initial opi-
nion, Mr. Justice Maule ruled that the insanity defense is available when
there is proof of the unsoundness of mind "such as render[s] [a defen-
dant] incapable of knowing right from wrong." 92 Lord Chief Justice Tin-
dal, writing for the majority, took Maule's idea and developed it at great-
er length. Tindal noted that the law presumed every defendant's sanity;
therefore, the defense had the burden of proving to the jury's satisfaction
that a party was "labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of
the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing;
or, if he did know it, that he did not, know he was doing what was
wrong.,
93
The rule makes two distinctions. In the first instance, one fails "to
know the nature and quality of the act he was doing" insofar as the actor
is so deluded that he truly believes he is performing one action when he
is doing something wholly other.94 Tindal also proposed a separate cate-
gory of defendants who should not be held responsible: those who knew
what they were doing but did not know that it was wrong.95 Furthermore,
Tindal indicated that the mere presence of a delusion in the mind of the
defendant is insufficient to grant the defense. 96 Rather, Tindal directed
trial courts to consider the nature of the delusion and how it affects the
actions of the defendant.97 A defendant may only be excused if, were his
delusion correct, he would have had an excuse under the law, such as
that granted by a reasonable mistake of fact.
98
The development of the law from Blackstone to M'Naghten paral-
lels the emergence of psychiatry as a profession. 99 Psychiatric experts
changed the quality of evidence sufficient for excusing criminal liability
on the grounds of insanity.' °° Previously, the finding of insanity rested
than through a jury trial. This is not too surprising in light of the fact that juries tend to
hold negative attitudes toward the insanity defense.
(citations omitted) (emphasis omitted).
89. M'Naghten, 8 Eng. Rep. at 718-19.
90. Id. at 719.
91. See id. at 719, 721.
92. Id. at 720.
93. Id. at 72 1.
94. Id. See generally OLIVER SACKS, THE MAN WHO MISTOOK His WIFE FOR A HAT (Touch-
stone 1998) (1985) (describing victims of neurological disorders so profound that they simply cannot
distinguish among various objects and actions).
95. See M'Naghten, 8 Eng. Rep. at 721.
96. See id. at 721.
97. See id. at 722.
98. Id.
99. See e.g., SMITH, supra note 82, at 90-91.
100. See ALAN NORRIE, CRIME, REASON AND HISTORY: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO
CRIMINAL LAW 173 (Robert Stevens et al. eds., 1993):
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:1
upon the ordinary observations of lay people. 10 After the rise of psy-
chiatrists (or alienists, as they were called) in the nineteenth century, the
finding of insanity became problematic; mental illness was no longer
something seen by ordinary people. Rather, mental illness referred to
something more occult, internal, and observable only by those with spe-
cial training.1
0 2
C. Reason, Mental Illness, and the Products Test
The M'Naghten rule seized the legal imagination and became the
test to determine criminal insanity not only in England but also in the
vast majority of United States jurisdictions. In 1972, the American Law
Institute's Model Penal Code revised and added to the M'Naghten test,
which resulted in "the ALI test". 0 3 The ALl test continues the cognitive
element of the M'Naghten rule't 4 and adds a volitional element, which
The concept of insanity appears to fit neatly into an orthodox liberal framework. The in-
sane person is morally, therefore legally, irresponsible for his acts, and unpunishable. At
most, the criticism might be that the law's outmoded narrowness stems from a judicial
over-sensitivity to the needs of social protection which should be corrected by reform in
favour of the accused. But what cannot be recognised from this perspective is how the
traditional views about insanity are ideologically entrenched within legal discourse, so
that much more rides on the issue than a small measure of enlightened liberal reform. At
stake is a particular way of seeing the social world and the human beings that populate it
that is both powerful, and odd.
(citation omitted).
101. The ordinary observations of lay people still constitute valid evidence of a defendant's
responsibility when he pleads not guilty by reason of insanity. See Duthey v. State, 111 N.W. 222,
225-26 (Wis. 1907). Relying on Duthey, the prosecution in the Dahmer case repeatedly asked ordi-
nary lay people about their observations of Jeffrey Dahmer and if they thought he was mentally ill
on the basis of their experience.
102. See, e.g., NORRIE, supra note 100, at 176:
Insanity came increasingly to be seen as a product of disease located in the brain which
caused the mad behaviour. Following their methodology to its natural conclusion, psy-
chiatrists then argued that the 'truth' of insanity lay not in its empirical manifestation, in
conduct displaying an obvious lack of reason, but in the underlying causal mechanisms to
be found in the brain.
It was this move in thinking that caused the break with law. If the ultimate locus of in-
sanity was not in its psychological manifestation but in underlying organic causes, it be-
came possible to conceive of forms of insanity which left the 'surface' areas of the
psyche, for example the reasoning faculty, relatively unaffected while attacking the 'dee-
per' elements of the will or the emotions. A lack of reason became one, but only one,
symptom of an underlying, causal, mental illness. A man could as a result appear quite ra-
tional but still be insane .... A man might know that he was doing wrong but be unable
to stop himself (volitional insanity), or believe that he was not bound by the normal rules
of society (emotional insanity).
103. SMITH, supra note 82, at 19.
104. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) ("A person is not
responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect
he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law." (alteration in original)).
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was first introduced in Parsons v. State'0 5 and then famously adopted and
developed by Judge David Bazelon in Durham v. United States.'0
6
The Durham decision reversed the criminal conviction of Monte
Durham, finding the trial court erred in holding that the defendant failed
to raise sufficient proof to consider the insanity defense.'0 7 The court
rejected the M'Naghten test and adopted a volitional approach that un-
derscored the defendant's ability to choose to act in some way other than
the way he did. 0 8 The proposed test read: "[A]n accused is not criminal-
ly responsible if his unlawful act was the product of a mental disease or
mental defect. ' ° 9 There are two key elements in this test: the first is the
soft definition of mental disease; the second is the hard determinism of
the "products" test.
1. Soft Definition of Mental Disease
The Durham court made no attempt to define "mental disease" save
that it addressed a condition that was capable of change in a way that a
mental defect would not be. 10 The distinction did not prove helpful ei-
ther to the courts or to psychiatrists called to testify because
"[p]sychiatrists and some judges believed it established medicine's right
to provide categories for classifying criminal deeds.""' The lack of clari-
ty is underscored by the historical event where psychiatrists redefined the
term." 2 Immediately following the Durham decision, court-appointed
psychiatric witnesses limited the definition of "mental disease" in insani-
ty pleas to cases of psychosis because that was the standard for involun-
tary civil commitments at that time." 3 After a few years with this ap-
proach, mental health professionals changed the working definition of
"mental disease" with no input from the courts. Professor Becker ex-
plains:
[I]n 1957 ... the staff of Saint Elizabeths Hospital decided to change
its policy. Nonpsychotic diagnoses-particularly, the diagnosis of
"sociopathic personality disturbance"-would now be explicitly rec-
orded ... [as] a "mental disease."...
105. 2 So. 854, 859 (Ala. 1887). 1 am grateful to Professor Bruce G. Berner of Valparaiso
University School of Law for calling my attention to the original decision in which the volitional test
emerged.
106. 214 F.2d 862, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
107. Id. at 868-69.
108. Id. at 874-75.
109. Id.
110. See id.
111. SMITH, supra note 82, at 19.
112. See generally Loftus E. Becker, Jr., Durham Revisited: Psychiatry and the Problem of
Crime (pt. 2), PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS, Sept. 1973, at 12 (1973).
113. /d. at 15.
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The change of policy at Saint Elizabeths had not been made as a
result of any new psychological insights. 114
This seemingly capricious shift undermined medical authority in the
courts; suddenly the accepted standard changed, and none of the in-
volved parties could explain why.'
15
2. Hard Determinism of the Products Test
The difficulty rooted in the nebulous definition of mental disease
was compounded by its pairing with a fuzzy notion of causation in Dur-
ham's "products test." After rejecting the M'Naghten test as inadequate,
the court held that "an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlaw-
ful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect."" 6 This test
drew battle lines between lawyers committed to free will and psychiatr-
ists who adopted a more determinist line. Psychiatrists preferred the
Durham products test to M'Naghten's line of authority. Professor Norrie
observes:
[T]hese tests . . . permitted a direct 'scientific' account of the ac-
cused's conduct to be delivered in cause and effect terms in the cour-
troom, unencumbered by old-fashioned and ultimately metaphysical
tests of responsibility. Durham addressed the underlying causes of
mentally disordered crime rather than dealing with what might only
be certain symptoms of a disorder. It dealt concretely with the disor-
dered subjectivity of the accused, and therefore was from the psy-
chiatrists' viewpoint more just and understanding."1
7
In contrast to the shifting views of psychiatrists, lawyers and judges
in the criminal justice system clung to the "old-fashioned . . . tests of
responsibility."' 18 Criminal lawyers labored daily to determine responsi-
bility. Attorneys and judges wondered if the approach of psychiatry was
at cross purposes with what they understood as the criminal law's prima-119
ry function: assigning responsibility :
For lawyers, however, Durham represented a threat to the very no-
tion of individual justice according to law. First, it took the decision
out of the hands of both the law and the jury by making the question
114. Id. at 16. Professor Becker notes later that psychiatrists proposed this shift because their
previous interpretation of the term seemed a far too restrictive definition of mental disease. Id. at 16.
Becker sees this shift as a salutary maneuver because it permitted the psychiatrists to testify to other
conditions which they had previously neglected to consider under the rubric of "mental disease,"
leading to more acquittals. Id. at 16-17. That said, the example described underscores the flimsiness
of the definition and may add support to the legal profession's mistrust of forensic psychiatry. See id.
at 17.
115. See e.g., Alan A. Stone, The Insanity Defense on Trial, 33 Hosp. & COMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY 636, 637 (1982).
116. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
117. NORRIE, supra note 100, at 183-84.
118. Id. at 184.
119. Id.
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of insanity a matter for psychiatry alone. The law was side-lined and
the jury left with no real decision on the accused's responsibility....
The psychiatrists' scientific operating assumption of a universal
determinism threatened to engulf the law's assumptions of free will
and responsibility .... Scientific determinism was not a theory about
insanity: it was a general theory about human conduct. Psychiatry
threatened the liberal conception of the responsible subject.12
0
D. The Law in Dahmer
Wisconsin adopted the ALI test that combines both cognitive ele-
ments from the M'Naghten test and the volitional stress from Durham:
[A defendant] is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of
such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect the person lacked
substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or
her conduct or conform his or her conduct to the requirements of
law.1
21
In Wisconsin, a defendant must establish this affirmative defense to
a reasonable certainty by the greater weight of the credible evidence.1
22
Whether the defendant has met this burden of proof is a question of fact
for the jury.123 Of course, different jurisdictions may assign burdens of
proof for affirmative defenses in different ways, but that consideration is
beyond the scope of this paper's concerns.
V. CHALLENGES FACED BY THE DAHMER DEFENSE
A. The Challenge of Proving Insanity in General
As indicated above, criminal law assumes that punishment is appro-
priate only where a person can be blamed for his actions. For this reason,
the law maintains that unless one's actions were the product of choice,
we do not find guilt as a matter of law. 124 Because mental disease or de-
fect can profoundly affect one's capacity to exercise rational choice, it
seems that a defense ought be given in cases where a defendant's medi-
cal condition prevents its exercise. 125 But establishing that a medical or
psychiatric condition exists can prove an elusive challenge. As the late
120. Id. (citation omitted).
121. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.15(1) (West 2009).
122. Id. § 971.15(3).
123. See State v. Leach, 370 N.W.2d 240, 247 (Wis. 1985).
124. For example, courts have found that involuntary behavior due to psychomotor epilepsy
may provide a defense to criminal liability. People v. Grant, 360 N.E.2d 809, 813 (Ill. App. Ct.
1977).
125. John J. McGrath, The Insanity Defense: A Difficult Necessity, 36 HOSP. & COMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY 54,54-55 (1985):
[Tihe sane should be judged and sentenced, but the insane are proven to be ill and thus
should be treated. It is crucial to distinguish between sanity and insanity during both
judgment and disposition .... A return to Bedlam cannot be risked simply because our
science finds the definition and demonstration of insanity difficult and elusive.
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Professor Georges Canguilhem of the Sorbonne pointed out, mental dis-
ease, and therefore the insanity defense, is often difficult to determine.
126
His student Michel Foucault observed:
[I]t is only by an artifice of language that the same meaning can be
attributed to "illnesses of the body" and "illnesses of the mind." A
unitary pathology using the same methods and concepts in the psy-
chological and physiological domains is now purely mythical .... 127
Psychiatric illnesses do not always have organic origins, and me-
thods used in diagnosing and treating physical illnesses do not have clear
parallels in psychiatry. 28 Conversely, it is also difficult to describe with
precision what makes up a "normal" range of rational choice.1 29 Thus,
psychiatry lacks a clear standard to enunciate when a person ought to be
held liable for their choices.' 30 This apparent confusion stems from the
uncertain organic basis for psychiatric maladies.t 31 The causal factors
linking body, mind, and behavior are still poorly understood. 13 2 The mat-
ter is further clouded by our positivist and empiricist bias, which largely
holds that something does not exist unless it can be measured. 133 Mental
and emotional problems are frequently not subject to empirical valida-
126. CANGUILHEM, supra note 42, at 117:
Minkowski also thinks that the fact of insanity cannot be reduced to just the one fact of
disease, determined by its reference to one image or precise idea of the average or normal
[human] being. When we call another man insane, we do so intuitively "as men, not as
specialists." The madman is "out of his mind" not so much in relation to other men as to
life: he is not so much deviant as different.
127. MICHEL FOUCAULT, MENTAL ILLNESS AND PSYCHOLOGY 10 (Alan Sheridan trans., Univ.
of Cal. Press 2d ed. 2008) (1954).
128. Id. at 10-11:
[P]sychology has never been able to offer psychiatry what physiology gave to medicine:
a tool of analysis that, in delimiting the disorder, makes it possible to envisage the func-
tional relationship of this damage to the personality as a whole. The coherence of a psy-
chological life seems, in effect, to be assured in some way other than the cohesion of an
organism .... One cannot, then, make abstractions in the same way in psychology and in
physiology, and the delimitation of a pathological disorder requires different methods in
organic and in mental pathology.
129. See CANGUILHEM, supra note 42, at 119:
In the final analysis it is the patients who most often decide-and from very different
points of view-whether they are no longer normal or whether they have returned to
normality. For a man whose future is almost always imagined starting from past expe-
rience, becoming normal again means taking up an interrupted activity ....
130. See Stone, supra note 115, at 640.
131. FOUCAULT, supra note 127, at 10-13.
132. CANGUILHEM, supra note 42, at 118 (noting how "somatic disease is capable of a superior
empirical precision, of a better-defined standardization" than is mental disease).
133. See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations: The Philosophical Critique of (a
Particular Type of) Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197, 1199 (1997) (noting how certain forms of
economic analysis presume that all things can be measured and compared):
A commitment to the commensurability of all an agent's ends runs very deep in the Law
and Economics movement. Even when a plurality of distinct ends is initially recognized,
the underlying view that agents are "maximizers of satisfactions," and that satisfaction is
something that varies in degree rather than in kind, leads the theorist rapidly back to the
idea that distinctions among options should be understood in terms of the quantity of util-
ity they afford, rather than in terms of any basic qualitative differences.
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tion, and psychiatrists observe that it is impossible to say if a patient is
cured. 134
The uncertain etiology of mental illness is often seen by jurists and
the public as undermining the criminal justice system when it is invoked
as the basis for excusing behavior. 135 Reflecting on the French expe-
rience, Foucault notes, "The essential issue therefore was to ascertain the
reality and degree of the madness in question. The deeper the insanity,
the more innocent the subject's will.' 136 The public seems to believe that
the insanity defense is successfully employed by large numbers of crimi-
nals who thereby avoid punishment.' 37 Further, psychiatrists are mi-
strusted because they contradict each other on the stand. 138 Professor
Alan Stone observed that the trial of John Hinckley, Jr., in which the
defendant was acquitted because the prosecution failed to disprove men-
tal illness beyond a reasonable doubt, "was a bleak experience for Amer-
ican psychiatry, and the verdict shook public confidence in the American
criminal justice system."
' 139
The above considerations underscore how the law and the public at
large misperceive how psychiatrists can and do contribute to the legal
enterprise. Initially, the prevailing clinical understanding of mental
health issues is not easily translated into conclusions that can be of use in
a courtroom. 140 This confusion in definition emerges in part because psy-
chiatrists and attorneys have vastly different objectives when they in-
quire into psychiatric pathology. Clinical study of the mind is a therapeu-
tic discipline. Psychiatrists and psychologists attempt to heal the suffer-
ing of those beset by mental and emotional distress. By contrast, lawyers
focus on questions of blame and responsibility; they strive to divide
those who have the ability to choose freely from those who cannot.'4 In
cases raising the insanity defense, therefore, the questions to be grappled
with at trial, though familiar ground for attorneys, are concerns far re-
134. Stone, supra note 115, at 640 ("Psychiatrists treat mental illness, often with great benefit
to very sick patients, but that is not the same as curing them .... We can treat people and return them
to the community. They will function better, but we cannot guarantee that they are cured ....
135. CRONIN, supra note 88, at 93.
136. MICHEL FOUCAULT, HISTORY OF MADNESS 137 (Jean Khalfa ed., Routledge trans., 2006)
(1961).
137. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 115, at 637, where Professor Stone summarizes a lengthy
statement by Hon. John Ashbrook of Ohio recorded in the 1981 Congressional Record.
138. Id.
139. ALAN STONE, LAW, PSYCHIATRY, AND MORALITY 77 (1984). John Hinckley, Jr. at-
tempted to assassinate President Ronald Reagan in 1981. He was found not guilty by reason of
insanity. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., Hinckley Hails "Historical" Shooting to Win Love, N.Y. TIMES, July
9, 1982, at A10, available at 1982 WLNR 315512.
140. CRONIN, supra note 88, at 90:
The definition of insanity is a legal term, not a mental health term, and the defendant
must meet the legal definition of being insane. The exact definition of insanity varies by
jurisdiction.... Not everyone who suffers from a mental illness is judged by the courts to
be insane. Indeed, many individuals who suffer from a psychosis and commit a crime do
not meet the legal criteria for insanity.
141. See Stone, supra note 115, at 640.
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moved from those of psychiatrists. 42 As a result, psychiatrists must beguarded in their testimony, and commentators worry that not all are. 143
Not all challenges go against the defense; evidentiary rulings in in-
sanity cases may cut both ways. Ordinarily, criminal cases are marked by
strict limitations on admissible testimony. In the first instance, the evi-
dence is restricted by the crime that has been charged. 44 The jury is di-
rected to determine facts at a particular point in time. 145 Evidence of oth-
er actions or events is limited either by constitutional claims146 or on the
grounds of relevance. 47 Insanity trials broaden the frame of relevance; as
the Wisconsin Supreme Court has noted, "no evidence should be ex-
cluded which reasonably tends to show the mental condition of the de-
fendant at the time of the offense."'148 By pleading insanity, the defendant
directs the jury to a question more amorphous than determining specific
facts at a given point in time. Professor Wigmore is clear in his discus-
sion of insanity pleas under common law: "Any and all conduct of the
142. See Insanity Def. Work Group, Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, American Psychiatric Association
Statement on the Insanity Defense, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 681,686 (1983):
The American Psychiatric Association is not opposed to legislatures restricting psychia-
tric testimony .... We adopt this position because it is clear that psychiatrists are experts
in medicine, not the law. As such, the psychiatrist's first obligation and expertise in the
courtroom is to "do psychiatry," i.e., to present medical information and opinion about
the defendant's mental state and motivation and to explain in detail the reason for his
medical-psychiatric conclusions. When, however, "ultimate issue" questions are formu-
lated by the law and put to the expert witness ... then the expert witness is required to
make a leap in logic. He no longer addresses himself to medical concepts but instead
must infer or intuit what is in fact unspeakable, namely, the probable relationship be-
tween medical concepts and legal or moral constructs such as free will.
143. STONE, supra note 139, at 96:
Psychiatry is held hostage by the psychiatrists who testify in courts whatever their stan-
dards and whatever the test of insanity may be. They undertake an enterprise which has
hazards for us all. The reputation and credibility of our profession is in their hands. And
if I am correct... they know not what they are doing.
144. FED. R. EVID. 402 ("All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by
the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed
by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissi-
ble."). If the evidence proposed does not make a fact in consequence as determined by the substan-
tive law more or less likely, it is not relevant. FED. R. EVID. 401. Therefore, courts streamline trials
by excluding matters that do not bear directly on the case at hand, even limiting relevant evidence in
some situations. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
145. RICOEUR, supra note 6, at 318:
Past acts are... represented solely in terms of the nature of the charges selected prior to
the actual trial. They are represented in the present within the horizon of the future social
effect of the verdict that will decide the case. The relation to time is particularly notewor-
thy here: representation in the present consists in a staging ... and a measured discourse
of conscious legitimation ....
146. For example, under the Fifth Amendment, "No person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V. Relying in part on this provi-
sion, the U.S. Supreme Court held that defendants have a right to be informed of their rights to an
attorney and to decline answering questions when subject to custodial interrogation. Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
147. FED. R. EvID. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.").
148. State v. Carlson, 93 N.W.2d 354, 361 (Wis. 1958).
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person is admissible in evidence" as the jury attempts to determine if a
defendant should be held accountable for his actions.14 9 As Professor
Goldstein observes:
The almost unvarying policy of the courts has been to admit any evi-
dence of aberrational behavior so long as it is probative of the defen-
dant's mental condition .... Indeed, virtually never does one see any
attempt to restrict the sort of lay evidence which is a staple of the in-
sanity defense-that the defendant wept, or that he was given to vio-
lent rages, or that he threatened to throw his child out the window.
150
By expanding the range of admissible evidence, the defendant
pleading insanity has greater resources to mine than does the ordinary
criminal defendant.15" ' That said, when the defendant pleads guilty, the
prosecution likewise can broaden the scope of the evidence it uses. Thus,
the defense must be wary when entering a plea that throws open the
doors to evidence ordinarily barred at trial.
B. Challenges Specific to the Dahmer Defense
The argument that anyone sexually attracted to corpses must have a
mental disease seems self-evident, but that assertion faced specific diffi-
culties in this case, both psychiatric and narrative. From the psychiatric
perspective, no less an authority than Sigmund Freud doubted the claim
that necrophiliacs suffer from a mental disease:
Nevertheless, in some of these perversions the quality of the new
sexual aim is of a kind to demand special examination. Certain of
them are so far removed from the normal in their content that we
cannot avoid pronouncing them 'pathological'. This is especially so
where (as, for instance, in cases of ... intercourse with dead bodies)
the sexual instinct goes to astonishing lengths in successfully overrid-
ing the resistances of shame, disgust, horror or pain. But even in such
cases we should not be too ready to assume that people who act in
this way will necessarily turn out to be insane or subject to grave ab-
normalities of other kinds.
1 52
Freud was quoted neither by the prosecution nor the defense in the
Dahmer case, but his reluctance to find disease in such cases directly
undermines the theory of the defense by observing that necrophiliacs can
"override" resistances to their sexual acts and remain sane.' 53
Freud's objection points more generally to a logical flaw in the de-
fense's strategy. The defense used circular logic to argue: (1) Jeffrey
149. 2 WIGMORE EvIDENCE § 228 (1979).
150. ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 54 (1967).
151. Id.
152. SIGMUND FREUD, The Sexual Aberrations, in THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF
SEXUALITY 1,27 (James Strachey ed. & trans., 1962).
153. Id.
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Dahmer's sexual predilections were so disturbing that no sane person
could share them, and (2) even if they could share them, they would not
act on them; therefore, (3) because Dahmer had these urges and acted on
them repeatedly, proves he could not control his actions. Therefore, he is
insane, and his actions should be excused. When examined carefully, the
position implies a wide range of disturbing conclusions. Change the facts
a little. Assume rather that the defendant is sexually aroused only when
he engages in acts of violent rape. Consistent with this deviation, he lures
unsuspecting victims back to his apartment where he rapes them brutally.
In his defense, he claims that he cannot control these urges; they are the
only way he can achieve sexual satisfaction. Such a stimulus for sexual
arousal is in many ways as distasteful as Dahmer's desires, but I doubt
that most people share an intuition that the law should excuse the expres-
sion of violent rape fantasies. Merely because Dahmer had an unusual set
of sexual triggers does not mean that he was less able to control himself
than anyone else. 154 Indeed, Dahmer himself did not seem to subscribe to
the "uncontrollable desire" argument:
I have one person to blame-the person sitting across from you-no
one else-no one put a gun to my head-I had choices to make and I
made the wrong choices[.] I could have made different choices in the
past[.] [I]t's obvious to me[.] If I had more foresight[,] if I had more
motivation to find a career and worthwhile acts to fill my time-
rather than drinking my problems away[.] I drank my emotions and
problems away.155
The narrative difficulties faced by the defense are less direct and
more complex. Initially, Dahmer laid out his actions in an extraordinarily
detailed set of interviews with detectives and experts investigating the
case. His statement to the Milwaukee Police Department alone fills over
145 typewritten pages. 56 Normally the defense controls the flow of in-
formation from the defendant; that was not the case here. Dahmer repeat-
edly asked to speak with officers, usually when his attorneys were
present, but he sometimes insisted on speaking without counsel. 57 This
154. See id.
155. Frederick A. Fosdal, Interview Notes for Jeffrey Dahmer Examination 9 (Oct. 16, 1991)
(unpublished report, on file with author).
156. See Statement of Jeffrey Dahmer, Case No. 2472 § 5 (unpublished police report, on file
with author). Based on my experience as an assistant district attorney, this statement differs not only
in quantity but also in kind. Before this case, I am hard pressed to recall a statement longer than
perhaps ten typewritten pages. It is as though the psychic floodwaters came pouring out of the de-
fendant once his dam of silence had been breached. In this way, it resembles the extensive narrative
described with characteristic insight by Michel Foucault who saw the confession of the murderer
Rivi~re and the dossier it engendered as expressing the battle among emerging professions trying to
assert their power in evolving industrial society. This particular strand of thought is unfortunately
beyond the scope of this paper. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, I, PIERRE RIVIERE, HAVING
SLAUGHTERED MY MOTHER, MY SISTER, AND MY BROTHER ... : A CASE OF PARRICIDE IN THE
19TH CENTURY (Michel Foucault ed., Frank Jellinek trans., Pantheon Books 1975) (1973).
157. See, e.g., Dennis Murphy, Statement of Jeffrey Dahmer, Case No. 2472 § 5, at 47-48
(July 27, 1991) (unpublished police report, on file with author):
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extensive confession hampered his attorneys' ability to craft a defense
because they could not proffer any argument that conflicted with Dah-
mer's self-reported narrative.
A further difficulty in the case arose from its particularly gruesome
facts, not only as reported by the defendant but also as photographed and
collected by him. 58 On the one hand, the spoken and visual evidence
could strengthen the argument that the defendant was mentally unhinged.
On the other hand, the defense attorneys needed to weigh proffering evi-
dence that could alienate the jury and risk a verdict based on disgust.
Further, because of the physical evidence, the attorneys could not simply
claim that Dahmer was delusional and made everything up. The physical
evidence tied him ineluctably to facts reported. The defense therefore
elected to clothe the evidence in a veneer of respectability by enveloping
it in the testimony of clinicians. Concrete details of the murders and the
disposal of the evidence were broadly "psychologized" so that the jury
would focus on the predicament of a young man haunted by his unortho-
dox sexual urges, rather than looking at his bloodstained hands.
VI. MEETING THE CHALLENGES: NARRATIVE THEORY AND TRIAL
COURTS
Trial attorneys are essentially storytellers, historians of brief mo-
ments in time who attempt to direct their audience to certain conclusions
and not others. 59 Stories and historical accounts are usually enclosed in
texts, a fixed set of symbols that mediate meaning from the author to the
reader.' 60 Although the trial court's decision in Dahmer was never ap-
pealed, and although no transcript was ever prepared, what occurred in
I asked Mr. Dahmer if he had anything else to tell me, and why he did not request to have
his attorney prior to talking to me, and he stated that he did not want his attorney there he
just wanted to tell me about this other thing that he had forgotten and he didn't need his
attorney present for that. I asked if he felt he needed the attorney for any other question-
ing, and he stated he felt he did not because he has been truthful with me the whole time
and he does not feel he needs his attorney present when I'm there. I again informed him
of his attorney's request, that he contact the attorney prior to contacting me, and he stated
he understands and if he feels he has something important enough to tell me he will call
me. I then informed him again that his attorney had requested his cooperation, and he
stated he would consider it.
158. The court ordered sealed a set of Polaroid photos taken by the defendant after sentencing.
I don't believe anyone has examined them since the trial.
159. See, e.g., AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 5, at 110. See generally WHITE,
CONSTITUTIONS AND RECONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5, at 3 (discussing the narrative nature of codi-
fied law); JAMES BOYD WHITE, Telling Stories in the Law and in Ordinary Life: The Oresteia and
"Noon Wine," in HERACLES' BOW, supra note 5, at 168 (demonstrating the legal process as a story
development and narrative method).
160. PAUL RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES: ESSAYS ON LANGUAGE,
ACTION AND INTERPRETATION 174 (John B. Thomson ed. & trans., 1981):
[I]n the asymmetrical relation between the text and the reader, one of the partners speaks
for both. Bringing a text to language is always something other than hearing someone and
listening to his speech.... For the text is an autonomous space of meaning which is no
longer animated by the intention of its author; the autonomy of the text, deprived of this
essential support, hands writing over to the sole interpretation of the reader.
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the trial court can helpfully be understood as a text. t61 With attorneys in
the authorial role and the jury cast as readers, witnesses spoke in front of
the jurors but did not interact with them. 162 Jurors were not free to ask
questions or to ask for clarification; rather, they were asked to apply the
facts, as they found them, to the law.
1 63
At a slightly different level of abstraction, the jury was asked to
construct a master narrative, a world, a context for the evidence that
emerged at trial and that somehow made sense of it.' 64 The defense pre-
sented a series of events following in sequence that urged the jury to
conclude that, because Jeffrey Dahmer's desires and actions were so
bizarre, he must have been suffering from a mental disease. By contrast,
the prosecution attempted to contextualize Dahmer's claimed madness
by drawing a picture of Dahmer the man. 65 Ultimately, the members of
161. 1 use the term "text" here broadly. Legal scholars are used to referring to textual analysis
at the appellate level. This makes perfect sense. Through printed texts and oral argument, appellate
lawyers appeal to the rational and the propositional. By contrast, trial attorneys convey meaning
through a much more diverse set of signifiers. In addition to being wordsmiths, trial attorneys need
to employ the craft of a stage director or camera operator. Trial attorneys appreciate that juries will
be moved by logic, but they also understand that reason is tutored by emotion. A bloodstained shirt,
a wedding photo of the victim, or a weapon actually used in a murder adds little to the propositions
that make up steps in a chain of reasons. However, these mute objects may speak eloquently of the
ebb and flow of a homicide victim's life, the terror of witnesses, and the burden of sorrow carried by
family members.
162. RICOEUR, supra note 160, at 146-47:
It does not suffice to say that reading is a dialogue with the author through his work, for
the relation of the reader to the book is of a completely different nature. Dialogue is an
exchange of questions and answers; there is no exchange of this sort between the writer
and the reader. The writer does not respond to the reader.... [Reading] thereby replaces
the relation of dialogue, which directly connects the voice of one to the hearing of the
other.
163. See PAUL RICOEUR, THE JUST 121 (David Pellauer trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2000)
(1995):
The application of a rule is in fact a very complex operation where the interpretation of
the facts and the interpretation of the norm mutually condition each other, before ending
in the qualification by which it is said that some allegedly criminal behavior falls under
such and such a norm which is said to have been violated. If we begin with the interpreta-
tion of the facts, we cannot overemphasize the multitude of ways a set of interconnected
facts can be considered and, let us say, recounted .... We never finish untangling the
lines of the personal story of an accused with certainty, and even reading it in such a way
is already oriented by the presumption that such an interconnectedness places the case
under some rule. To say that a is a case of B is already to decide that the juridical syllog-
ism holds for it.
164. RICOEUR, supra note 160, at 178:
What we make our own, what we appropriate for ourselves, is not an alien experience or
a distant intention, but the horizon of a world towards which a work directs itself. The
appropriation of the reference is no longer modelled on the fusion of consciousnesses, on
empathy or sympathy. The emergence of the sense and reference of a text in language is
the coming to language of a world and not the recognition of another person.
165. Id. at 278:
[Iqt must be said that any narrative combines, in varying proportions, two dimensions: a
chronological dimension and a non-chronological dimension. The first may be called the
'episodic dimension' of the narrative. Within the art of following a story, this dimension
is expressed in the expectation of contingencies which affect the story's development;
hence it gives rise to questions such as: and so? and then? what happened next? .... But
the activity of narrating does not consist simply in adding episodes to one another; it also
constructs meaningful totalities out of scattered events. This aspect of the art of narrating
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the jury had to reconcile these two approaches in terms of the law they
were given. They had to decide which narrative, if either, corresponded
with what they understood as the truth.
166
As Paul Ricouer observes in his work on nonfiction narratives, his-
torical truth as expressed in texts is always a constructed entity; even if it
does not correspond with the historical events it purports to describe, it
may well supplant the event itself in the community's imagination.,
67
Historians understand this distinction as a matter of course. Professor
Tzvetan Todorov observes:
The work of the historian, like every work on the past, never consists
solely in establishing the facts but also in choosing certain among
them as being more salient and more significant than others, then
placing them in relation to one another .... 168
Just as the historian chooses among salient facts, attorneys select
what evidence to put before the jury. 169 Thus, it matters greatly what evi-
dence is brought before the jury, for that testimony is the only basis whe-
reby the jury can construct its sense of "what really occurred." 170 Of
is reflected, on the side of following a story, in the attempt to 'grasp together' successive
events. The art of narrating, as well as the corresponding art of following a story, there-
fore require that we are able to extract a configuration from a succession.
166. RIcOEUR, supra note 6, at 178-79:
A vigilant epistemology will guard here against the illusion of believing that what we call
a fact coincides with what really happened, or with the living memory of eyewitnesses, as
if the facts lay sleeping in the documents until the historians extracted them. This illusion
... for a long time underlay the conviction that the historical fact does not differ funda-
mentally from the empirical fact in the experimental natural sciences .... [W]e need to
resist this initial confusion between a historical fact and a really remembered event. The
fact is not the event, itself given to the conscious life of a witness, but the contents of a
statement meant to represent it .... So understood, the fact can be said to be constructed
through the procedure that disengages it from a series of documents concerning which we
may say in return that they establish it. This reciprocity between construction (through a
complex documentary procedure) and the establishing of a fact (on the basis of the doc-
ument) expresses the specific epistemological status of the historical fact. It is this propo-
sitional character of the historical fact (in the sense of "fact that...") that governs the
mode of truth or falsity attached to the fact. The terms "true" and "false" can legitimately
be taken at this level in the Popperian sense of "refutable" and "verifiable."
(third omission in original).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 86 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting TZVETAN TODOROV, LEs ABUS DE
LA MtMOIRE 50 (1995).
169. Id. at 318:
Past acts are.., represented solely in terms of the nature of the charges selected prior to
the actual trial. They are represented in the present within the horizon of the future social
effect of the verdict that will decide the case. The relation to time is particularly notewor-
thy here: representation in the present consists in a staging, a theatricalization .... This
living presence of the scenes replayed solely on the plane of discourse comes under the
heading of visibility, which was shown ... to be related to the expressibility ... on the
plane of the literary representation of the past.
170. CHATMAN, supra note 8, at 45-46:
[T]he interesting thing is that our minds inveterately seek structure, and they will provide
it if necessary. Unless otherwise instructed, readers will tend to assume that even "The
king died and the queen died" presents a causal link, that the king's death has something
to do with the queen's. We do so in the same spirit in which we seek coherence in the
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course, the jury's reconstruction, based on its limited information, may
differ greatly from the historical event itself. 7  Despite this variance
from the historical event, in our system of justice, the jury's verdict is the
version of history that matters. Thus, the defense crafted an object of
discourse, of words, to supplant the flesh and blood reality of Jeffrey
Dahmer, leading the jury to focus on only parts of his story to persuade
them to adopt a version of events at odds with the broader historical
narrative. They did this by creating two claims of consistency that subli-
mated Dahmer's normality and attempted to hide his guilt.
The substance or subject matter of a narrative, or trial, cannot be se-
parated from its medium, how the story is told, and who tells the jury
what it hears. 72 In Dahmer's case in chief, the jury saw his life primarily
through the lens of detectives, clinical psychologists, and psychiatrists.
This narrative distance conferred a respectability upon the content which
would have been absent had Dahmer been testifying on his own be-
half. 73 If Dahmer were to recount the same events from the witness
stand, the jurors would naturally regard his testimony as self-serving and
discount its possible truthfulness. 74 By contrast, when that same testi-
visual field, that is, we are inherently disposed to turn raw sensation into perception. So
one may argue that pure "chronicle" is difficult to achieve. "The king died and then the
queen died" and "The king died and then the queen died of grief' differ narratively only
in degrees of explicitness at the surface level; at the deeper structural level the causal
element is present in both. The reader "understands" or supplies it; he infers that the
king's death is the cause of the queen's. "Because" is inferred through ordinary presump-
tions about the world, including the purposive character of speech.
171. RICOEUR, supra note 6, at 179:
What is one talking about when one says that something happened?... [I]t is to preserve
this status of the reference of historical discourse that I distinguish the fact as "something
said," the "what" of historical discourse, from the event as "what one talks about," the
"subject of..." that makes up historical discourse. In this regard, that assertion of a his-
torical fact indicates the distance between the said (the thing said) and the intended refer-
ence, which according to one of Benveniste's expressions turns discourse back toward
the world. The world, in history, is past human life as it happened .... [What is said is
known as] "standing for". To get there, we need to leave underdetermined the ques-
tion of the actual relation between fact and event, and tolerate a certain indiscrimination
in the employment by the best historians of these terms as standing for each other.
172. Id. at 163-64:
The specificity of testimony consists in the fact that the assertion of reality is inseparable
from its being paired with the self-designation of the testifying subject. The typical for-
mation of testimony proceeds from this pairing: I was there. What is attested to is indivis-
ibly the reality of the past thing and the presence of the narrator at the place of its occur-
rence. And it is the witness who first declares himself to be a witness.... These... as-
sertions link point-like testimony to the whole history of a life.
(citation omitted).
173. See id.
174. Indeed, the jury instructions in Wisconsin would explicitly invite this sort of reasoning on
the jury's part. See, e.g., WIS. JI-CRIMNAL § 300, at 1 (2003):
It is the duty of the jury to scrutinize and to weigh the testimony of witnesses and to de-
termine the effect of the evidence as a whole. You are the sole judges of the credibility,
that is, the believability, of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.
In determining the credibility of each witness and the weight you give to the testimony
of each witness, consider these factors:
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mony comes through the mouth of a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist,
the jury attaches unwarranted credibility to the claims made. 7 5 This is
not to say that the jury is necessarily persuaded by mental health profes-
sionals or police officers, but still, the defendant's words seem less self-
interested when audible in their voices rather than his own.
The effects of the gap between Dahmer and those who recounted his
statements are seen in cross examination. The prosecutors typically ad-
dressed not the internal consistency of Dahmer's statements, but the pru-
dential judgments made by the clinician in light of the evidence.17 6 By
encasing Dahmer's statements within sworn testimony of medical pro-
fessionals, the defense largely insulated the substance of Dahmer's
statements from challenge. Although the jury might have questioned the
clinical witnesses' conclusions, it did not consider directly the truthful-
ness of Dahmer' s self-report. 
177
The failure to interrogate Dahmer's statements for truthfulness is
not insubstantial. The defense repeatedly asserted that it was being trans-
* whether the witness has an interest or lack of interest in the result of this trial;
* the witness' conduct, appearance, and demeanor on the witness stand;
* the clearness or lack of clearness of the witness' recollections;
b hias or prejudice, if any has been shown;
* possible motives for falsifying testimony; and
* all other facts and circumstances during the trial which tend either to support or to
discredit the testimony.
175. RICOEUR, supra note 6, at 164:
It is before someone that the witness testifies to the reality of some scene of which he was
part of the audience, perhaps as actor or victim, yet, in the moment of testifying, he is in
the position of a third-person observer with regard to all the protagonists of the action.
This dialogical structure immediately makes clear the dimension of trust involved: the
witness asks to be believed. He does not limit himself to saying "I was there," he adds
"believe me." Certification of the testimony then is not complete except through the echo
response of the one who receives the testimony and accepts it. Then the testimony is not
just certified, it is accredited .... In this case, the accreditation comes down to authenti-
cating the witness on personal terms. The result is what we call his trustworthiness,
whose evaluation can be assimilated to comparative orders of magnitude.
(citation omitted).
176. Id. at 164-65:
The possibility of suspicion in turn opens a space of controversy within which several
testimonies and several witnesses find themselves confronted with one another.... The
witness anticipates these circumstances in a way by adding a third clause to his declara-
tion: "I was there," he says, "believe me," to which he adds, "if you don't believe me, ask
someone else," said almost like a challenge. The witness is thus the one who accepts be-
ing questioned and expected to answer what may turn out to be a criticism of what he
says.
177. The testimony of the court's own psychiatric expert, Dr. George Palermo, addresses this
very issue. See David Doege, Anger in His Homosexuality Led Dahmer to Kill, Psychiatrist Says,
MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Feb. 7, 1992, at 1:
Dahmer has lied for years and still lies today.
"He lied to the judge in 1989 (when Dahmer was sentenced for sexual assault)," Paler-
mo said. "He lied to his lawyer."
"He lied to many doctors to get the (sleeping) pills. It is my feeling he has embellished a
great deal in the things he has said he did."
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parent, when it was actually casting significant parts of the story into the
shadows. 7 8 For example, woven into the testimony of the psychiatrists
was an unstated assumption that Dahmer's statements were at all times
internally consistent; that he should be believed because he unburdened
himself completely and uniformly. The evidence does not support that
assertion. 179
Indeed, there are wide factual disparities, both large and small, in
Dahmer's recounting of the murder of Stephen Hicks, the first murder he
admitted committing. In his initial statement, Dahmer relates that he and
Hicks had sex at his home and later fought, and Hicks died, almost by
accident, when Dahmer struck him in the head with a barbell. 80 The sto-
ry develops over time. When he next describes the Hicks homicide, he
states that Hicks was not a homosexual, and they did not have sex and
does not mention a fight.' 8 In a later statement, he underscores that he
and Hicks did not engage in any homosexual activities before or after
Hicks's death. 82 When talking with one of the examining psychiatrists,
Dahmer related that he "[h]ad the idea to hit [Hicks] over the head for
178. RICOEUR, supra note 6, at 85 ("It is, more precisely, the selective function of the narrative
that opens to manipulation the opportunity and the means of a clever strategy, consisting from the
outset in a strategy of forgetting as much as in a strategy of remembering.").
179. Id. at 316-17:
To be sure, applying the criteria of concordance and relying upon independent verifica-
tion of the confession provide perfect illustrations of the theses offered . . . on the "evi-
dentiary paradigm": the same complementarity between the oral nature of testimony and
the material nature of the evidence authenticated by expert testimony; the same relevance
of "small errors," the probable sign of inauthenticity; the same primacy accorded to ques-
tioning, to playing with possibilities in imagination; the same perspicacity in uncovering
contradictions, incoherencies, unlikelihoods; the same attention to silences, to voluntary
or involuntary omissions; the same familiarity, finally, with the resources for falsifying
language in terms of error, lying, self-delusion, deception.
180. Patrick Kennedy, Statement of Jeffrey Dahmer, Case No. 2472 § 5, at 9-10 (July 23,
1991) (unpublished police report, on file with author):
Subject [Jeffrey Dahmer] states that when he was 18 years of age and living in Richfield,
Ohio, he picked up a hitchhiker whom he described as a white male about 19 years of
age. He states he took him home and had homosexual sex with him and states they were
drinking beer and became intoxicated. He states they got into a physical fight because the
19-year old individual tried to leave and that during the fight, he states he struck the hit-
chhiker with a barbel [sic]. He states that the blow of the barbel [sic] caused the death of
the hitchhiker, and at this time he took the body out into a wooded area by his house and
left it there to decompose for about two weeks.
181. Dennis Murphy, Statement of Jeffrey Dahmer, Case No. 2472 § 5, at 23 (July 24, 1991)
(unpublished police report, on file with author):
He states his first homicide which occurred, he believes around October of 1978, was of a
white male hitchhiker, whom he describes as 18-yoa., 510" tall, skinny build, maybe 150
lbs., having straight brown collar length hair, not wearing glasses, clean shaven, and he
believes he was not a homosexual. He states he didn't have sex with this individual, he
just invited him in for a drink, and when the individual wanted to leave that's when he hit
him with a "barbell" and subsequently disposed of the body behind his residence. He
states he did bum his clothes and identification.
182. R.W. Munsey, Statement of Jeffrey L. Dahmer, Case No. 2472 § 12, at 488 (Aug. 8,
1991) (unpublished police report, on file with author) ("Jeffrey L. Dahmer was interviewed regard-
ing whether he engaged in any homosexual activities with Steven M. Hicks before or after his death.
Jeffrey L. Dahmer stated there were 'no' homosexual activities.").
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about a half hour."' 83 He then strangled him with a barbell, explaining, "I
didn't want to get caught so I went all the way and finished it (strangled
him)."' 184 The day after the murder, Dahmer continued, he masturbated in
front of the body and touched the body in the chest and penis area, but
did not have oral sex.' 85 The following day he bought a hunting knife,
masturbated again, cut him open to view his insides, and then dismem-
bered the body "to make him light enough to carry."'' 86 In a later inter-
view with a different psychiatrist, Dahmer claims he opened Hicks's
belly and masturbated over that and later cut his head off, cleaned it off
under the sink, and masturbated in front of that.' 
87
Had Dahmer testified at trial, each of these inconsistencies would
have been laid out in detail before the jury to cast doubt on his veracity.
Because the evidence came in through clinicians and detectives though,
this line of cross examination was never developed. Therefore, the con-
tradictions within Dahmer's statements were largely ignored, except for
Dr. Palermo's assertion that Dahmer "embellished" much of what he
claimed to have done,' 88 and the jury was given the impression that
Dahmer was basically truthful.
It is noteworthy that Jeffrey Dahmer's statements describing the
Hicks murder grew more bizarre and disturbing as the trial date ap-
proached. By this time, Dahmer had likely internalized a desire to be
found psychologically ill rather than wicked. Because Dahmer's state-
ments furnish the sole source of information given to the jury, his mo-
tives to testify falsely at trial needed to be fully explored. In his varying
renditions of the Hicks murder, Dahmer may have reflexively shaded the
truth to appear more psychologically ill than he was.
The ostensible internal consistency of Dahmer's statements pro-
jected by the defense echoes a coordinated assertion that Dahmer's ac-
tions in the fifteen charged murders were similar. Rather than breaking
down each murder to explore their unique circumstances, the defense
implied that Dahmer's killings were locked in a repeating loop. Although
the defense addressed the specifics of the uncharged Hicks and Tuomi
murders, the fifteen charged offenses were grouped as an indistinguisha-
183. Frederick A. Fosdal, Interview Notes for Jeffrey Dahmer Examination 13 (Oct. 23, 1991)
(unpublished report, on file with author).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 14.
187. Park Elliott Dietz, Interview Notes for Jeffrey Dahmer Examination, at A8 I -A82 (Jan. 5,
1992) (unpublished report, on file with author).
188. See, e.g., Jim Stingl, Dahmer Needs Help but Is Sane, Court Told, MILWAUKEE J., Feb. 6,
1992, at I (internal quotation marks omitted):
[Dr.] Palermo called Dahmer a manipulator and said he doubted Dahmer's claim that he
planned to build a temple out of the bones of his victims.
He also doubted whether Dahmer actually ate the flesh of any of his victims. Dahmer
"embellished" the facts and made them more ugly than they already were, he said.
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ble whole by Dahmer's attorneys and expert witnesses. 189 For example,
Dr. Fred Berlin of the Johns Hopkins Medical School focused on the
process of differential diagnosis in reaching his conclusion that the de-
fendant suffered from a mental disease, rather than highlighting facts of
the crimes related by the defendant. 190 After describing Dahmer's disap-
pointment and hopelessness following the death of Steven Tuomi, Berlin
concluded that "Mr. Dahmer was out of control.... It wasn't going to be
he who was going to stop it. It was going to have to be an outside
force."'191 Dr. Berlin barely mentioned the name of any of Dahmer's oth-
er victims on direct examination.
192
Similarly, Dr. Judith Becker developed a narrative regarding Dah-
mer's developmental psychology. She brought out childhood memories
and tried to tie them to his later actions. 9 3 She testified that Dahmer was
eventually so "consumed" by the mental disease of necrophilia that his
obsession led him to kill uncontrollably. 9 4 Becker's testimony revealed
some differences from Dahmer's statement to the police; he stated to her
that he had sex with every victim's body after death. 9 5 Becker also dis-
cussed specifics of the murders themselves, including a new revelation
189. Videotape: State of Wisconsin v. Jeffrey Dahmer Tape One, at 46:10 (Jan. 30, 1992) (on
file with the Marquette University Law Library). In his opening statement, Dahmer's attorney
pointed out that, in the opinion of his three expert witnesses, after Dahmer's killing of Steven Tuomi
in the Ambassador Hotel in Milwaukee, "It was all over. Mr. Dahmer would continue to do this until
it was stopped." Id.
190. Videotape: State of Wisconsin v. Jeffrey Dahmer Tape Three, at 2:59:45 (Feb. 3, 1992)
(on file with the Marquette University Law Library). Dr. Berlin described psychiatric illness as
embodying a value judgment. Id. He stated that there is a diversity of bodily conditions and posed
the following argument: In physical medicine, consider two different sorts of conditions or
processes. One is called cancer, the other is called respiration or breathing. We don't like cancer. It
causes suffering; therefore, we call it a disease. Similarly, there are different sexual attractions. Some
people are heterosexually attracted; others are attracted to persons of the same gender. At one point,
psychiatry thought that homosexuality was a disease. It no longer does. Dahmer's case is different.
He has intense, recurrent sexual fantasies of dead bodies. Id.; see also Testimony from the Dahmer
Trial, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Feb. 4, 1992, at 6 ("If this isn't mental illness, from my point of view,
I don't know what is.").
191. David Doege, Doctor: Dahmer 'Out of Control' Testifies on Killer's Fantasies,
MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Feb. 4, 1992, at I (internal quotation marks omitted).
192. See id. On cross examination, the prosecutor elicited that Dr. Berlin spent only four hours
and forty-five minutes total with Dahmer in reaching his diagnosis, less than half the time spent by
any other expert witness. See id. This information may have diminished Dr. Berlin's effectiveness in
the jury's eyes.
193. Testimony from the Dahmer Trial, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Feb. 5, 1992, at 7:
At age 8 ... he recalled his father... fished in the pond ....
.... When he talked of cutting the fish open and seeing the inside of the fish, he became
somewhat more animated, somewhat more alive in a sense.
Knowing what he had done to his victims and cutting them open and knowing that he
had appeared to be fascinated by the viscera, by the insides of his victims, I wonder if
that early incident of the cutting open and the fascination with colors was not somehow
related to what happened later on.
(first and second omission in original).
194. Doege, supra note 41, at 1.
195. Id.
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that he had intercourse with the internal organs of his victims. 96 She also
discussed other gruesome aspects of the case such as the cannibalism of
Ernest Miller and Errol Lindsey. 197 That said, Dahmer's careful planning
and efforts to avoid capture were absent from her testimony. 98 Dr. Beck-
er's testimony was an interpretation of Dahmer's actions from a psycho-
logical model rather than a description of his actions; she wove a narra-
tive of what might have been going on in Dahmer's mind rather than
describing the whole of what he did.' 99 Her failure to wrestle with Dah-
mer's actions led her to minimize obvious aspects such as the need to
dispose of bodies before they started rotting. Dr. Becker also spent a
great deal of time explaining Dahmer's current suicidal ideation and his
plans for a bone shrine he never built.
20°
Dr. Becker's fascination with the psychological narrative is demon-
strated by her willingness to accept Dahmer's description of his proposed
"temple of bones," which did not match up with the physical evidence in
the case. Dahmer sketched for her a diagram of what the "temple" would
look like.2° ' It would be built around a black lacquered table that would
have two skeletons on either side of a desk resting at hip height, and
there would be skulls he collected on the table looking back at him. 20 2 He
claimed he had already purchased the table.0 3 The difficulty emerges
when one considers the physical evidence. The only table Dahmer owned
was a black coffee table about 15 to 18 inches tall and approximately
four feet long; it appeared in some of the photos of his victims. None of
the skeletons he collected could rest on it at hip height because it was not
tall enough. Further, the skulls could not be stacked in the ways he
claimed because the surface was too small to hold them. Dr. Becker
simply failed to check Dahmer's claims against evidence on police in-
ventory. 204 Similarly, a third clinician, Dr. Wahlstrom, focused on Dah-
196. Jim Stingl, Several Disorders Played Role: Expert Dahmer Was Psychotic, Witness Testi-
fies, MILWAUKEE J., Feb. 5, 1992, at 1. There is no evidence that Dahmer mentioned this act of
masturbating with internal organs to any other witness. Indeed, it is quite clear he did not say this to
either Dr. Fosdal or Dr. Dietz. Both of them spoke with the defendant after Dr. Becker's interview. I
find it difficult to account for Dahmer's failure to mention this particular paraphilia to other wit-
nesses when he had admitted so much already.
197. Testimony from the Dahmer Trial, supra note 193, at 7.
198. Id.
199. Dr. Becker acted as an excellent psychologist in trying to describe Dahmer's mental
processes. However, her analysis is not how the law looks at intent. As James Fitzjames Stephen
points out, "The only possible way of discovering a man's intention is by looking at what he actually
did, and by considering what must have appeared to him at the time the natural consequence of his
conduct." STEPHEN, supra note 59, at 11. By foregrounding the psychological history, Dr. Becker
de-emphasized the physical facts of the case.
200. See Doege, supra note 41, at 1.
201. See id.
202. See Stingl, supra note 196, at I.
203. See id. ("Dahmer said the temple, to be built on a black table in his West Side apartment,
would be a 'power center."').
204. Indeed, the court-appointed expert, Dr. George Palermo, "doubted Dahmer's claim that he
planned to build a temple out of the bones of his victims." Stingl, supra note 188, at 1. It may have
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205mer's delusions regarding his possible temple of bones. Wahlstrom's
testimony in particular dwelt on Dahmer's performance on a battery of
psychological tests.206 However, his testimony, like that of Drs. Berlin
and Becker, did not delve much into the particulars of the crimes them-
selves. 0 7 In the final analysis, his opinions seemed based largely on
broad abstractions, and he therefore failed to provide the jury with con-
crete evidence to refute the state's case.
Dahmer's failure to testify impeded another possible line of ques-
tioning: had Dahmer spoken under oath, the prosecution could have de-
veloped how he enticed men to come home with him. In the case-in-
chief, Dahmer rendered these encounters as largely financial.20 8 What if
this report was another of Dahmer's manipulations? It may be that one of
the most important ways Dahmer showed control was in his ability to
appear attractive, friendly, and a safe person with whom to go home.
Because he did not discuss these matters with the detectives or expert
witnesses, the jury could not reflect on this aspect of his personality.
From one perspective, his silence in the courtroom may have been that of
a puppeteer: he provided the words to the witnesses that he could not say
himself. By insulating himself from questions that would shatter his
claim of illness, he may have been manipulating the defense witnesses
just as he manipulated his victims.
At the end of the defense case-in-chief, the jury had a description of
a disturbed figure who did horrifying things. Surely that is one aspect of
Jeffrey Dahmer. However, he was much more. The image crafted by the
defense failed to account for how Dahmer could hold a job or persuade
his victims to return to his apartment with him. The defense focused the
jury on the bizarre and delusional, asking it to return a verdict based on
these disjointed episodes in the life of the silent man surrounded by his
attorneys at counsel table. It was not clear at the end of the defense's
case how someone as disturbed as the Jeffrey Dahmer they had presented
managed to function undetected for years.
VII. MEETING THE CHALLENGES: REFRAMING A MADMAN AS A
CONSUMMATE PLANNER
To counter the discursive image of a madman suggested by the de-
fense, the prosecution filled in the picture of the defendant, showing that
stemmed from the failure of Dahmer's story to match up with the physical evidence, but the record
does not address that point.
205. Stingl, supra note 196, at I ("Carl M. Wahlstrom Jr., who became a psychiatrist two years
ago and works in Chicago, said he believed Dahmer was psychotic because of his plans to erect a
temple where he would display the skulls and bones of his victims.").
206. See Carl M. Wahlstrom, Jr., Report of Psychiatric Evaluation of Jeffrey Dahmer 9-10
(Jan. 9, 1992) (unpublished court file, on file with author).
207. In an eleven-page report, brief descriptions of the crimes themselves appear in only four
paragraphs. See id. at 6-7.
208. See, e.g., Murphy & Kennedy, supra note 29, at 88.
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he was at all times in control of his actions. As a segue into the prosecu-
tion's case-in-chief, the court's witness, Dr. George Palermo, maintained
that Jeffrey Dahmer was responsible for his actions under the law.2
Palermo described Dahmer as making conscious choices "at the moment
of the killings, in the preparation of the killing and afterwards. 2 10 Paler-
mo anticipated the prosecution's strategy by stating "Jeffrey Dahmer is a
human being .... To take [that] away from him by just saying he is a
necrophile is wrong .... He is much more.",211 He continued, "Jeffrey
Dahmer knew exactly what he was doing.., he had taken precautions,
very, very good ones. He knew the consequences of his action but he did
not want to stop.",
212
The prosecution took as its theme Dahmer's desire to control and
his ability to choose, and it reframed earlier testimony in the case as indi-
cating careful planning on Dahmer's part. 2 3 Initially, the prosecution
needed to normalize Jeffrey Dahmer, to provide a context, by showing
that his life fit together coherently; he struck others as friendly, unre-
markable, and sane.2 14 Beginning with the cross-examination of Detec-
tive Dennis Murphy, the prosecution asked every witness who had exten-
209. Stingl, supra note 188, at 1:
Palermo said that like most people, he expected to come face-to-face with a "crazy" per-
son the first time he met with Dahmer, because of the number of people Dahmer had
killed.
"I was shocked when I met him," Palermo said. "I knew after four hours that he was not
psychotic."
Palermo said Dahmer's speech was clear and his answers were coherent. He found
Dahmer amiable and intelligent .... "He's a likable fellow."
210. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
211. Doege, supra note 177, at I (internal quotation marks omitted).
212. Testimony from the Dahmer Trial, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Feb. 7, 1992, at 7 (alteration in
original).
213. See, e.g., Jim Stingl, Urge to Kill Ruled: Expert, MILWAUKEE J., Feb. 3, 1992, at 1. As
Detective Murphy noted:
Dahmer felt a sense of power knowing his family, neighbors and even police officers
couldn't detect his secret world of killing. "He took pleasure in the fact of knowing that
he had a private world of his own that no one else knew about," Murphy said. "He felt he
had this ability to make people see a phase of him that only he wished them to see, and
this encouraged him to continue on with his crimes, feeling that he would never be
caught," Murphy said.
Id.
214. Under Duthey v. State, the jury is permitted to rely on the opinions of laypersons who are
familiar with the defendant about his sanity or lack thereof. Ill N.W. 222, 226 (Wis. 1907). The
substance of this common law decision is encased in the Federal Rules of Evidence on opinion
testimony by lay witnesses:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of opinions
or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on
the perception of the witness, (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimo-
ny or the determination of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.
FED. R. EvID. 701. The witness has to have first-hand knowledge, and this knowledge must be of the
sort that will help the jury resolve a disputed fact. This was the foundation that the prosecution used
in introducing testimony from Dahmer's co-workers, apartment manager, police officers, and poten-
tial victims who testified as to Dahmer's apparent sanity.
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sive contact with Jeffrey Dahmer the same set of questions. After estab-
lishing that the witness had spent an appreciable amount of time with
Dahmer, the examiner would ask if Dahmer displayed hallucinations,
delusions, unconnected thoughts, incoherent responses, or appeared not
215to be tracking the conversation.   In this manner, the prosecution built
up a weight of evidence from ordinary people who encountered the de-
fendant in various times and places, and who saw him as perfectly nor-
mal and unremarkable.
For example, his former boss at the Ambrosia Chocolate Company
testified that he had no problems with Dahmer, whom he described as
,216 ,2 17polite. 21 6 "He was quiet. He had no problems reacting with others.
Further, his boss thought Dahmer did "a satisfactory job. 21 8 One of the
facts that came out at trial was that Dahmer was able to mix almost five
hundred distinct chocolate recipes during his time there, indicating his
ability to perform and be paid for complex tasks. Dahmer's apartment
manager thought Dahmer was "a very nice guy," and he was willing to
ask Dahmer to become his business partner.219 His building manager
further described Dahmer's apartment as "probably the neatest apartment
I've seen.,0220 This line of questioning helped the jury see Dahmer as he
was seen by coworkers and other ordinary people. He did not strike ac-
quaintances as out of touch with reality.
A second sort of lay witness helped the jury focus on Dahmer's
mental state at or near the time of his attempted or completed murders.
The prosecution called citizen witnesses and police officers, whom had
observed Dahmer near these times, to testify to his apparent rationality
and control. A friend of Dahmer's fifth victim, Anthony Sears, explained
he dropped Dahmer and Sears off near Dahmer' s grandmother's home on
the last night he saw his friend.221 "I felt that [Dahmer] was a very nice
person. He seemed very kind. 222 Another witness, Ronald Flowers, had
difficulties starting his car, so Dahmer offered to take him to his grand-
215. See, e.g., Videotape: State of Wisconsin v. Jeffrey Dahmer Tape Three, at 48:20 (Feb. 3,
1992) (on file with the Marquette University Law Library). Detective Dennis Murphy denied on
cross examination that Dahmer displayed any evidence of mental illness during the approximately
sixty hours of interviews he had with him. Id. He further indicated that Dahmer was able to describe
in detail the extent of his planning, the lengths he went to in eliminating the evidence, and that he
felt he had the ability to make people see only what he wanted. Id.
216. David Doege, Dahmer's Work OK, Bosses Say, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Feb. 11, 1992, at
1.
217. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
218. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
219. Testimony from the Dahmer Trial, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Feb. 12, 1992, at 8.
220. Id.
221. Jim Stingl, Dahmer Is Sane, Psychiatrist Says, MILWAUKEE J., Feb. 8, 1992, at 1.
222. id. (internal quotation marks omitted). This observation goes to Dahmer's ability to be
manipulative. He could be charming and attractive to other men, a fact largely unexplored during
trial.
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mother's home to pick up jumper cables.223 After the cab dropped them
off near Dahmer's address, Flowers testified that he was suspicious and
warned Dahmer he only wanted to get his car started.224 Flowers came
inside the home reluctantly, and Dahmer said that he was tired and
needed some coffee. Flowers agreed and passed out soon after drinking
the coffee mixed with Halcion that Dahmer had prepared for him. 225 The
next thing Flowers remembered was awaking in a hospital room.
226
Flowers stated that he encountered Dahmer a year later in a bar; Dahmer
said to him, "I really don't remember who you are ... maybe we can go
have a cup of coffee. 227
On May 27, 1991, Jeffrey Dahmer lured a young Laotian man, Ko-
nerak Sinthasomphone, back to his apartment. He claimed to have
drugged him, drilled a hole in his skull, and injected him with a dose of
muriatic acid and water.228 Before killing him, Dahmer decided he
needed more beer before he could go through with killing and disposal,
and he left the young man in his apartment. 229 As he returned to his
apartment after having a drink, he saw Sinthasomphone sitting nude on
the curb. 230 Dahmer was taking him back to his apartment when both the
police and fire departments showed up.231 Dahmer reports that he told the
police that his friend always acted like this when he got drunk and did
not speak English.232 The police officers who spoke with Dahmer during
,,233this incident testified that he "responded in a calm, clear voice. Dah-
mer related that the youth was his friend who had drunk too much and
passed out on the couch.234 Dahmer spoke coherently and did not appear
23to be drunk.   He spoke with the officers about how bad crime was in
the neighborhood, and brought them into his apartment they described as
"well-kept" and "neat.9 236 The officers found Polaroid photos of Sintha-
somphone in the apartment, which they saw as confirming Dahmer's
story. They left Dahmer with what soon became his thirteenth victim.
Dahmer would later state that after the police left, he gave Sinthasom-
phone another shot of muriatic acid and killed him. 237 Furthermore,
223. David Doege, Those Who Got Away Recall Dahmer 'Why Is He Looking at Me Like




227. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
228. Fosdal, supra note 34, at 45.
229. See Dennis Murphy, Statement of Jeffrey Dahmer, Case No. 2472 § 5, at 117 (Aug. 2,




233. David Doege, Officers Recall Dahmer, Youth, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Feb. 12, 1992, at I
(internal quotation marks omitted).
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
237. Fosdal, supra note 34, at 46.
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Dahmer later told police that the body of another victim, Tony Hughes,
was on the floor of his bedroom at that time. 38 This evidence unders-
cored Dahmer's control of an extraordinarily stressful situation within an
hour of committing a murder. It undermines the defense's claim that he
was beset by unchecked passion.
The prosecution's expert witnesses largely corroborated the impres-
sions of the lay witnesses that Dahmer could control his actions at all
times. Echoing Freud's observation quoted above, Dr. Frederick Fosdal
testified that he had never seen a sexual disorder that rendered someone
unable to follow the law.239 Although Dahmer enjoyed the sex with a
compliant partner, he did not enjoy the killing, 40 and actually let some
folks go because he didn't have the energy to kill when he had a hangov-
er.24t He found killing difficult unless he was somewhat drunk.242 Under
Fosdal's analysis, the desire for sex was separated from the unpleasant
task of killing and the administrative details of disposing of the
corpses.243 Fosdal further undercut Dahmer's claim of uncontrollable
passion by eliciting that Dahmer would only approach men who did not
have cars so they would not leave evidence outside his apartment.
244
The theme of the final prosecution witness, Dr. Park Elliott Dietz,
was that none of Dahmer's acts were impulsive. Rather, each charged
238. See David E. Umhoefer, Police Were in Dahmer Flat, MILWAUKEE J., Aug. 1, 1991, at 1.
239. Jim Sting, Disorder Alone Is Not Insanity, Expert Testifies, MILWAUKEE J., Feb. 10,
1992, at 1.
240. Testimony from the Dahmer Trial, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Feb. 11, 1992, at 8:
E. Michael McCann, district attorney: Did the defendant at any time say to you that he
enjoyed the killing?
Fosdal: Repeatedly he denied that. I think that is established.
McCann: Did he say anything about taking pleasure from the killing?
Fosdal: He repeatedly denied that.
McCann: So the pleasure was the sex before and after, but he did not have that powerful.
. motive, a desire for the killing?
Fosdal: That was an unwanted step.
(second alteration in original).
241. Fosdal, supra note 28, at 25.
242. Testimony from the Dahmer Trial, supra note 240, at 8.
243. Id.
244. Fosdal, supra note 30, at 59:
Q: You and a guy go home together in a car-[h]e gives you a ride home and then he's
done with and then his car is parked down in the street.
A: That wouldn't have worked.
Q: Was that an issue?
A: Yeah-if they had a car, then I wouldn't ask them back.
Q: You meet the guy at the tavern, and he says I have a car.
A: Then I wouldn't have pursued it any further.
A: They would have parked the car near the house and that wouldn't have worked-
[tihey could have been traced.
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killing was "a planned and deliberate act.' '245 Dahmer would grind sleep-
ing pills before he went out to find a victim so they would be ready to
mix in a drink. 246 He was able to be charming, seductive, and lure people
back to his apartment. He would kill only on weekends so he could spend
more time with the bodies and not have to go to work.247 He only killed
in his own apartment where he could control who could come in so that
he would not be bothered.2 48 Dahmer also related to Dietz that he knew
right from wrong every time he killed, and he could have stopped him-
self from killing had someone walked in on him just before he committed
the act.249 Dahmer also said that if he could have "obtained the company
of these men and had sexual contact with them with less drastic means,
he would have stopped" killing.25°
Perhaps the most telling testimony was Dietz's report that Dahmer
explained he had always used a condom when engaging in sex with a
corpse or unconscious person to avoid contracting AIDS or other diseas-
es.251 "The intensity of his sexual urge at that point was less than that
many teenagers experience in the back seat with their girlfriend," Dietz
testified 2 This observation destroyed Dahmer's claim of unbridled and
uncontrollable passion.
Dietz also drew out that necrophilia was not Dahmer's primary at-
traction.253 Dahmer's first desire was for an attractive sexual partner who
would be under his complete control and never leave him. 254 His prefe-
rence would have been for an enduring relationship with an attractive
living person, but he never found someone who fit these criteria, so he
"settle[d] for less attractive, paraphilic alternatives. 255 His second choice
would be a "zombie" sexual partner who would be alive indefinitely but
would be lacking in will and therefore submit to his wishes.256 Dietz ob-
served that this fantasy is not uncommon and is played out in horror
films with science fiction plots such as The Stepford Wives.257 Dahmer's
258next choice would be an unconscious sexual partner. This sort of ob-
259ject also appears in Western cultures in the fairy tale Sleeping Beauty.
Only if these choices were unavailable would Dahmer begin to fantasize
245. Jim Stingl, Dahmer Knew What He Was Doing, Expert Says, MILWALKEE J., Feb. 12,





250. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
251. Jim Stingl, Prosecution Expert Doesn't Budge, MILWAUKEE J., Feb. 13, 1992, at 1.
252. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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about a freeze-dried body or freshly dead corpse of an attractive man.
260
Despite these unorthodox sexual longings, Dietz concluded that Dahmer
was able to function well in society and did not meet the criteria of any
of the recognized patterns of personality disorder.26'
CONCLUSION
Given the jury's task of constructing a master narrative, weaving
together the disparate strands of testimony to create a coherent picture, it
is perhaps understandable that the jury rejected Dahmer's claim of insan-
ity.262 There were too many logical gaps in a context too unfinished to
account for all the evidence of his complex life. The defense did not give
the jury a way of connecting the uncontrollable necrophile they portrayed
with a person who functioned rationally both at work and in his other
human interactions. The defense's case seemed pretextual because the
facts they elicited appeared incomplete in light of the broader context
revealed by Dahmer's own statements and actions.
Ultimately, Dahmer's silence, which made his killings possible,
may have led to his downfall in court. Soren Kierkegaard's Fear and
Trembling begins with a series of meditations on the Biblical patriarch
Abraham's failure to speak as he was taking his son Isaac up Mount Mo-
riah.263 By remaining silent, by not informing Isaac that he was told to
sacrifice him, Kierkegaard maintains Abraham failed to act ethically.26
Derrida observes in his commentary on Kierkegaard, "[Abraham] speaks
and doesn't speak .... He speaks in order not to say anything about the
essential thing that he must keep secret.,
265
Isn't this what Dahmer does both on the street and in the cour-
troom? He does not tell those whom he is seducing that they are potential
prey, that he is willing to kill them if they refuse to follow his every
whim. By strangling them, he silences their voices so they cannot be
witnesses against him. He does not respond to "missing" advertisements
he sees in the papers. Then, in the courtroom, he mutes his own voice so
the jury cannot observe his self-interested and manipulative behavior
first hand; rather, he is audible only in the voices to which he has chosen
to describe his past, a narrative that he may well have constructed for his
own purposes. While clothing himself in the guise of a Romeo or Juliet,
260. Id.
261. Id. at 6.
262. RICOEUR, supra note 163, at 178.
263. SOREN KIERKEGAARD, FEAR AND TREMBLING AND THE SICKNESS UNTO DEATH 26-77
(Walter Lowrie trans., Princeton Univ. Press 3d ed. 1968) (1843 & 1849).
264. Id. at 67; DERRIDA, supra note 2, at 60.
265. DERRIDA, supra note 2, at 60.
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a lover willing to give of self for the other, he in fact used the other for
266his own selfish purposes.
Ultimately, the weight of the testimony-the text generated at tri-
al-persuaded the jury that the silent defendant's proposed history of
events was incomplete. The interpretation of the past he proffered was
riddled with gaps and inconsistencies that could not be reconciled with
his actions, his previous statements, and the observations of others. Un-
like his trusting victims, the jury refused to be moved by the defendant's
silence. They found the context proposed by the prosecution more com-
pelling, and rather than accepting the defendant's muteness, they spoke
in his place.
266. See Stingl, supra note 213, at I (according to Detective Murphy, Dahmer claimed he
killed "[f]or his own warped selfish desire for self-gratification" (internal quotation marks omitted)).

CERTIFICATION AFTER ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH




Certification of state law questions to state courts allows a dialogue
between federal and state courts over questions of common concern. The
process of certification generally involves a federal court sending a diffi-
cult or novel question of state law to that state's highest court, whereu-
pon the state court responds with an answer that is authoritative. It does
not, however, require the federal court to relinquish jurisdiction over the
proceedings while the parties litigate the issue in state court. As a result,
certification has the potential to diminish tension between federal and
state courts' respective roles in a federalist system while improving effi-
ciency and accessibility for litigants.
While certification is not without its critics, it has been an important
component of the federal courts' toolkit since the Supreme Court initially
endorsed the use of certification in Clay v. Sun Insurance Office Ltd.1 In
the years since Clay, more states have adopted certification procedures
and more federal courts have relied upon certification when faced with
novel questions of state law. In Arizonans for Official English v. Arizo-
na,2 the Supreme Court expanded the role of certification when it di-
rected lower courts to certify questions of state law in cases where pre-
viously they would have abstained under the Pullman doctrine-a doc-
trine which allows federal courts to abstain in certain cases involving
federal constitutional challenges to state laws.
3
In this article, I examine the development of certification law in the
years following the Supreme Court's decision in Arizonans for Official
English. This article seeks to determine whether federal appellate courts
have followed the Supreme Court's directive to certify when previously
they would have abstained pursuant to the Pullman doctrine. Specifical-
t A.B., Brown University; J.D., Harvard Law School. I am grateful for the comments and
suggestions on earlier drafts provided by: Rishi Batra, Dario Borghesan, Richard Fallon, Alison
Kamhi, Mona Lewandoski, and Deborah Popowski.
1. 363 U.S. 207 (1960). Clay was a federal diversity case that involved a novel question of
Florida law. The Court commended the Florida Legislature for its "rare foresight" in passing a law
that allowed federal courts to certify questions of state law to the Florida Supreme Court. Id. at 212.
2. 520 U.S. 43 (1997).
3. Id. at 75-76. The Supreme Court first announced the Pullman doctrine in Railroad Com-
mission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). The doctrine is discussed more fully in Part 11
of this article.
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ly, this article catalogues the analytical frameworks federal courts use
when determining whether to certify a question of state law in a case that
presents Pullman considerations and assesses whether these frameworks
are consistent with Arizonans-and, as an intertwined inquiry, whether
they produce results that are consistent with Arizonans. After concluding
that the federal appellate courts' analytical approach to certification in
Pullman-type cases is inconsistent and frequently at odds with Arizo-
nans, this article recommends that courts follow a formal framework that
promises analytical consistency and compliance with the directive of
Arizonans.
Since Arizonans for Official English, the Supreme Court has re-
mained relatively silent on questions concerning when and whether to
certify. The Arizonans decision provided a relatively clear directive-
certify when previously you would have abstained pursuant to Pullman
-but the federal appellate courts have not implemented this rule consis-
tently or predictably. Both Pullman abstention and Arizonans certifica-
tion promote federalism values such as comity,4 but Arizonans certifica-
tion nearly always improves judicial efficiency while reducing the par-
ties' litigation time and costs. 5 By adopting a clear and consistent frame-
work to analyze whether certification is appropriate in cases involving
Pullman considerations, the courts of appeals will provide valuable guid-
ance to federal district courts. They will also promote the values that are
at the core of the Arizonans and Pullman decisions-namely, federal-
state comity and the efficient use of both the judiciary's and litigants'
resources.
To provide a foundation for the discussion of the federal appellate
courts' implementation of Arizonans for Official English, Part I begins
with a description of the formation of the Pullman doctrine as well as the
Arizonans decision and its impact on the doctrine of Pullman abstention.
Part II discusses the doctrinal and pragmatic considerations that might
lead a court to find abstention preferable to certification, even after the
Supreme Court's decision in Arizonans. I conclude that there are rela-
tively few considerations that should sway a court to abstain rather than
certify, but note that these considerations remain important and should
inform courts' analyses. With this framework in place, Part 1H provides
an overview of the federal appellate courts' approaches to analyzing
whether to abstain or certify in Pullman-type cases decided since Arizo-
nans. The analysis has varied dramatically, from circuit to circuit, and
even within circuits. I conclude that the vast range of analytical ap-
proaches used by the federal appellate courts produces confusing case
4. See generally Guido Calabresi, Federal and State Courts: Restoring a Workable Balance,
78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1293 (2003) (describing a "crisis" in the balance between state courts and lower
federal courts and prescribing more federal court certification as one way to address the crisis in
comity).
5. See infra Part I.C.
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law that is often at odds with Arizonans. In Part IV, I propose an analytic
framework that has the potential to provide clarity and consistency to this
rather muddled field of law.
I. RAILROAD PORTERS AND THE LANGUAGE OF STATE GOVERNMENT: A
SUMMARY OF THE PULLMAN AND ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH
DECISIONS
A. Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co.
6
In 1941, the Supreme Court decided Railroad Commission of Texas
v. Pullman Co. The case involved a challenge to the Railroad Commis-
sion's decision to require that all sleeping cars operated on Texas rail
lines be continuously attended by Pullman conductors.7 It had been the
Pullman Company's practice, on lesser-traveled routes with only one
sleeper car on a train, to staff the train with a Pullman porter rather than a
conductor.8 As the United States Supreme Court explained, it was "well
known" that Pullman porters were African-American while Pullman
conductors were white.9 The Pullman porters intervened in the lawsuit
brought by the Pullman Company challenging the Commission's order,
arguing that the order was "a discrimination against Negroes in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment."' The cases also presented an unsettled
issue of state law, namely whether the Railroad Commission had the
power to issue the order that the Pullman Company and Pullman porters
were challenging. 1'
Rather than decide the constitutional issue,' 2 the Court turned in-
stead to the state issue.' 3 The Court held that the federal district court,
when presented with the question of state law, should have "exercise[d]
its wise discretion by staying its hands."' 4 In explaining its decision, the
Court emphasized the "sensitive" nature of the constitutional issue and
determined that "[s]uch constitutional adjudication plainly can be
avoided if a definitive ruling on the state issue would terminate the con-
troversy." 5 In a nutshell, the Pullman doctrine today stands for the prop-
osition that a federal court, when faced with a tough constitutional ques-
tion that could be avoided if a state law question were decided in a cer-
tain way, should exercise its discretion to abstain from addressing the
state law question if it is difficult, sensitive, or relates to an important
6. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
7. Id. at 497-98.
8. Id. at 497.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 498.
11. Id. at 498-99.
12. Note that the Court heard this case over a decade before deciding Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
13. See Pullman, 312 U.S. at 501.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 498.
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governmental function. 16 The federal court should then direct litigants to
bring their claims in state court, so that a state court may decide novel or
unsettled questions of state law. If the federal issue is not precluded by
the decision in the state court, the litigants may return to federal court for
the resolution of the case.
17
The doctrine of Pullman abstention remains an important limitation
on the role of federal courts. The principles underlying the Supreme
Court's directive to abstain from answering the state law question in
Pullman remain vital to ongoing discussions about the proper role of
federal courts, notably in that the opinion's reasoning relied upon the
Court's assessment that abstention could promote federal-state comity.
The Pullman Court emphasized that, at least in cases brought at equity,
an "unnecessary ruling" on a question of state law made by a federal
court would not further the "reign of law" if it were subsequently sup-
planted by a state court decision. 8 The Court also reasoned that such a
ruling might create friction between the federal and state systems. 19
This doctrine is not without limitations. The most relevant to this ar-
ticle is a policy against abstaining in cases in which plaintiffs seek to
vindicate First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court has explained
that, "[i]n such case to force the plaintiff who has commenced a federal
action to suffer the delay of state court proceedings might itself effect the
impermissible chilling of the very constitutional right he seeks to pro-
tect., 20 Federal appellate courts have generally followed this rule, and
have declined to abstain in cases involving allegations that a state law
violates the First Amendment.
21
16. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 76 (1997):
Designed to avoid federal-court error in deciding state-law questions antecedent to feder-
al constitutional issues, the Pullman mechanism remitted parties to the state courts for ad-
judication of the unsettled state-law issues. If settlement of the state-law question did not
prove dispositive of the case, the parties could return to the federal court for decision of
the federal issues.
For the purposes of this article, I refer to cases that present these characteristics-a federal challenge
to a state law that has not yet been interpreted by that state's highest court-as a case presenting or
involving "Pullman considerations." This simply means that these are cases in which a court prior to
Arizonans would have looked to the Pullman decision and weighed these factors before determining,
in its discretion, whether abstention was proper.
17. See England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 375 U.S. 411,421-22 (1964).
18. Pullman, 312 U.S. at 500.
19. Id.
20. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 252 (1967); see also Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360,
378-79 (1964) ("We also cannot ignore that abstention operates to require piecemeal adjudication in
many courts.... thereby delaying ultimate adjudication on the merits for an undue length of time,..
. a result quite costly where the vagueness of a state statute may inhibit the exercise of First
Amendment freedoms." (citations omitted)).
21. See, e.g., Bad Frog Brewery, Inc. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 134 F.3d 87, 94 (2d Cir.
1998) ("If abstention is normally unwarranted where an allegedly overbroad state statute, challenged
facially, will inhibit allegedly protected speech, it is even less appropriate here, where such speech
has been specifically prohibited. Abstention would risk substantial delay while Bad Frog litigated its
state law issues in the state courts."); Cate v. Oldham, 707 F.2d 1176, 1184 (11 th Cir. 1983) ("Ab-
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Subsequent cases have determined Pullman's applicability to new
situations, including claims that invoke federal statutes rather than the
22federal constitution, civil rights claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §
1983,23 instances in which the federal court abstains and the state court
24decides both the state and the federal issues, and cases involving any
type of discretionary relief.25 In the process, the Supreme Court has en-
sured the longevity and continued relevance of the Pullman doctrine.
B. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona
26
In 1997, the Supreme Court decided Arizonans for Official English
v. Arizona. The Court relied upon a line of cases supporting the federal
courts' use of state law certification procedures in holding that the feder-
al court should have certified the central state law issue.27 This holding
established a new set of rules for courts faced with cases that involve
Pullman considerations.
Arizonans involved a federal constitutional challenge to an amend-
ment to the Arizona Constitution that declared English to be Arizona's
official language and "the language of ... all government functions and
actions., 28 A state employee, Maria-Kelly Yniguez, working as an insur-
ance claims manager for the state's Department of Administration
brought suit in federal court against the State of Arizona, Arizona's gov-
ernor, and several other state officials.29 She claimed that the Arizona
amendment violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
stention is to be invoked particularly sparingly in actions involving alleged deprivations of First
Amendment rights ... ").
22. See, e.g., Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 490, 492 (1949) (holding that Pullman absten-
tion was not appropriate to avoid the decision of sensitive non-constitutional issues).
23. See, e.g., Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 169, 176-77 (1959) (holding that Pullman
abstention is appropriate in cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983 provides a cause of
action for many plaintiffs alleging federal constitutional violations. It provides, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
24. See, e.g., England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 375 U.S. 411, 421 (1964) (holding
that, when the state court addresses both state and federal issues, the federal plaintiff is bound by res
judicata only if the plaintiff "voluntarily . . . and fully litigated his federal claims in the state
courts").
25. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 719, 731 (1996) (discussing general
principles of abstention and noting "we have recognized that the authority of a federal court to
abstain from exercising its jurisdiction extends to all cases in which the court has discretion to grant
or deny relief").
26. 520 U.S. 43 (1997).
27. Id. at 77 (citing Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., 484 U.S 383, 393-96 (1988);
Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 148 (1976); Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974)).
28. Id. at 48 (alteration in original) (quoting ARIZ. CONST. art. XXVIII, § 1 (1)-(2)).
29. Id. at 48-50.
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Constitution. 30 Yniguez, who was fluent in both Spanish and English,
alleged that her work handling medical malpractice claims required sig-
nificant interactions with the public and that, when working with mem-
bers of the public who only spoke Spanish, she spoke with them in Span-
ish.31 She brought suit because she believed that her Spanish-language
interactions might lead to the termination of her employment or other
sanctions, and she requested injunctive and declaratory relief that the
Arizona amendment violated the U.S. Constitution.32
Prior to trial, the Arizona Attorney General issued an official opi-
nion that the amendment to the Arizona Constitution must be read to
apply only to "official acts of government," and therefore that it did not
apply to "the delivery of governmental services., 33 The attorney general
reached this conclusion, at least in part, because he was obliged to read
this amendment "in line. . . 'with the United States Constitution.' 34 The
Arizona Attorney General had asked both the district court and the court
of appeals "to seek, through [Arizona's] certification process, an authori-
tative construction of the new measure from the Arizona Supreme
Court., 35 Despite the Arizona Attorney General's opinion and request for
certification, both the United States District Court for the District of Ari-
zona and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals declined to certify the issue
to the Arizona Supreme Court and found that the amendment was "fatal-
ly overbroad. 36
The U.S. Supreme Court chastised the lower courts for failing to
certify to the Arizona Supreme Court the issue of the proper construction
of the constitutional amendment. The Court declared that "[c]ertification
today covers territory once dominated by a deferral device called 'Pull-
man abstention.' 37 The Court emphasized that federal courts should not
reach constitutional questions unless necessary to resolve the case. The
Court reasoned that the Arizona Attorney General's actions in this
case-namely, issuing an opinion that indicated Yniguez's actions were
not unlawful under the Arizona amendment and requesting that the dis-
trict court and the court of appeals certify the issue to the Arizona Su-
preme Court-suggested that the constitutional issue might be easily
avoided by a narrowing construction of the Arizona amendment. 38 In-
deed, the Court's opinion notes that the amendment's sponsors affirmed
at oral argument before the Court that the attorney general's narrow con-
struction was the correct one-and this construction, all parties seemed
30. Id. at 50.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 50-51.
33. Id. at 52 (quoting Op. Att'y Gen. No. 189-009 (1989)).
34. Id. (quoting Op. Att'y Gen. No. 189-009 (1989)).
35. Id. at 75.
36. Id. at 54-55, 62.
37. Id. at 75.
38. Id. at 75, 77.
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to agree, would avoid the constitutional issue presented by this case.39
Finally, the Court noted that this question was particularly appropriate
for the state courts to decide because it touched upon a matter of "impor-
tance to the conduct of Arizona's business. ' 4°
In determining that the lower federal courts should have certified
the state law issue to the Arizona Supreme Court, the Arizonans Court
noted that Pullman abstention was "[a]ttractive in theory" but "protracted
and expensive in practice. ' 4A The Court emphasized, by comparison, the
virtues of certification, inasmuch as it "allows a federal court faced with
a novel state-law question to put the question directly to the State's high-
est court, reducing the delay, cutting the cost, and increasing the assur-
ance of gaining an authoritative response.'42 The Court relied upon pre-
vious cases in which it had found certification the appropriate course of
action 43-most notably, Bellotti v. Baird,44 which held certification to be
appropriate in a federal constitutional challenge to a state law restricting
access to abortion.45 Today, Arizonans for Official English stands for the
idea that federal courts should certify where previously they would have
abstained under the Pullman doctrine.46
C. The Relative Merits of Certification
As Arizonans for Official English emphasized,47 Pullman abstention
involves considerable expense to litigants, lengthens the litigation time-
line, and makes inefficient use of judicial resources.48 In a 1977 law re-
view article, Martha Field summarized the problems associated with ab-
stention:
[E]xtreme delays inherent in the abstention procedure, and the atten-
dant expense, have been chronicled many times. Essentially, the par-
ties to a case in which abstention is ordered must undergo two law-
39. Id. at 78.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 76.
42. Id. Note that certification is not limited to Pullman-type situations. Indeed, certification
may be an appropriate option in federal cases not invoking federal question jurisdiction. See
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1201 (5th ed. 2003) (describing cases prior to Arizo-
nans for Official English, in which the Supreme Court endorsed the use of certification in cases not
involving federal constitutional challenges to state laws).
43. See Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 76.
44. 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
45. Id. at 151:
The importance of speed in resolution of the instant litigation is manifest. Each day the
statute is in effect, irretrievable events, with substantial personal consequences, occur.
Although we do not mean to intimate that abstention would be improper in this case were
certification not possible, the availability of certification greatly simplifies the analysis.
46. See Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 75. Note, however, that Arizonans had
other holdings unrelated to the abstention/certification issue. See id. at 64-67 (standing); id. at 68-71
(mootness).
47. Id. at 77.
48. See Martha A. Field, The Abstention Doctrine Today, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 590, 591 (1977).
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suits instead of one, because their cause is bifurcated between state
and federal courts. When a federal court abstains in an action before
it, the plaintiffs must commence a new lawsuit in state trial court,
usually a declaratory judgment action, to have the unclear issue of
state law resolved. They must work their way up through the state
appellate system, usually without getting any priority on crowded
state dockets, before the state issue is settled, so that they can return
to the federal system for resolution of federal issues, with the atten-
dant appeals. The prospect is hardly a happy one for litigants. It may
deter them from seeking a federal forum in the first instance, or it
may, once abstention is ordered, induce them to cut their costs by
presenting all issues to the state court for decision and waiving their
right to return to federal court on the federal issues.
49
While certification is generally more efficient and entails less delay
than abstention, the procedure is not without its critics. 50 Nevertheless,
faced with a choice between certification and abstention, certification
will almost always be the speedier, more efficient, and most cost-
effective option.51
Some who criticize certification (and abstention, for that matter)
have questioned whether these procedures actually promote federal-state
comity, as their supporters claim.52 For instance, in an article criticizing
what he viewed as the overuse and misuse of certification, Judge Selya
of the First Circuit Court of Appeals wrote, "In the end, I believe that it
engenders more understanding, and a healthier respect for state courts
and what they do, when federal courts tackle the complexities of state
law head on."53 Others, such as Jonathan Remy Nash, question whether
certification is consistent with the constitutional and statutory limits on
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Bruce M. Selya, Certified Madness: Ask a Silly Question .. 29 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 677 passim (1995). But see Eric Eisenberg, A Divine Comity: Certification (at Last) in North
Carolina, 58 DUKE L.J. 69, 77-81 (2008) (noting that a well-drafted certification procedure, com-
bined with the state's highest court's judicious use of its discretion, could avoid many of the pitfalls
of certification).
51. See, e.g., Rebecca A. Cochran, Federal Court Certification of Questions of State Law to
State Courts: A Theoretical and Empirical Study, 29 J. LEGIS. 157, 217 (2003) (cataloguing delays
of over one year in Ohio's response to certified questions, but noting that "even waiting a year for an
answer to a certified question answer pales when compared to the time elapsed under abstention");
Judith S. Kaye & Kenneth I. Weissman, Interactive Judicial Federalism: Certified Questions in New
York, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 373, 397 (2000) (noting that New York courts have generally responded
to certified questions of law within six months of accepting the certified question); see also Jonathan
Remy Nash, Examining the Power of Federal Courts to Certify State Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV.
1672, 1698 (2003) ("[Cjertification avoids procedural complications that might hinder the state court
system's resolution of the state law question were abstention employed."). But see Selya, supra note
50, at 688 (noting that both certification and abstention require "piecemeal litigation spanning two
separate court systems-and such divisions are notoriously inefficient").
52. See, e.g., Selya, supra note 50, at 684-87 (emphasizing that certification is a one-way
street and noting that to allow state courts to certify questions of federal law to federal courts would
undermine the constitutional role of state courts in the federal system).
53. See id. at 687.
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federal jurisdiction.54 Nash has argued that certification "raises serious
questions of federal jurisdiction," and that its "jurisdictional underpin-
nings" are inherently weak.
55
Additionally, some judges and practitioners have been critical of the
results that certification produces in practice. Several commentators have
noted that problems arise when federal courts do not "artfully present[]"
the questions that they wish answered. 56 Other commentators have criti-
cized state courts when they dismiss a certified question without explana-
tion, arguing that "a brief, reasoned opinion when declining to answer
would help avoid federal court frustration and misinterpretation of si-
lence, as well as expressly enforce the policies and practice of [state]
certification. 57 Judge Selya has argued that "the advisory nature of certi-
fied questions poses a psychological barrier to enthusiastic engagement
with the issues. 58 State courts are not given jurisdiction over the cases in
which questions are certified to them, 59 but their answers are binding on
the federal court and on future litigants. 60 Judge Selya concludes that this
lack of jurisdiction and the resulting "psychological barrier" leads state
courts to treat the certified issue differently than they would if it were a
live case or controversy that had worked its way through the state court
system.61
Despite these criticisms of both the theory and practical problems
underlying certification, it is generally accepted that certification is pre-
ferable to the lengthy and expensive process associated with abstention a. 2
54. Nash, supra note 51, at 1672 (concluding that certification can be understood under both a
"unitary" and a "binary" conception, but that neither framework can provide a full foundation for
both constitutional and statutory jurisdiction).
55. See id. at 1748-49.
56. Selya, supra note 50, at 689; see also Cochran, supra note 51, at 198 (noting that most
questions certified to the Ohio Supreme Court failed to meet the court's requirement that the certi-
fied question be a pure question of law); Kaye & Weissman, supra note 51, at 404-414 (outlining
cases in which the New York Court of Appeals declined to answer certified questions).
57. Cochran, supra note 51, at 179; see also Selya, supra note 50, at 681-82; Richard Alan
Chase, Note, A State Court's Refusal to Answer Certified Questions: Are Inferences Permitted?, 66
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 407,422 (1992).
58. Selya, supra note 50, at 682.
59. But see Nash, supra note 51, at 1675:
First, the unitary conception applies when a federal court that certifies a question to a
state high court is understood to transfer the very case that is before it (or some portion
thereof) to the state court. The state court considers and responds to the questions of state
law, whereupon the federal court regains control of the case. Under this conception, there
is one, unitary case, with jurisdiction shifting from the federal court to the state court and
then back to the federal court.
60. 17A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
JURISDICTION 3d §4248 (2007 & Supp. 2009).
61. Selya, supra note 50, at 682.
62. See, e.g., id. at 688 (arguing that both certification and abstention are problematic and that
federal courts should "abjur[e]" from piecemeal litigation, but not disputing the claim that certifica-
tion, as compared to abstention, is somewhat more efficient); see also Kaye & Weissman, supra note
51, at 384-85:
Supreme Court support for certification has been widely echoed. In 1967, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted the Uniform Certification
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And, given the Supreme Court's strong endorsement of the use of certifi-
63cation in Pullman-type cases, it appears that, for these cases at least,
certification is here to stay.
I. SITUATIONS IN WHICH A COURT MIGHT CHOOSE TO ABSTAIN
RATHER THAN CERTIFY
The consensus among commentators appears to be that, when
choosing between abstention and certification, federal courts ought to
choose the latter, both for doctrinal and pragmatic reasons. 64 Why, then,
would any court abstain, given the very tangible advantages of certifica-
tion and the U.S. Supreme Court's endorsement of the certification
process? This section details those scenarios in which a court may decide
to abstain without contravening the Supreme Court's directive in Arizo-
nans for Official English. These procedures are necessarily intertwined:
as more courts certify in Pullman-type cases, it follows that courts should
resort to Pullman abstention with decreasing frequency.
Federal courts' doctrine provides several scenarios in which a fed-
eral court should abstain rather than certify. In Pennhurst State School &
Hospital v. Halderman,65 the Supreme Court expanded its Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence to hold that a federal court could not enjoin a
state official from violating state law.66 If a federal court certified a ques-
tion of state law to the state's highest court in order to avoid a federal
constitutional issue under Arizonans and Pullman, the Pennhurst doc-
trine would nevertheless prevent the federal court from granting injunc-
tive relief if the state court's response made clear that a state official's
actions were not consistent with state law. In that scenario, the court
would not need to reach the federal constitutional issue, because of the
state court's response; but it would also be unable to grant an injunction
ordering the state official to comply with state law. In other words, certi-
fication for Pullman reasons cannot deal with the Pennhurst problem,
and the parties would need to re-litigate the issue in state courts. In such
of Questions of Law Act.... In 1969, the American Law Institute chimed in with its
support, as did the American Bar Association in 1977. In 1992, the National Conference
on State-Federal Judicial Relationships suggested that certification could enhance judi-
cial federalism, and in 1995, the Committee on Long Range Planning of the United States
Judicial Conference recommended that states without certification procedures adopt
them.
63. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 75-80; see also Bellotti v. Baird,
428 U.S. 132, 150-51 (1976) (emphasizing the virtues of certification in a federal constitutional
challenge to a state law that had not been interpreted by the state's highest court); Lehman Bros. v.
Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1974) (emphasizing relative merits of certification when a diversity
case presents an unclear issue of state law).
64. See sources cited supra note 62.
65. 465 U.S. 89 (1984). Specifically, Pennhurst created an exception to the rule established in
Ex parte Young. Id. at 105-06. Young held that, even though the Eleventh Amendment barred suits
against the states, plaintiffs could sue state officials seeking relief against state action. Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908). Pennhurst limited Young's reach, and thus limited the excep-
tion to the Eleventh Amendment's reach.
66. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 465 U.S. at 117.
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a situation, certification is inadequate, and the federal court would need
to abstain while the state court addressed the state law issues and deter-
mined whether an injunction would be appropriate relief.
An example of this Pullman-Pennhurst scenario arose in University
of Utah v. Shurtleff.7 In Shurtleff, the United States District Court for the
District of Utah heard a case brought by the University of Utah against
the state attorney general. The University sought equitable relief and a
judgment that the University's firearm policy banning concealed wea-
pons was: (1) protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the
U.S. Constitution, (2) protected by a provision of the Utah Constitution
that purported to give autonomy to the University, and (3) not actually in
conflict with the state's concealed weapons laws.68 The court found that
the Pennhurst decision would prevent it from granting the requested
equitable relief--enforcement of state law against a state official. 69 Ulti-
mately, the court decided to dismiss the state law claims against Utah's
attorney general because of the Eleventh Amendment protections an-
nounced in Pennhurst.70 As to the remaining federal claim, the court
noted that it was left with "jurisdiction over a meaty federal constitution-
al claim that could be rendered moot by a favorable state court decision
on either of [the] state law claims."'71 Citing Pullman and other cases for
the principle that questions of state law should be resolved before pro-
ceeding to substantial federal constitutional questions, the court deter-
mined that Pullman abstention was appropriate. 72 Given that the plain-
tiffs would need to bring the state law claims before the state court sys-
tem, certification would offer none of its usual advantages. Indeed, certi-
fication in this case might have been more inefficient-inasmuch as it
likely would have involved the state's highest court answering a state
law question in the abstract and then later hearing an appeal of the same
issues brought by the same plaintiffs.
Federal courts' doctrine creates another situation in which absten-
tion will generally be preferable to certification, namely, when abstention
is mandated under another doctrine. Most prominent amongst the other
abstention doctrines is the Younger doctrine.73 Younger requires federal
courts to abstain when an injunction is sought to stay ongoing criminal
proceedings.74 Subsequent decisions extended Younger to cases in which
declaratory judgment was sought,75 to some cases in which the federal
67. 252 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (D. Utah 2003).
68. Id. at 1266-67.
69. Id. at 1282.
70. Id. at 1281-83.
71. Id. at 1283.
72. Id. at 1284-85.
73. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
74. Id. at 41. Note that, unlike Pullman, the Younger doctrine of abstention is not discretio-
nary. Id.
75. Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 68-69 (1971).
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plaintiffs brought suit before state criminal proceedings, 76 to civil en-
forcement cases brought by the state,77 and even to some cases not
brought by the state but which involved important state interests. 78 It
would defy logic for the federal court to certify the state law question
that gave rise to Pullman considerations if another doctrine, such as
Younger or Burford79 or Colorado River,8° would require abstention.
In addition to the limitations imposed by doctrines of federal courts
and federal jurisdiction, a number of pragmatic considerations might lead
a federal court to abstain rather than to certify. A federal court might note
that parallel proceedings in state court already exist, such that it would be
inefficient and cumbersome to certify a question to the state's highest
court when there is already a case working its way through the state court
system that will present the same issue to the state's highest court with a
full factual record and without any of the disadvantages of certification.
Alternatively, a federal court might decide that questions of state law are
so predominant that abstention would actually be more efficient. 81 Final-
ly, a federal court might decide that the state law question is so fact in-
tensive that the state court would be unable to provide a fair and rea-
soned answer without its own fact-finding trial procedure.
A federal court may also be limited by the certification rules of the
state whose law is in question. Certification procedures vary from state to
state. In California, for example, a federal district court may not certify
questions of state law to the California Supreme Court; the California
Rules of Court provide for certification of questions only from "the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court, a United States Court of Appeals, or the court
of last resort of any state, territory, or commonwealth., 82 The Delaware
Supreme Court Rules prohibit that state's highest court from accepting a
76. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 348-49 (1975). But see Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422
U.S. 922, 930-31 (1975).
77. Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444 (1977).
78. See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1987).
79. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 333-34 (1943) (requiring abstention where a com-
plex state administrative scheme that is overseen by the state courts presents a better forum for
adjudicating the case at issue in the federal court).
80. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1976)
(creating a narrow exception to the general rule that pendant proceedings in state court do not bar
related proceedings in federal court).
81. In a federal question case, these additional state law issues would likely be brought in by
the parties' use of supplemental jurisdiction, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2006). See, e.g., Shegog v.
Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chi., 194 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1999). In that case, discussed in Part IlI.G,
infra, the Seventh Circuit heard an appeal involving one federal claim and many state law claims. Id.
at 837. The Seventh Circuit abstained, rather than certifying, but the court's reasoning deviated from
the Arizonans for Official English framework, inasmuch as the court justified not certifying because
it feared that this would "short-circuit" the process of decision by state courts. Id. at 840. If, howev-
er, the Seventh Circuit had emphasized that certification was less appropriate than abstention, be-
cause abstention might actually be more efficient for litigants and the courts, then it would have been
consistent with the holding and reasoning of Arizonans.
82. CAL. R. CT. 8.548.
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certified question where any of the material facts are in dispute.83 And
one state, North Carolina, does not provide for any certification of ques-
tions to its highest court. 84 Furthermore, many states' certification proce-
dures give the state's highest court the discretion whether to accept the
certified question.85 Consequently, a federal court may correctly certify a
question, only to have the highest state court decline to answer. In these
situations, where certification is unavailable because of state certification
rules or because of a state court's exercise of its discretion, a federal
court considering Pullman abstention should either abstain or decide the
state law issue on its own.
mI. WHEN Do COURTS ABSTAIN AND WHEN Do THEY CERTIFY?
As the previous sections have shown, federal courts considering
Pullman abstention should certify a question of state law rather than ab-
stain. This section analyzes when they actually certify instead of abstain.
Of course, a court may decide to abstain or decide the legal issue itself if
it relies upon case-specific reasons-such as those discussed in the pre-
vious section-that make certification less attractive or feasible than
abstention. An examination of federal case law since Arizonans for Offi-
cial English reveals, however, that most circuits' practices do not con-
form neatly to these rules. Some circuits, such as the Second Circuit,
have endeavored to follow the guidance provided by the U.S. Supreme
Court. Other circuits, however, have seemed less concerned with the
intent of Arizonans and have either applied an inconsistent approach to
these cases or have generally preferred abstention to certification.
This section details the varied approaches taken by different cir-
cuits, with attention to the structure and reasoning employed by the vari-
ous courts of appeals as they assess whether to abstain or certify. The
following catalogue of cases includes descriptions of nearly every case
decided since Arizonans for Official English in which a federal appellate
court has abstained or certified a question of state law in a case involving
Pullman considerations. The cases are organized by circuit and in chro-
nological order within each circuit. This list does not include cases in-
volving questions of law from states that, at the time the case was de-
83. DEL. Sup. CT. R. 41(b).
84. See Eisenberg, supra note 50, at 7 1.
85. See, e.g., DEL. Sup. CT. R. 41(b) ("Certification will be accepted in the exercise of the
discretion of the Court only where there exist important and urgent reasons for an immediate deter-
mination by this Court of the questions certified."); HAW. R. App. 13(a):
When a federal district or appellate court certifies to the Hawai'i Supreme Court that
there is involved in any proceeding before it a question concerning the law of Hawai'i
that is determinative of the cause and that there is no clear controlling precedent in the
Hawai'i judicial decisions, the Hawai'i Supreme Court may answer the certified question
by written opinion.
OR. R. APP. P. 12.20(3) ("The Supreme Court will consider whether to accept a question certified to
it without oral or written argument from the parties unless otherwise directed by the Supreme
Court."); see also Cochran, supra note 51, at 176 (noting that the Ohio Supreme Court often declines
to explain its exercise of its discretion when deciding not to answer certified questions).
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cided, did not have certification procedures in place. I have also omitted
a handful of unpublished cases that did not add any depth or information
that was not ascertainable through other cases.
A. First Circuit
The First Circuit Court of Appeals has employed several different
approaches in determining whether to certify in cases involving Pullman
considerations. 86 At times, the court has left the decision completely
within the discretion of the lower court, while at other times it has di-
rected the district court to certify, even going so far as to provide the
exact question that the district court must certify. In other cases, the First
Circuit has found abstention appropriate, relying on pragmatic factors
such as the existence of parallel proceedings in state court.
In Romero v. Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico,87 the First Cir-
cuit held that the district court should have stayed the case and certified a
question of law to the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico. 88 The case pre-
sented a First Amendment challenge to the Puerto Rico Bar Associa-
tion's use of mandatory membership dues to purchase group life insur-
ance for members. 89 It involved Pullman considerations because it was
unclear whether, under the state law governing the bar association, the
association had the authority to purchase life insurance using member
dues. 90 The First Circuit directed the district court to certify to the Su-
preme Court of Puerto Rico, relying upon the United States Supreme
Court's opinion in Arizonans, and provided the specific question that the
lower court should certify. 91 The court noted that certification was espe-
cially appropriate in this case because it would "recognize[]" the role that
the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico played in regulating the bar.92
In Laffey v. Begin,93 the First Circuit took another approach to the
issue of whether to abstain or certify. In a First Amendment challenge to
86. For a description of Pullman considerations, see supra note 16.
87. 204 F.3d 291 (1st Cir. 2000).
88. Id. at 304-05.
89. Id. at 293:
Romero argued that being compelled to purchase life insurance violated his First
Amendment rights in two senses. First, noting that compelled membership in a bar asso-
ciation infringes on his freedom of association, he claimed that Puerto Rico's interests in
promulgating the statutory purposes of the bar may be sufficient to overcome his interest
in not being compelled to associate and pay dues, but only in support of activities ger-
mane to the bar's legitimate purposes. Mandatory purchase of life insurance as a condi-
tion of bar membership does not, he argued, meet this germaneness test. Second, he
stated that he believes in a free-market economy and is opposed to government-sponsored
social programs, especially for those who are not indigent. Thus, the mandatory life in-
surance provision is contrary to his political philosophy, and he objects to this non-
incidental expenditure on ideological grounds.
90. Id. at 293, 305.
91. Id. at 305.
92. Id.
93. 137 F. App'x 362 (1 st Cir. 2005).
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Rhode Island's election contributions law, the court found that the case
involved Pullman considerations and noted that the parties to the lawsuit
had agreed that the questions of state law "should be answered as expedi-
tiously as possible by the state supreme court."94 The First Circuit left to
the district court's discretion the decision of whether to abstain or certify,
but suggested that the district court should first consider whether an ap-
peal of the state administrative agency's decision at issue could be taken
directly to the state supreme court.95 The court continued: "If such re-
view is not available and other conventional routes to the state court ap-
pear for any reason to be precluded, the district court may certify the
appropriate state law questions to the Rhode Island Supreme Court."
96
While this section of the opinion is dicta, the court appeared to suggest
that certification should be the last choice, only to be resorted to if a case
could not be brought in state court. This, of course, contravenes Arizo-
nans for Official English, which emphasized that courts should certify
whenever possible and only resort to abstention when certification pro-
cedures were unavailable.
Finally, in Rivera-Feliciano v. Acevedo-Vildt,97 the First Circuit
Court of Appeals held that Pullman abstention was appropriate, in large
part because "arguments virtually identical to those presented here had
been presented to the courts of Puerto Rico even before this suit was
filed, and these are now pending before the Supreme Court of Puerto
Rico."98 The court also noted that abstention was appropriate under the
Colorado River doctrine, a doctrine that, in very limited circumstances,
"permit[s] the dismissal of a federal suit due to the presence of a concur-
rent state proceeding for reasons of wise judicial administration." 99 The
case involved a constitutional challenge to correctional procedures and
involved several regulations and questions of law that the Supreme Court
of Puerto Rico had not had an opportunity to decide. 1° While the parallel
state proceedings and the applicability of Colorado River abstention
made the case a strong candidate for abstention rather than certification,
the opinion does not mention certification as a possibility, let alone ana-
lyze the relative merits of certification and abstention in the case.
B. Second Circuit
Shortly after Arizonans for Official English was decided, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals issued a pair of opinions that provided a
rigorous and thorough analytical framework for deciding whether to ab-
94. Id. at 363.
95. Id. at 364.
96. Id.
97. 438 F.3d 50 (1 st Cir. 2006).
98. Id. at 61.
99. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 819 (1976).
100. Rivera-Feliciano, 438 F.3d at 60-62.
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stain or certify. The Second Circuit's case law is clear and relatively con-
sistent on the issue.
In Tunick v. Safir,10 1 the Second Circuit provided a thoughtful anal-
ysis of when, in a Pullman case, a court should certify rather than ab-
stain. The case involved a First Amendment challenge to state law prohi-
biting public nudity, brought by a photographer who wished to stage a
photo shoot involving "75 to 100 nude models arranged in an abstract
formation" on a city street. 10 2 Writing for a Second Circuit panel, Judge
Calabresi noted that:
Arizonans made quite clear that, in the eyes of the Supreme Court,
the device of certification provides all the benefits of Pullman absten-
tion (deference in a federal system to state courts on questions of
state law and statutory interpretations that avoid constitutional diffi-
culties), while reducing greatly its drawbacks (delay and cost).
10 3
Judge Calabresi's opinion also noted, though, that Arizonans does
not require a federal court to certify whenever there is a federal constitu-
tional challenge to a state law that is unclear or has not yet been inter-
preted by the state's highest court. The opinion pointed to two "right to
die" cases that the Supreme Court decided shortly after Arizonans.'0
4
Those two cases-Washington v. Glucksberg10 5 and Vacco v. Quill1 6 -
involved federal constitutional challenges to state laws prohibiting physi-
cian-assisted suicide. Both cases presented Pullman considerations and
an opportunity to certify: a federal challenge to state laws that had yet to
be construed by the states' highest courts and that could be avoided by
narrowing constructions.'0 7 In his analysis of these cases, Judge Calabre-
si emphasized that the U.S. Supreme Court reached the merits of the
challenges "despite the concession of the parties that, under certain inter-
pretations, the statutes would avoid constitutional challenge."' 1 8 The opi-
nion explained this apparent inconsistency by looking to the federalism
values that underlie both certification and abstention: Arizonans for Offi-
cial English concerned "the very manner in which Arizona was to carry
out the basic functions of state governance," while the right to die cases
did not implicate "core functions of state governments."
'' 09
Judge Calabresi concluded that Arizonans and the right to die cases
"in no way lessen the significance of [the] Pullman factors" when deter-
101. 209 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2000).
102. Id. at 68.
103. Id. at 73.
104. Id. at 74.
105. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
106. 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
107. Tunick, 209 F.3d at 74.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 77.
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mining whether to certify." 0 Rather, Arizonans and the right to die cases
"put a gloss" on the Pullman factors and point to "other factors that are
relevant to the question of certification.""' The opinion explained that a
federal court considering whether to certify "in federal constitutional
litigation involving state statutes" should "look first to the Pullman doc-
trine for guidance."' 12 The court explained: "This is so because, although
Pullman abstention involves problems that certification may avoid or
reduce, it still remains the doctrine whose purpose is most proximate to
that of certification in cases concerning the federal constitutional validity
of state laws." ' 13 After extensive analysis, the opinion concluded:
The composite lesson of all these cases is that there are at least six
factors that must be considered in deciding whether certification is
justified. They are (1) the absence of authoritative state court inter-
pretations of the state statute, (2) the importance of the issue to the
state and the likelihood that the question will recur, (3) the presence
of serious constitutional difficulties that could be avoided by a possi-
ble interpretation of the statute, (4) the capacity of certification to re-
solve the litigation and either to render federal constitutional deci-
sions unnecessary or to ensure that they are inescapably before the
federal court, (5) the federalism implications of a decision by the fed-
eral courts and in particular whether a decision by the federal judi-
ciary potentially interferes with core matters of state sovereignty, and
(6) the effect of the delay entailed by certification on the asserted
rights at issue.14
Based on its application of these factors to the case at hand, the
Second Circuit certified a question to the New York Court of Appeals
relating to the construction of the state's public nudity statute." 5 The
Second Circuit determined that: (1) the New York Court of Appeals had
not interpreted the statutory provision at issue;" 6 (2) the constitutional
issue was "grave," noting in particular, the "tortured issue of the level of
protection ... [for] artistic or expressive nudity"; 1 7 (3) a construction of
the state statute that could avoid the constitutional issue was plausible;' 1 8
(4) certification would either completely resolve the case or resolve all
issues but the constitutional issue; 119 (5) federal courts were taking a
more active role than customary in reviewing city actions due to the
"heavy stream of First Amendment litigation generated by New York
City in recent years," and certification might relieve some of the tension
110. Id. at 75.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 74.
113. Id.
114. Id. at81.
115. Id. at 89.
116. Id. at 81.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 84.
119. Id. at 85.
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resulting from the federal courts' oversight;' 20 and (6) the decision to
certify would be "the least harmful alternative" in terms of delay. 121 Tu-
nick remains the most thorough and rigorous analysis to date of whether
a court should certify a question of state law in a case involving Pullman
considerations.
A year later, faced with another case involving Pullman considera-
tions, the Second Circuit again chose to certify the state law issues to the
New York Court of Appeals. 122 In Allstate Insurance Company v. Se-
rio,123 several insurance companies brought a First Amendment chal-
lenge to a New York law limiting their ability to make referrals to in-
sured parties. 124 The opinion, also authored by Judge Calabresi, generally
followed the framework established in Tunick, although it did not ad-
dress each of the Tunick factors. 125 The opinion also forged some new
ground. It held that, in a Pullman case where the court certified a ques-
tion and the state court declined to answer the certified question, "this
court, once having given the state a first shot at reading its law, has full
latitude to interpret the relevant state law.' 26 The Second Circuit noted
an additional factor weighing in favor of certification: just as in Arizo-
nans for Official English, the state attorney general in Serio had argued a
saving construction of the statute was possible.
27
In Nicholson v. Scoppetta,128 the Second Circuit heard a constitu-
tional challenge to the City of New York's practice of removing children
from the custody of a parent who had been a victim of domestic vi-
olence.129 The court recognized family law disputes as an area of "tradi-
tional state concern," and noted that both a concern for federal-state com-
ity, and the fact that this was an area in which the state courts were par-
ticularly knowledgeable, weighed in favor of certification. 30 The court
further noted that the state law was ambiguous,' 31 and that the constitu-
tional challenges were complex but could be avoided by a particular in-
terpretation of the state law.' 3 2 The court relied on both Pullman and
Arizonans for Official English as it reached its conclusion that certifica-
tion was the appropriate course. 33 It did not rely explicitly upon the Tu-
120. Id.
121. Id. at 88.
122. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Serio, 261 F.3d 143, 145 (2d Cir. 2001).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 144.
125. Id. at 149-54.
126. Id. at 153 n.14.
127. Id. at 153.
128. 344 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2003).
129. Id. at 158.
130. Id. at 168.
131. Id. at 169.
132. Id. at 171-76.
133. Id. at 167-68.
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nick framework, but the analysis in this case is not at odds with that
framework.
C. Third Circuit
Since Arizonans for Official English, the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals has heard few cases involving Pullman abstention or requests to
certify. Consequently, the Third Circuit does not have a well-developed
doctrine to guide judges in deciding whether to abstain or certify.
In Philadelphia City Council v. Schweiker,134 the Third Circuit re-
viewed a lower court's decision to abstain in a case involving a constitu-
tional challenge to a state agency's decision to take over the Philadelphia
school district. 135 The Schweiker court made no mention of certification
as it reviewed the district court's decision to abstain.
In Afran v. McGreevey, 36 the Third Circuit heard a constitutional
challenge to the New Jersey governor's decision to delay the effective
date of his resignation. 137 The court found that Pullman abstention would
be inappropriate, but emphasized that certification was also inappropriate
for the same reason: the relative clarity of state law. 38 The court also
noted that its analysis was informed by consideration of "timing, feasibil-
ity, public policy, and plaintiffs' choice of forum."'
139
D. Fourth Circuit
Like the Third Circuit, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has
heard few cases involving Pullman considerations in the years since Ari-
zonans for Official English. In a 2003 case, PSINet, Inc. v. Chapman,'
4°
the Fourth Circuit heard a case challenging an amendment to a Virginia
law criminalizing sale of certain sexually explicit materials to youth.
14'
The statute had been litigated extensively prior to the amendment at issue
in the case.142 In the prior litigation, the U.S. Supreme Court had certified
multiple questions of state law to the Supreme Court of Virginia. 
43
Without citing Pullman, the Fourth Circuit also chose to certify several
questions of state law to the Supreme Court of Virginia. This omission is
troubling. While citing to Pullman might seem like an unnecessary for-
mality to some, the Pullman decision, and the analysis it supports, should
be at the foundation of any discussion about whether to certify for Pull-
man reasons. As the Second Circuit explained in Tunick, courts consider-
134. 40 F. App'x 672 (3d Cir. 2002).
135. Id. at 674.
136. 115 F. App'x 539 (3d Cir. 2004).
137. Id. at 540.
138. Id. at 542-43.
139. Id. at 543.
140. 317 F.3d 413 (4th Cir. 2003).
141. Id. at 415.
142. Id. at 415-18.
143. Id. at 416.
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ing certification should look to Pullman for guidance because "it still
remains the doctrine whose purpose is most proximate to that of certifi-
cation in cases concerning the federal constitutional validity of state
laws."' 144 Arizonans for Official English did not supplant Pullman; in-
stead, it merely "put a gloss" on the guidance provided by Pullman."
45
Nevertheless, it does appear that the Fourth Circuit relied upon a
Pullman-type justification in its decision to certify: "Ascertaining the
scope of the [state] law's coverage and what compliance measures would
preclude conviction is necessary for resolution not only of the First
Amendment claim, but also for resolution of the Dormant Commerce
Clause claim."'146 The Fourth Circuit cited Arizonans as it explained its
decision to certify, and emphasized that when a federal tribunal considers
invalidating a state statute that the state's highest court has yet to interp-
ret, the federal court should tread lightly.
47
E. Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has tended to avoid certification
in favor of abstention. It has also overlooked both options in some cases,
even when construing state laws that involve core state functions and that
are being challenged on federal constitutional grounds.
In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Unauthorized Practice of
Law Committee,14 8 the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court's decision
to abstain under the Pullman doctrine. 149 The court concluded that the
district court did not abuse its discretion and had not erred in abstain-
ing. 50 As part of its analysis, the Fifth Circuit considered whether the
district court had erred in not certifying the state law issue to the Su-
preme Court of Texas. While the Fifth Circuit cited Arizonans and noted
that certification was likely more efficient, it nonetheless concluded that
abstention was preferable to certification because other insurance com-
panies were currently litigating the state law issues in Texas's state
courts.15' The court therefore concluded "that the Supreme Court of Tex-
as would be better suited to answer this question with the benefit of
records generated in state court by several insurance companies than it
144. Tunick v. Safir, 209 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 2000).
145. Id. at 75:
Given the shared goals of Pullman abstention and of the device of certification, the fac-
tors counseling the former are also suggestive of when the latter is desirable. As a result,
Arizonans, Quill, and Glucksberg in no way lessen the significance of these Pullman fac-
tors. They do, however, put a gloss on them, while also pointing to other factors that are
relevant to the question of certification.
146. PSINet, 317 F.3d at 422-23.
147. Id. at 424.
148. 283 F.3d 650 (5th Cir. 2002).
149. Id. at 652.
150. Id. at 657.
151. Id. at 656-57.
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would be by receiving a certified question from one insurer with a rela-
tively limited record on appeal."'
' 52
In a 2005 habeas case, Gomez v. Dretke,153 the Fifth Circuit ab-
stained based on Pullman and other prudential considerations. The case
involved a request by a prisoner to stay his habeas appeal so that he
could seek remedies in state court that had recently become available.
154
The court did not discuss certification, but certification would not have
addressed all of the concerns at work in the case. Most notably, certifica-
tion would not address the court's desire to allow the state prisoner the
opportunity to litigate his claims in the state system in light of the possi-
bility of new relief.
In 2006, the Fifth Circuit heard Center for Individual Freedom v.
Carmouche,'55 a First Amendment challenge to Louisiana's Campaign
Finance Disclosure Act. 156 The court construed the Act "in a way that
save[d] it from constitutional infirmity."'' 57 It did not, however, abstain or
certify to allow the state courts to construe the Act. The dissent argued
that "[t]he majority erred in refusing to certify the res nova state law
questions implicated in the interpretation of the CFDA to the Louisiana
Supreme Court."'5 8 The dissent further argued that the case involved core
state functions, namely the promotion of "genuinely democratic elections
to fill its major public offices free from corruption and other undue influ-
ences," and that this made certification all the more appropriate.1
59
F. Sixth Circuit
In the years immediately following Arizonans for Official English,
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals tended to abstain without addressing
whether certification was appropriate. While the Sixth Circuit was slow
to adopt certification, it now routinely certifies questions of state law to
the state court in cases involving Pullman considerations, although it
often does so without reference to Pullman or discussion of abstention.
For the reasons discussed above, acknowledgment of and reference to the
Pullman doctrine provides valuable guidance to courts as they determine
whether certification is the appropriate action.
60
In 1998, the Sixth Circuit heard Slyman v. City of Willoughby,'6' a
case involving a constitutional challenge to a zoning ordinance. 62 The
152. Id. at 656-57.
153. 422 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2005).
154. Id. at 265.
155. 449 F.3d 655 (5th Cir. 2006).
156. Id. at 658.
157. Id. at 664.
158. Id. at 672.
159. Id. at 669. The majority opinion does not address the dissent's arguments that abstention
or certification would have been more appropriate. See id. at 666.
160. See, e.g., Tunick v. Safir, 209 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 2000).
161. 134 F.3d 372, 1998 WL 24990 (6th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision).
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court found that abstention under both the Pullman and Thibodaux'63
doctrines was appropriate.164 The Thibodaux doctrine suggests abstention
is appropriate in cases that involve particularly sensitive matters relating
to "sovereign prerogative," especially where the issue somehow touches
upon "the apportionment of governmental powers" between local and
state-wide authorities.' 65 While it did not discuss the possibility of certi-
fication, the decision to abstain rather than certify might have been due
to the necessity of abstaining under the Thibodaux doctrine.
That same year, the Sixth Circuit decided Gottfried v. Medical
Planning Services, Inc.,166 a federal First Amendment challenge to a
state-court-issued injunction that prohibited protesters from congregating
outside of an abortion clinic.167 The court gave a reasoned and thoughtful
explanation as to the appropriateness of abstention to address the Pull-
man concerns in this case:
Abstention is the proper course here because the state court, unlike
the federal court, can modify its injunction or narrowly construe it in
light of any intervening legal developments. Giving the state court
the first opportunity to reassess the injunction in light of the Supreme
Court's recent decisions ... is the most efficient way to decide this
168case.
While the opinion did not directly address whether certification was an
option, this analysis of the parallel proceedings thoroughly supports the
court's conclusion that abstention provided the best response to the is-
sues present in the case.
In Brown v. Tidwell,169 the Sixth Circuit upheld the district court's
decision to abstain in a case involving a challenge to a state practice of
collecting "jail fees.' 170 The court did not discuss certification, nor did it
offer any explanation that showed abstention to be particularly appropri-
ate in the case.
In Northland Family Planning Clinic, Inc. v. Cox, 17' a challenge to
Michigan's "partial birth abortion" law, the Sixth Circuit considered cer-
tifying a question relating to the law's meaning to the Michigan Supreme
Court. 72 The case involved a federal constitutional challenge to a state
law, but the Sixth Circuit held that certification-and, presumably, ab-
162. Id. at *2.
163. La. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28 (1959).
164. Slyman, 1998 WL 24990, at *2.
165. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 28.
166. 142 F.3d 326 (6th Cir. 1998).
167. Id. at 328.
168. Id. at 332 (citations omitted).
169. 169 F.3d 330 (6th Cir. 1999).
170. Id. at 332.
171. 487 F.3d 323 (6th Cir. 2007).
172. Id. at 327-28, 343.
[Vol. 87:1
CERTIFICATION AFTER ARIZONANS
stention-would be inappropriate because the law was not subject to a
narrowing construction that would bring it within the requirements of the
Federal Constitution. 73 While the Sixth Circuit ultimately decided to
neither certify nor abstain, the case is notable because it discusses certifi-
cation, rather than abstention, when faced with Pullman-type issues.
174
Indeed, the court did not even cite to Pullman; it relied instead on Arizo-
nans for Official English to establish the framework for analyzing
whether to certify. 175
In Planned Parenthood Cincinnati Region v. Strickland,1 76 the Sixth
Circuit heard a constitutional challenge to an Ohio law that prohibited
the "off-label" use of the drug commonly known as RU-486.177 After
finding that Pullman considerations were at play (again, without actually
citing to Pullman), the court found certification appropriate.1 78 Notably,
the opinion implied that the decisions whether to abstain or to certify
required the same analysis 179 and that once a court found that either was
appropriate, it should generally choose certification.' 80 Indeed, although
the court initially analyzed whether certification or abstention was ap-
propriate, the bulk of the analysis dealt solely with certification.
1 8'
G. Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has only decided a few cases
involving Pullman considerations or certification since Arizonans for
Official English. In Shegog v. Board of Education of the City of Chica-
182go, a case brought under federal question jurisdiction that involved
primarily state law claims, the court considered certifying the state law
issues to the Illinois courts but ultimately opted for an abstention-like
remedy. 83 The court remanded the case to the district court with instruc-
173. Id. at 343.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. 531 F.3d 406 (6th Cir. 2008).
177. Id. at 408-09.
178. Id. at 410-11. The court relied primarily upon the Supreme Court's decisions in Bellotti v.
Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976), and Arizonans for Official English. Id.
179. See id.:
Where a statutory interpretation is at issue, the United States Supreme Court has in-
structed the federal courts to employ certification or abstention if the "unconstrued state
statute is susceptible of a construction by the state judiciary which might avoid in whole
or in part the necessity for federal constitutional adjudication, or at least materially
change the nature of the problem."
(emphasis added) (quoting Bellotti, 428 U.S. at 146-47).
180. See id.
181. See id. at 410-12. For another case in which the Sixth Circuit has opted for certification
without consideration of the Pullman factors, or, indeed, citation to Pullman, see American Booksel-
lers Foundation for Free Expression v. Strickland, 560 F.3d 443, 444-45,447 (6th Cir. 2009) (certi-
fying the construction of state law restricting use of the Internet for distribution of sexually explicit
materials to juveniles).
182. 194 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1999).
183. Id. at 840.
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tions to determine whether the federal claim was sound.184 If the claim
was sound, the district court was instructed to "provide appropriate relief
and then either relinquish supplemental jurisdiction ... or defer further
proceedings until the state courts have had an opportunity to address the
main state-law question."'' 85 If the claim was not sound, the district court
was instructed to dismiss the case and direct the plaintiffs to seek redress
in state court.' 86 The court preferred not to certify the question because it
was concerned that "[c]ertification may present the question in a need-
lessly abstract way ... or short-circuit the normal process of decision by
the state's intermediate appellate courts.' 87 By definition, certification
involves a question presented in a somewhat abstract manner to the
state's highest court (thus, "short-circuiting" the trial-level and interme-
diate state courts), but this was the precise procedure endorsed in Arizo-
nans for Official English. The court's deviation from the Arizonans
framework was likely related to its appraisal that the lone federal claim
was weak. However, by not citing this as an explanation for its decision




The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has also heard few cases in-
volving either Pullman or Arizonans for Official English since Arizonans
was decided. The case law is sparse: only one Eighth Circuit case con-
tains any substantive discussion of abstention or certification.
In that case, List v. County of Carroll,189 the Eighth Circuit heard a
challenge to the district court's decision to dismiss claims alleging Mis-
souri state practices violated the Americans with Disabilities Act and the
Rehabilitation Act.' 90 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, but on
different grounds than the district court's decision. 19! Although the court
noted that at least some of the claims were appropriate for Pullman ab-
stention,192 its analysis was brief and did not mention the possibility of
certification.
. Ninth Circuit
In the years since Arizonans for Official English, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals' Pullman-type cases have been inconsistent and inade-
quately explained. Many of the court's abstention or certification deci-
184. Id.
185. Id. (citation omitted).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See supra note 81.
189. 240 F. App'x 155 (8th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
190. Id. at 156.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 157.
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sions go unpublished-a pattern that does not advance the development
of robust and resilient case law or provide guidance to lower courts.
More than any other circuit, therefore, the Ninth Circuit's approach to
the issue has been inconsistent and poorly reasoned.
In the 1998 case San Remo Hotel v. City & County of San Francis-
co,193 the Ninth Circuit considered a takings challenge to a San Francisco
ordinance regulating hotel rooms. 194 The court abstained after concluding
that the takings question could be avoided by allowing the state courts to
interpret the ordinance at issue. 195 The court did not, however, mention
certification as an option. This may have been because the California
certification rule states that a federal district court may not certify a ques-
tion of state law to the California Supreme Court; that privilege is limited
to the U.S. Supreme Court, federal courts of appeal, or any other state's
court of last resort. 196 However, due to the Ninth Circuit's silence on this
issue in The San Remo Hotel-as well as its other Pullman-type cases
involving questions of California law-it is impossible to know whether
this rule impacted the court's decision. Nor is it possible to discern how a
litigant might induce the Ninth Circuit to certify a question on appeal that
had prompted a district court to abstain based on an unclear question of
California law.
In an unpublished opinion in 2000, Cucamongans United for Rea-
sonable Expansion v. City of Rancho Cucamonga,197 the Ninth Circuit
considered an appeal of the district court's decision to abstain pursuant to
Pullman.198 The appellants requested that the circuit court certify the
state law questions. 199 The circuit court addressed this request in two
short sentences: "The decision whether to certify a question of state law
to a state supreme court rests in the sound discretion of the federal court.
• ..After reviewing the briefs, record, and relevant law in this case, we
conclude that certification to the California Supreme Court is not appro-
priate.,,200 The court of appeals held that the lower court had not abused
its discretion in abstaining. That same year, in two other unpublished
cases, the Ninth Circuit reviewed lower court decisions to abstain-both
of which it ultimately upheld-but did not mention certification as an
201option in either case.
193. 145 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 1998).
194. Id. at 1098.
195. Id. at 1104.
196. CAL. R. CT. 8.548.
197. 210 F.3d 382, 2000 WL 61312 (9th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision).
198. Id. at *1.
199. Id.
200. Id. at *2 (citation omitted).
201. Resist the List v. Selecky, 242 F.3d 383, 2000 WL 1507524, at *1 (9th Cir. 2000) (unpub-
lished table decision); Santa Clara County Corr. Peace Officers' Ass'n, Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors,
225 F.3d 663, 2000 WL 734387, at *2 (9th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision).
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In a lengthy opinion examining the legality of a city ordinance regu-
lating rental housing, the Ninth Circuit concluded in Columbia Basin
202Apartment Association v. City of Pasco that Pullman abstention was
appropriate as applied to some of the plaintiffs, and that Younger absten-
tion was appropriate for the remaining plaintiffs.0 3 Although the plain-
tiffs in Columbia Basin suggested certification as an alternative to ab-
stention, the majority opinion did not address their request. 204 However,
the dissent disagreed with the majority's finding that Younger and Pull-
man abstention applied to the parties in this case and suggested that a
"better course of action would be... to certify the doubtful questions of
state law to the Washington Supreme Court.,
2 05
In an unpublished opinion from 2002, Fetish & Fantasy Halloween
Ball, Inc. v. Ahern Rentals, Inc.,°206 the Ninth Circuit found that Pullman
abstention was appropriate for a question involving the constitutionality
of a Nevada prejudgment attachment statute.0 7 While the court did not
discuss whether certification would have been available in the case, it did
note that abstention was particularly appropriate because there was al-
ready a "pending state-court action between [the parties that] provide[d]
an opportunity for the Nevada courts to construe the attachment sta-
tute.
, ,20 8
In another opinion from 2002, Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District, No. 1,209 a Ninth Circuit panel decided
to certify a question regarding whether a school district's use of race to
assign students to different schools violated Washington's anti-
discrimination statute.2 1 Although the court did not reference the Pull-
man decision, the case clearly involved Pullman considerations inas-
much as the Ninth Circuit was motivated to certify the question so as to
"avoid making federal constitutional decisions unless and until neces-
sary."'21 The case had been before the Ninth Circuit previously,2 12 and
while the analysis as to whether to certify was brief (and contained no
mention of Pullman or abstention), its brevity may have been due to the
panel's familiarity with the details and extensive history of the case.
202. 268 F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2001).
203. Id. at 794.
204. See id. at 805.
205. Id. at 810 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
206. 45 F. App'x 585 (9th Cir. 2002).
207. Id. at 588.
208. Id. at 587.
209. 294 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2002).
210. Id. at 1086-87. This case has a lengthy procedural history. The Supreme Court ultimately
reversed the Ninth Circuit's substantive constitutional holdings in 2007. See Parents Involved in
Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 710-11 (2007).
211. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 294 F.3d at 1092 (quoting Clark v. City of Lakewood,
259 F.3d 996, 1016 n.12 (9th Cir. 2001)).
212. Id. at 1086.
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In an unpublished 2004 decision, Lueck v. Nevada Judicial Ethics &• • 213
Election Practices Commission, a Ninth Circuit panel found that the
plaintiff likely did not have standing and remanded the case "with in-
structions to dismiss [the plaintiffs] complaint without prejudice to any
right he may have to seek review by the Nevada Supreme Court. ' 14 The
court reasoned that whether the plaintiffs had standing turned on a ques-
tion of state law, a determination the court considered a proper basis for
215Pullman abstention. Nowhere in the opinion, however, did the court
mention the option of certification.
In Smelt v. County of Orange,21 6 a challenge to California's law
prohibiting same-sex marriage, the Ninth Circuit held that the district
court had not abused its discretion when it abstained .2 7 At issue was
whether the California law violated the California Constitution and the
- 218U.S. Constitution. The court did not address certification as an option.
However, in its analysis, the court emphasized that abstention was par-
ticularly appropriate in this case because very similar cases were pending
in the state court system and were likely to reach the California Supreme
Court.
2 19
Most recently, the Ninth Circuit heard a challenge to a city's prac-
tice of denying health insurance to former employees.22 0 In Doyle v. City
of Medford,22 a group of retirees alleged that the city's practice violated
Oregon law and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
22
The plaintiffs' due process claim was based on the contention that Ore-
gon law conferred on them a property interest in health insurance bene-
fits during their retirement.223 The Ninth Circuit noted an ambiguity in
the Oregon statute at issue that had not been interpreted or resolved by
the Oregon courts. 22 4 The Ninth Circuit, in deciding to certify, wrote
simply: "without guidance from the Oregon Supreme Court about what
the [ambiguous] phrase ... means in this context or ... [what] the legis-
lature intended, we are unable to decide the federal constitutional ques-
tion accurately., 225 Interestingly, the court then cited Oregon case law
governing certification of questions from federal courts to the Oregon
Supreme Court and noted that one factor bearing on the certification de-
cision is whether the issues in the case "could implicate the doctrine of
213. 106 F. App'x 552 (9th Cir. 2004).
214. Id. at 555.
215. Id. at 554.
216. 447 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 2006).
217. Id. at 686.
218. ld. at 676-77.
219. Id. at 681.
220. Doyle v. City of Medford, 565 F.3d 536, 537 (9th Cir. 2009).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 537.
223. Id. at 538.
224. Id. at 541.
225. Id. at 542.
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'Pullman abstention. ' ' ' 226 The court devoted considerable space to its
discussion of whether Pullman factors were at play in this case-
ultimately concluding that they were-and relied on both Arizonans for
Official English and an Oregon case for the proposition that certification
would avoid many of the inefficiencies associated with abstention.227
This analysis, while thorough, was misplaced. To analyze the appro-
priateness of abstention and certification, along with the relative merits
of each, only after having decided to certify, puts the cart before the
horse. The court presents its analysis of abstention in an attempt to per-
suade the Oregon Supreme Court to accept and answer the certified ques-
tion, without using any of this analysis to support its initial decision to
seek state court guidance. 8
J. Tenth Circuit
While the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has heard relatively few
cases involving Pullman considerations since Arizonans for Official Eng-
lish, it has provided one well-reasoned and comprehensive opinion that
discusses when to certify and when to abstain.
Kansas Judicial Review v. Stou?2 9 involved a First Amendment
challenge to the Kansas Code of Judicial Conduct canon that prohibits
judicial candidates from making certain types of campaign pledges.23°
The Tenth Circuit chose to certify the "important and unsettled questions
231of state law" underlying the claim to the Kansas Supreme Court. In
deciding to certify, the court first looked to whether the case was an ap-
propriate candidate for Pullman abstention.232 Without coming to any
firm conclusions as to whether the case justified abstention, the court
noted the problems inherent in abstention-especially the effect of ab-
stention-related delay in First Amendment cases-and the Supreme
Court's expression of a preference for certification, rather than absten-
tion.2 33 It endorsed certification as "consistent with our duties to avoid
passing on the constitutionality of a statute where possible," especially
when it is a state statute that has yet to be interpreted by the state's high-
234est court. The court concluded that the decision to certify rests within a
federal court's discretion, but that "where statutory interpretation is at
issue, the touchstone of our certification inquiry is whether the state sta-
226. Id. at 543 (citing W. Helicopter Servs., Inc. v. Rogerson Aircraft Corp., 811 P.2d 627, 630
(Or. 1991)).
227. Id. at 543-44 (citing Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 75 (1997);
W. Helicopter Servs., Inc., 811 P.2d at 632).
228. Id. at 543 ("We recognize that the court takes into account several discretionary factors
when deciding whether to accept a question for certification.").
229. 519 F.3d 1107 (10th Cir. 2008).
230. Id. at II11.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1118-19.




tute is readily susceptible of an interpretation that 'would avoid or sub-
stantially modify the federal constitutional challenge to the statute.'
' 235
K. Eleventh Circuit
Like the Tenth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has
heard few cases involving Pullman considerations since Arizonans for
Official English was decided. The circuit's sole opinion dealing with the
question of when to certify rather than abstain, however, provides an
accessible and detailed framework to guide lower courts.
In Pittman v. Cole,236 the Eleventh Circuit considered a First
Amendment challenge to the "enforcement of advisory opinions promul-
gated by the Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commission and the Alabama
State Bar's Office of General Counsel" that would have prevented judi-
cial candidates from answering election-related questionnaires. 37 The
district court had abstained under the Pullman doctrine. 238 The Eleventh
Circuit concluded that the decision to abstain was erroneous, even as it
noted that "the district court was correct in recognizing that unsettled
issues of state law could well shape if not moot the plaintiffs' federal
constitutional claims. ' 239 Though the case involved Pullman considera-
tions, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion
because it failed to consider several prudential factors, including "'delay,
cost, doubt as to the adequacy of state procedures[,] ... the existence of
factual disputes, and [whether] the case has already been in litigation for
a long time,"' as well as the type of claim at issue.240 The court empha-
sized that Pullman abstention would rarely be appropriate in cases in-
volving First Amendment challenges because delay is particularly inju-
rious to First Amendment rights.24 The Eleventh Circuit then remanded
the case to the district court with instructions to certify the questions of
242state law to the Alabama Supreme Court. In so doing, it emphasized
that where abstention might have proven "problematic," certification
simplified the analysis and allowed the federal court to request clarifica-
tion from state courts.243
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS: TWO APPROACHES TO PROPER CERTIFICATION
The inconsistency within and across the circuits has created a con-
fusing backdrop for litigants and for lower courts considering whether to
certify a question of state law in cases involving a federal constitutional
235. Id. at 1119-20 (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 148 (1976)).
236. 267 F.3d 1269 (11 th Cir. 2001).
237. Id. at 1273, 1276.
238. Id. at 1285.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1286-87 (quoting Duke v. James, 713 F.2d 1506, 1510 (11 th Cir. 1983)).
241. Id. at 1290.
242. Id. at 1291.
243. Id. at 1290.
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challenge to a state law. The Supreme Court's decision in Arizonans for
Official English made clear that lower courts must, at a very minimum,
consider certification when they otherwise would have abstained under
Pullman. Arizonans did not, however, provide an analytical framework
to guide lower courts as they determine whether to abstain, to certify, or
to decide for themselves the state law issues. As the previous section
shows, certain circuits-most notably the Second Circuit, the Tenth Cir-
cuit, and the Eleventh Circuit-have developed a clear, coherent frame-
work for determining whether to abstain or certify. Other circuits, such
as the First Circuit and the Ninth Circuit, have failed to provide a consis-
tent, thorough, and transparent approach to this issue. This inconsistency
is problematic for numerous reasons. Here, however, I simply note that
dramatic inconsistencies can lead to unfair results and, just as important-
ly, a public perception of arbitrary decision-making.
244
In this section, I suggest two approaches to deciding whether to ab-
stain or certify in Pullman-type cases. Both approaches are consistent
with the Supreme Court's cases on the issue of certification in cases in-
volving federal constitutional challenges to state laws. The first ap-
proach, derived from the Second Circuit's cases, combines the Pullman
doctrine with recent certification decisions from the Supreme Court to
create a list of factors that each court should consider as it determines
whether certification or abstention is appropriate. The second approach is
a two-step analysis that modifies the Second Circuit framework by
breaking the inquiry into two separate prongs.
A. The Tunick Analysis
The first approach involves the framework devised by Judge Cala-
bresi in Tunick v. Safir.245 In Tunick, Judge Calabresi emphasized that,
244. See Stephen B. Burbank, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, and Interbranch
Relations, 95 GEO. L.J. 909, 915 (2007):
Research suggests that diffuse support [of the courts] is linked to legitimizing messages
about the courts, such as those that highlight the role of precedent and the rule-of-law
ideal, and that it is adversely affected by delegitimizing messages, such as those that
frame court decisions simply in terms of results (for example, the message that Bush v.
Gore decided the 2000 election).
Sarah E. Ricks, The Perils of Unpublished Non-Precedential Federal Appellate Opinions: A Case
Study of the Substantive Due Process State-Created Danger Doctrine in One Circuit, 81 WASH. L.
REV. 217, 217 (2006):
Doctrinal divergence between the Third Circuit's binding and non-precedential opinions
has undermined the predictive value of precedential state-created danger decisions, creat-
ing an obstacle to settlement at both the trial and appellate levels. In turn, district courts'
unpredictable application of the non-precedential opinions has undermined the critical
appellate functions of ensuring that like cases are treated alike, that judicial decisions are
not arbitrary, and that legal issues resolved at the appellate level need not be relitigated
before the district courts.
See also Robert S. Thompson, Legitimate and Illegitimate Decisional Inconsistency: A Comment on
Brilmayer's Wobble, or the Death of Error, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 423, 432-35 (1986) (describing
normative objections to judicial inconsistency).
245. 209 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2000).
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though Arizonans for Official English should be read as instructing the
use of certification "in more instances than had previously been thought
appropriate," Arizonans does not hold that a court "must certify whenev-
er (a) a plaintiff raises a federal constitutional challenge to state law in
federal court, (b) the state's highest court has not interpreted the statute,
and (c) the constitutional question could conceivably be avoided by some
saving interpretation. '246 His opinion concluded that any discussion of
the appropriateness of certification in federal constitutional challenges to
state statutes must rely on Pullman "for guidance,, 247 and that, "[g]iven
the shared goals of Pullman abstention and of the device of certification,
the factors counseling the former are also suggestive of when the latter is
desirable. 248 Arizonans for Official English and the Second Circuit's
right-to-die cases, Judge Calabresi reasoned, add a "gloss" to the Pull-
man factors, but do not undermine or displace the Pullman analysis.249
From these various strands of case law, Judge Calabresi produces
six factors that a court should consider when determining whether to
certify a case involving federal constitutional challenges to state law: (1)
whether the state statute has already been interpreted by the state's high-
est court; (2) how important the issue is and whether it is likely to recur;
(3) whether serious constitutional issues may be avoided by certain inter-
pretations of the state statute; (4) the extent to which certification would
"render federal constitutional decisions unnecessary or ...ensure that
they are inescapably before the federal court"; (5) whether the state law
issue implicates core issues of state governance and how a potential fed-
eral decision would impact federalism concerns; and (6) how the certifi-
cation-related delay would impact the claimed federal rights.25°
These six factors will clarify whether certification is the appropriate
action or whether the federal court should instead construe the state sta-
tute without certifying a question to the state court. The Tunick analysis
convincingly adapts the Supreme Court's cases into an accessible six-
factor test that, if uniformly applied by federal appellate courts, would
impose much-needed consistency in this area of law. What these six fac-
tors do not explicitly address are those situations in which certification
may be appropriate, but, for reasons addressed in Part II of this article,
abstention may be even more appropriate. In other words, the Tunick
analysis does not account for instances in which the federal court should
seek state court guidance, but where certification is unavailable or inap-
propriate because of doctrinal reasons (under Pennhurst other forms of
246. Id. at 73-74.
247. Id. at 74 ("[Alithough Pullman abstention involves problems that certification may avoid
or reduce, it still remains the doctrine whose purpose is most proximate to that of certification in
cases concerning the federal constitutional validity of state laws.").
248. Id. at 75.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 81.
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abstention) or pragmatic reasons (such as the existence of a similar case
pending before the state supreme court).
B. The Two-Step Analysis
The two-step approach would require a court considering certifica-
tion or abstention to engage in a straightforward two-step analysis: first,
whether the case involves Pullman considerations, and second, whether
any factors exist that weigh against the presumption of certification. Un-
der this approach, a court would first determine whether or not a case
involves Pullman considerations. 25  During this first step, the court
would temporarily ignore both the possibility of certification and the
question of whether abstention would be the best option. Instead, the
court would focus solely on the existence of Pullman considerations. A
court would analyze whether there is: (1) a difficult constitutional issue
involving core issues of state governance that (2) could be avoided by a
narrowing construction of a (3) state law that has yet to be construed by
the state's highest court 2  From this analysis, the court will have as-
sessed whether seeking guidance-either certification or abstention-
from the state courts would be appropriate.
After ascertaining whether the Pullman factors are satisfied, the
court would proceed to determine whether any factors exist that weigh
against the presumption of certification and suggest that the court either
abstain or decide the issue on its own. If any of the prudential or doctrin-
al considerations discussed in Part II of this article were present, then the
court should balance them with the advantages inherent in certifica-
253tion. For example, a court might decide to abstain, rather than certify,
because the case involves Pennhurst considerations that would render the
251. While I argue here that a court determining whether to certify on Pullman grounds should
first determine whether the threshold requirements for Pullman abstention are met, I do not suggest
that certification is only appropriate if these threshold requirements are met. Indeed, certification is
appropriate in many situations in which abstention would most definitely not be appropriate. See
FALLON ET AL., supra note 42, at 1201. This article deals only with the limited set of cases in which
a court is considering Pullman abstention and has the option to certify rather than abstain. In non-
Pullman certification, a court determining whether to certify should not use the abstention analysis
as its starting point. See Deborah J. Challener, Distinguishing Certification from Abstention in Di-
versity Cases: Postponement Versus Abdication of the Duty to Exercise Jurisdiction, 38 RUTGERS
L.J. 847, 885 (2007) (arguing that certain limitations on abstention are not applicable to certification,
and that courts need not apply principles of abstention when determining whether to certify).
252. See, e.g., Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 344 F.3d 154, 168 (2d Cir. 2003) ("We need not certify
or abstain unless 'the [state] statute is fairly subject to an interpretation which will render unneces-
sary or substantially modify the federal constitutional question' . . . . Nor are we obliged to avoid
constitutional questions that are not 'serious."' (alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
253. See Pittman v. Cole, 267 F.3d 1269, 1289 (11 th Cir. 2001) (emphasizing certification's
benefits and finding that certification was appropriate where abstention was not).
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court unable to grant the requested relief,2 54 or because parallel proceed-
ings in the state courts are already under way.
255
The mere presence of one of the factors outlined in Part II should
not, however, end the inquiry. Whether the existence of a certain factor
should lead the court to abstain, rather than certify, will differ from case
to case. For instance, the presence of parallel state court proceedings
(assuming the inapplicability of Younger) might not justify abstention if
the case involved a First Amendment challenge on the grounds that the
delay that accompanies abstention can cause particular harm to First
Amendment freedoms.256 This result might not be the same in a case that
does not involve the First Amendment. In the end, this analysis is essen-
tially a balancing test: the court must weigh the various pragmatic and
doctrinal considerations and determine, on balance, whether certification
or abstention is more appropriate. Of course, the Supreme Court's state-
ments favoring certification must inform a court's balancing act; in the
end, certification should have a thumb on the scale.
This two-step analysis is not altogether unfamiliar. Indeed, some
courts already employ similar analyses in their approach to cases involv-
ing Pullman considerations.257 For instance, in Pittman v. Cole,25 8 the
Eleventh Circuit first determined that, while Pullman factors were
present in the case, factors such as the likely impact of abstention-related
delay and the interim relief granted to plaintiffs made abstention inap-
propriate. 9  The court then considered certification, noting that
"[a]lthough we conclude that the district court erred by abstaining in the
manner that it did in this case, we agree with it that there exist important
unsettled issues of state law that are likely to shape, alter, or moot the
federal constitutional issues raised by the plaintiffs' claims., 260 The court
concluded that certification was appropriate in light of the advantages of
certification, as well as the Supreme Court's endorsement of the proce-
dure in Arizonans for Official English.26 1
254. See, e.g., Univ. of Utah v. Shurtleff, 252 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1285 (D. Utah 2003) (abstain-
ing under the Pullman doctrine, in part, because the Pennhurst doctrine precluded the court from
addressing the state law claims in the case).
255. See, e.g., Rivera-Feliciano v. Acevedo-Vili, 438 F.3d 50, 61-62 (1st Cir. 2006) (finding
Pullman abstention appropriate because the same issues were pending before the Supreme Court of
Puerto Rico as a result of parallel state court proceedings).
256. See, e.g., Kan. Judicial Review v. Stout, 519 F.3d 1107, 1119 ("Courts have been particu-
larly reluctant to abstain in cases involving facial challenges on First Amendment grounds.. . in part
because the delay caused by declining to adjudicate the issues could prolong the chilling effect on
speech." (citation omitted)).
257. And, of course, other courts may be employing this balancing approach without making it
explicit. But if they do not make their reasoning explicit, it is difficult for the case law to develop
and for lower courts to know how they ought to approach the issue.
258. 267 F.3d 1269 (11 th Cir. 2001).
259. Id. at 1285-88.
260. Id. at 1288.
261. Id. at 1288-91.
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The two-step test takes after the Tunick analysis inasmuch as it in-
corporates the six Tunick factors. Both approaches would make clear
whether certification is an appropriate course of action, and both tests
would also bring a consistent analytic approach to this field of law. By
separating the inquiry into two steps, however, the two-step framework
provides more information. As with Tunick, the two-step approach helps
the court determine whether certification is appropriate. But it also helps
the court determine whether certain factors counsel in favor of absten-
tion. It is important to not combine these steps, because the inquiries are
fundamentally different: whether to ask for participation from the state
courts versus how to facilitate state court participation.
The two-step structured analysis has the potential to bring clarity
and even elegance to an area of law that has long been unwieldy and
unnecessarily confusing. Imposing a degree of formality to the analysis
262would provide predictability and guidance to lower courts and parties.
By following the Supreme Court's ruling in Arizonans for Official Eng-
lish more closely, federal appellate courts would also protect the federal-
ism values embodied in both Arizonans and Pullman. And, perhaps most
relevant to practitioners and litigants, they will ensure that parties are
spared the unnecessary delay and expense involved in abstention that the
Arizonans for Official English decision sought to eliminate.
CONCLUSION
Certification and abstention play an important role in the complex
and changing relationship between federal and state courts. With certifi-
cation's rising frequency, abstention under the Pullman doctrine has nec-
essarily waned. As this article has shown, however, the theory and rea-
soning underlying Pullman abstention remain essential to any analysis of
certification in cases where previously a court would have considered
abstaining under the Pullman doctrine. If the circuit courts are to develop
a coherent and thorough approach to certification in cases where they
previously would have abstained, they must look to Pullman to deter-
262. As discussed supra note 244, inconsistent or unexplained decision-making may result in
arbitrary decisions (or a perception of arbitrariness) and may undermine the legitimacy of the court
system. It also makes the job of federal district courts more difficult. See also Martha J. Dragich,
Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish if They Publish? Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions
to Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater Threat?, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 757, 800
(1995) ("By failing to provide sufficient guidance to lower court judges, summary dispositions,
selective publication practices, and noncitation rules undermine certainty, predictability, and fidelity
to authority.").
Of course, even with a more formalistic framework, the federal courts retain discretion in
determining whether to certify or abstain. See R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496,
501 (1941) ('These cases reflect a doctrine of abstention appropriate to our federal system whereby
the federal courts, 'exercising a wise discretion,' restrain their authority because of 'scrupulous
regard for the rightful independence of the state governments' and for the smooth working of the
federal judiciary." (quoting Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U.S. 453, 457 (1919); Di Giovanni v. Cam-
den Fire Ins. Ass'n, 296 U.S. 64, 73 (1935)).
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mine whether to involve the state courts and to Arizonans for Official
English to determine how to seek state court guidance.
Courts considering a Pullman-type case should rely upon the Tunick
framework or adopt the two-step analysis described in Part IV.B. The
latter option is preferable, inasmuch as it addresses not just whether to
seek state court guidance, but also what procedure to use to obtain state
guidance. Nevertheless, both options will ensure compliance with the
Supreme Court's decisions in Pullman and Arizonans for Official Eng-
lish. Following the guidance of these two cases will allow courts to de-
velop a robust body of case law, provide a foundation for clear and tho-
rough analysis, and lead to consistent results that reflect the federalism
values at the heart of both decisions.

ARIZONA V. GANT: RETHINKING THE EVIDENCE-
GATHERING JUSTIFICATION FOR THE SEARCH INCIDENT TO
ARREST EXCEPTION, AND TESTING A NEW APPROACH
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court's decision in New York v. Belton1
2has been subject to recent criticism from scholars and Supreme Court
Justices 3 alike, calling for the Court to revisit its broad construction of
the search incident to arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment's prohi-
bition against warrantless searches and seizures in the vehicle-search
context.
The Court seized the opportunity to reexamine Belton in Arizona v.
Gant.4 The Gant holding, while narrowing the scope of the search inci-
dent to arrest exception in some situations, extended its scope in others,
perhaps straying from the tenets of the Fourth Amendment.
5
Part I of this Comment recounts the inconsistent history of the
search incident to arrest exception, and the state of the law prior to the
Gant decision. Part H summarizes the facts, procedural history, and opi-
nions of Gant. Part II analyzes Gant's two-part holding, suggests an
alternative rule for the second part, and tests the compatibility of the rule
with another area of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence-the law relating
to inventory searches. The Comment concludes that the Supreme Court
should rethink its treatment of the Fourth Amendment's warrant re-
quirement in the vehicle context.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Origin of the Search Incident to Arrest Exception
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable
searches and seizures. 6 The search incident to arrest exception to the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition against warrantless searches provides
that, under certain circumstances, law enforcement officers in the field
may conduct searches incident to a lawful arrest without a search war-
1. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
2. See, e.g., David S. Rudstein, Belton Redux: Reevaluating Belton's Per Se Rule Governing
the Search of an Automobile Incident to an Arrest, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1287, 1288 (2005).
3. See, e.g., Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring).
4. 129 S. Ct. 1710(2009).
5. See James J. Tomkovicz, Divining and Designing the Future of the Search Incident to
Arrest Doctrine: Avoiding Instability, Irrationality, and Infidelity, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417, 1473-
74 (2007).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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rant.7 The exception originated in the dictum of Weeks v. United States.8
Distinguishing Weeks from previous cases, the Court stated that the issue
was "not an assertion of the right on the part of the government always
recognized under English and American law, to search the person of the
accused when legally arrested, to discover and seize the fruits or evi-
dences of crime." 9
Since Weeks, the Supreme Court has wrestled with a satisfactory de-
finition of the scope of authority to search granted by the exception. 10 In
that time the proper scope has repeatedly expanded and contracted.
B. United States v. Rabinowitz"
In Rabinowitz, federal agents, incident to a lawful arrest for forgery
of stamps, searched a desk, safe, and file cabinet in the one-room office
where the arrest was made. 12 The Court held that the search was reasona-
ble under the search incident to arrest exception because the search was
not "general or exploratory," but sought evidence relevant to the crime of
arrest, which the agents had reason to believe was hidden in the office.
13
Rabinowitz allowed searches conducted under this evidence-gathering
justification to extend beyond the person of the arrestee, and beyond the
area immediately surrounding him. 14
Justice Frankfurter's dissent warned that the search incident to ar-
rest exception was meant to be narrow and based on necessity. 15 Further,
and particularly relevant to the Gant decision, Justice Frankfurter noted
that extending searches beyond the arrestee's person for the purpose of
gathering evidence allowed searches without probable cause.'6 The dis-
sent warned that this broad grant of authority to field officers, absent
judicial scrutiny through the warrant-issuing process, could lead to a
slippery slope and eventually result in a police state.'
7
7. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1716.
8. 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
9. Id.
10. Tomkovicz, supra note 5, at 1421.
11. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
12. Id. at 57-59.
13. Id. at 62-63.
14. See id. at 61.
15. Id. at 72 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citing Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281
(1897)).
16. See id. at 80:
The purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to assure that the existence of probable cause
as the legal basis for making a search was to be determined by a judicial officer before
arrest and not after, subject only to what is necessarily to be excepted from such re-
quirement. The exceptions cannot be enthroned into the rule.
(emphasis added).
17. Id. at 82 ("The progress is too easy from police action unscrutinized by judicial authoriza-
tion to the police state.").
[Vol. 87:1
ARIZONA V. GANT
C Chimel v. California' 8
In Chimel, police officers arrested Ted Chimel in his home, and
proceeded to search the entire three-bedroom house without a search
warrant.' 9 The Supreme Court held the search was unreasonable, and
crafted a narrower search incident to arrest rule that expressly overruled
Rabinowitz. 20 Chimel held that "it is reasonable for the arresting officer
to search the person" of the arrestee without a search warrant, as well as
the "area 'within his immediate control."' 2 '
The Court recognized only two justifications supporting use of the
search incident to arrest exception: (1) ensuring officer safety by prevent-
ing the arrestee from accessing weapons, and (2) thwarting the destruc-
22tion of evidence by preventing access to such evidence.
D. New York v. Belton
23
In Belton, the Supreme Court applied the exception to arrests of ve-
hicle occupants, and established a broad scope of police authority for
24vehicle searches. The Court held that "when a policeman has made a
lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a
contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compart-
ment of that automobile., 25 The rule also applied to recent occupants
26
and allowed searches of containers within the passenger compartment,
but excluded the trunk from the searchable area.27
The Court reasoned that, because no workable definition existed in
the vehicle context for the "area within the immediate control of the ar-
restee, ' 28 law enforcement officers needed a straightforward rule for effi-
cient application of the search incident to arrest exception.29
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan argued that the Court sa-
crificed Fourth Amendment principles to obtain a bright-line rule.30 Jus-
tice Brennan attacked the majority's acceptance of a legal fiction that
merely paid lip service to Chimel's twin justifications of protecting offic-
18. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
19. Id. at 754.
20. Id. at 768.
21. Id. at 763 (defining "within his immediate control" as "the area from within which he
might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence").
22. Id.
23. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
24. See id. at 460-61.
25. Id. at 460.
26. See id.
27. Id. at 461 & n.4 (defining "container" as "any object capable of holding another object").
28. Id. at 460.
29. Id. at 459-60 ("When a person cannot know how a court will apply a settled principle to a
recurring factual situation, that person cannot know the scope of his constitutional protection, nor
can a policeman know the scope of his authority.").
30. Id. at 468 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court does a great disservice ... to the policies
underlying the Fourth Amendment ... ").
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ers and preserving evidence. 31 Justice Brennan noted that when officers
arrest an occupant of a vehicle, "the justifications underlying Chimel's
limited exception to the warrant requirement cease to apply," because the
passenger compartment cannot be in the "area within his immediate con-
trol" when the arrestee is physically restrained.32
Therefore, although the Court insisted its holding "in no way alters
the fundamental principles established in the Chimel case, ' 33 Justice
Brennan argued the fiction that "the interior of a car is always within the
immediate control of an arrestee who has recently been in the car" cannot
be reconciled with Chimel.34 Justice Brennan also questioned how much
direction the supposed bright-line rule would actually supply, and con-
tended that Chimel, unmodified, provided adequate guidance for law
enforcement in the vehicle context.35 Twenty-three years passed before
the Court revisited the Belton decision.
E. Thornton v. United States
36
Thornton affirmed and extended Belton, holding that an officer had
the right to search an arrestee's vehicle incident to the arrest even when
the officer's first contact with the arrestee occurred outside of the ve-
hicle. 37 Because the arrestee was a "recent occupant" of the vehicle, the
Court found the search reasonable. 38 However, five justices expressed
dissatisfaction with the state of the law as governed by Belton in the
search incident to arrest exception for motor vehicles. 39 In addition to the
two dissenting justices, Justice O'Connor voiced her disapproval in a
concurring opinion,4° while Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Ginsburg,
concurred only in the judgment.
41
Justice Scalia's opinion attacked the fiction of using Chimel's twin
justifications to support the reasonableness of Belton searches.4 2 Justice
Scalia observed the risk that a handcuffed arrestee, secured in the back of
a squad car, might obtain a weapon or destructible evidence from within
his vehicle "was remote in the extreme. 43
31. See id. at 466.
32. Id. at 466.
33. Id. at 460 n.3 (majority opinion).
34. See id. at 466 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 471-72.
36. 541 U.S. 615 (2004).
37. See id. at 623-24 (holding that the arrestee was a "recent occupant" under Belton where
the arrestee pulled into a parking lot and exited his vehicle before the arresting officer was able to
pull him over, and the officer pulled in behind him, exited his vehicle, and initiated contact).
38. Id. ("So long as an arrestee is the sort of 'recent occupant' of a vehicle such as [the arres-
tee] was here, officers may search that vehicle incident to the arrest.").
39. Id. at 624, 632.
40. id. at 624 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
41. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
42. See id. at 631.
43. Id. at 625.
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The concurrence advocated applying the evidence-gathering justifi-
cation from the overruled Rabinowitz case in the vehicle context.44 Jus-
tice Scalia contended warrantless vehicle searches incident to arrest
should be valid only "where it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant
to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle. 45 The approach
conspicuously required less than probable cause to perform a warrantless
search incident to arrest.46 Yet, the opinion gave several reasons why
warrantless vehicle searches should require less than a showing of prob-
able cause, including a reduced expectation of privacy in motor vehicles,
and "heightened law enforcement needs" because the mobility of ve-
hicles creates a greater risk that evidence within the vehicle will be lost.
47
Thornton showed the readiness of five justices to alter Belton's
broad construction of the search incident to arrest exception as applied to
vehicles. Five years after Thornton, the Supreme Court changed the
scope of the exception in Arizona v. Gant.
H. ARIZONA V. GAN7
48
A. Facts
On August 25, 1999, Tucson police officers responded to a tip about
an illegal drug enterprise operating in a residence.49 Rodney Gant ans-
wered the door, identified himself, and told the officers that the owner of
the house would return later.50 A records check on Gant showed an out-
standing warrant for his arrest for driving with a suspended license.51
The officers returned the same evening, and had finished arresting
and securing a man and a woman near the house when Gant pulled into
the residence's driveway.52 Gant parked, stepped out of his vehicle, and
an officer arrested and handcuffed Gant between ten and twelve feet
from the vehicle. 53 After placing the handcuffed Gant in the backseat of a
squad car, the officers searched his vehicle and found a gun and a bag of
cocaine in a jacket on the backseat.
54
B. Procedural History
Facing charges of possession of a narcotic drug for sale and posses-
sion of drug paraphernalia, Gant moved to suppress the evidence found
44. See id. at 629 (citing United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 60-64 (1950)).
45. Id. at 632.
46. See id.
47. Id. at 630-32 (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303-04 (1999)).
48. 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).
49. Id. at 1714.
50. Id. at 1714-15.
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during the search of his car, contending the search violated his Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches.55 The trial court
found the search reasonable and denied Gant's motion.56
The Arizona Supreme Court reversed, holding the search unreason-
able under the Fourth Amendment because neither of Chimel's twin jus-
tifications for a search incident to arrest existed once Gant was hand-
cuffed in the back of a squad car.57 The Arizona Supreme Court stated it
did not purport to "reconsider" Belton, and explained that because the
rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were not present to
justify the search, the search incident to arrest violated the existing
Fourth Amendment law.58 The Court distinguished Thornton, noting that
the defendant in Thornton never raised the argument that the underlying
justifications for the exception were absent, and only contended that it
did not apply because he was outside of his vehicle when he first encoun-
tered the police. 59 The State of Arizona petitioned the United States Su-
preme Court for certiorari, and the Court, responding to persistent calls
60 61to revisit the Belton decision, granted the petition.
C. Majority Opinion
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court, which held that
the officers conducted an unreasonable search of Gant's vehicle.62 The
Court held that Chimel's rationale 63 "authorizes police to search a vehicle
incident to a recent occupant's arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured
and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of
the search." 64 The Court also held that police may search a vehicle inci-
dent to a recent occupant's arrest where it is "'reasonable to believe evi-
dence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle."'
65
Because the Gant rule treats the exception differently depending on
the crime of arrest,66 the rule is best explained by splitting the holding
into its two parts. Professor James Tomkovicz articulates the classifica-
tions particularly well, separating crimes of arrest into "evidentiary" and
55. Id.
56. See id.
57. Id. at 1715-16.
58. State v. Gant, 162 P.3d 640, 643 (Ariz. 2007).
59. Id. at 644.
60. See, e.g., Rudstein, supra note 2, at 1288 ("Given the dissatisfaction with the Belton rule
expressed by five Justices in Thornton, it is an appropriate time to evaluate again the holding and
reasoning of Belton.").
61. Arizona v. Gant, 128 S. Ct. 1443 (2008) (mem.).
62. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1724.
63. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (recognizing that ensuring officer safety
and preventing destruction of evidence are the two justifications underlying use of the search inci-
dent to arrest exception).
64. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719.




"nonevidentiary" offenses. 67 An arrest for a nonevidentiary offense sup-
plies no reason to believe that evidence specific to the offense of arrest
might be found in the vehicle, while an arrest for an evidentiary offense
does create a reasonable belief that such evidence might be found.68
1. Arrests for Nonevidentiary Offenses
The Court distinguished Belton and Thornton by classifying driving
with a suspended license as the type of offense "for which police could
not expect to find evidence in the passenger compartment of Gant's
car."' 69 If the offense of arrest is nonevidentiary, only Chimel's twin justi-
fications of ensuring officer safety and preserving evidence validate war-
rantless searches of vehicles incident to arrest of an occupant or recent
occupant, and only then if "the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching
distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search. 7 ° The
Court's holding effectively overruled Belton for nonevidentiary offenses,
establishing a narrow application of the exception.7'
The Court rejected the State's argument that Belton searches are
reasonable even where there is no possibility that the arrestee might
access the passenger compartment, and explained that the new rule "cor-
rectly balances law enforcement interests, including the interest in a
bright-line rule, with an arrestee's limited privacy interest in his ve-
hicle. 72 The Court reasoned that a broad reading of Belton gives police
too much authority to conduct warrantless searches when no reasonable
basis exists to believe evidence of the offense might be found in the ve-
hicle.73 The Court characterized police authority granted under Belton to
rummage through a person's private effects as "the central concern un-
derlying the Fourth Amendment.,
74
2. Arrests for Evidentiary Offenses
As proposed by Justice Scalia in Thornton, the Court adopted the
evidence-gathering justification for vehicle searches incident to arrests
67. Tomkovicz, supra note 5, at 1418.
68. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719:
In many cases, as when a recent occupant is arrested for a traffic violation, there will be
no reasonable basis to believe the vehicle contains relevant evidence. But in others, in-
cluding Belton and Thornton[, both drug offenses], the offense of arrest will supply a ba-





71. See id. ("To read Belton as authorizing a vehicle search incident to every recent occu-
pant's arrest would thus untether the rule from the justifications underlying the Chimel exception...
[W]e reject this reading of Belton.").
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for evidentiary offenses.75 Justice Stevens suggested drug offenses are
evidentiary offenses, referencing the crimes at issue in Belton and Thorn-
ton.76 Both cases concerned drug offenses, which Justice Stevens con-
tended created a reasonable belief that evidence relevant to those crimes
could have been found in the arrestees' respective vehicles.7 The Court
also held an arrest for an evidentiary crime supplies a "basis for search-
ing the passenger compartment and any containers therein. 78 By so
holding, the Court retained the physical scope of the Belton search, 79 but
only in situations giving rise to an evidence-gathering justification to
conduct the search.8 °
D. Concurring Opinion
Justice Scalia wrote separately in Gant, despite the Court having
adopted his proposed rule from Thornton. Justice Scalia lamented the
"charade" of retaining Chimel's justifications in the car search context.8'
As an alternative, he advocated adopting only an evidence-gathering jus-
tification for warrantless vehicle searches incident to arrests of recent
occupants. 82 Justice Scalia reasoned that allowing searches under Chi-
mel's rationale where arrestees are unsecured invites officers to leave the
scene unsecured.83 Interestingly, in Thornton, decided just five years
earlier, he quickly dismissed the same argument.
84
E. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Alito's dissent, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Kennedy joined, and Justice Breyer joined in part, attacked the Court's
insufficient support for its departure from stare decisis.85 The dissent also
questioned adopting Justice Scalia's proposed rule from his concurring
75. See id. at 1719; Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring).
76. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Compare id. (holding searches of a vehicle's passenger compartment reasonable when
incident to evidentiary arrests), with New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460-61 & n.4 (1981) (defin-
ing the area of the "passenger compartment" as encompassing the compartment itself as well as all
containers within the compartment, including glove compartments, consoles, luggage, boxes, bags,
and clothing, but not the trunk).
80. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719.
81. Id. at 1724-25 (Scalia, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 1725.
83. Id. at 1724-25 ("[T]his standard.., leaves much room for manipulation, inviting officers
to leave the scene unsecured ... in order to conduct a vehicle search.").
84. Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 627 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[l]f an
officer leaves a suspect unrestrained nearby just to manufacture authority to search, one could argue
that that search is unreasonable precisely because the dangerous conditions justifying it existed only
by virtue of the officer's failure to follow sensible procedures.").
85. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1727 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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opinion in Thornton without independent explanation of its origin or
rationale.86
The dissent noted law enforcement's considerable reliance on Bel-
ton, as evidenced by the fact that it was taught in police academies. 87 The
dissent argued that the Belton rule offers a more workable alternative
than Gant's rule.88 Justice Alito contended that Gant, by narrowing the
application of Chimel's justifications,89 creates a "'perverse incentive for
an arresting officer to prolong the period during which the arrestee is
kept in an area where he could pose a danger to an officer."'
90
Finally, Justice Alito questioned the part of the new rule that re-
quires "reason to believe" rather than probable cause.91 The dissent con-
cluded that it would simply apply Belton, and reverse the holding of the
Arizona Supreme Court.92
III. ANALYSIS
A. Gant's Abandonment of Beltonfor Nonevidentiary Offenses
The first part of the Gant holding, narrowing the scope of vehicle
searches incident to arrests for nonevidentiary offenses, presents two
concerns: (1) that the new rule abandoned a workable bright-line rule
crafted in Belton, thwarting the efficiency of law enforcement; 93 and (2)
that the change in the rule's wording undermines the justifications it pur-
ports to advance.
1. Gant Correctly Abandoned Belton's Rule for Nonevidentiary Of-
fenses
a. Belton Failed to Provide an Adequate Bright-Line Rule
In Gant, Justice Stevens noted the inconsistency of lower courts in
applying Belton to recent occupants of vehicles. 94 The disparities resulted
from Belton's failure to provide any instruction in determining the re-
quired spatial relationship between arrestee and vehicle at the time of
86. Id. at 1726.
87. Id. at 1728.
88. Id. at 1729 ("[S]erious problems will also result from the second part of the Court's new
rule, which requires officers making roadside arrests to determine whether there is reason to believe
that the vehicle contains evidence of the crime of arrest.").
89. See id. at 1719 (majority opinion).
90. Id. at 1730 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Abdul-Saboor, 85 F.3d 664,
669 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). But see Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 627 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("The weakness of this argument is that it assumes that, one way or another, the search
must take place. But conducting a Chimel search is not the Government's right; it is an exception-
justified by necessity-to a rule that would otherwise render the search unlawful.").
91. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1731 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("Why ... is the standard for this type of
evidence-gathering search 'reason to believe' rather than probable cause?").
92. Id. at 1732.
93. See id. at 1729.
94. Id. at 1721 (majority opinion).
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arrest, and the temporal relationship between the time of arrest and time
of search.95 In other words, how close to the vehicle did an arrest have to
occur to authorize a search of the vehicle incident to the arrest, and how
soon after the arrest must police search the vehicle?
In 1986, the Supreme Court of Connecticut held a search unreason-
able that continued after police removed the arrestee from the scene.9 6
Eight years later, the First Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a search con-
tinuing after police removed the arrestee from the scene.97 Other deci-
sions have wrestled with finding a required spatial relationship between
arrestee and vehicle at the time of arrest.98 A rule creating opposite re-
sults in similar situations offers no workable bright line.
In Gant, the Court specified the required spatial99 and temporall °°
relationships for a reasonable vehicle search incident to arrest for a non-
evidentiary offense. The majority correctly found that Belton's bright
line only worked to confuse lower courts and breed inconsistent deci-
sions.
10 1
b. Balancing the Interest in Efficient Law Enforcement
Against the Protections of the Fourth Amendment
In Thornton, Justice O'Connor characterized lower courts' applica-
tion of Belton as treating "the ability to search a vehicle incident to the
arrest of a recent occupant as a police entitlement."10 2 In Gant, the Court
stated that the fact that law enforcement relied on Belton's broad con-
struction of search authority to the point of treating it as an entitlement
could not outweigh the constitutionally guaranteed individual privacy
interest. 1
03
95. See id. at 1720-21 & nn.6-7; see also Thornton, 541 U.S. at 622 (establishing that the
exception applies when an officer makes initial contact with the arrestee outside of the vehicle).
96. State v. Badgett, 512 A.2d 160, 169 (Conn. 1986).
97. United States v. Doward, 41 F.3d 789, 793 & n.3 (1st Cir. 1994).
98. Compare United States v. Caseres, 533 F.3d 1064, 1072 (9th Cir. 2008) (declining to
apply Belton when police approached arrestee after he had left his vehicle and reached his resi-
dence), with Black v. State, 810 N.E.2d 713, 713-14, 716 (Ind. 2004) (applying Belton when arres-
tee was apprehended inside a shop while his vehicle was parked outside), and Rainey v. Common-
wealth, 197 S.W.3d 89, 94-95 (Ky. 2006) (upholding a vehicle search incident to the arrest of its
recent occupant, where police apprehended the occupant fifty feet from the vehicle).
99. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (holding the Chimel rationale applies only when an arrestee is
"within reaching distance of the passenger compartment").
100. Id. (holding the arrestee must be "within reaching distance of the passenger compartment
at the time of the search" (emphasis added)).
101. See id. at 1720-21 & nn.6-7. But see id. at 1729 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("The first part of
the new rule . . . reintroduces the same sort of case-by-case, fact-specific decisionmaking that the
Belton rule was adopted to avoid.").
102. Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 624 (2004) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
103. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1723 (majority opinion).
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Justice Alito based his dissent on the fact that police officers had re-
lied on Belton's rule for over twenty-five years.'04 However, length of
reliance on a rule should not matter if that rule allows activity which
unlawfully diminishes a constitutional protection.10 5 In Gant, the Court
properly concluded that the interest in efficient law enforcement cannot
outweigh the importance of the Fourth Amendment's protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures for nonevidentiary crimes.
2. The Change from "Area into Which an Arrestee Might Reach" 1°6
to "Within Reaching Distance"'1 7 Undermines Chimel's Twin
Justifications
Under Gant, the arrestee must be "unsecured and within reaching
distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search" in order
for the officer to search the vehicle based on Chimel's justifications.10 8 In
a situation where an officer is outnumbered by unsecured arrestees out-
side the reaching distance of the vehicle,'09 the officer can reasonably
fear the arrestees may attempt to overpower the officer and access wea-
pons or destructible evidence within the vehicle. But a court applying the
Gant rule might hold a vehicle search under these facts unreasonable,
because the arrestees are not in "reaching distance of the passenger com-
partment."' 10 Chimel's phrasing"' offers more room to argue that the
passenger compartment is in the area within the immediate control of the
arrestees in such a situation.
In a footnote in Gant, the Court recognizes the unlikelihood of a sit-
uation where an officer cannot complete an arrest by securing the arres-
tee or arrestees in handcuffs, 1 2 but argues that a search incident to arrest
would be reasonable in these situations.' 13 Yet, the Court's rephrasing of
Chimel's rule, and its qualifying footnote, unnecessarily muddle a once-
clear rule statement. Even considering the footnote's recognition of situa-
104. Id. at 1728 (Alito, J., dissenting).
105. See id. at 1723 (majority opinion):
If it is clear that a practice is unlawful, individuals' interest in its discontinuance clearly
outweighs any law enforcement 'entitlement' to its persistence .... [N]one of the dissen-
ters in Chimel or the cases that preceded it argued that law enforcement reliance interests
outweighed the interest in protecting individual constitutional rights so as to warrant fi-
delity to an unjustifiable rule.
106. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
107. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719.
108. Id. (emphasis added).
109. This was the case in Belton: there, the arresting officer, lacking enough handcuffs to
secure the four arrestees, instructed the arrestees to stand in four different areas of the road while he
conducted a search of their persons and then the passenger compartment. See New York v. Belton,
453 U.S. 454, 456 (1981).
110. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719.
111. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763 (the area "within [the arrestee's] immediate control").
112. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 n.4 (citing 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 7.1 (4th ed. 2004)).
113. See id. (holding that a search is reasonable where an officer is unable to perform an arrest
because a real possibility exists that the arrestee might gain access to the passenger compartment).
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tions analogous to Belton, a strong argument exists that "reaching dis-
tance" simply means an arm's length.
The Gant rule creates potential situations where an arresting officer
cannot search a vehicle, even where the facts implicate the justifications
for the exception. The Chimel construction of the rule offers a workable
solution to unusual fact patterns like Belton, while recognizing any ex-
ception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement must be narrow
and well-delineated. Returning to Chimel's original wording best serves
the exception's justifications because it governs the situation, however
unlikely, where an arrestee outside reaching distance of the vehicle
threatens either officer safety or preservation of evidence. 1
4
B. A Suggested Approach for Applying the Exception to Evidentiary
Crimes
The second part of Gant's holding allows police to perform a war-
rantless search of a vehicle incident to an arrest when a reasonable belief
exists that evidence relevant to the offense of arrest could be found in the
vehicle." 5 As the dissent noted, the new rule for evidentiary crimes subs-
titutes "reason to believe" for probable cause as the standard for perform-
ing a search under the Fourth Amendment."
6
While valid reasons support establishing a broad scope for evi-
dence-gathering searches incident to arrest in the vehicle context, 1 7 an
expansive construction of the exception raises equally valid concerns.
1 8
The relevant consideration is whether the government interest in effec-
tive law enforcement outweighs the individual privacy interest in being
free from unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment.
Perhaps less intrusive methods exist to further the government's in-
terests. If the Court considers the interest of ensuring successful prosecu-
tions important enough to disregard constitutionally protected rights in
114. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 471 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[R]elevant factors [in determining
the area within the arrestee's immediate control] would surely include the relative number of police
officers and arrestees ... and the ability of the arrestee to gain access to a particular area or contain-
er.").
115. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (citing Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004)
(Scalia, J., concurring)).
116. Id. at 1731 (Alito, J., dissenting).
117. See Thornton, 541 U.S. at 631 (Scalia, J., concurring) (advancing a "reduced expectation
of privacy" and "heightened law enforcement needs" as justifications for allowing evidence-
gathering searches); see also Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1720 ("[A] motorist's privacy interest in his vehicle
is less substantial than in his home .. "); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 304 (1999) ("[T]he
,ready mobility' of an automobile creates a risk that the evidence or contraband will be permanently
lost while a warrant is obtained." (quoting California v. Camey, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985))).
118. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(discussing the importance of adhering to the Fourth Amendment's purpose that any invasion into
one's privacy must be judicially sanctioned); Tomkovicz, supra note 5, at 1471-72 (characterizing
the allowance of warrantless vehicle searches incident to arrest under an evidence-gathering justifi-
cation without a probable cause requirement as a worrisome grant of unchecked power to law en-
forcement officers in the field).
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pursuit of evidence, it should at least consider a rule that serves these
interests without violating the reasonableness mandate of the Fourth
Amendment. This mandate is served either by procuring a warrant based
on sufficient probable cause, or acting within the scope of an exception
sufficiently tied to the justifications upon which it is based."19
1. The Suggested Rule for Applying the Vehicle Search Incident to
Arrest Exception to Evidentiary Crimes
The Gant rule works on an assumption that, because of the mobility
of vehicles, there is no time to reasonably procure a search warrant for
the vehicle an officer desires to search. An ideal rule would preserve the
Fourth Amendment's search warrant requirement, and still recognize an
evidence-gathering justification in the vehicle context. The rule would
read: Before searching a vehicle incident to the arrest of an occupant or
recent occupant for the purpose of gathering evidence relevant to the
crime of arrest, an arresting officer "must secure and use search warrants
wherever reasonably practicable."'
' 20
The rule would recognize that, because of the ready mobility of ve-
hicles, there will often be instances where obtaining a search warrant is
not reasonably practicable. Where obtaining a search warrant is not rea-
sonably practicable-and there is reason to believe that relevant evidence
inside the vehicle will be transported or destroyed-an officer may tem-
porarily restrict access to the vehicle12 until a search warrant can be ob-
tained.
This rule attempts to protect the government's interest in gathering
evidence to ensure successful prosecutions, and to satisfy the Fourth
Amendment's purpose that an objective, judicial mind determines
whether the situation justifies an intrusion into the arrestee's privacy.
22
Existing Fourth Amendment law regarding impounded vehicles, howev-
er, necessitates further analysis to determine the plausibility of the rule in
situations where obtaining a search warrant would not be reasonably
practicable.
119. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) ("[S]earches conducted outside the
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated excep-
tions."). But see Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 572-74 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the Fourth Amendment does not contain an explicit warrant requirement, and requires only
"reasonableness" in the search).
120. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948) (citing Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10, 14, 15 (1948); Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1, 6 (1932); Go-Bart Importing Co v.
United States, 282 U.S. 344, 358 (1931); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925)).
121. Impounding the vehicle would constitute a temporary restriction of access.
122. See McDonald, 335 U.S. at 455 ("[The warrant requirement was created] so that an objec-
tive mind might weigh the need to invade ... privacy in order to enforce the law.").
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2. Impounded Vehicles and the Fourth Amendment: The Inventory
Search
a. Background of Inventory Searches of Impounded Vehicles
The authority of police to inventory lawfully impounded vehicles is
a well-defined exception to the Fourth Amendment's search warrant and
probable cause requirements. 123 However, inventory searches must be
reasonable under the circumstances, complying with the Fourth Amend-
ment's prohibition against unreasonable searches. 124 A vehicle must be
properly impounded, giving police lawful custody over it, for an invento-
ry search to be reasonable.
25
The Supreme Court recognizes three administrative, "community
caretaking functions"' 126 as the justifications for inventory searches of
impounded vehicles: (1) to protect the owner's property within the ve-
hicle; (2) to protect police from claims or disputes regarding lost or sto-
len property; and (3) to protect the police and the public from potential
danger.127 The presence of any of these justifications authorizes a war-
rantless inventory search of an impounded vehicle.
128
Officers must perform an inventory search in good faith and in fur-
therance of the above-mentioned administrative functions, as the inven-
tory "must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover
incriminating evidence."'' 29 Conducting the search in accordance with
standardized police procedure normally satisfies the good faith require-
ment. 30 A court will likely find an inventory search reasonable so long
as standardized procedures allow the scope of the search employed by an
officer. 131 And, even if an officer suspects the existence of evidence of a
123. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367-76 (1976) (identifying the "inhe-
rent mobility of automobiles" and a diminished privacy interest in vehicles-as opposed to the
home-as the two reasons for the exception to the warrant requirement); see also Colorado v. Ber-
fine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643 (1983).
124. See Bertine, 479 U.S. at 373-74.
125. See Opperman, 428 U.S. at 371 n.5; see also Woodford v. State, 752 N.E.2d 1278, 1281
(Ind. 2001) (holding impoundments are proper and recognizing lawful custody where the impound-
ment is part of the "administrative caretaking functions of the police," or where "authorized by state
statute").
126. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 368 (quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433,441 (1973)).
127. Id. at 368-69.
128. See Bertine, 479 U.S. at 373 (holding that where police took a vehicle to a secure, lighted
storage facility, the fact that there existed little risk of theft or vandalism of property in the vehicle
did not eliminate the need for an inventory because the other two justifications for an inventory
search were still present).
129. Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1,4 (1990).
130. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 374-75.
131. See Wells, 495 U.S. at 4 ("[P]olicies of opening all containers or of opening no containers
[within the vehicle] are unquestionably permissible ... ").
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crime in the vehicle, it does not preclude the police from inventorying
the vehicle so long as they follow the standardized procedure.
1 32
The scope of a reasonable vehicle inventory includes a search of
any area of the vehicle that serves the government community caretaking
interests. 33 Supreme Court decisions hold the scope of a reasonable in-
ventory search extends to an unlocked glove compartment, 34 and to con-
tainers in the passenger compartment.' 35 Therefore, the scope of an in-
ventory search at least matches the scope of a search incident to arrest,
and perhaps exceeds it,136 assuming Gant retained Belton's prohibition
on trunk searches incident to arrest.
137
b. Plausibility of the Suggested Approach in Light of the In-
ventory Search Doctrine
Assuming, for the purpose of testing the suggested rule, that an im-
poundment incident to the arrest of a vehicle occupant constitutes a
proper impoundment and authorizes an inventory of the vehicle, the sug-
gested rule likely fails. The existence and pervasiveness of the inventory
search exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement hind-
ers the suggested rule's effectiveness where "obtaining a search warrant
is not reasonably practicable."' 138 The inventory search exception fru-
strates the purpose of the suggested rule because Supreme Court deci-
sions recognize the inventory search as a routine police activity incident
to impoundment,1 39 and if a vehicle in fact contains evidence of a crime,
police will inevitably discover it via a warrantless search regardless of
the reasons behind that search. However, while the existence of the in-
ventory search may negate any exclusionary remedy for evidence found
during an unconstitutional application of the search incident to arrest
exception, it does not preclude victims of such unconstitutional searches
132. See United States v. Petty, 367 F.3d 1009, 1013 (8th Cir. 2004) ("[Piolice 'may keep their
eyes open for potentially incriminating items that they may discover in the course of an inventory
search, as long as their sole purpose is not to investigate a crime ....' (quoting United States v.
Marshall, 986 F.2d 1171, 1176 (8th Cir. 1993))); see also State v. Ture, 632 N.W.2d 621, 629
(Minn. 2001) (holding that, if an officer has an investigatory motive for conducting an inventory
search, the search remains reasonable so long as it is coupled with a non-investigatory motive).
133. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 376 n. 10 (1976).
134. Id. (holding the search of a glove compartment reasonable in order to prevent theft, and to
protect the police and public if "vandals" found a firearm).
135. See Wells, 495 U.S. at 4 (holding that a standardized police policy allowing officers to
open all containers in the course of an inventory search would be reasonable).
136. See, e.g., United States v. Duncan, 763 F.2d 220, 223 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that an
inventory search extending to a trunk was reasonable because of the interest in police protecting
themselves from false claims of stolen or lost property). But see United States v. Wilson, 636 F.2d
1161, 1165 (8th Cir. 1980) ("[Tlhe needs of the government in conducting an inventory search may
be ordinarily accomplished without the serious intrusion into the locked trunk of an automobile.").
137. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 461 n.4 (1981).
138. See supra Part III.B.I.
139. See Opperman, 428 U.S. at 392 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The court's result authorizes
indeed it appears to require the routine search of nearly every car impounded.").
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from bringing suit for violations of their constitutional rights.140 There-
fore, while the suggested rule may protect the Fourth Amendment right
of individuals to be free from unreasonable searches in this setting, it
would likely have little effect on any exclusionary remedy available to a
criminal defendant.
i. An Inventory Search Will Reveal Any Evidence that
Officers Would Have Found by Conducting a Vehicle
Search Incident to Arrest
Because the inventory search is virtually routine procedure, and be-
cause the scope of the search matches that of the vehicle search incident
to arrest exception, the result is the same as if Gant's rule for evidentiary
crimes remained unmodified: police will search the vehicle without a
warrant and discover any existing evidence which would have been dis-
covered by a search incident to arrest.
The suggested rule only precludes warrantless vehicle searches in-
cident to arrest under an evidence-gathering justification. However, once
impounded, police will still search the same vehicle without a warrant
under administrative justifications.
The suggested rule would only pay lip service to the Fourth
Amendment's objectives.1 41 It would prohibit warrantless searches under
an evidence-gathering justification, but would not change the fact that
the same warrantless search, with the same result, will take place under
administrative justifications. In reality, is a defendant awaiting prosecu-
tion for a drug offense concerned whether police found the drugs in his
car under an evidentiary or administrative rationale? Or is the defendant
simply concerned that police found the drugs in his car?
ii. The Inevitable Discovery Rule
The inevitable discovery rule works as a catch-all in an exclusio-
nary analysis, tying together the exceptions to the warrant requirement.
The prosecution invokes the inevitable discovery rule as a challenge to
exclusion of evidence unconstitutionally obtained by the government.
142
If the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
the evidence would have inevitably been discovered by lawful means,
then the evidence is admissible.
143
The inevitable discovery doctrine defeats any exclusionary goal of
the suggested rule. Picture a situation requiring impoundment because
140. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996).
141. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948) (defining the objective of the
Fourth Amendment as interposing "an objective mind" between the citizenry and law enforcement to
determine whether the interest in enforcing the law justifies an invasion into privacy).
142. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442-43 (1984).
143. See id. at 442-44.
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obtaining a warrant is not reasonably practicable. Impoundment will
eventually result in an inventory of the vehicle. Any evidence officers
find will be admissible under the inevitable discovery rule because an
inventory would have eventually revealed the evidence lawfully in the
absence of the illegal search. While the illegal search would potentially
open officers to civil liability, 44 the damage to the vehicle owner is done
if contraband is actually found.
The suggested rule 45 serves the Fourth Amendment's purpose of al-
lowing a judicial mind to determine the validity of police invasions into
privacy in terms of establishing a defined constitutional protection under
the search incident to arrest exception. However, one way or another, it
allows the same result it was designed to curtail-a police invasion of
privacy supported neither by a search warrant, nor by probable cause, in
the form of an inventory search. Similarly, under the Gant rule, it ap-
pears that where an arrest of a vehicle occupant requires an impound-
ment, the prosecution will have access to evidence obtained by an officer
exceeding the lawful scope of the search.
3. The Inventory Search Doctrine Is Insufficiently Tied to the Justi-
fications for its Existence, and Therefore Must Be Reconsidered
The inventory search is an unnecessarily intrusive-and fairly inef-
fective-method of furthering the caretaking needs on which it is based,
making it the type of thinly veiled general rummage that the Fourth
Amendment sought to eliminate. 46 Although the Supreme Court holds
that an inventory search does not require a warrant or probable cause,'47
the three administrative needs on which the inventory search is based fail
to justify an exception to the warrant requirement. 48 Also, alternative
methods exist to serve these needs and still adhere to the Fourth
144. For example, a claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
145. See supra Part Ill.B. 1:
Before searching a vehicle incident to the arrest of an occupant or recent occupant for the
purpose of gathering evidence relevant to the crime of arrest, an arresting officer 'must
secure and use search warrants wherever reasonably practicable.' ... Where obtaining a
search warrant is not reasonably practicable, and there is reason to believe that a danger
exists that relevant evidence inside the vehicle will be transported or destroyed, an officer
may temporarily restrict access to [impound] the vehicle until a search warrant can be ob-
tained.
(quoting Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948)).
146. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 464 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[ln deter-
mining whether to grant an exception to the warrant requirement, courts should carefully consider
the facts and circumstances of each search and seizure, focusing on the reasons supporting the ex-
ception .... " (citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 59 (1968))); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
I, 19 (1968) ("The scope of the search must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances
which rendered its initiation permissible." (quoting Warden v. Hayden 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967)
(Fortas, J., concurring))).
147. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 371 n.5 (1976).
148. Id. at 389 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Amendment by protecting individuals from arbitrary invasions of privacy
by law enforcement.
149
a. Protection of the Vehicle Owner's Property
Protecting property within an impounded vehicle from theft and
vandalism appears to be a benevolent reason for conducting an inventory
search.1 50 However, this rationale ignores owners who do not wish to
have their vehicles searched for this purpose.' 51 Further, without proba-
ble cause 15 of the presence of property in the vehicle worthy of protec-
tion, the search becomes a mere rummage through the property of anoth-
er. This type of search does not further any caretaking objective and de-
rives its only support from a general curiosity about the contents of the
vehicle. This for-your-own-protection rationale' 53 for the vehicle inven-
tory search exception, in the absence of an owner's consent, should not
outweigh the individual privacy interest implicated in the search.
As an alternative to inventory searches, perhaps police can increase
security around impound lots in order to better protect the property with-
in the vehicles. And, although Opperman contends that additional securi-
ty measures-such as posting a guard around impound lots---could be
"prohibitively expensive" for smaller jurisdictions, 54 this unproven pre-
diction hardly qualifies as a circumstance of "such exigency that, as a
practical necessity, rigorous enforcement of the warrant requirement is
impossible."'
' 55
b. Protection of Police from False Claims of Stolen or Lost
Property
South Dakota v. Opperman, the seminal case upholding warrantless
inventories of impounded vehicles, advanced the protection of police
from false claims of stolen or lost property as one justification for the
exception.' 56 But, as the dissent noted, South Dakota state law absolved
the police in Opperman from any obligation other than inventorying
items in plain view and locking the car, thus obviating any further police
action for the purpose of protecting themselves from claims of stolen
149. Contra Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983) ("The reasonableness of any partic-
ular governmental activity does not necessarily or invariably turn on the existence of alternative 'less
intrusive' means.").
150. See Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369.
151. Id. at 392 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[Lit is obvious that not everyone whose car is im-
pounded would want it to be searched.").
152. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 21 (1968) ("[l]n justifying the particular intrusion the
police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with ra-
tional inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.").
153. See Oppermnan, 428 U.S. at 389 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 379 (Powell, J., concurring).
155. Id. at 367 (majority opinion) (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54
(1925)).
156. Id. at 369.
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property.1 57 Even if other jurisdictions lack similar provisions, the Op-
perman decision, upon which later Supreme Court holdings are based,1
5 8
erred in reasoning that the search protected police from false claims of
theft. Inventory searches do not effectively protect police from false
claims159: a claimant can still assert that an officer stole an item before
the inventory occurred, or that officers intentionally omitted an item's
presence from their records.' 
60
In the Opperman dissent, Justice Marshall offered a more effective,
less intrusive method of security from false claims.' 61 Justice Marshall
suggested placing seals on the trunk and doors of the vehicle, where an
unbroken seal signified that the car was unopened during police custo-
dy. 162 This too leaves police open to false claims, as owners might claim
police broke a seal, and then replaced it. However, if the police used in-
dividually numbered seals, provided the numbers to the arrestee, and
placed the seals on the vehicle in his presence, the arrestee would have
no claim of stolen property if the seal remains unbroken.
c. Protection of Police and the Public from Potential Danger
While protection from potential danger undoubtedly represents a le-
gitimate interest, the Supreme Court's broad construction of the excep-
tion allows inventory searches where no specific circumstances indicate
the presence of a specific danger.' 63 Specific facts should be required to
implicate this justification because impoundment alone creates no rea-
sonable belief of danger. 164 While situations implicating a safety ratio-
nale may arise, it cannot logically justify the search of every impounded
vehicle. 65 However, the Supreme Court accepts this rationale, even
where the "danger" is invented. 66 Using the Opperman Court's logic
allowing searches based on the unsubstantiated presence of danger, what
157. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-39-11 (2009) (implying that when police are in possession
of an impounded car, they are acting as gratuitous depositors); State v. Opperman, 228 N.W.2d 152,
159 (S.D. 1975) (holding that as gratuitous depositors, police are protected from civil tort claims if
they remove objects from the vehicle in plain view, close the windows, and lock the doors).
158. See, e.g., Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S 1, 4 (1990); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374-
75 (1987); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983).
159. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 378-79 (Powell, J., concurring) ("It is not clear.., that invento-
ries are a completely effective means of discouraging false claims ... .
160. id. at 379.
161. See id. at 391 n. 10 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
162. Id.
163. See, e.g., Wells, 495 U.S. at 2 (arrest for driving under the influence); Bertine, 479 U.S. at
367 (arrest for driving under the influence); Opperman, 428 U.S. at 365 (police impounded vehicle
for parking violations).
164. Oppernman, 428 U.S. at 378 (Powell, J., concurring) ("Except in rare cases, there is little
danger associated with impounding unsearched automobiles.").
165. Id. at 389-90 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Even aside from the actual basis for the police
practice in this case, however, I do not believe that any blanket safety argument could justify a
program of routine searches of the scope permitted here.").
166. See id. at 376 n.10 (majority opinion) (holding a police inventory search of a vehicle
impounded for a traffic violation reasonable for the purpose of protecting the public from vandals
who might find a firearm).
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is to stop police from inventorying parked cars on the street in the off
chance that one of them contains a weapon?
167
An argument exists that an arrest for an evidentiary crime and sub-
sequent impoundment of the arrestee's vehicle provide probable cause
that the vehicle contains evidence relevant to the crime of arrest. Com-
bined with other specific facts offering a certain location and a certain
item to search for, this is likely true. However, without specific facts
showing that a specific item within a vehicle presents a danger, the ex-
ception becomes unhinged from the safety rationale, and reverts to a
general rummage, unconnected to the reason for its existence.
4. A Suggested Course of Action
In reconsidering the inventory search, the Court should heed the ad-
vice of Justice Scalia: If a search is for an evidence-gathering purpose,
then the Court should at least admit that purpose, and then test it against
the Fourth Amendment. 68 But if the inventory search exception exists to
serve the needs listed in Opperman, then the Court should narrowly tailor
the grant of police authority to fulfill those needs. The above-mentioned
alternatives' 6 9 are viable ways to further the two interests in protecting
vehicle owners from theft and protecting police from false claims of sto-
len property. The safety rationale simply cannot logically or constitution-
ally justify warrantless, broad-scope searches of every impounded ve-
hicle.
170
Adopting the suggested rule for evidentiary crimes and using less
intrusive alternatives' 7' to address administrative needs provides a work-
able framework. It acknowledges the importance of administrative inter-
ests-and the interests in gathering evidence to aid prosecution of sus-
pected criminals-yet remains loyal to the purpose of the Fourth
Amendment by adhering more closely to its warrant requirement. The
increased costs these rules would place on police departments are conce-
dedly a burden. But this burden does not outweigh the importance of
protecting the privacy of citizens from arbitrary rummages by govern-
ment officials.
167. See id. at 391 n.8 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("If this asserted rationale justifies search of all
impounded automobiles, it must logically also justify the search of [a]ll automobiles, whether im-
pounded or not, located in a similar area, for the argument is not based on the custodial role of the
police.").
168. Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 631 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[1]f we are
going to continue to allow Belton searches ... we should at least be honest about why we are doing
so.").
169. See supra Part ll.B.3.a-b.
170. Oppernan, 428 U.S. at 389-91 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
171. See supra Part III.B.3.a-b (suggesting increased security at impound lots and the use of





The Supreme Court's decision in Gant cuts two ways. First, it re-
turns to a narrow search incident to arrest exception for nonevidentiary
crimes, although its wording might result in confused application of the
rule by lower courts. Second, and more troubling, it reflects a continuing
trend placing higher value on successful prosecution of suspected crimi-
nals than on the intent of the Fourth Amendment's framers. The Gant
rule applied to evidentiary crimes in the vehicle context, by adopting an
evidence-gathering justification with no probable cause requirement,
effectively removes the judicial mind from the process and grants offic-
ers in the field the discretion to determine whether an invasion of privacy
is justified. This is exactly what the framers sought to prevent.
172
While the rule suggested above provides an alternative to warrant-
less vehicle searches incident to arrest, it does so only until tripping over
the next exception to the warrant requirement. The existence and breadth
of the inventory search exception virtually ensure that, under the pro-
posed improvement, warrantless search is inevitable.
In the context of vehicle searches after the arrest of an occupant, the
exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement have enve-
loped the rule. After an arrest, it is difficult to imagine a situation where
the vehicle search would take place under authority of a search warrant.
Whether the search is conducted incident to an arrest or as an inventory,
the paths circumventing that set forth by the Fourth Amendment have
become the most traveled. The Court's treatment of the Fourth Amend-
ment in the vehicle context deserves a better explanation than the oft-
repeated diminished privacy interest in vehicles,'7 3 because "[t]he word
,automobile' is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment
fades away." 174 Courts must avoid treating the Fourth Amendment as a
"nuisance, [and] a serious impediment in the war against crime,"'175 and
instead temper the need for effective law enforcement with the directives
issued in the Bill of Rights.
To be sure, other freedoms in the Constitution might engender more
support than Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable search
and seizure-the individuals who invoke the protection are often accused
criminals. But, to quote Justice Frankfurter, "[I]t is precisely because the
appeal to the Fourth Amendment is so often made by dubious characters
that its infringements call for alert and strenuous resistance."'
' 76
172. Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1720 (2009) ("[T]he central concern underlying the
Fourth Amendment [is] the concern about giving police officers unbridled discretion to rummage at
will among a person's private effects.").
173. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I, 12-13 (1977).
174. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,461 (1971).
175. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 157 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 156.
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WINTER V. NATIONAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL:
ENABLING THE MILITARY'S ONGOING ROLLBACK OF
ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION
INTRODUCTION
Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA")'
in an effort to encourage environmental responsibility in federal agency
decision-making. 2 Recently, NEPA and other environmental laws have
been challenged by the military, which has asserted that these laws inter-
fere with combat readiness and, therefore, national security.3 In Winter v.
National Resources Defense Council, Inc. ,4 the Court invalidated por-
tions of a preliminary injunction restricting the Navy's use of high-
intensity sonar, finding that the balance of equities and public policy
interests favored the Navy's interest in conducting realistic training exer-
cises. 5 The Court's evaluation of the balance of equities and public poli-
cy interests, however, was based on its complete deference to the Navy's
6factual determinations regarding crucial aspects of the case.
This Comment argues that the Court's complete deference to the
Navy's factual determinations unfairly tipped the balance of equities and
public policy interests in favor of the Navy. This made it impossible for
the Court to accurately evaluate the propriety of injunctive relief. While a
measure of deference to the military's professional expertise is desirable,
excessive deference undermines other key government objectives. By so
deferring to the Navy's factual determinations, the Court enabled the
military's ongoing rollback of environmental protection.
Part I of this Comment explains NEPA's environmental impact
statement ("EIS") requirement, then discusses the standards that courts
have used when evaluating the propriety of injunctive relief. Part 1H
summarizes the Court's opinion in Winter, including the facts, procedur-
I. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006).
2. Id. § 4331(a):
The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's activity on the interrelations of
all components of the natural environment ... declares that it is the continuing policy of
the Federal Government... to use all practicable means and measures ... to create and
maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and
fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future generations of
Americans.
3. Marcilynn A. Burke, Green Peace? Protecting Our National Treasures While Providing
for Our National Security, 32 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 803 passim (2008).
4. 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008).
5. Id. at 378.
6. See id.
7. See Burke, supra note 3, at 874 ("[Wlhile [the Department of Defense] asserts its need for
this statutory relief to fulfill its obligation to defend this nation, it may be simultaneously abandoning
much of what makes this country worth defending.").
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al history, and opinions. Part 1I explores three topics: (1) the Court's
deference to the Navy's factual determinations; (2) the impact that Win-
ter may have on future military compliance with NEPA; and (3) the Win-
ter decision in the context of post-9/11 trends in military environmental
compliance. This Comment concludes that the Winter Court unreasona-
bly deferred to the Navy, that Winter threatens to undermine NEPA, and
that Winter highlights the military's ongoing rollback of environmental
legislation in the wake of 9/11.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
NEPA requires that every federal agency consider the environmen-
tal consequences of a proposed course of action before acting.8 To this
end, NEPA requires that an agency submit a detailed EIS prior to under-
taking any activity that "significantly affect[s] the quality of the human
environment." 9 When the action would result in no significant impact on
the environment, NEPA permits agencies to file an environmental as-
sessment ("EA") in lieu of an EIS, or to rely on a categorical exclusion if
one applies.' °
Crucially, NEPA does not require a particular substantive result in
any case. Nonetheless, in Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council,"
the Court noted that NEPA does contain "action-forcing" procedures.'
2
First, a timely EIS focuses an agency's attention on the environmental
consequences of a proposed project, ensuring that the agency is aware of
those consequences before starting the project.' 3 Second, a timely EIS
assures the public that the agency has taken environmental consequences
into account during the decision-making process. 14 NEPA's implement-
ing regulations also require that the agency accept public input once a
draft EIS is released.' 5 Third, a timely EIS gives notice to the various
other governmental bodies that might have to deal with the project's off-
site or secondary consequences. 6
8. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a)-(b) (2006).
9. Id. § 4332(2)(C).
10. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (2009) (explaining the Council on Environmental Quality's defini-
tion of "Environmental Assessment"); id. § 1508.13 (explaining the Council on Environmental
Quality's definition of "[finding of no significant impact"); id. § 1501.4(2) (explaining that categor-
ically excluded activities do not normally require an EIS).
11. 490 U.S. 332 (1989).
12. Id. at 348-51.
13. Id. at 349.
14. Id.
15. 40 C.F.R. § 1503.1(a)(4) (2009).
16. Id. § 1503.1(a)(1).
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B. The Test for Evaluating the Propriety of Injunctive Relief
Preliminary injunctions are remedies at equity, issued only where
there is a risk of irremediable injury, and where legal remedies would be
inadequate.' 7 Courts have traditionally evaluated the propriety of injunc-
tive relief by balancing the inconvenience to the non-moving party
(should the injunction be imposed) against the risk of irreparable harm to
the moving party.' 8 Courts also give attention to the public consequences
of ordering injunctive relief.19 Until Winter, the Ninth Circuit applied a
more flexible standard, and Ninth Circuit courts were able to tailor in-
junctive relief to fit "the necessities of the particular case."2° Some have
argued that this flexible standard unduly increases the availability of in-
junctive relief, which has traditionally only been imposed in extraordi-
21nary circumstances.
U. WINTER V. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL
A. Facts
For the last forty years, the Navy has used mid-frequency active
("MFA") sonar during training exercises off of the southern coast of Cal-
ifornia ("SOCAL").22 The MFA sonar system works by emitting high-
intensity sound into the ocean depths, and then analyzing the echoes to
reveal underwater objects.23 MFA sonar is currently the only available
means of detecting the near-silent submarines deployed by potential mili-
tary adversaries.24
However, a "rapidly accumulating body of evidence" shows that
MFA sonar injures marine mammals, both directly and indirectly. 25 The
SOCAL waters are home to thirty-seven species of marine mammals.
26
Directly, MFA sonar generates energy sufficient to cause cranial he-
morrhaging or decompression sickness in these animals. 27 Indirectly,
MFA sonar harms marine mammals by contributing to underwater noise
pollution. 28 Because many marine mammals have evolved to depend on
sound, any significant increase in underwater noise pollution, such as the
17. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-12 (1982).
18. ld. at 312.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 375-76 (2008).
22. Brief for the Petitioners at 2, Winter, 129 S. Ct. 365 (No. 07-1239), 2008 WL 3285392.
23. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 370.
24. Id. at 370-71.
25. See Joel R. Reynolds, Submarines, Sonar, and the Death of Whales: Enforcing the Deli-
cate Balance of Environmental Compliance and National Security in Military Training, 32 WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 759,760 (2008).
26. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 371.
27. Reynolds, supra note 25, at 762-63.
28. Id. at 760.
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use of MFA sonar, impairs marine mammals' breeding, hunting and na-
29vigation activities.
B. Procedural History
In February 2007, the Navy released an EA for an upcoming series
of SOCAL training exercises,30 estimating that the exercises would result
in over 500 severe and 170,000 minor injuries to marine mammals in
SOCAL waters.31 Nevertheless, the Navy concluded that this did not
amount to the requisite "significant impact" on the environment, and
32therefore that a full EIS would not be necessary.
Plaintiff National Resources Defense Council ("NRDC") filed a
complaint against the Navy shortly thereafter, alleging that the Navy
violated NEPA by proceeding with the exercises without first preparing
an EIS.33 NRDC sought to compel the Navy to prepare an EIS.34 The
district court found the Navy's EA inadequate, and that the EA did not
relieve the Navy of its obligation to prepare a full EIS.35 Accordingly, the
district court enjoined the Navy's use of MFA sonar until the Navy pre-
pared an EIS.36 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court's
injunction was too broad, and remanded the case with instructions to
impose mitigation provisions that would allow the Navy to continue its
exercises.37
On remand, the district court imposed on the Navy a synthesis of six
mitigation provisions. 38 The Navy challenged two of the six provisions
on appeal: the mandatory shutdown of MFA sonar when a marine mam-
mal is sighted within 2200 yards, and the mandatory seventy-five percent
reduction in sonar volume during "surface ducting" 39 conditions.40 While
waiting for the appeal, the Navy sought emergency 41 Executive Branch
relief from the Council on Environmental Quality ("CEQ"),42 which au-
29. Id.
30. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 372.
31. Id. at 392 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 372 (majority opinion).
33. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1113-14 (C.D. Cal.
2008).
34. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 518 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 2008).
35. Winter, 530 F. Supp. at 1116-17.
36. Id. at 1115.
37. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 373.
38. Winter, 530 F. Supp. 2d. at 1118-21.
39. Surface ducting conditions "occur[] when the presence of layers of water of different
temperature make it unusually difficult for sonar operators to determine whether a diesel submarine
is hiding below." Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 385 (Breyer, J., concurring).
40. Id. at 373 (majority opinion). Hereinafter these two provisions will be referred to as
"shutdown" and "power-down" provisions.
41. Under NEPA's implementing regulations, agencies may, in emergency circumstances,
request the Executive Branch to authorize alternative arrangements that are limited to the scope of
the emergency. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.11 (2009).
42. The Council on Environmental Quality is the Executive Branch office that is responsible
for overseeing federal compliance with NEPA. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4341-47 (2006).
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thorized the Navy to implement alternative arrangements of its own mak-
ing.4 3
Alternative arrangements in hand, the Navy asked the Ninth Circuit
to vacate the shutdown and power-down provisions.44 The Ninth Circuit
disregarded the alternative arrangements, finding that emergency cir-
cumstances did not exist, and the court upheld the two challenged provi-
sions in the district court's injunction.45 The Navy petitioned for certiora-
ri on the issue of whether the district court abused its discretion in impos-
ing the preliminary injunction, and the Supreme Court granted the peti-
tion.46
C. Majority Opinion
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the opinion of the Court, with Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito joining.47 The majority opinion dis-
cussed the propriety of the shutdown and power-down provisions in the
district court's preliminary injunction.48 As such, it generally avoided
addressing whether NEPA required the Navy to prepare an EIS before
starting the sonar exercises. 49 The Court found that the shutdown and
power-down provisions in the district court's injunction were an abuse of
discretion, because the district court failed to accord sufficient deference
to the Navy's factual determinations when evaluating the balance of eq-
uities and public policy interests.50
First, the Court adjusted the standard the Ninth Circuit used when
deciding whether a preliminary injunction would be proper. The Ninth
Circuit standard, prior to Winter, allowed the court to order an injunction
when there was a "possibility" of irreparable harm to the moving party.5'
The Court found this standard to be too lenient, and established that there
52must instead be a "likelihood" of irreparable harm to the moving party.
In light of the confusion surrounding this issue, Chief Justice Ro-
berts synthesized precedent to explain a four-part test for evaluating the
propriety of injunctive relief: "A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunc-
tion must establish (1) that he is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) that
he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,
43. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 373.
44. Id. at 374.
45. Id.
46. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2964 (2008) (mer.).
47. See Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 371, 382, 387.
48. Id. at 374-81.
49. Id. at 381.
50. See id. at 382.
51. Id. at 375.
52. Id.
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(3) that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and (4) that an injunction
is in the public interest."
53
Furthermore, the Court found that the lower courts had failed to re-
consider the likelihood of harm to the moving party in light of the shut-
down and power-down provisions alone.54 The Court acknowledged,
however, that these errors might ultimately have been harmless:
It is not clear that articulating the incorrect standard affected the
Ninth Circuit's analysis of irreparable harm. Although the court re-
ferred to the possibility standard, and cited Circuit precedent along
the same lines, it affirmed the District Court's conclusion that plain-
tiffs had established a near certainty of irreparable harm.
55
Second, the Court briefly addressed the merits of the case: whether
the Navy's EA had satisfied its NEPA obligations, without filing an EIS.
The Court found that the Navy had met its procedural obligations under
NEPA for two reasons: because the Navy's activities had taken place for
forty years, and because the Navy had taken a "hard look at environmen-
56tal consequences" before launching the SOCAL training exercises.
Third, the Court discussed the balance of equities. The Court em-
phasized that, because the case involved matters of national security, the
Court should grant "'great deference to the professional judgment of
military authorities concerning the relative importance of a particular
military interest."'' 57 With this in mind, the Court accepted the Navy's
statement that the shutdown and power-down provisions would degrade
the value of the SOCAL training exercises.58
The Court found that the Navy's interest in realistic training exer-
cises outweighed the public's ecological, scientific, and recreational in-
terests in obtaining a preliminary injunction, and therefore the shutdown
and power-down provisions were an abuse of discretion.59 The Court
found it important that NRDC sued to compel the Navy to prepare an
EIS, not to enjoin the Navy from the use of MFA sonar.
60
Fourth, the Court addressed the Ninth Circuit's treatment of the
public interest element. Once again, the Court stressed the need for defe-
rence to the military's judgment regarding the impact of mitigation ef-
53. Id. at 374 (emphasis added).
54. Id. at 376.
55. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
56. Id. (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989)).
57. Id. at 377 (quoting Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986)).
58. See id.
59. Id. at 377-78.
60. Id. ("Given that the ultimate legal claim is that the Navy must prepare an EIS, not that it
must cease sonar training, there is no basis for enjoining such training in a manner credibly alleged
to pose a serious threat to national security.").
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forts on the efficacy of training exercises.6' Specifically, the Court found
that the lower courts had not sufficiently deferred to the Navy's judg-
ment regarding the magnitude of the burden imposed by the injunction.
62
While the Ninth Circuit found that any unreasonable burden on the Navy
could later be alleviated by permitting the Navy to request relief on an
emergency basis, the Supreme Court disagreed, arguing that it would
compromise national security to award the Navy relief only once emer-
gency circumstances have materialized.6 3
D. Concurring Opinion
Justice Breyer wrote a concurring opinion, in which Justice Stevens
joined in part. The concurring opinion found the shutdown and power-
down provisions to be an abuse of discretion for five reasons. First, Jus-
tice Breyer found that there was no proven need for the two challenged
provisions. 64 In other words, there was no strong evidence establishing
the amount of marginal harm attributable to the two specific challenged
provisions.
65
Second, Justice Breyer deferred to Navy officials' assertions that a
delay in completing the SOCAL training exercises would have serious
ramifications for the Navy's combat readiness. 66 Third, the concurring
opinion found it important that the lower courts did not explain why they
rejected the Navy's affidavit-supported assessment of the two challenged
provisions' impact on the efficacy of the exercises. 67 Fourth, Justice
Breyer addressed the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the record, finding
fault with the Ninth Circuit's conclusions. 68 Fifth, Justice Breyer argued
that the district court imposed mitigation provisions that made continued
exercises impossible, defying the Ninth Circuit's instructions.
69
The concurrence concluded by suggesting that the Court should
have modified the injunction to include the altered shutdown and power-
down provisions that the Ninth Circuit imposed pending appeal.7v Justice
Breyer argued that the provisional measures had "become the status
quo," and that the measures were equitable in light of the Navy's ability
to conduct its training exercises under them.71
61. See id. at 378-79.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 380-8 1.
64. Id. at 383 (Breyer, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 383-84.
66. Id. at 384 ("Taken by themselves, [the Navy's] affidavits make a strong case for the
proposition that insistence upon the two additional mitigating conditions would seriously interfere
with necessary defense training.").
67. Id. at 384-85.
68. Id. at 385-86.
69. See id. at 386.
70. Id. at 387.
71. Id.
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E. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Souter
joined. The dissent argued that the lower courts did not abuse their dis-
cretion, because the balance of equities favored upholding the prelimi-
nary injunction against the Navy.72
First, Justice Ginsburg discussed the case and determined that the
plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits, in that an EIS was proba-
bly required before launching the SOCAL exercises.73 She argued that
the EIS is more than a mere procedural device; it forces government
agencies to fully consider the impact of their actions on the environment
before they act.74 As such, failure to prepare a timely EIS defeats
NEPA's purpose.75 She emphasized that, while NEPA does not require a
certain result, NEPA's EIS requirement plays a crucial informational role
in the decision-making process.
76
Justice Ginsburg argued that the Navy could have avoided this suit
by simply preparing a sufficient, timely EIS. 77 The Navy sought favora-
ble relief from the Executive Branch, rather than through the proper leg-
islative channels. 78 Justice Ginsburg argued that this was "surely not
what Congress had in mind when it instructed agencies to comply with
NEPA 'to the fullest extent possible.' '' 79 Therefore, because the Navy
attempted to shortcut the process, equity demanded that the Navy bear
the burden of its procedural failures in the form of a preliminary injunc-
tion.8°
Second, Justice Ginsburg stressed the importance of flexibility in
equitable relief.8' When the likelihood of harm is high, the likelihood that
the moving party will succeed on the merits is less important, and vice
versa.82 The dissent argued that the majority opinion does not reject this
"sliding scale" standard.83 Justice Ginsburg found it significant that the
Navy itself predicted harm to marine mammals. 84 In light of this discus-
sion, the dissent would have upheld the preliminary injunction in its enti-
rety.
85
72. Id. at 387 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 393.
74. See id. at 389-90.
75. Id. at 390.
76. Id. at 389-90.
77. See id. at 390.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 391 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2006)).
80. See id. at 391-93.
81. Id. at 391 ("Flexibility is a hallmark of equity jurisdiction.").
82. Id. at 392.
83. id.
84. id.




In Winter, the Court weighed in on a pre-existing conflict between
"the safety and continuation of the Republic and other values we hold
dear, among them a healthy environment. '' 86 The Court correctly pointed
out that the judiciary is inexperienced with national security issues, and
therefore the Court should defer to the military's judgment regarding
national security.87 However, the Court's complete deference to the Navy
unfairly tipped the balance of equities and public policy interests in favor
of the Navy. More seriously, the Court's tacit approval of the Navy's
actions in circumventing NEPA could effectively invalidate NEPA as it
concerns the military. Finally, the Court's decision in Winter highlights a
broader trend: the military has used 9/11 and national security concerns
as a pretext for rolling back constraining environmental legislation.
A. The Court's Complete Deference to the Navy's Factual Determina-
tions
The Court deferred extensively to the Navy regarding several of the
Navy's key factual determinations. This deference, in aggregate, had the
effect of skewing the balance of equities and public policy interests in
favor of the Navy. The skewed balance of equities and public policy in-
terests made it impossible for the Court to accurately evaluate the pro-
priety of injunctive relief.
The Court's deference to the Navy in Winter involved the Navy's
factual determinations, rather than the Navy's interpretations of its own
enabling act or regulations. Therefore, the Chevron
88 and Skidmore89
deference doctrines do not apply. Instead, the Court applied the military
deference standard set out in Goldman v. Weinberger.90 Professor Jona-
than Masur assails this type of deference as "judicial abdication,"91 and
contends that it is inconsistent with the body of law requiring some level
of judicial inquiry into agency determinations. 92 Professor Masur asserts
that such deference to the military has "overwhelmed the legal strictures
established to constrain the operation of executive power."93 The Court's
86. Hope Babcock, National Security and Environmental Laws: A Clear and Present Dan-
ger?, 25 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 105,107 (2007).
87. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 377.
88. Chevron deference dictates that an agency's interpretation of its enabling act is binding on
courts, so long as the enabling act's language is ambiguous and the interpretation of that language is
reasonable. WILLIAM F. Fox, UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 314-15 (5th ed. 2008) (dis-
cussing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
89. Skidmore deference dictates that an agency's interpretation of its own regulations is per-
suasive but not necessarily controlling. Id. at 320 (discussing Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134
(1944)).
90. 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) ("[Clourts must give great deference to the professional judg-
ment of military authorities concerning the relative importance of a particular military interest.").
91. Jonathan Masur, A Hard Look or a Blind Eye: Administrative Law and Military Defe-
rence, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 441,515 (2005).
92. Id. at 518-19.
93. Id. at 445.
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complete deference to the military's factual determinations in Winter
permitted the Navy's version of the facts to determine the balance of
equities and public policy interests. The Court's opinion demonstrates
the effect of this deference in five different ways.
First, the Court deferred to the Navy's claim that no evidence con-
nected the forty years of SOCAL exercises with a single sonar-related
injury to a marine mammal. 94 Yet, the Navy itself admitted that the exer-
cises would affect approximately 80,000 marine mammals, some of
which would be severely injured or killed.95 In fact, in 2000, the Navy
and NOAA Fisheries conducted an investigation into a mass marine
mammal stranding event in the Bahamas.96 The report concluded that the
seventeen marine mammals were driven onto shore by injuries from un-
derwater acoustic sources. 97 The report connected those injuries to a se-
ries of contemporaneous Navy MFA sonar exercises, and the Navy
pledged to be more careful in the future.98
The evidence that the use of MFA sonar causes mass marine mam-
mal strandings and deaths is "overwhelming," and the Navy was well
aware of it.99 It is surprising, then, that the Court deferred to the Navy's
assertion that there would be no irremediable damage to the environ-
ment. It is difficult to think of an injury less remediable than the death of
any number of marine mammals.
By contrast, the Navy's probable injuries in the case of a mid-
training sonar shutdown are quite remediable. A mid-exercise MFA so-
nar shutdown would delay the completion of the exercise, and would
undoubtedly raise costs, but it would not make completion of the exer-
cise impossible.'0° The Navy mischaracterized this inconvenience as an
irremediable injury, and the effect on marine mammals as negligible. The
majority accepted this mischaracterization at face value.
Second, the Court observed that the injunction's shutdown provi-
sion would amount to a hundredfold increase in the surface area of the
shutdown zone.1 'O However, at the Navy's urging, the Court disregarded
the observation that this MFA sonar shutdown zone is roughly the same
size as the Navy's existing long-frequency active ("LFA") sonar shut-
down zone. 0 2 The Court, perhaps humbled by the Navy's chastisement
94. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 381 (2008).
95. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 22, at 9.
96. NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. & DEP'T OF THE NAVY, JOINT INTERIM REPORT:
BAHAMAS MARINE MAMMAL STRANDING EVENT OF 15-16 MARCH 2000, at ii (2001),
www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/pdfs/health/stranding-bahamas2000.pdf.
97. Id.
98. Id. at vi.
99. See Reynolds, supra note 25, at 762-69 (providing a catalog of other sonar-related strand-
ing events).
100. See Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 377; id. 384 (Breyer, J., concurring).
101. Id. at 379.
102. See id. at 379-80.
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of the Ninth Circuit, declined to explore the effect on the training exer-
cises of congruent MFA/LFA shutdown zones.10 3 By deferring to the
Navy's unsubstantiated claim that MFA sonar and LFA sonar are irre-
concilably dissimilar in terms of the effect of the technology on marine
mammals, °4 the Court failed to consider a range of factors that could
have shown the burden to be smaller than the Navy asserted it to be.
Third, the Court deferred to the Navy regarding the power-down
provision. The Court correctly recognized the Navy's important interest
in training under surface ducting conditions when they exist. 0 5 Presuma-
bly, however, the conditions that conceal enemy submarines also conceal
marine mammals. In other words, when surface ducting conditions exist,
the Navy must be just as vigilant in avoiding marine mammals as it is in
looking for enemy submarines. As Justice Breyer argued, the Court could
have imposed the Ninth Circuit's provisional injunction, requiring the
Navy to power down the sonar in proportion to the proximity of marine
mammals to the vessel.' °6 Justice Breyer's compromise would allow the
Navy to continue training, while mitigating the injury to nearby marine
mammals.
Fourth, the Court deferred to the Navy regarding the connection be-
tween the SOCAL training exercises and national security. The Navy
asserted that the injunctions would jeopardize national security.107 This
conclusion was an exaggeration. The injunctions issued by the district
court would not make training exercises impossible; they would merely
cause delay and disruption. 0 8 Also, the injunctions applied to training
exercises in SOCAL waters, and not to Navy actions generally. 0 9
The Navy also argued the injunction would create "an unacceptable
risk to the Navy's ability to train for essential overseas operations at a
time when the United States is engaged in war in two countries."' 10 This
assertion was also an exaggeration. While the United States was indeed
at war in Iraq and in Afghanistan, none of the United States' adversaries
in those countries fielded a naval force-let alone the advanced "silent
submarines" that MFA sonar was designed to detect. The Navy failed to
explain the connection between adequate sonar training and combat rea-
diness against these land-based, non-state forces. The Navy failed to ex-
plain how a delay in sonar training presented an "unacceptable risk" to
103. "The Ninth Circuit's willingness to strike out on its own in this complicated military and
scientific context underscores the degree to which it has failed to defer to the professional military
judgment of the Nation's most senior naval officers .... " Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 22, at
53.
104. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 380.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 387 (Breyer, J., concurring).
107. Id. at 381 (majority opinion).
108. Id. at 384 (Breyer, J., concurring).
109. See id. at 372-73 (majority opinion).
110. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 22, at 20.
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ground forces in Iraq and Afghanistan."' The Navy also failed to explain
how the injunction affected the combat readiness of already-deployed
forces, other than underlining the importance of fleet-wide integration." 
2
Professor Burke refers to such unsubstantiated claims as "thought-
terminating clich[s]."' 13
Finally, the Court deferred to the Navy regarding the urgent need to
dissolve the injunction. The Court vacated the two challenged provisions,
effectively handing the Navy the same result that it had sought from the
CEQ.114 As Justice Ginsburg points out, however, the "emergency cir-
cumstances" under which the Navy obtained the alternative agreements
were of the Navy's own making: had the Navy filed an EIS before
launching the SOCAL training exercises, it would not have had to seek
emergency relief from the CEQ. " 5 Justice Ginsburg correctly argued that
the Navy should bear the burden of its procedural failures.' 
16
The majority's eagerness to defer to the Navy's factual determina-
tions regarding significant aspects of this case could also stem from the
suit's underlying subject matter. The NRDC sought not to permanently
enjoin the Navy from use of MFA sonar, but to compel the Navy to pre-
pare an EIS, which at this stage of the case would have been merely a
procedural gesture." 7 Nevertheless, the Court's complete deference to
the Navy's factual determinations prevented the Court from accurately
evaluating the propriety of injunctive relief.
B. Winter's Impact on Future Military Compliance with NEPA
The underlying issue in Winter was whether the Navy should have
prepared an EIS before launching its SOCAL training exercises. The
majority opinion focuses on the narrower issue: the propriety of two
challenged provisions in the district court's preliminary injunction. Al-
though the Court generally avoided discussing the merits of the case,
during the injunctive relief discussion it did briefly discuss the likelihood
that NRDC would prevail on its NEPA claim. 1 8 The Court characterized
NEPA as a mere procedural device, and implied that the Navy's EA sa-
tisfied NEPA's EIS requirement. 19
111. See id. at 46 (stating that soldiers involved in the SOCAL training exercises conduct
missions within Iraq and Afghanistan).
112. Id. at 4.
113. Burke, supra note 3, at 808.
114. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 373-74.
115. Id. at 390 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
116. See id. at 387.
117. See id. at 381 (majority opinion).
118. Id. at 382.
119. Id. at 376 ("NEPA imposes only procedural requirements to 'ensur[e] that the agency, in
reaching its decision, will have available, and will carefully consider, detailed information concern-
ing significant environmental impacts."' (alteration in original) (quoting Robertson v. Methow
Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989))).
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The assertion that NEPA is a procedural device is technically true in
that NEPA does not require any particular result, 120 but characterizing
NEPA as mere procedure ignores the crucial role that NEPA procedures
are designed to play in government agencies' decision-making processes.
As Justice Stevens noted in Robertson, NEPA's EIS requirement ensures
that government agencies will make informed decisions regarding
whether to undertake a proposed action. 121 In other words, the EIS is a
tool to be used before the action, to determine whether the action will
take place.
Justice Ginsburg agrees: "[T]he timing of an EIS is critical .... An
EIS must be prepared 'early enough so that it can serve practically as an
important contribution to the decisionmaking process and will not be
used to rationalize or justify decisions already made."",122 Justice Gins-
burg characterized the Navy's actions as "short circuit[ing]" its NEPA
obligations.
123
Chief Justice Roberts' majority opinion argued that NEPA's ulti-
mate objective is to ensure that agencies take a "hard look" at environ-
mental consequences. 24 The Court argued that the Navy had conducted
its SOCAL training exercises for forty years without incident, and the
Navy's EA amounted to a hard look at the training exercise's environ-
mental consequences. 25 Therefore, the Court concluded, the Navy satis-fied this objective. 126
The majority's reasoning is troubling. First, the Court's assertion
that the use of MFA sonar should not be enjoined because it has been in
use for forty years 27 is flawed. It would be bad public policy for a prac-
tice's history to establish its immunity from injunction. Otherwise, gov-
ernment agencies would have carte blanche to continue any established
practice, regardless of harmful environmental impacts.
28
Second, the Court construes NEPA to require merely that agencies
take a hard look at environmental consequences.129 However, NEPA
unambiguously requires government agencies to prepare an EIS for all
120. Robertson, 490 U.S. at 350.
121. Id. at 349.
122. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 390 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442
U.S. 347, 351 n.3 (1979)).
123. Id. at 391.




128. The Court struck down another long-standing practice during the same term it decided
Winter: In Arizona v. Gant, a Fourth Amendment case involving police officers' right to search an
arrestee's vehicle, the court stated that, "[i]f it is clear that a practice is unlawful, individuals' inter-
est in its discontinuance clearly outweighs any law enforcement 'entitlement' to its persistence."
Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1723 (2009).
129. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 376.
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major federal actions significantly affecting the human environment. 130
Justices Ginsburg and Stevens have both discussed the importance of
preparing an EIS, as opposed to merely taking a hard look. 13 1 Justices
Ginsburg and Stevens have concluded that NEPA's clear procedures,
including the EIS, are necessary to effectuate NEPA's purpose.
132
The Court's decision suggests that NEPA compliance is arbitrary,
so long as agencies take a hard look at the environmental consequences
of an activity. If adopted in a future decision, this "hard look" standard
would undermine NEPA by permitting agencies to provide post-hoc jus-
tification for environmentally destructive activities. Moreover, compared
to the clear EIS guidelines, 33 this hard look standard is vague. The stan-
dard threatens to waste judicial resources by delegating to courts the re-
sponsibility to determine, on a fact-intensive case-by-case basis, what
constitutes a hard look at an activity's environmental consequences. By
contrast, if an agency prepares an EIS, all a reviewing court must do is
apply NEPA's EIS requirements and implementing regulations.
Professor Hope Babcock highlights the fact that, while Congress
provided for military waiver procedures under many environmental sta-
tutes, it did not provide for a waiver procedure to NEPA's EIS require-
ment. 134 Despite this omission, NEPA allows the military some flexibili-
ty under the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"). The APA defini-
tion of "agency" excludes the exercise of military authority "in the field
in time of war," and only agencies as defined by the APA are required to
prepare an EIS. 135 Congress could have provided a waiver to the EIS
requirement, but it did not, possibly because the Navy was already ex-
empt from preparing an EIS for wartime field operations. Congress did
not exempt the Navy from its obligation to prepare an EIS for domestic
training exercises, such as those in SOCAL.
Justice Ginsburg agrees that the EIS requirement is central to
NEPA's objectives. 136 She reasoned that the Navy's failure to file an EIS
instigated the action, and therefore that the Court should have upheld the
injunction. 37 This suggested holding is in perfect harmony with envi-
130. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006).
131. See Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 389-91 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Robertson v. Methow Valley
Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 348-53 (1989).
132. See Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 389 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Robertson, 490 U.S. at 350.
133. § 4332(2)(C).
134. The Clean Water Act, Clean Air Act, Toxic Substances Control Act, CERCLA, Safe
Drinking Water Act, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Endangered Species Act, Marine
Mammal Protection Act, Coastal Zone Management Act, and National Historic Preservation Act all
contain provisions which allow an executive official (usually the President) to waive the military's
obligation to comply with these acts in emergency circumstances. Babcock, supra note 86, at 110-
16.
135. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(l)(G) (2006); § 4332(2)(C).
136. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 389 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The EIS is NEPA's core require-
ment.").
137. Id. at 387, 390, 393.
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ronmental compliance considerations; if the Court showed an inclination
to impose preliminary injunctive relief when an agency fails to file an
EIS, agencies would be more likely to comply with NEPA. Unfortunate-
ly, the Court's decision in Winter may prove to discourage agencies from
filing NEPA-compliant environmental impact statements.
C. The Military's Post-9/1 1 Offensive Against Environmental Legislation
Finally, the Winter Court's willingness to defer to the Navy's judg-
ment and to allow the Navy to bypass clear NEPA requirements is part of
a broader, more troubling trend. Professor Babcock accuses the Depart-
ment of Defense ("DOD") of manipulating post-9/1 1 national security
concerns to stage an offensive against constraining environmental legis-
lation. 138
Professor Babcock explains this trend in light of the broader post-
9/11 erosion of civil liberties exemplified by the USA PATRIOT Act.
1 39
The USA PATRIOT Act, enacted in the months immediately following
9/11, was intended to enhance the government's power to combat terror-
ist threats, but had the additional effect of eroding civil liberties. 40 Until
recently, the military had to resort to various statutory waiver systems to
circumvent environmental legislation. 14' But military efforts to curtail
environmental legislation found new traction in the post-9/1 1 and post-
USA PATRIOT Act reality.
142
For example, in the years immediately following the 9/11 terrorist
attacks, the DOD convinced Congress to exempt the military from key
areas of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act ("MBTA"), the Marine Mammal
Protection Act ("MMPA"), and the Endangered Species Act ("ESA").1
43
These exemptions were characterized as essential to national security. 144
This trend shows no sign of slowing. 45 In fact, the Navy urged the Court
in Winters to view the Navy's MMPA exemption as evidence that other
environmental regimes should necessarily be subordinated to military
138. "[Tjhe military is using the 'war on terrorism' as a Trojan horse to get out from under
thirty years of constraining environmental laws it has never fully accepted." Babcock, supra note 86,
at 110. "[T]he 9/11 attacks provided DOD with an opportunity that it seized to get relief from laws
that it has resisted for decades." Id. at 153.
139. See id. at 120-26.
140. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
141. Babcock, supra note 86, at 110- 16 (describing the waiver processes available to the mili-
tary under various environmental statutes).
142. Burke, supra note 3, at 811.
143. See id. at 808; Babcock, supra note 86, at 127-30.
144. U.S. Representative Bob Barr, R-GA, advocated for the continued abrogation of environ-
mental legislation, characterizing the debate as a false choice between soldiers "surviv[ing] on the
battlefield" and "trampling blades of grass." Burke, supra note 3, at 807.
145. Professor Babcock notes that the military has also set its sights on securing exemptions
from the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), and the Clean Air Act ("CAA"). Bab-
cock, supra note 86, at 132.
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training."46 Then-Vice President Dick Cheney referred to the post-9/11
restrictions on civil liberties as "the new normalcy." 147 These assertions
suggest an intent to roll back all constraining environmental legislation,
not just MMPA or NEPA, which should have given the Court pause.
With Winter, this troubling trend has spread to NEPA. The Court
accepted the Navy's tenuous assertion that the SOCAL training exercises
are necessary to ensure military preparedness. 48 Such deference to the
Navy's factual determinations, and willingness to create military exemp-
tions to existing environmental regimes, allows the military to dodge its
environmental obligations.
CONCLUSION
While deference to the military's professional judgment is to a cer-
tain extent desirable, it is possible for courts to defer to an unreasonable
extent. When a court unquestioningly accepts one party's characteriza-
tion of a case, the court simply cannot accurately evaluate the propriety
of injunctive relief. In Winter, the Court's complete deference to the
Navy's factual determinations unfairly tipped the balance of equities and
public policy interests against the plaintiffs.
The Court's complete deference to the Navy will likely have an im-
pact far beyond the parties involved. First, the Court's decision implies
that the military can comply with NEPA's objectives without having to
comply with NEPA procedures. Second, the Court's decision perpetuates
the military's offensive against "constraining" environmental legisla-
tion. 149 In Winter, the Court missed out on an opportunity to slow this
trend, and prevent the military's rollback of environmental legislation.
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146. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 22, at 15.
147. Babcock, supra note 86, at 125.
148. See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 377 (2008).
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